Sixes and Snake eyes Rommel's luck in an alternate 1942 desert war

[David Flin]

I know but that requires not just simple research but understanding. And oftentimes research that goes beyond what is available to most people.

I don't see that as a problem. If someone doesn't understand an area, it's fine to gloss over the details. I know very little about ballet, for example. If, for some reason, I needed to include developments in ballet in a TL, I'd sketch out a very loose framework and pick the brains of those people here who do have that understanding.

I also don't see it as a problem for writing a TL to require understanding the subject on which one is writing, especially in an area when plenty of the readership have detailed understanding. I wouldn't dream of doing a TL set in the Russian Revolution, because I don't understand it or know much about the players. I am (or was) happy to start TLs in areas where I have an understanding of the situation, be it 1970s UK centred around The Troubles, or the Falklands War, or other areas I am confident in.

Put simply, if I don't understand something, I'm not going to be able to write a convincing TL about it. If that means that there are fewer highly implausible TLs around, I don't see that as a problem. And, if there are TLs that cover an area that I am very familiar with that stipulate something that blows away my suspension of disbelief, I'll say so. So, the Troubles, the Lebanese Civil War, power generation policy from 1996 onwards, MI6 operations in certain very specific situations, the East End of London in the 1950s, and so on. All grist to the mill.

And if authors aren't willing to get feedback on a piece, then they really shouldn't be publishing publicly. It's not like post-1900 is short of active threads.

 

[Garrison]

I don't see that as a problem. If someone doesn't understand an area, it's fine to gloss over the details. I know very little about ballet, for example. If, for some reason, I needed to include developments in ballet in a TL, I'd sketch out a very loose framework and pick the brains of those people here who do have that understanding.

I also don't see it as a problem for writing a TL to require understanding the subject on which one is writing, especially in an area when plenty of the readership have detailed understanding. I wouldn't dream of doing a TL set in the Russian Revolution, because I don't understand it or know much about the players. I am (or was) happy to start TLs in areas where I have an understanding of the situation, be it 1970s UK centred around The Troubles, or the Falklands War, or other areas I am confident in.

Put simply, if I don't understand something, I'm not going to be able to write a convincing TL about it. If that means that there are fewer highly implausible TLs around, I don't see that as a problem. And, if there are TLs that cover an area that I am very familiar with that stipulate something that blows away my suspension of disbelief, I'll say so. So, the Troubles, the Lebanese Civil War, power generation policy from 1996 onwards, MI6 operations in certain very specific situations, the East End of London in the 1950s, and so on. All grist to the mill.

And if authors aren't willing to get feedback on a piece, then they really shouldn't be publishing publicly. It's not like post-1900 is short of active threads.

And of course no one expects perfect knowledge and people will disagree over the significance of some events and the butterfly effect can be invoked on a modest localized scale. However it must be remembered that even allowing for that this TL does not meet the standards of Post-1900 and it remains here because it had established roots and couldn't be moved to Writers, where it belongs and the requirements of plausibility are more flexible.

 

[David Flin]

I wince a little over that description of the Writers' Forum. I would suggest that if the emphasis is on the story, be it a yarn or character study or fantasy, it belongs there. Things there get commented on for the storytelling. Six East End Boys, for example, has a very weak historical background, and lives or dies by the quality of the tale. Are the characters convincing? Does the plot hold together? Is it a story one wants to read?

Here, the emphasis is squarely on the history, and that is where TLs will get criticised. I wouldn't dream of criticising this TL here on the basis of characterisation. If it were on the Writers' Forum, then characterisation is absolutely an area of discussion. Here, one comments on the history. Do we have any evidence, for example, that Rommel ensured that he ate what his soldiers ate? Is it plausible for the British to destroy the water infrastructure? Can German soldiers walk through a gap quarter of a mile wide and not get shot to pieces?

I don't care for implications (not that I see you as implying) that this forum is better or worse than the Writers' Forum. They are for different things.

My tale, The Queen of The Windsor Castle, belongs there, not here. It may have a basis in historical plausibility, but any tale which involves Walford and Weatherfield is not one where historicity is an important consideration.

 

[cardcarrier]

If you are dependent on Liddell Hart's skills at getting to the truth from his interviews with German officers post-War, you're in for a fantasy ride.

He swallowed, hook, line, and sinker, the insane levels of flattery (why, Liddell-Hart, your theories were our inspiration and wonderment and even though our operational actions bore no relation to what you proposed, we were in awe of your God-like understanding of the theory of battle. Truly, you were a genius among genii. Please put in a good word for us at our trial where we are accused of knowing things about the Holocaust and war crimes that were committed by our commands and that we knew nothing about even though they were happening under our nose, oh great and wise one). I do not exaggerate by much.

Liddell-Hart's interviews with German officers post-war are worthless. They break all known journalistic criteria (unverified sources, not looking for alternative explanations). In short, the German officers spun him what he wanted to hear, and he went away happy.



Is this from your own imagination, or do you have a source for it? Because the commanding general doing this is an idiotic and insane way of operating. A commanding officer, at any level, who limits their own ability to make quick, accurate decisions is a liability. If they need to know how far a trooper can be pushed on the rations available, you detail off a staff officer to be the (very bad) control. You do not do anything to hamper your own judgement. I know of no reference for such an action except that of the film Battle of the Bulge (that well-known historically accurate source).

And as for the concept of an experienced soldier who hasn't learned how to cat-nap, it is to laugh. Every soldier (and sailor and air force person) very quickly learns how to grab sleep as and where they can. It was a trick I certainly learned, enabling me to sleep with my eyes open and vaguely aware of what's going on while standing up, or in any convenient location. (A trick that has come in useful more recently as my cancer now prevents me from sleeping longer than about an hour at a time. So I cat-nap a lot - sleep for an hour, walk for ten minutes, sleep for an hour). The point is, that's standard for any serviceman.

To the untrained eye, your paragraph above might seem like praise of the almighty Rommel. It's actually pretty damning criticism.

I recognize the limitations of the Rommel Papers, in that they where instrumental in creating the Rommel myth; west Germany needed a "clean" war hero for that generation and the western allies went along with it. There is very solid later academic research on Rommel's war crimes, which showed the proper light on his murdering ways starting in the 1980s

So in recognizing the political axe of the book, we must still acknowledge that his sources for the book where Rommel's personal notes/manuscripts that he had been keeping for the purposes of writing his post war memoir, given directly to Hart by Lucie Rommel; who hid the papers from the Gestapo; interviews with Lucie and Manfred Rommel. and direct side by side writing with Hans Von Luck who was a combat and staff officer under Rommel and was a former student of his when Rommel was a commander at the Reichswehr war college.

I never paused to the consider displaying an aircraft shell to Hitler and Goring as something fabricated for the Rommel myth; getting secondary confirmation would be impossible because Hitler, Jodl and Goring where all long dead by 1953. In story cadence and the Rommel's career arc it made sense in some way that, that meeting began a process of ending his favored political son status that domino down to high command (Hitler) rejecting every course of action Rommel suggested the rest of the war, where up to September 1942 his opinion was given great deference by Hitler on nearly every occasion, including his decision to retreat during operation crusader; a level of deference not even conferred on his other political favorites like Guderian

Rommel was ill in OTL by the fall of 1942, which was part of the reason he went home, he had lost weight and had a liver infection and had been under enormous mental strain for months. The DAK operated at a much faster operational tempo than the 8th army, which gave them advantages early in the battle because they would steal march times on them for surprise parties when the sun would come up, but even loaded with doped up panzerchoclate, humans have limits and they where falling asleep at their tanks or on runway alerts in the case of the luftwaffe. It's been argued to me that Rommel missed significant tactical opportunities that where well within his command prowess at Matruh and first Alamein, simply because he was so exhausted and ill that he couldn't process the information completely and took far longer than normal to make his decisions. I am sure in your worldwide career you had to sleep in some creative places, Rommel as a younger man and in that war probably did too, BUT he was in his 50s, and his command style treated his body like he was in his 20's including stunts like going forward through artillery barrages and machine gun fire with his most forward platoons at Gazala, like he was Grant at Shilo' and frequent purposeful or accidental use of his HQ as an emergency machine gunner platoon; just at Gazala alone he probably narrowly missed getting his head blown off at least 4-5 times... his manic need to lead from the front, while it helped at a number of locally decisive occasions was not helpful for someone supposed to be commanding 10 divisions in a major offensive, his HQ multiple times lost communication with him and left Westphal (Bird Colonel) in a position of issuing commands like a 4 star general, legitimate criticism can be laid there of him as a commander as you suggested; he didn't manage himself as a resource well, to his army's detriment;

 

[David Flin]

It's been argued to me that Rommel missed significant tactical opportunities that where well within his command prowess at Matruh and first Alamein, simply because he was so exhausted and ill that he couldn't process the information completely and took far longer than normal to make his decisions. I am sure in your worldwide career you had to sleep in some creative places, Rommel as a younger man and in that war probably did too, BUT he was in his 50s, and his command style treated his body like he was in his 20's including stunts like going forward through artillery barrages and machine gun fire with his most forward platoons at Gazala, like he was Grant at Shilo' and frequent purposeful or accidental use of his HQ as an emergency machine gunner platoon

I'm in my 70s. I have long-term cancer that I'll take with me to my grave, along with a piece of shrapnel lodged in my spine that gives me pain every time I bend (and has done for nigh on 40 years), one kidney, and last year, I went through 7 surgical operations (including one that was 12 hours long, and one in which I briefly and technically died on the table).

I can still grab sleep in short stints in odd places - on buses, waiting in line at supermarket check-outs, on the London Underground, in hospital waiting rooms (I'm getting really good at those), and while gardening. If I can do it, then the All-Powerful Rommel can.

Incidentally, going forward with his most forward platoons is the sign of a Bad General, not a Good one. He is the general. He needs a view of the battlefield, not just a tiny segment of it. It gives up control, which is what a general is there for. If he wants to play at being platoon leader, he should be a platoon leader.

As for his operational genius, that is a matter of some debate.

To quote from Wiki as a starting point:

Certain modern military historians, such as Larry T. Addington, Niall Barr, Douglas Porch and Robert Citino, are skeptical of Rommel as an operational, let alone strategic level commander. They point to Rommel's lack of appreciation for Germany's strategic situation, his misunderstanding of the relative importance of his theatre to the German High Command, his poor grasp of logistical realities, and, according to the historian Ian Beckett, his "penchant for glory hunting".[477][478] Citino credits Rommel's limitations as an operational level commander as "materially contributing" to the eventual demise of the Axis forces in North Africa,[478][N 12] while Addington focuses on the struggle over strategy, whereby Rommel's initial brilliant success resulted in "catastrophic effects" for Germany in North Africa.[479] Porch highlights Rommel's "offensive mentality", symptomatic of the Wehrmacht commanders as a whole in the belief that the tactical and operational victories would lead to strategic success. Compounding the problem was the Wehrmacht's institutional tendency to discount logistics, industrial output and their opponents' capacity to learn from past mistakes

In many ways, there is some similarity with Robert E Lee. Overrated as a military commander; successful against modest opponents, and screwed big time as soon as he comes up against a competent, non-panicking opponent; fighting for a repulsive cause, and somehow maintaining a reputation as a Man Of Honour despite (a) not even freeing his own slaves and taking free blacks as slaves or (b) committing war crimes as a regular occurrence and at the very least turning a blind eye to attempted genocide; a lack of flexibility in operations and bereft as soon as the one-trick is adequately countered.

his manic need to lead from the front, while it helped at a number of locally decisive occasions was not helpful for someone supposed to be commanding 10 divisions in a major offensive, his HQ multiple times lost communication with him and left Westphal (Bird Colonel) in a position of issuing commands like a 4 star general, legitimate criticism can be laid there of him as a commander as you suggested; he didn't manage himself as a resource well, to his army's detriment;

Absolutely. And yet we never see this in this TL.

I ask again: the story you give about Rommel eating the same food as his soldiers. Was that colour thrown in by you, or is there a source for it?

 

[cardcarrier]

I'm in my 70s. I have long-term cancer that I'll take with me to my grave, along with a piece of shrapnel lodged in my spine that gives me pain every time I bend (and has done for nigh on 40 years), one kidney, and last year, I went through 7 surgical operations (including one that was 12 hours long, and one in which I briefly and technically died on the table).

I can still grab sleep in short stints in odd places - on buses, waiting in line at supermarket check-outs, on the London Underground, in hospital waiting rooms (I'm getting really good at those), and while gardening. If I can do it, then the All-Powerful Rommel can.

Incidentally, going forward with his most forward platoons is the sign of a Bad General, not a Good one. He is the general. He needs a view of the battlefield, not just a tiny segment of it. It gives up control, which is what a general is there for. If he wants to play at being platoon leader, he should be a platoon leader.

As for his operational genius, that is a matter of some debate.

To quote from Wiki as a starting point:

Certain modern military historians, such as Larry T. Addington, Niall Barr, Douglas Porch and Robert Citino, are skeptical of Rommel as an operational, let alone strategic level commander. They point to Rommel's lack of appreciation for Germany's strategic situation, his misunderstanding of the relative importance of his theatre to the German High Command, his poor grasp of logistical realities, and, according to the historian Ian Beckett, his "penchant for glory hunting".[477][478] Citino credits Rommel's limitations as an operational level commander as "materially contributing" to the eventual demise of the Axis forces in North Africa,[478][N 12] while Addington focuses on the struggle over strategy, whereby Rommel's initial brilliant success resulted in "catastrophic effects" for Germany in North Africa.[479] Porch highlights Rommel's "offensive mentality", symptomatic of the Wehrmacht commanders as a whole in the belief that the tactical and operational victories would lead to strategic success. Compounding the problem was the Wehrmacht's institutional tendency to discount logistics, industrial output and their opponents' capacity to learn from past mistakes

In many ways, there is some similarity with Robert E Lee. Overrated as a military commander; successful against modest opponents, and screwed big time as soon as he comes up against a competent, non-panicking opponent; fighting for a repulsive cause, and somehow maintaining a reputation as a Man Of Honour despite (a) not even freeing his own slaves and taking free blacks as slaves or (b) committing war crimes as a regular occurrence and at the very least turning a blind eye to attempted genocide; a lack of flexibility in operations and bereft as soon as the one-trick is adequately countered.



Absolutely. And yet we never see this in this TL.

I ask again: the story you give about Rommel eating the same food as his soldiers. Was that colour thrown in by you, or is there a source for it?

Rommel when the German effort in Africa began was a 2 star general, he had no say over the strategic management of Germany or the Axis even as a political favorite. We went through it early in the thread, his logistics where a circular problem, for which there was no solution, no matter what his orders where and if he obeyed them or not, he was fighting a materially superior enemy from a poor logistical position which would always get progressively worse no matter what he did.

Rommel didn't council Mussolini to not recall his merchant fleet in advance of his DOW, ending up with dozens of valuable vessels interned or just taken by the British and French
Rommel didn't council Mussolini to not have a day 1 active plan to take Malta
Rommel didn't council Mussolini to send useless foot infantry to the desert
Rommel didn't council Mussolini to declare war with no fuel reserves for his fleet
Rommel didn't work in the armaments office who slow walked licenses for German aircraft engines and radar for Italy
Rommel didn't decide for Hitler to ignore the advice of the quartermaster corps, the navy and the airforce about the level of commitment needed to win a campaign in africa (4 divisions 1000 planes or don't bother - Paulus)
Rommel didn't write the French Armistace which omitted transit rights to Tunis/Bizertte
Rommel didn't chose to declare war on the United States and Russia making the economic power ratio against the axis greater than 7:1

Reading his papers (with eyes open) he was more strategically open minded and worldly than anyone else in the German officer corps; and also vastly more realistic about the changes on the battlefield that allied overwhelming airpower had created. He beat good generals and lessor generals; for his thumping Ritchie who wasn't up to the task, he also threw O'Conner of Operation Compass fame into a prisoner cage too; no amount of praise should be spared Montgomery though, even though the strategic balance had drastically changed in the allies favor, Montgomery handled the whip like a pro, and ran a supremely organized and well thought out command, and he was a better general with 10 divisions than Rommel was; period.

The food thing, is interpretation of Rommel (and other German officers) criticism of Italian officers for having better food than the enlisted men; which I took to mean they didn't in their own command, in some reading about the French mutinies of 1917 I saw the same sort of parallels, so I presumed that it was general policy in both wars

Regarding Rommel being tired and making mistakes in the ATL, bear in mind I shaved 2 weeks off historical Gazala/Matruh/1st Alamein because of the failure to execute operation freeborn. The worst of Rommel's tactical and strategic blunders happened in the last 2 weeks of the heavy fighting. Most of the heavy fighting in the ATL gazala was done in the first 10 days; and the balance has almost exclusively been British collapse of confidence and continued withdrawal from the DAK, Rommel hasn't had to do anything other than march in the timeline since he defeated the Northumbrian and South African divisions

 

[BELFAST]

Aside from the issue of getting those 7 extra divisions (did Germany even have 5 motorised infantry divisions, never mind having them as spare divisions) - which you rightly point out is a fantasy, the fact that they would be impossible to supply (especially without the British Supply Dump Superstores conveniently placed). Even Rommel would know that.

Alexandria is not usable as a port. All his supplies have to come down one crappy desert road for hundreds of miles. Supplying those extra divisions is a complete fantasy.

Indeed. hard to see him get much more troops.

You don't know the desert, do you. Any history of desert warfare will tell you how absurd that thought Rommel has there is. It was demonstrated, quite clearly, that desert campaigns require, absolutely, the development of water infrastructure to support troops. Adding more troops just makes things worse. There is no water infrastructure beyond the Nile, just sand destroying the trucks and tanks.

And good luck with relying on the Nile. The troops he has aren't used to that water. If they rely on it, one week down the line, and he'll find his troops stricken with dysentery. His forces will be at half strength, if that, for a couple of months, and going nowhere.

The Germans did have treatment for dysentery(Bacillus subtilis).

German Soldiers Forced to Eat Poop to Cure Dysentery Outbreak

What could be worse than being overcome with gut-wrenching cramps, cold sweats, and horrible dizziness in the deserts of North Africa? Maybe the moment

www.warhistoryonline.com

 

[David Flin]

The food thing, is interpretation of Rommel (and other German officers) criticism of Italian officers for having better food than the enlisted men; which I took to mean they didn't in their own command, in some reading about the French mutinies of 1917 I saw the same sort of parallels, so I presumed that it was general policy in both wars

The general of an army needs to be available and ready to be at full potential at a moment's notice. Better food isn't an issue either way; regular food is. Soldiers can go on half-rations (it's not fun), and while the general should shift heaven and earth to correct this, the general cannot afford to have his decision-making abilities impaired.

Given how much Rommel criticised the Italians and decried them as being useless, not always justified, I don't think we can take this one criticism at face value.

A general is not a junior officer. A junior officer running a troop (something about which I know a bit) is entirely expected to share in the hardships of his men (but not necessarily the benefits - when nutty comes through and there is insufficient for everyone, the one person you can guarantee will go without is the junior officer in command. The sergeant, that's another matter. Sergeants are old and wise and steeped in the ways of sin).

A captain of a ship will leave the actually running of the ship to the watchkeeping officers. He'll be on the bridge, sometimes. Other times, he'll be in his cabin, making sure he's ready and alert for when the buzzer goes with the words: "Captain to the Bridge." A captain's cabin is rather more luxurious than those of the ordinary ratings. In larger ships, he might have a day cabin and a night cabin - a luxury in a warship. Captains of ships ran on Catnaps and Kai (hmm - nice title. File that away for future reference).

 

[BELFAST]

My preference for TLs is for historical people within them to respond to different circumstances in ways that plausibly match with what we know of their personality at the time the piece is set. If I were to set a piece in mid 1980s UK, and I had Thatcher vacillating over whether or not to take on the miners, and had her acknowledging that those who disagreed with her had a point, I would be rightfully torn apart for it.

There are, and have been, plenty of TLs where I disagree over details and so forth, but I can see the underpinning logic behind them. That's fine. Plenty of people have differed with details in TLs I wrote, and the TL was the better for this as it forced me to consider whether or not they had a point.

I'll continue to point out areas where I have issues - such as the nonsense about Rommel limiting his ability to make decisions - for the OP to consider.

And as for the concept of an experienced soldier who hasn't learned how to cat-nap, it is to laugh. Every soldier (and sailor and air force person) very quickly learns how to grab sleep as and where they can. It was a trick I certainly learned, enabling me to sleep with my eyes open and vaguely aware of what's going on while standing up, or in any convenient location. (A trick that has come in useful more recently as my cancer now prevents me from sleeping longer than about an hour at a time. So I cat-nap a lot - sleep for an hour, walk for ten minutes, sleep for an hour). The point is, that's standard for any serviceman.

My former boss was a skipper on a herring boat and they would work for 3-4 fore days without normal sleep when they were on the herring.
But lots of catnaps and sleeping standing up. even 20 minutes he said made a big diffenence.

 

[cardcarrier]

The general of an army needs to be available and ready to be at full potential at a moment's notice. Better food isn't an issue either way; regular food is. Soldiers can go on half-rations (it's not fun), and while the general should shift heaven and earth to correct this, the general cannot afford to have his decision-making abilities impaired.

Given how much Rommel criticised the Italians and decried them as being useless, not always justified, I don't think we can take this one criticism at face value.

A general is not a junior officer. A junior officer running a troop (something about which I know a bit) is entirely expected to share in the hardships of his men (but not necessarily the benefits - when nutty comes through and there is insufficient for everyone, the one person you can guarantee will go without is the junior officer in command. The sergeant, that's another matter. Sergeants are old and wise and steeped in the ways of sin).

A captain of a ship will leave the actually running of the ship to the watchkeeping officers. He'll be on the bridge, sometimes. Other times, he'll be in his cabin, making sure he's ready and alert for when the buzzer goes with the words: "Captain to the Bridge." A captain's cabin is rather more luxurious than those of the ordinary ratings. In larger ships, he might have a day cabin and a night cabin - a luxury in a warship. Captains of ships ran on Catnaps and Kai (hmm - nice title. File that away for future reference).

Failure to manage himself as a resource was a shortcoming of Rommel as a commander, probably half his personality, and the other half his meteoric rise to command, going from Major to 5 star general in 10 years, so he didn't have much of a baseline to establish proper behavior patterns as general, let alone attend any sort of line commanders class where they would teach that sort of thing, or have any prolonged time under anyones wing, since most of his superiors where promoted almost as fast as he was; plus Africa was a nearly 100 percent independent command where he could do whatever he wanted, there was no wise older general to order his ass back to HQ where it belonged or to grab 8 hours of sleep to keep a clear mind when needed

Montgomery was the far better model of proper management of an army and army group


theres a difference between visiting the front which Patton and Montgomery did to get a feeling of the conditions, and to boost morale of the troops and taking a Northumbrian bunker with a submachine gun in your hand, which is no place for a 4 star general

 

[ferdi254]

The next harbor Germany has is Tobruk. That is 700 km to the East. A german Opel truck had a range of 300 km.

So one would need around 210 liters of fuel for the truck to have one trip and back. Which of course requires said truck to haul it deducting available food. For 80k men one would need 160 tons of water every day. The Opels could carry 3 tons. That is 2.75 tons after fuel.

which would mean 60 trucks daily alone for the water.

Food will need another 60 trucks. And that is just moving it to Alexandria.

If you assume two traveling days for the trip each way and one for on and offloading you need 600(!) trucks just for food and water. Assuming none breaks down, no spare parts are needed…

And everyday you would need to have 25,200 litres of fuel in Tobruk. Every single day.

And that was just water and food. Not a single shot, no fuel, no spare parts, no nothing. Going further East is simply not in the cards.

 

[David Flin]

The next harbor Germany has is Tobruk. That is 700 km to the East. A german Opel truck had a range of 300 km.

So one would need around 210 liters of fuel for the truck to have one trip and back. Which of course requires said truck to haul it deducting available food. For 80k men one would need 160 tons of water every day. The Opels could carry 3 tons. That is 2.75 tons after fuel.

which would mean 60 trucks daily alone for the water.

Food will need another 60 trucks. And that is just moving it to Alexandria.

If you assume two traveling days for the trip each way and one for on and offloading you need 600(!) trucks just for food and water. Assuming none breaks down, no spare parts are needed…

And everyday you would need to have 25,200 litres of fuel in Tobruk. Every single day.

And that was just water and food. Not a single shot, no fuel, no spare parts, no nothing. Going further East is simply not in the cards.

We've been through these numbers before. Adding fuel requirements, and doubling that total brings us to around 15% of the total German truck production for the entire war.

That assuming that the port at Tobruk can handle these volumes, which it can't. Even at 100% capacity, it physically can't unload the amount needed.

Benghazi, the next closest port, is an extra 450km away.

The numbers have been shrugged off.

 

[ferdi254]

Yes with the reasoning that Rommel mostly lived on captured ressources. But those are gone. Now it is the hard way.

 

[cardcarrier]

Chapter 23.1

6-15-42 23:59 hrs British 8th army and Middle East HQ Suez Egypt Reporting back to American President Roosevelt and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Brig General Bonner Fellers, American military attache to MEGHQ and Pending Chief of Staff GSO1 to American Expeditionary Corps of Egypt
Report sent via US ARMY CIPHER SYSTEM (UNBREAKABLE)

Urgent report and personal observations:

The Panzer Army Africa is confirmed as having arrived in at least corps strength into Alexandria and it's suburbs
Intelligence reports arrival of high ranking German government ministers into Egypt for purposes of making contacts with Farouk
Intelligence reports advanced DAK companies from the 90th light division have reached Damanhur on the extreme western edge of the Delta
8th Army divisions have largely and successfully withdrawn east of the Delta and are approaching our expanded Suez perimeter
GHQ staffers are assessing what equipment may have been abandoned at Alamein to speed the army's withdrawal, the divisions are in tact even in spite of conflict with the Egyptian civilian population
GHQ staffers report west bank ferry terminals and bridges such that Rommel might easily advance have been demolished, and that the army's position should be regarded as secure for now
Rommel is believed to be very low on fuel and other soft supplies, his army strength in our estimate is on the high end of British estimates approximately 85000 men and 300 tanks
Auchinlek in conjunction with my staff believe that the reinvigorated 8th army, with American troops should be fully online and ready for offensive action no later than 9/10
In light of the extreme damage done to the bridging and ferry structures of the western delta; it is essential that additional independent engineer battalions and bridging equipments be dispatched to Egypt in the fastest shipping possible; the 8th army will probably need additional support in these areas as well via the lend lease
GHQ is preparing estimates of Rommel's timetable to return to the offensive and what his offensive options might be; and attempting to foresee if the 8th army can attack before he is ready; bearing in mind every previous GHQ and our own estimates of Rommel's attack dates have always missed the mark
It is hoped that because Rommel would need, for the first time in the African theater masses of bridging equipment no matter what routes of advance he might take, that his form up can be more easily spotted, and that this would be an offensive where finally he might not enjoy tactical surprise
The Panzer Army Africa did demonstrate at Tobruk when it maneuvered through the anti tank ditches, that they had some bridging equipment, but current GHQ estimates are that Rommel at his best can only move a regiment over a water obstacle in any short period of time, it is not presumed that he has moved that equipment up from Tobruk yet
GHQ staffers privately advised me that they do not believe Rommel would try to force the waterways of the delta and nile without sufficient equipment to move at least his 2/3 core German divisions as a fast group
Desert Air Force staffers advise me that it will take several weeks at minimum for the Axis air forces to begin substantially basing themselves in Lower Egypt, and that the strip they have built at El Dabbah is so primitive as to not be worth much to them
Desert Air Force staffers are preparing revised estimates for the number of axis aircraft on hand, but it is presumed they will be hamstrung like the army by lack of fuel in lower Egypt
The preparation of these estimates does not include incoming high performance fighters being diverted from delivery to Malta
The preparation of these estimates does not include possible (likely in our opinion) additional intervention by axis aircraft when Malta capitulates
Lt Colonel Baxter advises that the capitulation of Malta would free up as many as 450 aircraft to further support Rommel's efforts (assuming 50 axis aircraft would be based on the island, and that their suppression/anti shipping operations are supported by 500 aircraft)
Baxter believes that because of the low amounts of fuel available in Egypt, that it would be more likely that these forces could either rotate out with some of Rommel's more depleted squadrons, or could be deployed to Crete for further bombing operations against Egypt, or possibly used to stiffen their air forces in southern Russia if they believe Rommel has the situation in hand, it's a dire unknown
Admiral Harwood and Navy staffers are still in discussion with London about an honorable and humane way to handle the Malta problem, the previously floated idea about negotiating temporary custody to Turkey has been squashed
The loss of Alexandria fleet base and the insecurity closing the Suez Canal means that even emergency resupply by submarine would be long delayed and would likely be too small to affect the outcome of Malta's people
General Gort tells Auchinlek that he will not accept the further food deterioration on Malta as previously planned, in light of Julius being cancelled, he says there are simply too many ration cards to fill and not enough to go around and the belt cannot be tightened more and that the garrison is starving along side the civilian population and will be hardly capable of fighting by the end of the month
Auchinlek is despondent about Malta's fate and is having grave difficulty accepting the garrison would be lost without getting to battle
Smith is also in poor spirits about Malta but has suggested to London, and to Lampson via an intermediary, since they are no longer directly speaking, that they should open up negotiations with the Italians via the Vatican about their taking custody of the island to feed it's civilians and end their plight
Auchinlek has asked Harwood to inquire with Gibraltar fleet command if a great evacuation fleet might be marshaled there and sail to Malta, evacuate the garrison and as many civilians as possible; Harwood says such a mission would require an armada of battleships and aircraft carriers and would entail heavy losses; as surprise would be impossible and the entire central Med is under axis air domination, he was quick to point out the heavy losses the fleet took conducting an evacuation from Crete; he says to run a similar operation at Malta would be more dangerous, and with the allied navies committments in the pacific, the atlantic and supplying materials to Russia in their grave war circumstances, that there simply is no great fleet to muster before Malta will succumb to hunger
Lampson came to me privately and said he will not endorse opening negotiations with the Vatican or any other 3rd party, concerning Malta's fate; he believes that the moment the Italians are met with diplomats for Malta that they will immediately land into the starved garrison and compel their surrender, rendering the negotiations pointless and merely propaganda fuel for the axis
In light of all the above our own staff sees continuing hold the Island as futile and extending human suffering. American bomber squadrons have fuel here and will be able to hit Rommel's main anchorages, and the island can be retaken when the war circumstances improve, if the Vatican can get the bombing to stop and allow foodstuffs onto the island, this would be for the best. It is no longer a base aside Rommel's supply lines, his lines go to Bengahazi, Tobruk and the small fishing villages; blocking Tripoli is no longer worth the heavy losses in ships (even if they can be forced through) that it was before
A GHQ staffer privately told me that London is going to force the final issue with Malta before they cashier Auchinlek so the last bit of stain from the defeat at Gazala can be pinned to him, allowing the next commander to start with a clean slate
Will present additional updates on relations with the Egyptians and state of the army in the Suez perimeter in the next update

end transmission

 

[cardcarrier]

We've been through these numbers before. Adding fuel requirements, and doubling that total brings us to around 15% of the total German truck production for the entire war.

That assuming that the port at Tobruk can handle these volumes, which it can't. Even at 100% capacity, it physically can't unload the amount needed.

Benghazi, the next closest port, is an extra 450km away.

The numbers have been shrugged off.

They havent been shrugged off; Rommel did get to Alamein after all, and remain there without his troops starving to death for 3 and a half months; and that was without capturing Tobruk semi in tact, capturing a segment of military railroad in tact or capturing the balance of the 8th army's stocks in Libya at it's railhead, which has been granted him in the ATL all while case blue was operating at it's highest pitch and army group center was in a life and death battle at Rhzev. The German and Italian quartermaster corps in that period got blood out of a stone

And there is no reason to use Opel Blitz trucks as a measure, by this time period 85 percent of Rommel's trucks where captured British units; if anything the numbers in OTL of fuel burn where much worse since he only captured Tobruk 4 percent in tact and had to have all of his supplies brought up from Bengahzi which is even further away; at least in my timeline he has 1/3 use of Tobruk, so his position is less insane than OTL (a little bit)

when we see things in OTL of the 6th army and Army group A running out of fuel, it should be carefully noted at the same time incredible efforts where made to rebuild Rommel's army in July and August 1200 miles from his primary supply bases, including the consumption of vast amounts of fuel to land replacement tanks at Tripoli and Bengahzi and then march them to the front at Alamein... this is one of the reasons I consider people saying Hitler only cared about the eastern front, as a trope, if someone wanted to check who got more fresh tanks in July and August 1942 Rommel or the 1st/4th panzer army, I would bet the answer would surprise people

 

[CalBear]

If you are dependent on Liddell Hart's skills at getting to the truth from his interviews with German officers post-War, you're in for a fantasy ride.

He swallowed, hook, line, and sinker, the insane levels of flattery (why, Liddell-Hart, your theories were our inspiration and wonderment and even though our operational actions bore no relation to what you proposed, we were in awe of your God-like understanding of the theory of battle. Truly, you were a genius among genii. Please put in a good word for us at our trial where we are accused of knowing things about the Holocaust and war crimes that were committed by our commands and that we knew nothing about even though they were happening under our nose, oh great and wise one). I do not exaggerate by much.

Liddell-Hart's interviews with German officers post-war are worthless. They break all known journalistic criteria (unverified sources, not looking for alternative explanations). In short, the German officers spun him what he wanted to hear, and he went away happy.



Is this from your own imagination, or do you have a source for it? Because the commanding general doing this is an idiotic and insane way of operating. A commanding officer, at any level, who limits their own ability to make quick, accurate decisions is a liability. If they need to know how far a trooper can be pushed on the rations available, you detail off a staff officer to be the (very bad) control. You do not do anything to hamper your own judgement. I know of no reference for such an action except that of the film Battle of the Bulge (that well-known historically accurate source).

And as for the concept of an experienced soldier who hasn't learned how to cat-nap, it is to laugh. Every soldier (and sailor and air force person) very quickly learns how to grab sleep as and where they can. It was a trick I certainly learned, enabling me to sleep with my eyes open and vaguely aware of what's going on while standing up, or in any convenient location. (A trick that has come in useful more recently as my cancer now prevents me from sleeping longer than about an hour at a time. So I cat-nap a lot - sleep for an hour, walk for ten minutes, sleep for an hour). The point is, that's standard for any serviceman.

To the untrained eye, your paragraph above might seem like praise of the almighty Rommel. It's actually pretty damning criticism.

That last sentence is a Bridge too Far.

Stand down.

 

[Gudestein]

Absolutely. And yet we never see this in this TL.

Was the update not exactly describing the consequences of the leadership style, that you complain we never see?

 

[BELFAST]

The next harbor Germany has is Tobruk. That is 700 km to the East. A german Opel truck had a range of 300 km.

So one would need around 210 liters of fuel for the truck to have one trip and back. Which of course requires said truck to haul it deducting available food. For 80k men one would need 160 tons of water every day. The Opels could carry 3 tons. That is 2.75 tons after fuel.

which would mean 60 trucks daily alone for the water.

Food will need another 60 trucks. And that is just moving it to Alexandria.

If you assume two traveling days for the trip each way and one for on and offloading you need 600(!) trucks just for food and water. Assuming none breaks down, no spare parts are needed…

And everyday you would need to have 25,200 litres of fuel in Tobruk. Every single day.

And that was just water and food. Not a single shot, no fuel, no spare parts, no nothing. Going further East is simply not in the cards.

Could fishing boats be used to move supplies past Tobruk and offloaded to the small fishing ports east of Tobruk.
Not enough to supply the army but it might help a little.

 

[cardcarrier]

Could fishing bats be used to move supplies past Tobruk and offloaded to the small fishing ports east of Tobruk.
Not enough to supply the army but it might help a little.

Rommel has a difficult deal (better than otl but still enough to drive any supply officer to drink to liver failure)

He has full use of Bengahzi and Tripoli which are far away, but very safe now that the Alexandria fleet is withdrawn, and Malta is neutralized and those ports combined, in theory can handle ~60k tons of cargo a month, enough to meet all the PAA needs for offensive warfare (more or less)

He has some use of Tobruk, which in it's current state can handle ~7.5k tons of cargo a month. Tobruk (temporarily) is pretty safe
He has the ability to move supplies from Tobruk to Sollum via the military rail road which he captured in tact (that segment only, the railroad in Egypt is otherwise destroyed in front of him in this timeline)

He captured the small fishing ports on the frontier in tact in between Toburk and Sollum; so to the degree the Italians would be willing to use coastal convoys of light vessels to they could land some stuff at the fishing ports and get it onto the railroad to be pushed to Sollum; he has nothing tangible in Egypt other than just beaching shit

The Italians made use of coastal convoys in the gulf of sirte throughout 1941 until Rommel pushed the British back at Gazala. They even ran a version of the Tokyo express when force K was super active where troops, ammo fuel and soft stores where loaded aboard destroyers or light cruisers and sent on fast missions to help resupply the PAA

 

[wietze]

Rommel has a difficult deal (better than otl but still enough to drive any supply officer to drink to liver failure)

He has full use of Bengahzi and Tripoli which are far away, but very safe now that the Alexandria fleet is withdrawn, and Malta is neutralized and those ports combined, in theory can handle ~60k tons of cargo a month, enough to meet all the PAA needs for offensive warfare (more or less)

so the arial corridor to them is also safe? that means the Me 323s can be used a lot more efficient, in otl a lot of them got shot down

Messerschmitt Me 323 Gigant - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org