Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942

[RanulfC]

To all those definitely not internally shouting 'hurry up' still on course for mid to late August, by which time I should have the whole of 1943 laid out, and there is a lot going on there.

Or externally! Because as Dan said we are patiently and respectfully awaiting you, working at your own and sustainable pace to reach the goal we all desire.

And there is absolutely NO truth to the vicious rumor that we have a "go-fund-me" set up to "arrange" a nice quite, (and isolated) place for you to write where the worries of "outside life" won't intrude or disturb you... (For nor particular reason do you happen to know your ankle size? Asking for a friend...)

Randy

 

[galileo-034]

Or externally! Because as Dan said we are patiently and respectfully awaiting you, working at your own and sustainable pace to reach the goal we all desire.

And there is absolutely NO truth to the vicious rumor that we have a "go-fund-me" set up to "arrange" a nice quite, (and isolated) place for you to write where the worries of "outside life" won't intrude or disturb you... (For nor particular reason do you happen to know your ankle size? Asking for a friend...)

Randy

A short while after...

 

[Garrison]

IV - Erwin Rommel​

General Erwin Rommel was the commander of the 7th Panzer Division in 1940 and had the unwanted distinction of being the most senior German officer captured by the Allies prior to 1942. Rommel was an aggressive, driven commander, or simply a reckless one with no regard for the finer points of operational strategy such as logistics depending on which of his former comrades’ you chose to ask. In the days prior to his capture his tanks had been reduced to refuelling at civilian petrol stations as the 7th had far outrun their own supply lines, as well as their infantry support. This though reflected the general limitations of the Heer’s support infrastructure rather than any personal traits of Rommel. Nonetheless the 7th Panzer outrunning its infantry played a large part in the capture of Rommel at Arras, providing the high point of the military careers not only of the tank crews involved but arguably of the Covenanter tank itself. To this day the Covenanter on display at the Bovington Tank Museum is painted as the vehicle on which Rommel was carried into captivity, along with a display of photos taken after Rommel’s return to British lines.

Rommel’s meteoric rise to command the 7th Panzer was largely due to his close personal association with Hitler, including commanding his bodyguard at one point during the early years of the Reich. The fact that he remained a personal favourite of Hitler explains why German propaganda insisted that Rommel had been killed rather than captured, dying in a suitably heroic manner for the Fatherland. Picture of Rommel with British officers that appeared in US newspapers and other neutral sources were completely censored and even formal notifications from the British as to his POW status were buried, leaving Rommel’s family uncertain of his fate until the end of the war.

Rommel’s relationship with Hitler, as well as his working knowledge of German strategy and doctrine, naturally led to considerable British efforts to persuade him to co-operate with interrogators, mostly by offers of a far more comfortable incarceration than that enjoyed by ordinary German POWs, though this carrot was balanced by the stick of suggestions that a refusal to co-operate could see him shipped off to a camp somewhere in the Canadian wilderness. Throughout the remainder of 1940 Rommel resisted the blandishments and veiled threats of his captors, still believing that after the fall of France Britain would soon either make peace or be invaded and occupied. Transcripts of conversations he had with his interrogators and other German officers indicate he was confident that their roles would soon be reversed and that he retained his faith in Hitler and the ultimate superiority of the Wehrmacht. It was not until the autumn of 1941, with the prospects of repatriation and German victory receding into the distance, that Rommel began to offer some co-operation with the British. Though he still refused to discuss military matters he did provide insights into Hitler and his inner circle. This suited the British initially, though they soon began to realize that much of what Rommel had to be taken with more than a grain of salt as his view of Hitler skewed towards idolatry, while the war was still going well for Germany at least.

By the end of 1942 Rommel was attempting to rewrite his own history, suggesting that he had supported Hitler out of pragmatism and that if he had still been in Germany he would have sided with those who sought to remove the Fuhrer, which was an easy claim to make when one was residing in a manor house in the English countryside rather than in Berlin or on the front lines in the USSR. At the end of the war Rommel was repatriated and proceeded to join many other surviving senior German officers in writing a memoir of his experiences, and like so many of the others his biography not very subtly argued that the fate of the Third Reich might have been different if he had been in a position to shape German strategy. This generated a war of words with some of his former comrades in arms, which boosted their book sales while providing little real insight to the conduct of the Nazi war machine. Rommel was given a role in the newly formed Bundeswehr, but his unpopularity with many of the senior officers of the new German army meant his career stalled and he retired in 1955.

Rommel dabbled in German politics though the latter half of the 1950s, however his personal closeness with Hitler and his later co-operation with the British meant he that could find no party that was willing to put him up as a serious candidate and there were rumours that he even flirted with neo-Nazi elements, though little in the way of hard evidence of such contacts was ever found. Rommel died quietly in 1960, succumbing to a heart attack and being buried in a family plot with only his children and a few old comrades from the 7th Panzer in attendance. That he has not been entirely forgotten in the decades since his death is down to the fact that his efforts to portray himself as the man who might have won the war for Germany became far more popular posthumously than they ever had while he was alive, perhaps because unlike so many of his contemporaries he never had the opportunity to demonstrate his flaws and limitations when the war turned decisively against Germany.

 

[The Ghost of Danton]

Well, it beats having to kill yourself.

 

[Garrison]

Well, it beats having to kill yourself.

One of the ironies of alt-history, Rommel didn't know how good he had it ITTL

 

[Tanner151]

I’ve finally caught up and wow. Garrison, you have done an incredible job here in depicting this alt-WW2 and have even PoDs that appear minor snowball as the years go on.

Chamberlain’s Mandate not only ends the war sooner, but drastically reduces casualties and infrastructure damage. Italy not being bombed and fought over tooth and nail is a relief as a lot of that older history can be preserved a bit better.

You are also introducing historical figures, especially for the British, that I had not simply known about. Same for Fredendall. And if the WAllies can end the war farther East into Europe then that would be better for the Cold War to come, less people to live under totalitarian communism.

Excellent work, and eagerly await the sequel.

 

[Garrison]

I’ve finally caught up and wow. Garrison, you have done an incredible job here in depicting this alt-WW2 and have even PoDs that appear minor snowball as the years go on.

Chamberlain’s Mandate not only ends the war sooner, but drastically reduces casualties and infrastructure damage. Italy not being bombed and fought over tooth and nail is a relief as a lot of that older history can be preserved a bit better.

You are also introducing historical figures, especially for the British, that I had not simply known about. Same for Fredendall. And if the WAllies can end the war farther East into Europe then that would be better for the Cold War to come, less people to live under totalitarian communism.

Excellent work, and eagerly await the sequel.

Thank you, the sequel writing is deep into September 1943, where there is a lot going on.

 

[Garrison]

V – France – MS vs. OTL​

In a direct comparison with OTL France did rather better during the battles of 1940, fighting on for the better part of four months rather six weeks. The question is does that make a difference to how the French performance in the first year of the war is perceived in the Munich Shuffle universe relative to the real history? My own take on it is that they probably come off worse overall. In OTL they were taken by surprise by the German strike through the Ardennes and never had a chance to recover their balance, not helped by the chronic issues of the French High Command. Sickle Cut was a massive gamble and courtesy of the Mechlin incident the French apparently had all their beliefs about how the attack would be carried out confirmed, so there was a rationale for dismissing the idea of a major attack through the Ardennes. In the Munich Shuffle world on the other hand the French had plenty of time to consider their next move and given the balance of forces among the Allies the decisions did rest with the French ultimately. The Allies had contained the initial German attack in the MS TL, only to then sit there from May to July 1940 without taking any offensive action, allowing themselves to be outflanked and cut off by the Manstein Sweep when Hitler decided to take the gamble.

Overall then some historians will almost inevitably see the French High Command as complacent and almost criminally negligent in the discharge of their duties. The question is how fair is my representation of the French reaction to the situation the find themselves in during the alternate summer of 1940? Obviously, there was an element of narrative choice at work, I simply didn’t want to cut off the bulk of the rest of the events in the war, which a better French response, in either 1940, would certainly have led to. The Germans probably should have been defeated in 1940, but that’s a TL for someone else to write. That being said I think the strategy that Gamelin pursues after containing the Germans is consistent with what we know of French plans for defeating the Wehrmacht in the event they struck west. The essence of Gamelin’s plan was to halt any German offensive before it reached French soil and then hold them in place while German resources ran down and the Entente’s built up, the latter ideally achieved with the help of the USA. In some respect they wanted a rerun of the Hundred Days in 1918, intending to launch a series of offensive moves against an exhausted and overextended army and forcing them to capitulate, all the while minimizing French casualties, which would inevitably be high in any sort of premature, overambitious offensive, with the costly Nivelle offensive of 1917 that provoked mutiny in the French army doubtless looming large in Gamelin’s mind.

Would a different commander have done better? Maybe, but Weygand seems to have been rather fragile mentally and I’m not at all sure he would have been any more willing to gamble the lives of French soldiers on a quick offensive in June 1940 than Gamelin, whatever certain British generals might have called for. In the end I think that the French response to the situation in 1940 that I created is a reasonable guess as to what would have happened. The reputation of the French military is still probably going to be better than that of the Italians, though I admit that is a very low bar to clear.

 

[Hereward the White]

Could it be that the reputation of the French military ends up being categorised as the 20th century's equivalent to the British army in the Crimean War? "Lions led by donkeys"

 

[McAuslan_in_the_Rough]

Could it be that the reputation of the French military ends up being categorised as the 20th century's equivalent to the British army in the Crimean War? "Lions led by donkeys"

Wasn't that World War I? In the Crimean War, a donkey might have been an improvement over the Earl of Cardigan.

 

[Garrison]

Could it be that the reputation of the French military ends up being categorised as the 20th century's equivalent to the British army in the Crimean War? "Lions led by donkeys"

There could certainly be an element of that, the French forces fought well but were undone by poor strategy both ITTL and IOTL.

 

[Garrison]

Wasn't that World War I? In the Crimean War, a donkey might have been an improvement over the Earl of Cardigan.

The quote most likely comes from the Crimean War, the version attributed to WWI was made up by politician/psuedo-historian Alan Clark.

 

[CB13]

V – France – MS vs. OTL​

In a direct comparison with OTL France did rather better during the battles of 1940, fighting on for the better part of four months rather six weeks. The question is does that make a difference to how the French performance in the first year of the war is perceived in the Munich Shuffle universe relative to the real history? My own take on it is that they probably come off worse overall. In OTL they were taken by surprise by the German strike through the Ardennes and never had a chance to recover their balance, not helped by the chronic issues of the French High Command. Sickle Cut was a massive gamble and courtesy of the Mechlin incident the French apparently had all their beliefs about how the attack would be carried out confirmed, so there was a rationale for dismissing the idea of a major attack through the Ardennes. In the Munich Shuffle world on the other hand the French had plenty of time to consider their next move and given the balance of forces among the Allies the decisions did rest with the French ultimately. The Allies had contained the initial German attack in the MS TL, only to then sit there from May to July 1940 without taking any offensive action, allowing themselves to be outflanked and cut off by the Manstein Sweep when Hitler decided to take the gamble.

Overall then some historians will almost inevitably see the French High Command as complacent and almost criminally negligent in the discharge of their duties. The question is how fair is my representation of the French reaction to the situation the find themselves in during the alternate summer of 1940? Obviously, there was an element of narrative choice at work, I simply didn’t want to cut off the bulk of the rest of the events in the war, which a better French response, in either 1940, would certainly have led to. The Germans probably should have been defeated in 1940, but that’s a TL for someone else to write. That being said I think the strategy that Gamelin pursues after containing the Germans is consistent with what we know of French plans for defeating the Wehrmacht in the event they struck west. The essence of Gamelin’s plan was to halt any German offensive before it reached French soil and then hold them in place while German resources ran down and the Entente’s built up, the latter ideally achieved with the help of the USA. In some respect they wanted a rerun of the Hundred Days in 1918, intending to launch a series of offensive moves against an exhausted and overextended army and forcing them to capitulate, all the while minimizing French casualties, which would inevitably be high in any sort of premature, overambitious offensive, with the costly Nivelle offensive of 1917 that provoked mutiny in the French army doubtless looming large in Gamelin’s mind.

Would a different commander have done better? Maybe, but Weygand seems to have been rather fragile mentally and I’m not at all sure he would have been any more willing to gamble the lives of French soldiers on a quick offensive in June 1940 than Gamelin, whatever certain British generals might have called for. In the end I think that the French response to the situation in 1940 that I created is a reasonable guess as to what would have happened. The reputation of the French military is still probably going to be better than that of the Italians, though I admit that is a very low bar to clear.

Hi Garrison,

In your reading, did you ever identify key French Leadership who you believe could have made a difference if they have been in the right places in 1937-1940? It seems that in a huge majority of TTL's, no matter what the technological butterflies, the French military and civilian leadership culture always proved to be their Achilles Heel. So in short, were there men you identified on the periphery who had the right ideas, which assuming all technologies remained constant, could have led France to meaningfully different outcome? Thanks so much to you and all the other highely learned men who congregate here and all the rest of us to learn from you.

Cheers, Matthew. 🍻

 

[Garrison]

Hi Garrison,

In your reading, did you ever identify key French Leadership who you believe could have made a difference if they have been in the right places in 1937-1940? It seems that in a huge majority of TTL's, no matter what the technological butterflies, the French military and civilian leadership culture always proved to be their Achilles Heel. So in short, were there men you identified on the periphery who had the right ideas, which assuming all technologies remained constant, could have led France to meaningfully different outcome? Thanks so much to you and all the other highely learned men who congregate here and all the rest of us to learn from you.

Cheers, Matthew. 🍻

The problem is I'm not sure any of them are credible replacements, and I would say the important improvements would be focused on communications and tactics. Weygand's tactics post Dunkirk were sound, but too late and his morale was too fragile by that point. Likewise whoever is in charge of the French army they need to have proper telephone and radio communications. it is astounding that the French HQ lacking either was not apparently considered a problem.

 

[CB13]

Did the French ever do any large scale exercises to test their tactics and communications? Or was it one of those things where the High Command game planned the Attackers to do exactly the same thing they expected each and every time? So a slow, plodding German Advance through Northern Belgium to which they would then assess "Oh yeah. We got this."

Maybe that's the butterfly they missed - an independent and irreverent personality wargaming as "the Germans". Someone who would have to have political connections to ensure they could expose the faults, without getting bounced for their ungentlemanly behavior.

Just developing the idea further....if no such person existed inside the French system, maybe it's multinational wargame where a Brit, Canadian, Aussie or Kiwi gets the reins as "the Germans"?

 

[Garrison]

Did the French ever do any large scale exercises to test their tactics and communications? Or was it one of those things where the High Command game planned the Attackers to do exactly the same thing they expected each and every time? So a slow, plodding German Advance through Northern Belgium to which they would then assess "Oh yeah. We got this."

Maybe that's the butterfly they missed - an independent and irreverent personality wargaming as "the Germans". Someone who would have to have political connections to ensure they could expose the faults, without getting bounced for their ungentlemanly behavior.

Just developing the idea further....if no such person existed inside the French system, maybe it's multinational wargame where a Brit, Canadian, Aussie or Kiwi gets the reins as "the Germans"?

The thing is having access to a telephone or radio at your HQ is just so basic that it fits the old cliché of it was written as fiction no one would believed it. Imagine if I had made up such a thing for the TL, i would have been rightly ripped to shreds for ludicrous implausibility. They did conduct some war games that explored the idea of an attack through the Ardennes, and ignored the results. That was hardly exclusively a French problem, war games that didn't deliver the desired outcome were ignored by all militaries. What France needs in 1940 is Clemenceau and Foch, alas there don't seem to have been any direct equivalents available, or at least not at the level of seniority required.

 

[diestormlie]

Did the French ever do any large scale exercises to test their tactics and communications? Or was it one of those things where the High Command game planned the Attackers to do exactly the same thing they expected each and every time? So a slow, plodding German Advance through Northern Belgium to which they would then assess "Oh yeah. We got this."

Maybe that's the butterfly they missed - an independent and irreverent personality wargaming as "the Germans". Someone who would have to have political connections to ensure they could expose the faults, without getting bounced for their ungentlemanly behavior.

Just developing the idea further....if no such person existed inside the French system, maybe it's multinational wargame where a Brit, Canadian, Aussie or Kiwi gets the reins as "the Germans"?

The issues is that the communication issues with the French Army are also political issues. Essentially, the French political system did not quite trust the military to not coup the government if the government was of a political persuasion the French Military Establishment did not like (read, too much to the left.) So the French Army was saddled with burdensome communication requirements for Orders to stymie their ability to, well, do the coup.

 

[CB13]

The issues is that the communication issues with the French Army are also political issues. Essentially, the French political system did not quite trust the military to not coup the government if the government was of a political persuasion the French Military Establishment did not like (read, too much to the left.) So the French Army was saddled with burdensome communication requirements for Orders to stymie their ability to, well, do the coup.

Thank you @diestormlie !

I had read that a long time ago and I had COMPLETELY forgotten it.

So then then the butterfly would perhaps first necessitate a pro-military set of politicians (or at least, not anti-military). Perhaps a military leader or multiple leaders recognize their predicament and start a "charm offensive" in the mid-1930's as a critical first step. Maybe at the onset of Spanish Civil War, the military leaps forward with public statements in support of the primacy of "defending the Republic"?

 

[vizzer]

Thank you @diestormlie !

I had read that a long time ago and I had COMPLETELY forgotten it.

So then then the butterfly would perhaps first necessitate a pro-military set of politicians (or at least, not anti-military). Perhaps a military leader or multiple leaders recognize their predicament and start a "charm offensive" in the mid-1930's as a critical first step. Maybe at the onset of Spanish Civil War, the military leaps forward with public statements in support of the primacy of "defending the Republic"?

The question is defending it from what - if the answer is Socialists & Anarchists well that was what Franco claimed.

 

[Bougnas]

Hi Garrison,

In your reading, did you ever identify key French Leadership who you believe could have made a difference if they have been in the right places in 1937-1940? It seems that in a huge majority of TTL's, no matter what the technological butterflies, the French military and civilian leadership culture always proved to be their Achilles Heel. So in short, were there men you identified on the periphery who had the right ideas, which assuming all technologies remained constant, could have led France to meaningfully different outcome? Thanks so much to you and all the other highely learned men who congregate here and all the rest of us to learn from you.

Cheers, Matthew. 🍻

The POD needs to happen before or in 1935, not really later. The simplest one is to avoid the injury to Georges in 1934 and see him replace Weygand in 1935 instead of Gamelin, with some shuffling at the lower levels. Georges isn't perfect but has a lot of advantages over Gamelin (more strategically cautious, which helps with the forces he had, pro-radio and more pro-armor, less enigmatic and ambiguous, Gamelin being atrocious in that regard, takes his real forces into account more).

The problem is I'm not sure any of them are credible replacements, and I would say the important improvements would be focused on communications and tactics. Weygand's tactics post Dunkirk were sound, but too late and his morale was too fragile by that point. Likewise whoever is in charge of the French army they need to have proper telephone and radio communications. it is astounding that the French HQ lacking either was not apparently considered a problem.

See above. Weygand is out anyway as he was far too old for the position. Luckily Gamelin was quite uniquely bad so almost any replacement would be substantially better.

Did the French ever do any large scale exercises to test their tactics and communications? Or was it one of those things where the High Command game planned the Attackers to do exactly the same thing they expected each and every time? So a slow, plodding German Advance through Northern Belgium to which they would then assess "Oh yeah. We got this."

Maybe that's the butterfly they missed - an independent and irreverent personality wargaming as "the Germans". Someone who would have to have political connections to ensure they could expose the faults, without getting bounced for their ungentlemanly behavior.

Just developing the idea further....if no such person existed inside the French system, maybe it's multinational wargame where a Brit, Canadian, Aussie or Kiwi gets the reins as "the Germans"?

That's the catch: they did almost no large scale maneuvers in the period. Mostly because until 1935 and even later they had almost none of the modern vehicles needed for that, and after that it was the support equipment, training grounds that were lacking. There were no exercises in 1936, one was supposed to happen in 1937 with a DLM, a DCR and a motorized ID but didn't, testing of the DCR in 1938 was cancelled.

The thing is having access to a telephone or radio at your HQ is just so basic that it fits the old cliché of it was written as fiction no one would believed it. Imagine if I had made up such a thing for the TL, i would have been rightly ripped to shreds for ludicrous implausibility. They did conduct some war games that explored the idea of an attack through the Ardennes, and ignored the results. That was hardly exclusively a French problem, war games that didn't deliver the desired outcome were ignored by all militaries. What France needs in 1940 is Clemenceau and Foch, alas there don't seem to have been any direct equivalents available, or at least not at the level of seniority required.

There were enough radios to function to at least a decent level. Gamelin is almost solely responsible for not using it and not pressuring his subordinates to use them.

The issues is that the communication issues with the French Army are also political issues. Essentially, the French political system did not quite trust the military to not coup the government if the government was of a political persuasion the French Military Establishment did not like (read, too much to the left.) So the French Army was saddled with burdensome communication requirements for Orders to stymie their ability to, well, do the coup.

Thank you @diestormlie !

I had read that a long time ago and I had COMPLETELY forgotten it.

So then then the butterfly would perhaps first necessitate a pro-military set of politicians (or at least, not anti-military). Perhaps a military leader or multiple leaders recognize their predicament and start a "charm offensive" in the mid-1930's as a critical first step. Maybe at the onset of Spanish Civil War, the military leaps forward with public statements in support of the primacy of "defending the Republic"?

The political factor is grossly overrated. At least in the way people usually think. I have seen it brought up so rarely (as in never) in French academic studies of the French army that it feels like some meme fostered by the Vichy govt to blame the socialists or conversely by the socialists to dunk on the vichysts postwar.

Plus, the fact the freaking Front Populaire immediately provided a shitload of money for rearmament in 1936 even when the war wasn't quite imminent just shows that socialist hate of a strong military was not prevalent, not in the late 30s at least when there was still a lot of time to rearm. Conversely the right-wingers look like the real anti-militarists given the cuts or small increases in budget they provided.