November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – USA – Edging Towards War
Franklin Roosevelt’s victory in the election held on the 5th of November may have been something of a foregone conclusion, still having the outcome confirmed was a great relief to the British and those who supported greater intervention on the part of the USA. Measures such as the Two Ocean Navy Act had passed in the summer and the bases for destroyers’ deal had left US neutrality looking rather threadbare, certainly from the perspective of the Axis powers. US Navy operations in the Neutrality Zone that Roosevelt had declared in 1939 were almost entirely designed to aid the British, with U-Boat sightings being quickly passed on to the Royal Navy and as 1941 progressed the Neutrality patrol would take on a ever more aggress posture.
This however did not mean that Roosevelt had a free hand to do as he wished, there was still a powerful isolationist lobby on the other side, with Charles Lindbergh being perhaps its most prominent public figurehead and one of the leaders of the America First movement. Lindbergh had visited Germany and been treated to carefully stage-managed tours of Luftwaffe bases and demonstrations of the latest aircraft. The reports he gave based on this highly selective showcase contributed greatly to the overestimation of the size and power of the Luftwaffe that plagued strategic planning in the US and Europe up until the truth became apparent over Southern England in 1940. Lindbergh’s was hardly the only voice and some of them were far more vicious and laden with pro-German and anti-Semitic messages that had found a receptive audience with many in the USA. Father Charles Coughlin had a national radio broadcast and used it as a platform for isolationist sentiment, and was increasingly seen as leaning heavily towards the Fascist dictatorships as a bulwark against Communism, though his reach had been curtailed by 1940 owing to a series of legal difficulties and the increasing reluctance of certain broadcasters to carry his speeches [1].
While the images of mass meetings and protests by America First are compelling, they conceal a more nuanced picture of isolationist sentiment. For many there was a simple pragmatism to their attitude. If Britain and France had been so willing to appease Germany, why should the USA care? Even if Germany did launch a war surely the might of the French army and the impregnable Maginot Line would bring about a swift defeat for the Nazis? Why should America be drawn into a war that would have no impact on their country in the name of political ideals that meant little to the average US citizen? The fall of France certainly provided a catalyst to change people’s opinions. The nation that had fought Imperial Germany for four years had fallen to Nazi Germany in four months and now the question was, what would happen if Britain was also forced to submit? This certainly pushed some to take an even more hard-line isolationist stance, others though were more willing to listen to Roosevelt’s rhetoric of offering all aid short of war and he would get the Lend-Lease act approved by Congress in March of 1941 [2].
One thing the British could offer in return for material aid was technical knowhow and the lessons of their combat experience. This was more welcome in some quarters than others. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) was distinctly Anglophobic and dismissed advise about convoy operations and the use of airpower to help close the so-called Atlantic Gap. Fortunately, others were more willing to look at the evidence of the effectiveness of long-range patrol aircraft and a few would be deployed before the official entry of the USA into the war [3].
When it came to the air forces the relationship was rather more respectful and the USAAC was certainly willing to listen when the RAF explained their plans for the introduction of 20mm cannon as fighter weapon. The USAAC had already standardised on the .50 calibre machine gun for their fighters and there would be repeated arguments during the war over the merits of the destructive power of the 20mm cannon versus the larger ammunition capacity the .50 calibre, but the USAAC, and then the United States Army Air Force, did see the merits of the cannon when it came to the ground attack role [4].
The US Army on the other hand leaned a little closer to Admiral King. They were working on two tanks under the M3 designation, one light and one medium, the designations represented something of the different approach to tank design the American pursued versus the Cruiser and Infantry categories the British used. For the sake of simplicity, the British referred to the light tank as the Stuart, and the medium as the Grant. While the British had concluded that light tanks had no place in front line combat, they still had uses as reconnaissance vehicles and potentially as vehicle for equipping light ‘cavalry’ units, as well as in the role of Imperial security duties in places where they were not going to have to fight enemy tanks. The Stuart was far better armoured and armed than the British Mark VI B light tank, with a 37mm cannon instead of a machine gun. It was in many respects like the German Panzer II in its capabilities. In the end the British accepted them in substantial numbers given that it offered a means to finally remove the Mk VI B from service and expand their armoured forces, particularly in North Africa where the Stuart was superior to most Axis armour it faced and would also prove highly effective in Southeast Asia where heavier tanks would have struggled [5].
If the British were eventually won over by the merits of the Stuart, the same could not be said for the Grant. This was tank was intended as interim vehicle while the development of the M4 Sherman was still ongoing, and this reflected in a design that seemed to be neither one thing nor the other. It had two main weapons, a turret mounted 37mm gun and a 75mm mounted in the hull that could be used firing armour piercing anti-tank rounds or an effective HE round. It was a good gun but being mounted in a sponson in the hull meant that it had extremely limited traverse and prevented the Grant from adopting a hull down position when firing and its tall profile exacerbated this issue. The 37mm gun may have been better than the German equivalent fitted to the Panzer III, the British however felt it was inferior to their own 2pdr, which was academic as they had already decided a 6pdr would be necessary going forward. The two weapon positions necessitated a crew of seven and though the British suggested eliminating the separate radio operator the Americans were reluctant to embrace this at first and even if it was incorporated the Grant would still require a six-man crew. For comparison no British tank in service had more than a four-man crew and even the A22 and A24 would only require a five-man crew, in simple terms larger crews meant fewer crews for the British and the Dominion forces. On the positive side the tank was reasonably mobile and despite the crew size relatively spacious inside.
Overall, it was a design the British considered as already obsolescent, especially if one assumed, as the British did, that the Germans were pursuing the very same path of improved armour and a firepower that they were. This view wasn’t shared by the Americans, who felt the British were overstating both the performance of their own tanks and the likelihood of German upgrades in response. They were certain that their plans for the M3 and its long-term successor the M4 Sherman would be more than adequate. It would only be in late 1941 that it would become apparent that the British had been accurate in their assessment of the likely future of German tank development, which would create some issues for the US Army as it entered the war. The Grant did see some service with the British, though it was limited to South East Asia where it proved highly effective against the Japanese [6].
Despite ongoing resistance on the home front at the beginning of 1941 President Roosevelt was doing his best to support the British and prepare the USA for the prospect of becoming an active participant in the war. That remained a distant prospect however even as the US Navy became increasingly aggressive in the Atlantic and the USA would still be a long from ready when the ‘day that will live in infamy’ plunged them into the war.
[1] Coughlin is an interesting figure, an actual Catholic priest who was never directly connected to any US pro-Nazi organization but was claimed as an influence by at least one of them.
[2] Overall isolationism was neither monolithic nor as overwhelming as it sometimes portrayed.
[3] I honestly think King would have been happier fighting the British than the Japanese of Germans.
[4] So yeah, the 50 cal is more powerful the .303 but less so than the 20mm, but yes there have been many arguments on the topic.
[5] The name Lee doesn’t gain currency here.
[6] So given developments not surprising the British are not impressed by the Lee/Grant and equally unsurprising the Americans are sure it will be fine. This means not much chance of alt US tanks at this point, unless anyone has suggestions.