Until Every Drop of Blood Is Paid: A More Radical American Civil War

I mean... I kinda disagree? While McClellan does deserve credit for training and organizing the Army of the Potomac, I really hesitate to say that his talents were unique. After all, McClellan didn't train and organize the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland and those western armies made the most amount of progress for the Union in the war. Furthermore, McClellan kinda crippled the Union cavalry in the Eastern Theater by parceling out the volunteer cavalry regiments as guides and couriers. Of all people, John Pope, the much derided braggart who got smashed at Second Bull Run, did a better job of using the Union cavalry force by actually creating functioning cavalry brigades. It should also be noted that the success of Hooker's reforms in enhancing the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac suggests that McClellan's organization wasn't perfect to begin with.
OTL or TTL?
 
OTL or TTL?
OTL. Now to some extent I've been swayed by Ethan Rafuse and Joseph L. Harsh that McClellan is a better general than Stephen Sears makes him out to be and that some opportunities were lost because of the inexperience of several subordinate generals, but McClellan is still quite a very flawed general and I do think that his importance in training and organizing the Army of the Potomac to be overstated.
ITTL I'd bet that there would be very few historians who are willing to try to redeem or make a sympathetic look for McClellan, especially with the catastrophe of the Peninsula.
 
OTL. Now to some extent I've been swayed by Ethan Rafuse and Joseph L. Harsh that McClellan is a better general than Stephen Sears makes him out to be and that some opportunities were lost because of the inexperience of several subordinate generals, but McClellan is still quite a very flawed general and I do think that his importance in training and organizing the Army of the Potomac to be overstated.
ITTL I'd bet that there would be very few historians who are willing to try to redeem or make a sympathetic look for McClellan, especially with the catastrophe of the Peninsula.

Just another instance of a Civil War general promoted beyond his competency due to a desperate shortage of trained officers.

Little Mac was a splendid engineer. He would have made a fine quartermaster general and would have been terrific in a training command. But for combat, I wouldn't trust him n anything above division command, and never on important detached duty if it could be helped.

The Peninsula Campaign was shrewd strategy; indeed, Grant was minded to try it himself in 1864, only he knew the stink of McClellan would kill its reception with Lincoln and Stanton. The pity is, McClellan wasn't the man to execute it.
 
yah that tl not dead! but image is not working
It seems to be working fine for everyone else? Anyway, it's just a dumb meme.

If the one in the centre is McClellan? IIRC he also helped save the union. Just with army logistics and not actual battles, which he was not great at.
I mean... I kinda disagree? While McClellan does deserve credit for training and organizing the Army of the Potomac, I really hesitate to say that his talents were unique. After all, McClellan didn't train and organize the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland and those western armies made the most amount of progress for the Union in the war. Furthermore, McClellan kinda crippled the Union cavalry in the Eastern Theater by parceling out the volunteer cavalry regiments as guides and couriers. Of all people, John Pope, the much derided braggart who got smashed at Second Bull Run, did a better job of using the Union cavalry force by actually creating functioning cavalry brigades. It should also be noted that the success of Hooker's reforms in enhancing the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac suggests that McClellan's organization wasn't perfect to begin with.
That's my position as well, though I posted the meme from an ITTL perspective - where, arguably, McClellan is the man who did the most to hinder the Union cause.

M'Clellan is our man
M'Clellan is our man
We'll show our deeds
Where'er he leads
M'Clellan is our man!
I actually do like some songs that mention McClellan. He seemed particularly loved by the Irish, who often included mentions of him leading them or something like that.

Just another instance of a Civil War general promoted beyond his competency due to a desperate shortage of trained officers.

Little Mac was a splendid engineer. He would have made a fine quartermaster general and would have been terrific in a training command. But for combat, I wouldn't trust him n anything above division command, and never on important detached duty if it could be helped.

The Peninsula Campaign was shrewd strategy; indeed, Grant was minded to try it himself in 1864, only he knew the stink of McClellan would kill its reception with Lincoln and Stanton. The pity is, McClellan wasn't the man to execute it.
I think it was a legitimately good plan, and had a more aggressive general been the one to execute it it well could have ended the war right there.
 
Just imagine Grant in charge in 1862.

Or even Thomas. Not as aggressive as Grant, but would never have been scared off.
It makes me think of the TL Grant at Gettysburg. Grant’s more aggressive nature really came out after the battle as the ANV was pursued after the battle nearly turning their retreat into a rout. The TL was never finished but as I recall, the ANV was stuck between a rock and a hard place by the end and, no matter the outcome, would be basically spent as an effective fighting force.
 
I'm sorry if this has already been addressed, but I wonder if, with the high-profile Confederate sabotage efforts, espionage, and general radicalization of the war, could we perhaps see more of the union's fledgling efforts towards a proto-"security state" preserved into peacetime (especially in the South)? It'd be interesting to see whether these factors can make headway against the general demobilization and normalization that'll come with peace, the low capacity of the federal government, and the (towards the federal government if not local ones) relative civil libertarianism that-from a modern perspective-prevailed until the 20th century in the US.

Edit: maybe things like Pinkertons getting folded into a permanent government agency, weaker habaeus corpus/free speech protection, or even a national guard in the modern federalizable sense, rather than state militias?
 
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I'm sorry if this has already been addressed, but I wonder if, with the high-profile Confederate sabotage efforts, espionage, and general radicalization of the war, could we perhaps see more of the union's fledgling efforts towards a proto-"security state" preserved into peacetime (especially in the South)? It'd be interesting to see whether these factors can make headway against the general demobilization and normalization that'll come with peace, the low capacity of the federal government, and the (towards the federal government if not local ones) relative civil libertarianism that-from a modern perspective-prevailed until the 20th century in the US.

Edit: maybe things like Pinkertons getting folded into a permanent government agency, weaker habaeus corpus/free speech protection, or even a national guard in the modern federalizable sense, rather than state militias?
Yeah, that's precisely one of my objectives. The Army is not the best at enforcing the post-war settlement, but some sort of security force should remain to help against the Klan and other terrorists, and to take up the slack of enforcing equality - OTL, the Republicans tried to rely a lot in the Federal Judiciary, which simply wasn't enough. The greatest factor working in favor of this is that violence against political enemies is now generally accepted as a necessary evil, if not even an outright good. After all, if we let those Copperheads run around freely they may start another massacre, right? So, the issue at question isn't "are we going to repress our opponents?" but "how are we going to do that?". I already described the growth of paramilitary "Union Leagues" in the North, and what bothers Lincoln and the Republicans isn't their existence but that they operate outside a legal framework.

Eventually, I can see the Unionist guerrillas (as long as they weren't too brutal) and others like the Pinkertons forming a Federal enforcement service that will at first be meant only for the war but will remain indefinitely because the South will remain in turmoil for years after the formal end of the war. Southern complains about bayonet rule may be somewhat more justified when in the post-war South the local National Guard officer can have you thrown into prison for being a rebel, and you may remain there without a trial (and if you receive one is by a military tribunal) while the local Bureau has your property confiscated. Of course, it's necessary not to overdo it.

Loving the story so far... Here's to hoping that TTL's analogue to the Battle of the Crater fares better than IOTL
Thanks! I don't know if something like the Crater could end up happening ITTL, but I've always have a fondness for some of the more out-there ideas that were tried.

I was thinking more of an expanded Secret Service that focuses more on maintaining federal authority in general rather than just handling counterfeiters.
Yeah, something like that. Especially if the former rebel leaders (at least those who haven't been exiled or executed) know that there's always an agent breathing down their necks and thus they should play nice.
 
Thanks! I don't know if something like the Crater could end up happening ITTL, but I've always have a fondness for some of the more out-there ideas that were tried.
Interestingly, the Crater was not the first mining operation in the ACW. During the Siege of Vicksburg, mines were a major feature of Grant's attack plan. These mines had less powder and were far smaller in length. Because of the nature of the soil around Vicksburg, mines were considerably quick to build. The first mine detonated beneath the 3rd Louisiana Redan on June 25, but the defenders had already prepared a rear line to seal any breakthrough caused by the mine. The attack was a failure but not a very costly one - 243 men lost for 94 rebels. A second mine was detonated on July 1st and the 3rd Louisiana Redan was completely destroyed but no assault followed. If Pemberton had not surrendered on July 6th, Grant intended to detonate 13 mines simultaneously for assault columns to storm the trenches. Considering that Grant's troops had dug their trenches almost right next to the Confederate defenses themselves, a lot of historians rate the probability of success to be near guaranteed.

It's interesting to note that despite Grant's use of mines, he did not seem very enthusiastic about Burnside's mine until he realized that it could serve as the decisive blow in his 1-2 punch Third Petersburg offensive. On a side note, the Army of the Cumberland also dug a mine beneath a section of the Joseph Johnston's Kennesaw Mountain Line during the stalemate. However, Johnston's evacuation left the mine without purpose so it was never detonated.
 
Thanks! I don't know if something like the Crater could end up happening ITTL, but I've always have a fondness for some of the more out-there ideas that were tried.
The actual Battle of the Crater was meant to be fought by a USCT division, which was trained to carry out the plan, but General Meade ordered Burnside to use white troops instead (it is not clear if he just didn't have confidence in the USCT or was afraid of being seen as sacrificing black soldiers to keep the white soldiers alive), and Burnside literally chose a random division by having his commanders draw lots.

Unfortunately, the guy that was picked, Brig. Gen. Ledlie, not only didn't even bother to brief his soldiers about what they were expected to do, he also stayed the entire battle getting drunk behind lines.

The end result was a catastrophe, since the soldiers decided to go through the crater instead of around the crater (they had thought the crater could be a good pit/trench, only to realize too late that the crater was too exposed) and getting themselves butchered (along with the USCT division, who ended up suffering the most casualties after Burnside sent them to rescue Ledlie's men), Ledlie was drummed out of the army and Burnside never returned to command, even though it wasn't his idea to change the plan with so little advance (by the time Meade was finally condemned for his role, Burnside's reputation was ruined).

If there's an equivalent to the Battle of the Crater, perhaps you could change it so the USCT division attacking are kept in their position and carry out the attack. Should they be successful, it would be another demonstration to the American people that "negroes" are just as capable as whites - and you could even have an intrepid reporter interview one of the black soldiers that intervened in the battle.
 
it is not clear if he just didn't have confidence in the USCT or was afraid of being seen as sacrificing black soldiers to keep the white soldiers alive
According to Earl J Hess, Meade's reason was that the USCT division assigned to the task was completely green. He feared that they would get hung up in an already complex operation and suffer heavy casualties, leading to said accusations. The USCT's exuberance would have been better than the confusion of Ledlie's division, but it should be noted that Edward Ferrero, the USCT division commander, was hanging out with Ledlie and getting drunk in a bomb shelter while his men were getting slaughtered.
Burnside's reputation was ruined
To be fair, I'd argue that Burnside should've been relieved a long time before the Crater and that he deserved some degree of blame over the Crater debacle. Both Grant and Meade agreed that the operation had failed at 9:30 a.m. (before the USCT went in) and gave the order to evacuate the captured positions before a devastating counterattack could occur. Despite this, Burnside stubbornly clung onto the hope of saving his offensive. Burnside only passed on the evacuation order two hours later.
 
I just recently started to read this TL and has to say, its really great. It like a history book from an alternative world.
I wonder who will run against Lincoln in 1864, now that the National Union is more or less dead. Maybe some sort of "Peace Republicans" by Greely or the Blairs.
And how do you think, how will the alternate history perception of the ACW be ITTL?
After all, Lee had his "Cannae", but the North still fought on.
 
Interestingly, the Crater was not the first mining operation in the ACW. During the Siege of Vicksburg, mines were a major feature of Grant's attack plan. These mines had less powder and were far smaller in length. Because of the nature of the soil around Vicksburg, mines were considerably quick to build. The first mine detonated beneath the 3rd Louisiana Redan on June 25, but the defenders had already prepared a rear line to seal any breakthrough caused by the mine. The attack was a failure but not a very costly one - 243 men lost for 94 rebels. A second mine was detonated on July 1st and the 3rd Louisiana Redan was completely destroyed but no assault followed. If Pemberton had not surrendered on July 6th, Grant intended to detonate 13 mines simultaneously for assault columns to storm the trenches. Considering that Grant's troops had dug their trenches almost right next to the Confederate defenses themselves, a lot of historians rate the probability of success to be near guaranteed.

It's interesting to note that despite Grant's use of mines, he did not seem very enthusiastic about Burnside's mine until he realized that it could serve as the decisive blow in his 1-2 punch Third Petersburg offensive. On a side note, the Army of the Cumberland also dug a mine beneath a section of the Joseph Johnston's Kennesaw Mountain Line during the stalemate. However, Johnston's evacuation left the mine without purpose so it was never detonated.
Huh, I actually didn't know mines were tried during Vicksburg or Kennesaw Mountain. Really interesting. I might have some Union Army attempting that then. I've already said I'm fond of the more out-there projects both sides attempted. That's why I'll also include the Hunley in a future battle.

If there's an equivalent to the Battle of the Crater, perhaps you could change it so the USCT division attacking are kept in their position and carry out the attack. Should they be successful, it would be another demonstration to the American people that "negroes" are just as capable as whites - and you could even have an intrepid reporter interview one of the black soldiers that intervened in the battle.
Since I first read about the Crater I have wanted to change its outcome to make it a successful offensive by the USCT. But now I hesitate, because I fear creating circumstances almost equal to OTL might seem contrived but also because I kind of already did the "USCT saves the day" at Union Mills. But there can't be too many moments of Black heroism, right?

To be fair, I'd argue that Burnside should've been relieved a long time before the Crater and that he deserved some degree of blame over the Crater debacle. Both Grant and Meade agreed that the operation had failed at 9:30 a.m. (before the USCT went in) and gave the order to evacuate the captured positions before a devastating counterattack could occur. Despite this, Burnside stubbornly clung onto the hope of saving his offensive. Burnside only passed on the evacuation order two hours later.
Dear Burn is a person I feel oddly sympathetic towards even if as a commander he was mediocre at best.

Haven't said this before when I first read this timeline but jolly good thread. Very enjoyable
Thanks! I do think some of the best people in the forum have come to make very valuable comments. In many a occasion the contributions of members have taught me new things and changed my perspective of the war and its meaning.

I just recently started to read this TL and has to say, its really great. It like a history book from an alternative world.
I wonder who will run against Lincoln in 1864, now that the National Union is more or less dead. Maybe some sort of "Peace Republicans" by Greely or the Blairs.
And how do you think, how will the alternate history perception of the ACW be ITTL?
After all, Lee had his "Cannae", but the North still fought on.
Thank you very much! I consciously tried to imitate a history book. Nothing against the TLs that do it, but I don't like narrative TLs, those who are mere enumerations of dates, or those who quote from several fictional history books. I think my style allows for greater coherence and easier flow, if I say so myself.

As for political realignment, without the National Union to concentrate and direct political efforts the enemies of the Republican program are in disarray, but Lincoln has still many opponents, both personal and factional, and though organized "Copperheadism" is mostly dead, the desire for peace, reactionary racism and hostility to radicalism remain. Instead of overt peace, and indeed led by the Greeleys and Blairs of the Party, there are many Republicans who believe the South could be brought back in if Lincoln just dropped all radical measures (abolition, confiscation and treason trials). Thus, continuing the war until unconditional victory is achieved is only useless bloodshed. Just offer peace on the only condition of Union, and Breckinridge et al will surrender at once, they say.
 
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Lee looking for his Cannae always confused me. It really seems like they tended to forget the Carthaginians lost that war, for pretty much the same reason the Confederacy lost: the Romans could muster more men and throw army after army at the Carthaginians until they crushed Hannibal beneath the weight of numbers.
 
Lee looking for his Cannae always confused me. It really seems like they tended to forget the Carthaginians lost that war, for pretty much the same reason the Confederacy lost: the Romans could muster more men and throw army after army at the Carthaginians until they crushed Hannibal beneath the weight of numbers.
The german general staff had the same obssesion with Cannae in 1914. And they also forgot what happend later. For some generals, the whole idea of "we take some risk, we win this big battle and the war will be over by Cristmas" is just to sexy.
 
The german general staff had the same obssesion with Cannae in 1914. And they also forgot what happend later. For some generals, the whole idea of "we take some risk, we win this big battle and the war will be over by Cristmas" is just to sexy.
TBF in regards to the German's if they do take Paris the war's basically over in the West at that point.
 
TBF in regards to the German's if they do take Paris the war's basically over in the West at that point.
The main target in 1914 was the french army and not Paris. And to encircle the French, the Germans would have to allow them to push to the Rhine. If the French still have their army. they will keep fighting. After all, with two strong allies, the situation is still much better then 1870.
 
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