Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942

[galileo-034]

George would have been the most sensible choice indeed, but I don't know if his injury being butterflied would have had made much of a difference.

I might need to search it, but I remember having read that Georges was viewed as unpalatable to the left wing parties. Even the left parties were so busy fighting against each other, which prevented them from governing effectively despite winning a majority in 1932 elections, the riots of February 1934 effectively scared them enough about the fascist threat to bring about the Popular Front in 1936. I can conceive that they may have been on edge regarding any commander in chief even slightly close to the moderate right in these conditions, but as I said, I'll need to check my sources (I've actually purchased a book on France's policies regarding Germany over the 1933-1939 period, but I'm not yet out of another reading).

 

[cortz#9]

Could it be that the reputation of the French military ends up being categorised as the 20th century's equivalent to the British army in the Crimean War? "Lions led by donkeys"

There could certainly be an element of that, the French forces fought well but were undone by poor strategy both ITTL and IOTL.

 

[CB13]

Hi Bougnas,

Just re: Your note about the French inability to do exercises because they didn't have the right equipment - Was actual equipment really necessary? Didn't Germany use fake tanks and other vehicles extensively for their exercises while awaiting the factories to produce their actual armaments? Could not have France done the same? They even had sufficient numbers of tanks like R35, H35, B1 as early as 1937-1938, didn't they?

 

[marathag]

Just re: Your note about the French inability to do exercises because they didn't have the right equipment - Was actual equipment really necessary? Didn't Germany use fake tanks and other vehicles extensively for their exercises while awaiting the factories to produce their actual armaments? Could not have France done the same? They even had sufficient numbers of tanks like R35, H35, B1 as early as 1937-1938, didn't they?

US Army used fakes too, and
The August 1938 maneuvers, under the command of Maj. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, were actually five separate exercises. Due to the widely scattered posts and size of the army’s two subordinate corps areas, it was too expensive to concentrate all Third Army units at one location. Therefore, the Fourth Corps Area held its maneuver in Mississippi’s DeSoto National Forest and the Eighth Corps Area held its major maneuver at Camp
Bullis, TX, but also had smaller exercises at Fort Bliss, TX; Fort Huachuca, AZ; and Pole Mountain Reservation, WY.
The maneuvers, though in separate locations, were tied together by a common scenario and included significantly large numbers of horse cavalry units

Oh, and some National Guard Units had to use rented horses. The Remount Depot for 3rdA was in Minnesota, and couldn't afford the trip South. Many units were not close to being fully equipped

 

[Bougnas]

Hi Bougnas,

Just re: Your note about the French inability to do exercises because they didn't have the right equipment - Was actual equipment really necessary? Didn't Germany use fake tanks and other vehicles extensively for their exercises while awaiting the factories to produce their actual armaments? Could not have France done the same? They even had sufficient numbers of tanks like R35, H35, B1 as early as 1937-1938, didn't they?

Yes, Germany did it. France didn't for some reason, but might be tied to the period where national service was only 10 months. 2 year service was restarted in 1935, but by then a lot of the training infrastructure and grounds had been closed and took a long time to reopen, like the School of Infantry and Tanks.

Also, tanks were available in the dozens by 1937-38, but the support equipment and training facilities for the DCR was neglected, hence why the 1937 exercises were cut. 1938 was because of the Anschluss/
then Czechoslovak crises.

It is clear France neglected training at the time though, in complete opposition to pre-WW1 and 1917-18 French commanders who emphasized a lot of training. Even during the Phoney War, only 1/3rd of the time was to be dedicated to training in the inexperienced 2nd Army near Sedan, and in practice only half a day a week! Instead they overfocused on building trenches. This ruined morale and without endurance training, troops would often be exhausted and prone to panicking after a short march during combat.

@Garrison On an unrelated note, I learnt the French did contemplate using the BEF instead of the 7th Army for the mission of linking with the Dutch. Gamelin was however so obsessed with making this mission happen that he wanted as few middlemen as possible. Ironic since the BEF was probably the best formation for the job with the highest degree of motorization of the Battle (though Gen. Giraud did a lot to make the 7th as mobile and powerful as possible given the limited ressources).

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Yes, Germany did it. France didn't for some reason, but might be tied to the period where national service was only 10 months. 2 year service was restarted in 1935, but by then a lot of the training infrastructure and grounds had been closed and took a long time to reopen, like the School of Infantry and Tanks.

Also, tanks were available in the dozens by 1937-38, but the support equipment and training facilities for the DCR was neglected, hence why the 1937 exercises were cut. 1938 was because of the Anschluss/
then Czechoslovak crises.

It is clear France neglected training at the time though, in complete opposition to pre-WW1 and 1917-18 French commanders who emphasized a lot of training. Even during the Phoney War, only 1/3rd of the time was to be dedicated to training in the inexperienced 2nd Army near Sedan, and in practice only half a day a week! Instead they overfocused on building trenches. This ruined morale and without endurance training, troops would often be exhausted and prone to panicking after a short march during combat.

@Garrison On an unrelated note, I learnt the French did contemplate using the BEF instead of the 7th Army for the mission of linking with the Dutch. Gamelin was however so obsessed with making this mission happen that he wanted as few middlemen as possible. Ironic since the BEF was probably the best formation for the job with the highest degree of motorization of the Battle (though Gen. Giraud did a lot to make the 7th as mobile and powerful as possible given the limited ressources).

There was a story I heard about a French Lt who in early 1940 discovering that many of his gunners had never fired their 25mm AT guns, on his own initiative took his unit to a disused quarry and had them shoot the guns

The Corps commander found out, ate a rug and almost had the poor chap court martialled

The Corps in question '10th' was the one defending the Ardennes!

This video describes the issues with the French command system as it was in May 1940

 

[Garrison]

Yes, Germany did it. France didn't for some reason, but might be tied to the period where national service was only 10 months. 2 year service was restarted in 1935, but by then a lot of the training infrastructure and grounds had been closed and took a long time to reopen, like the School of Infantry and Tanks.

Also, tanks were available in the dozens by 1937-38, but the support equipment and training facilities for the DCR was neglected, hence why the 1937 exercises were cut. 1938 was because of the Anschluss/
then Czechoslovak crises.

It is clear France neglected training at the time though, in complete opposition to pre-WW1 and 1917-18 French commanders who emphasized a lot of training. Even during the Phoney War, only 1/3rd of the time was to be dedicated to training in the inexperienced 2nd Army near Sedan, and in practice only half a day a week! Instead they overfocused on building trenches. This ruined morale and without endurance training, troops would often be exhausted and prone to panicking after a short march during combat.

@Garrison On an unrelated note, I learnt the French did contemplate using the BEF instead of the 7th Army for the mission of linking with the Dutch. Gamelin was however so obsessed with making this mission happen that he wanted as few middlemen as possible. Ironic since the BEF was probably the best formation for the job with the highest degree of motorization of the Battle (though Gen. Giraud did a lot to make the 7th as mobile and powerful as possible given the limited ressources).

There are just so many ways in which things could have gone so much better for the Allies in 1940 its still baffling sometimes how the Germans managed to win the battle. I do understand the thoroughly depressing reasons why they did, it's still just hard to find it plausible.

 

[Bougnas]

There are just so many ways in which things could have gone so much better for the Allies in 1940 its still baffling sometimes how the Germans managed to win the battle. I do understand the thoroughly depressing reasons why they did, it's still just hard to find it plausible.

It's such a rich and massive amount of mistakes that the biggest bottlenecks in my plans to write a French victory TL are:
- to create a reasonable POD to plausibly improve many factors at once
- to do so without wanking France to the level of a curbstomp
- to retain the OTL situation of having the war set in 1939 and the battle in 1940
- to be original at the same time

So basically you need a balance between the wanked parts and those that remain screwed otherwise it can quickly snowball into a more assertive France before the war or a curbstomp.

 

[RanulfC]

There are just so many ways in which things could have gone so much better for the Allies in 1940 its still baffling sometimes how the Germans managed to win the battle. I do understand the thoroughly depressing reasons why they did, it's still just hard to find it plausible.

Whoever's writing OTL got enough complaints they managed to JUST tweak out an early German win but as they didn't want to get moved to the ASB section they managed to keep it JUST inside the lines

Randy

 

[Garrison]

It's such a rich and massive amount of mistakes that the biggest bottlenecks in my plans to write a French victory TL are:
- to create a reasonable POD to plausibly improve many factors at once
- to do so without wanking France to the level of a curbstomp
- to retain the OTL situation of having the war set in 1939 and the battle in 1940
- to be original at the same time

So basically you need a balance between the wanked parts and those that remain screwed otherwise it can quickly snowball into a more assertive France before the war or a curbstomp.

It is tricky, maybe you need to go further back, have some figure who died in WWI live or have someone who lived die and let that generate enough ripples to nudge things just a little in the 1930s?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

It's such a rich and massive amount of mistakes that the biggest bottlenecks in my plans to write a French victory TL are:
- to create a reasonable POD to plausibly improve many factors at once
- to do so without wanking France to the level of a curbstomp
- to retain the OTL situation of having the war set in 1939 and the battle in 1940
- to be original at the same time

So basically you need a balance between the wanked parts and those that remain screwed otherwise it can quickly snowball into a more assertive France before the war or a curbstomp.

Its certainly a riddle

Improve the French too much and perhaps Herr Hitler turtles instead!

And an improved French military might result in different political decisions as far back as the re-occupation of the Rhineland - with an invigorated French military the government might have been far more confident to oppose it and call Herr Hitler's bluff

While better for humanity I recall Antony Williams talking about when making some of the decision for his 'Foresight War' novel he had to be careful to not improve things so much that WW2 does not happen which would have made for a far less interesting story and not provided the background for his alt weapons etc.

There was a lot of brinkmanship by the Axis forces early on that could easily be challenged even by the OTL French and Allied forces of the day.

 

[vizzer]

It's such a rich and massive amount of mistakes that the biggest bottlenecks in my plans to write a French victory TL are:
- to create a reasonable POD to plausibly improve many factors at once
- to do so without wanking France to the level of a curbstomp
- to retain the OTL situation of having the war set in 1939 and the battle in 1940
- to be original at the same time

So basically you need a balance between the wanked parts and those that remain screwed otherwise it can quickly snowball into a more assertive France before the war or a curbstomp.

Corruption is your friend - say whoever is building radios in France bribes sufficient deputies & procurement officers that they buy lots of his radios. They may not be the best but when the scheme falls through there are enough to give every tank, artillery platoon& infantry company one. They may not have as much ammunition or fuel but now they have RADIOS and if the lower levels of French forces are using them it may also encourage the commanders to do so 😁

 

[Garrison]

Corruption is your friend - say whoever is building radios in France bribes sufficient deputies & procurement officers that they buy lots of his radios. They may not be the best but when the scheme falls through there are enough to give every tank, artillery platoon& infantry company one. They may not have as much ammunition or fuel but now they have RADIOS and if the lower levels of French forces are using them it may also encourage the commanders to do so 😁

How about the contracts to build large parts of the Maginot Line get caught up in a bribery scandal, discrediting the whole project? Or maybe Maginot himself is the man to be removed from history, with a replacement who remembers what happened to the Verdun forts and shies away from fixed defences?

 

[The Ghost of Danton]

Is their a Belgian that could live or die that might result in them letting the WAllies station troops their after the invasion of Poland? Feels like that could work.

 

[Ambusher11]

Its certainly a riddle

Improve the French too much and perhaps Herr Hitler turtles instead!

And an improved French military might result in different political decisions as far back as the re-occupation of the Rhineland - with an invigorated French military the government might have been far more confident to oppose it and call Herr Hitler's bluff

While better for humanity I recall Antony Williams talking about when making some of the decision for his 'Foresight War' novel he had to be careful to not improve things so much that WW2 does not happen which would have made for a far less interesting story and not provided the background for his alt weapons etc.

There was a lot of brinkmanship by the Axis forces early on that could easily be challenged even by the OTL French and Allied forces of the day.

Yup. While you might be able to get a war over Hitler attempting to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936 or 1937 in a scenario where the French are improved, it almost certainly would result in the quick defeat of Germany and Hitler subsequently committing suicide in Berlin when the city is about to fall. Clearly less interesting story-wise than WWII occurring as OTL in 1939 but with an improved France.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Yup. While you might be able to get a war over Hitler attempting to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936 or 1937 in a scenario where the French are improved, it almost certainly would result in the quick defeat of Germany and Hitler subsequently committing suicide in Berlin when the city is about to fall. Clearly less interesting story-wise than WWII occurring as OTL in 1939 but with an improved France.

In fact while perhaps not as interesting to us as a story but a situation where France does not blink in 1936 and in fact does mobilise in response to the German Militarisation of the Rhineland.

In 1936 the Heer numbered just 300,000 men, and this through the introduction of conscription that year - starting from March 16 1936 (when Hitler made his speech denouncing the stipulations of Versailles) - after the militarisation of the Rhineland

So likely a lot closer to 100,000 when the events of march 8th took place

Even the OTL French army of the day could have curb stomped it had the decision been made - let alone a superior French army

Quite a massive Mothra!

 

[CB13]

There was a story I heard about a French Lt who in early 1940 discovering that many of his gunners had never fired their 25mm AT guns, on his own initiative took his unit to a disused quarry and had them shoot the guns

The Corps commander found out, ate a rug and almost had the poor chap court martialled

The Corps in question '10th' was the one defending the Ardennes!

This video describes the issues with the French command system as it was in May 1940

Wow! In the category of "Stuff you just couldn't make up!"

Thank you @Cryhavoc101....

It's such a rich and massive amount of mistakes that the biggest bottlenecks in my plans to write a French victory TL are:
- to create a reasonable POD to plausibly improve many factors at once
- to do so without wanking France to the level of a curbstomp
- to retain the OTL situation of having the war set in 1939 and the battle in 1940
- to be original at the same time

So basically you need a balance between the wanked parts and those that remain screwed otherwise it can quickly snowball into a more assertive France before the war or a curbstomp.

What about an external person....like a Charles Boyer, who chooses that instead of acting, the Republic needs him to take a stand. He leaves acting and runs on an anti-establishment platform and the story could focus on the back-and-forth battle between our new hero (the revolutionary) and the establishment?

 

[Bougnas]

Yup. While you might be able to get a war over Hitler attempting to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936 or 1937 in a scenario where the French are improved, it almost certainly would result in the quick defeat of Germany and Hitler subsequently committing suicide in Berlin when the city is about to fall. Clearly less interesting story-wise than WWII occurring as OTL in 1939 but with an improved France.

Yep, you would kinda lose the vibe of the 1939-42 war and its new toys. Granted I've also contemplated a Sudeten war with Poland getting invaded by the Soviets because they tried a landgrab in CZ to spice things up, but Germqny kinda needs a counterwank if one wants to get a hard battle of France.

Wow! In the category of "Stuff you just couldn't make up!"

Thank you @Cryhavoc101....



What about an external person....like a Charles Boyer, who chooses that instead of acting, the Republic needs him to take a stand. He leaves acting and runs on an anti-establishment platform and the story could focus on the back-and-forth battle between our new hero (the revolutionary) and the establishment?

I'm guaranteed to use a political POD anyway when I get to the TL yes. But it will be more like wanking an OTL loser rather than bringing someone new.

 

[galileo-034]

The Rhineland thing...
Well, that one is symptomatic of the many failures 1939-1940 brought to open light. As far as I understood it, the lack of reaction to Hitler remilitarization of the Rhineland was primarily a failure on the part of French military intelligence.
They severely overestimated the strength of the German forces supposedly involved, ludicrously counting in the large numbers of paramilitaries and auxiliaries that Hitler sent in, making the German army of then a paper tiger. That evaluation in turn drove the estimate of the forces required for a military intervention far up.

That last one mattered especially since the financial cost of such a mobilization was deemed by the government too heavy, keeping in mind that the legislative elections were near (the ones that brought Blum and the Popular Front), and except for Mandel, ever the die-hard disciple of Clemenceau, there was noone willing to make this decision in such a politically sensitive season (Mandel did not have quite the connections to pull the government towards his view and was as isolated as Churchill was on the other side of the Channel, so I think only Barthou could have done that, but alas...).

Make the estimates closer to the reality, and the cost lower, then an intervention could happen (note I say not would but could).

 

[Bougnas]

The Rhineland thing...
Well, that one is symptomatic of the many failures 1939-1940 brought to open light. As far as I understood it, the lack of reaction to Hitler remilitarization of the Rhineland was primarily a failure on the part of French military intelligence.
They severely overestimated the strength of the German forces supposedly involved, ludicrously counting in the large numbers of paramilitaries and auxiliaries that Hitler sent in, making the German army of then a paper tiger. That evaluation in turn drove the estimate of the forces required for a military intervention far up.

That last one mattered especially since the financial cost of such a mobilization was deemed by the government too heavy, keeping in mind that the legislative elections were near (the ones that brought Blum and the Popular Front), and except for Mandel, ever the die-hard disciple of Clemenceau, there was noone willing to make this decision in such a politically sensitive season (Mandel did not have quite the connections to pull the government towards his view and was as isolated as Churchill was on the other side of the Channel, so I think only Barthou could have done that, but alas...).

Make the estimates closer to the reality, and the cost lower, then an intervention could happen (note I say not would but could).

France overestimated more than German numbers, they also overestimated the scale and mobilization potential of the industry, as well as the "natural prowess" of the German people, succumbing to positive discrimination of the Germans while underestimating the morale of the French conscript. Those studies were made as early as 1933.

Even if more realistic assessments happened, the plan was only to mobilize, then either occupy Luxemburg with the approval of the local govt and SDN or take some territory in the Saarland as safety. The latter option was judged fairly useless for the effort. Of course either of those reactions could spice things up before a 1938 or 1939 war in a TL.