Operation Compass, Part 5.
25 - 31 December 1940. Tobruk
The reconnaissance work of the 11th Hussars, backed up by 7th Armoured Brigade, had allowed General O’Connor to have a good picture of the Italian position at Tobruk already. In many ways the Italian defences were very similar to Bardia’s, and as far as could be gathered, manned by fewer troops. This was confirmed on examining some captured papers in Bardia. Having allowed his force to rest on Christmas Day, General Creagh was given the task of moving up his two Armoured Brigades and the 7th Support Group, to capture the Italian airfield at El Adem, then cut the road between Tobruk and Gazala.
The British 16th Brigade was dispatched along the road towards Tobruk, accompanied by 48th Bn RTR, both units having been in reserve for the assault on Bardia. O’Connor thought about attempting to attack Tobruk ‘on the bounce’ just with the three British infantry battalions and the Infantry Tanks, backed up by the 7th Armoured Division. Too many things could go wrong, and if there were 25000 Italians, and if they resisted more comprehensibly than they’d done up until then, attacking with only 1800 men might be a disaster. The idea was shelved.
While Bardia’s harbour had been captured it was found to be badly damaged, not so much by the Italians, but by the Royal Navy, especially the gunboat HMS Aphis which had entered the port some days previously and laid waste to it. This had the effect that bulk cargoes still had to be offloaded at Sidi Barrani and Sollum. Work to improve the facilities at Sollum meant that it was increasing the tonnage it was able to deal with, it was hoped to increase this to 500 tons per day, but that was still some weeks away.
The RASC was therefore once more having to run long convoys of trucks over large distances, often in appalling sand storms. The windfall of Italian trucks was much needed, but these were unfamiliar to their new owners, and all too many were wrecked or damaged by ill-use. General Hutchison had hoped for the Italian windfall, and with his contacts in Cairo and elsewhere tried to get some RASC men trained in the use and maintenance of the Italian makes and models, as some of these were present in the civilian population. This would pay off over time, but the immediate needs were the priority. Losses among the trucks and lorries was running as high as 40% as time went on. Part of the problem was if a lorry broke down, rather than being towed back to a workshop and fixed, usually a small matter of a spare part, it tended to be stripped of parts by other lorries passing. Before long, it would be little more than a carcass stripped bare, and beyond repair.
The best news in the capture of Bardia for the quartermasters was that the water plant was intact. This was soon pumping water again back to Fort Capuzzo’s cisterns, having cleaned them out of the salty water first discovered there. The Italians also had large quantities of bottled mineral water. A lot of this had to be distributed among the Italian POWs, so that they had something refillable as they were marched back through Sollum to Sidi Barrani, then onwards towards the Delta.
The Italian artillery men had often destroyed their gun sights before surrendering, and radios were smashed, so that a lot of captured equipment, which would have been useful, had been put beyond use. This had caused rumours back in Cairo that the Australians were looting and pillaging, destroying valuable assets. None of this was particularly true. Large quantities of the Italian rations and clothing were having to be given to the POWs, as the numbers being processed were so much greater than what had been planned for.
Some things were taken over by the Australians. The Australians made up some of their deficit in anti-tank guns and mortars with captured Italian weapons. Italian groundsheets and boots had become much prized, the Australian’s own boots had been worn out with all their marching. Italian groundsheets were found to make reasonable tents, some pistols, watches and compasses were ‘acquired’ but systematic looting was an unfair accusation. The Australians also enjoyed a lot of practice with Italian grenades, mortars and guns to get used to them all.
The Divisional Cavalry Regiment had supplemented their Bren carriers with a variety of Italian tankettes, they’d even taken over six each M11/39 and M13/40 tanks. The Royal Tank Regiment lent them some fitters and mechanics to help them get used to the diesel engines, and soon their crews were soon proficient enough. The sides of the captured vehicles were emblazoned with a kangaroo to notify everyone that they were under new management.
When the 19th Australian Brigade arrived at Bardia from Sidi Barrani on December 27th, the other two Australian Brigades, along with the two Tank Battalions, began the journey to Tobruk. Having begun as the least well equipped of the three Australian Brigades, the 19th Brigade had made the most of the Italian weapons captured at Sidi Barrani and now was fully equipped, some would argue, over equipped.
The distance of some seventy miles to Tobruk from Bardia meant that two new Field Supply Depots had to be created for the two Divisions, halfway between Bardia and Tobruk at Gambut, 180 miles from the railhead at Marsa Matruh. Amongst the movement forward were some of the 7th Armoured Division’s support units. By moving an RAOC workshop to Bardia it would allow the stricken Valiants to be fixed up and provide the Cruiser tanks with support a bit closer to the front. Likewise, the RAF were moving some of their ground crew forward, with the aviation fuel and Italian bombs discovered on some of the landing strips, made life a little easier for the Desert Air Force.
With 7th Armoured Brigade in the lead, they found the Italian airfield at El Adem, which was also a repair depot for the Regia Aeronautica, (the Italian Royal Air Force), which was taken by 8th Hussars without any opposition by the evening of 26 December. A supply of water was found which, while not potable, was able to be distributed for the purposes of washing. The 1st Bn RTR carried on forward to Acroma, where, with a company of infantry from 1st Kings Royal Rifle Corps and a battery of guns, they dominated the coastal road. The Valiant I* tanks 3rd Sharpshooters repeated their role of cutting the road beyond the Italian position of Tobruk, with another company of 2nd Rifle Brigade and a battery of anti-tank supporting them.
4th Armoured Brigade had taken a more direct route through Gambut, clearing the way for the 16th Infantry Brigade coming behind them, and then moved up towards the eastern and southern perimeter of the Italian position. An Italian artillery barrage made the tanks, with the 1st Kings Royal Rifle Corps in lorries, pull back out of range. An attack on the bounce without enough artillery support would have been very costly. The 4th Armoured Brigade held these positions until the arrival of the three British infantry battalions, 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment, 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment, who took up positions and dug in around the Italian’s perimeter. The 48th Bn RTR were held back out of sight of the Italians. Once the infantry was settled in, they began aggressive patrolling in their sectors looking for weak points and capturing unwary sentries.
To the south, 11th Hussars’ armoured cars found the Italian landing ground at Bir el Gubi deserted and carried on to Bir Hacheim. Further south again patrols from the Long Range Desert Group kept an eye of known and potential Italian positions.
When General Mackay came forward to Tobruk, consulting with Brigadier Greenfield (16th Brigade) and the two Armoured Brigade Commanding Officers, it was obvious that the same plan which had worked at Bardia would likely work just as well here. An infantry attack to open the door for the Infantry Tanks, which would then work their way through the Italian defences with infantry support, covered by artillery.
Brigadier Greenfield was keen for his men to make the initial assault, since they had sat out the last one. General Mackay thought that the two Australian Brigades could do it again without as much rehearsal of working with the tanks. All that was necessary was for the artillery to come up, with full stocks of ammunition, and if the British Brigade were able to do the reconnaissance patrols, finding the best place to break in, then the Australians would do the rest. One of the advantages of the speedy fall of Bardia was that the artillery still had good stocks of ammunition already at hand. What had to be brought forward was enough to replace what had been fired off during the assault.
General O’Connor found himself going back and forth chasing up supplies. If Tobruk’s harbour could be taken, then this would simplify his supply lines significantly. He was aware that the RAF were doing their best to keep up, and with the capture of El Adem, the Italian Air Force were now operating from further away, so the air situation was still in British favour. Having lost the 4th Indian Division to the attack on Sudan, O’Connor was aware that General Wavell was under pressure to keep supporting the Greeks. Two of the RAF squadrons that had been available at Sidi Barrani had already been withdrawn for that purpose.
O’Connor had consulted Wavell, who had come forward to Sidi Barrani, about what the objectives of Operation Compass were now. Having achieved the first objective, to knock the Italians out of Egypt, O’Connor wanted clarity about the follow up. Capturing Tobruk would allow the possibility of capturing Benghazi, and that was a port which would really open up the rest of Libya to the British if captured. That was a very different proposal to what was begun. Churchill, when consulted by Chief of the Imperial General Staff, over the matter still had one eye on Greece, but was delighted at the way Compass had gone so far. The Greeks had done an excellent job throwing back the Italians, what further help they would want would need to be assessed. Wavell could see the possibility that if Compass knocked the Italians out of Cyrenaica this would give Mussolini another major blow, especially if the work to be done in Sudan went well. Wavell supported O’Connor’s desire that Tobruk should be captured, then a proper review could be done.
Having this received this confirmation, O’Connor spoke to General Mackay and Brigadier Naesmyth to figure out how quickly they’d be ready. General Mackay had been thinking about it too, and he was concerned that the edge would come off the men if they stayed around too long in the living conditions they were enduring. From his point of view, the British patrolling had shown that there was a pretty obvious place to attack near post 57, but there were two issues. The first was the artillery support. As long as there were enough shells for the guns, then he’d be ready to go. The second was the discovery of a line of booby-traps in front of the anti-tank ditch. These would add to the burden of the engineers in the early phase of the assault.
Naesmyth agreed about being ready. While some of the Valiant Tanks that had been seriously damaged were still back at Bardia, and there were always a few that needed a bit of maintenance, his three battalions still numbered the best part of 150 tanks. The use of Close Support tanks with their HE shells had proven extremely useful, and if General Creagh would agree to lend them, even just the Valiant I* CS tanks, then Naesmyth’s Tank Brigade was ready to go. One difference to the attack on Bardia was noted however, and that was the need to get in among the Italian artillery line as quickly as possible.
Looking at Mackay’s plan O’Connor was conscious that while the two Australian Brigades had been enough for the battle at Bardia, he believed that the 16th Brigade would be needed to penetrate towards Tobruk itself while the two Australian Brigades rolled up the Italian defenders along the line. Mackay agreed and the fine tuning of the planning was able to begin. O’Connor also ordered General Creagh that when the time came, 7th Armoured Division were to demonstrate in support of the attack and to keep the Italians on the eastern side of the perimeter guessing. Meanwhile 11th Hussars would continue to press forward towards Derna and Mechili to see what the lay of the land was.
O’Connor consulted with the quartermasters, who assured him that more artillery shells were due, so they set the date for the assault for the early hours of the morning of 3 January 1941. His Royal Navy and Royal Air Force liaisons, now that a date was set, began to coordinate the help that would be needed from the sea and air.
Brigadier Herring, Commanding Officer Royal Artillery, 6th Australia Division, had his work cut out. His men had been assiduously working to map the Italian artillery positions using captured maps, aerial photographs and flash-spotting (taking bearings on the flashes of enemy guns and recording the time of flight of their shells). Once they had fixed the positions of the Italian batteries, they could ensure that accurate fire would be brought down on them on the critical day.
Herring and his staff also had a complex series of timed barrages to work out with the tanks and infantry. Once the battle started it was very difficult to coordinated between the attacking force and the covering artillery. The 16th British Brigade particularly needed a more flexible support plan, so an observer from the designated Field Regiment would accompany each Battalion HQ, and the 48th Bn Royal Tank Regiment would keep back a radio link tank between the infantry battalion and the Royal Artillery Field Regiment. Thankfully, there were enough tanks that leaving a few out of the assault was possible.
