Chapter 13.1
06-05-42 23:59 hrs British 8th army and Middle East HQ Cairo Egypt Reporting back to American President Roosevelt and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Colonel Bonner Fellers, American military attache to MEGHQ
Urgent update:
Due to chaotic combat situation, briefings are off schedule and disjointed, will report back 2-3 times per day as necessary or ordered
Gazala troops surrender to Panzer Army Africa !
50th British division and 1st south African division, and elements of other divisions pushed into their pocket lost!
GHQ staff officers assessing total men lost, there was similar unit mixing issues due to heavy combat the last few days, privately they admit upwards of 20,000 men lost along the coast road and in the boxes
GHQ staff officers advise large loss of army materials at Gazala
GHQ staff officers advise large loss of armored vehicles and transport at Gazala
GHQ staff officers privately advise 83000+ men lost since Rommel began attack, at least 65 percent are pows or missing
Mood and atmostphere in GHQ heavily impacted by loss of Gazala troops
Smith and Auchinlek heavily impacted by loss of Gazala troops
South African staff officers are furious at the loss of their divisions, this represented large share of their contribution to the war, and they where hopelessly cut off under Ritchie's command with almost no opportunity to fight back
Ritchie is relieved of command, Auchinlek and Smith take over direct command of the 8th army
South African staff officers eagerly await arrival by GHQ officers who are en route to inspect conditions
South African staff officers openly insuborindate to Smith, this creates difficult working condition between them
South African staff officers applying heavy pressure via their government to have Smith removed from Egypt... and Auchinlek
GHQ staff officers privately advise Gazala line and box system was a mistake, and that the forces where far too dispersed; which allowed Rommel to engage them in detail and inflict locally heavy defeats
GHQ staff officers privately advise they greatly underestimated the armored strength Rommel had built on the recovery from Operation Crusader
GHQ staff officers privately advise they have undersestimated the quality of some new models of German and Italian tanks
Desert air force staff officers privately advise they underestimated the quality and sortie tempo of the axis airforce was capable of projecting in an offense, they advise recon was severely underutilized
Desert air force staff officers privately advise, that far too much of the forward operational air force assets and CCC was based at Gambut, which was more exposed to potential ground assault than was realized; failure to adequately defend or counter attack this area successfully was devastating throughout the battle and conceded much air space to the axis, especially as the battle wore on and the supply of long range fighter escort drop tanks was depleted
GHQ staff officers privately advise disposition of supplies and failure to destroy axis supplies was a grave error as screening forces to the south were easily maneuvered around which let Rommel get deep into the hen house right at the start of the battle
The quality of Rommel's air recon network was underestimated
The quality of Rommel's other sources of intelligence has been underestimated
Rommel's ability to maneuver in the most unexpected directions in all defiance of conventional military wisdom to force great elements of surprise, was heavily underestimated
The quality of some of the Italian divisions was underestimated per private GHQ disclosures, especially Italian mechanized troops at knights bridge
GHQ staff officers advise that scale of army equipment and supplies lost to Rommel the past week is strategically devastating and make up many gaps in his supply chain
GHQ and our staff regard Rommel deploying 5 divisions over the border into Egypt as, least case; one GHQ estimate is that he can deploy 9 divisions into Egypt (bear in mind that axis divisions are only assumed to be 70 percent size of British divisions when at full strength)
Royal Navy and desert air force staff officers are more firm in their view that Rommel has 25-33 percent use of Tobruk harbor. Our staff and GHQ believe he would use Toburk for his most critical supplies (fuel and some replacement tanks) because it is 900 miles closer to the fighting than Tripoli; and that his air force can better escort convoys between Crete and Toburk
GHQ confirms Rommel receiving significant air delivered reinforcements, 164th per our observations appears to be an intact line infantry division; more research is being done concerning "6th panzer" to see if Rommel is actually receiving a new tank division, or if these are replacements for his existing divisions. 2nd parachute strength is still being assessed but appears to be ~large brigade~ of elite infantry
Rommel pushing the front so far back enables him to likely make better use of Bengahzi since it is largely out of air attack range
Royal Navy is continuing to have difficult meetings about the fate of Malta, a number of staff officers consider Malta lost now, or at least not worth the potential loss of ships, and aircraft, now that Rommel can bypass it by going athens-crete-tobruk
Most Royal Navy staff officers in GHQ are recommending canceling operation vigorous due to Rommel's looming invasion of Egypt, they advise that their ships for the region are already stretched thin due to local issues here, and diversion of units to Pacific. They are worried that vigorous will take heavy losses now that Rommel's air force, especially his dive bombers can attack from Gambut and Crete against the convoy long before it gets near Malta
Royal Navy staff officers privately advise axis submarines are beginning to relocate from libyan waters to Egyptian waters to harass lines of communication and screen against naval raids on the coastal road
Desert air force staff officers press very hard on Auchinlek to make final decision on defensive lines for Egypt, they agititate heavily against his "alamein" defensive line, advising they had moved many assets to the frontier fields and Matruh, and that using only mobile delaying tactics in most of Egypt would compel another significant redeployment and that many sorties would be lost in the movement, and Tobruk (and the smaller fishing ports on the frontier) would be driven out of most escorted bombing range, increasing the security of Rommel's supply lines
Royal Navy staff officers vigorously oppose the "alamein" defensive line, saying it is past their "red line" for evacuating the fleet, and that the position is within escorted bombing range of the delta fleet anchorage, but at the same time, they also say they cannot support the "matruh" position with resupply in the face of axis air attacks
One Royal Navy senior officer says they will execute rapier on their own authority of Auchinlek lets Rommel reach Alamein position; this lead to heated exchange and our removal from the room
Authority for Rapier is not exactly delegated as far as our staff can tell; we believe final decision is being reserved for London
Rapier is bitterly controversial inside GHQ due to lack of Egyptian consent
Alexandria and the delta are vital to the Egyptian way of life, intelligence officers in GHQ advice rapier would have gravely negative political consequences for British presence in Egypt
GHQ intelligence officers advise there are axis sympathizers inside the Egyptian population and the Egyptian army who will already be emboldened when Rommel crosses the border (and are already thought to be emboldened by the fall of Tobruk) whom would be prone to cause security troubles if rapier is executed
General Smith completely endorses rapier in the event of not being able to hold Rommel from reaching the delta
General Smith advocates armored counter attacks from the south in the event Rommel cannot be held back from the delta
General Smith advocates keeping some fresh deliveries of tanks in reserve around cairo for this purpose instead of sending them to the coastal road to defend the delta
General smith advocates keeping some air squadrons in reserve around cairo for the same prupose
Diversion of air defense assets from the canal to the front lines is causing bitter disagreements between services inside GHQ
Royal Navy officers for first time discuss possible red line closures of the Suez Canal in the event of the axis being able to attack it with escorted dive bombers
Royal Navy staffers confirm all repair work will be stopped when Rommel crosses the border and that all ships will be made ready to sail on 12 hours notice
Royal Navy demands regular motoring time updates between Rommel and the fleet anchorage; this is currently estimated at 30 hours if he was to resume an offensive today over the border, which is likely impossible due to need to consolidate for a number of days
Redlines include not only dive bomber range, but also Rommel reaching 13 hours motoring time to Alexandria in the event of Army defeat or retreat
Several ships under repair which are not ready to steam away from the combat area will instead be used as blocking ships for rapier in the event of Rommel reaching the red lines
Auchinlek is making tours of grounds around Matruh and Alamein tomorrow to assess best defensive practices to withstand the invasion
will send personal observations in next transmission
end transmission