Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
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Derek Pullem
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That means they may get to Homs - it's still a long way to Tripoli and the danger is a worm out WDF meeting fresh (but inexperienced) AK units on the road to Tripoli
Okay then. So at this point it's no more notable than any of the other tiny seaside villages/settlements on the Bay of Sidra? I think Wavell will have to reign O'Conner in, after Brega, despite him temporarily having the supplies to push further.
Derek Pullem
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Its only notable feature is an Ottoman era fort that was upgraded by the italians after they took over in 1912
Without consulting my references, I seem to remember Sirte was a very small harbour. basically a pier capable of holding a 3 ton truck and its load and with a small draught alongside, possibly capable of taking a small coaster of perhaps 50-60 tons cargo. Certainly not the answer to a logisticians prayers!
Probable not even enough to keep a significant garrison in food and water, never mind any other supplies.
Not sure if I brought this up on this forum before.
OTL, 9 Feb 1941, Italian steamers IV NOVEMBRE (61 GRT), TENAX (115grt) and ROSANNA ( 205 grt) were lost in stranding on the Sirte Coast.
Italian Steamer EMILIA GUIDI (472grt) and TERESUCCIA (313 grt) were scuttled at Mersa El Braga.
This may suggest how small the harbours were along this stretch of coast. IIRC, grt is a volume measurement and not a weight measurement. 100 cubic feet = 1 GRT??? So this suggests the harbours along this coast were used to coasters that carried an average of 100grt with the larger (?) harbours capable of taking up to 400 grt. But with waht handling equipment?
OTL, 9 Feb 1941, Italian steamers IV NOVEMBRE (61 GRT), TENAX (115grt) and ROSANNA ( 205 grt) were lost in stranding on the Sirte Coast.
Italian Steamer EMILIA GUIDI (472grt) and TERESUCCIA (313 grt) were scuttled at Mersa El Braga.
This may suggest how small the harbours were along this stretch of coast. IIRC, grt is a volume measurement and not a weight measurement. 100 cubic feet = 1 GRT??? So this suggests the harbours along this coast were used to coasters that carried an average of 100grt with the larger (?) harbours capable of taking up to 400 grt. But with waht handling equipment?
There may be a POD here that could help. I did say the convoys were held up in Palermo while the RN carried out operations in the area. What if the harbour-masters decided it was safe to send a convoy across to Tripoli and the RN forces blundered into it. Bang goes about half of the DAK initial AFVs. Up to our esteemed author of course!
Derek Pullem
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Agree here - but the OTL focus on Greece would direct the RN attention away from Tripoli / Sicily. I'm not sure that changes ITTL yet.
A lot of changes have happened hell the fact they are holding some tanks in a reserve is a major plus when compared to OTL and the whole Operation Compass is proceeding a lot more rapidly as well and the logistics situation seems a better as well.
Depending on the escort and sea conditions that could be a disaster for the convoy especially if visibility drops at the worst time for them also adding to this the RN had a lot of subs in the Med too as well all it takes is one of them being in position at the right time.
However, the OTL focus being on Greece still did not stop the Italian and perhaps German Harbour-masters from stopping the convoys due to RN activity in their Area of Operations. In other words. OTL there was enough happening to suggest that a convoy or two going from Naples to Tripoli was likely to meet a rather unhappy end if it was allowed to proceed.
indeed, on 5th march. OTL, HMS/M Upright and Utmost departed Malta for patrols on the Tripoli convoy route and HMS/M Truant departed Malta for a coastal patrol in the Gulf of Sirte.
9 march 1941 -HMS/M Utmost sinks an Italian Steamer in the Gulf of Hammamet at 39.09N, 11.07E.
Not beyond the bounds of probability?
However, as this whole Timeline is based on a tank designer surviving, I can see why the OP may want to ignore this. And I understand why he may want to keep the North Africa fanboys at bay. It is after all his vision of what a small matter can affect the future. Dare I say, for want of a nail? And he has followed this principle exceedingly well.
SO the British getting to Tripoli before the Germans isn't going to happen. No matter what there will have to be a halt somewhere. The British do have quite a lot going for them ITTL however.
As it stands we are 3 weeks ahead of OTL. If nothing else changes Britain will reach El Aghelia on the 19th of January. Not that other things wont change. The faster advance will likely catch Italian units and positions completely flat footed.
The captured Italian trucks will be a great help, yes not all of them can be put into service straight away but while not ideal is not much of a problem. Having the ability to put a few into service straight away is a nice bonus but also having a reserve of trucks isn't a bad thing. As the British trucks wear out and break down it becomes possible to train the driver on the Italian trucks and put him back into supplying the WDF. This sort of thing has already been considered see here
What does this all mean, well a quicker resumption of the advance. Britain can't just decide it is going to Tripoli and set off. Supply dumps and maintenance stations lines of communication etc need setting up on the way. How easy this is depends on what sort of resistance the Italians are able to mount. If they aren't able to mount any sort of serious and organised resistance the British will know. Patrolling will give the British an idea of what is in front of them and it likely won't be much. At that point while a large portion of the WDF may sit in place resting and refitting before the next big move I would not be surprised to see a smaller formation sent ahead to capture convenient locations for supply dumps etc. Think of it as a reconnaissance in force that is laying the groundwork for the main force to move up behind. Then when the main force does mover it has supplies of food, POL and water ready to supplement those it is bringing with it. How far that advance force Might go depends but Sirte is as good a place as any to aim for and set up a more permanent base of operations to launch the next push from. It is pretty much half way from El Aghelia and Misrata so as a point to move the main force too before starting the next push it may well be considered convenient.
As it stands we are 3 weeks ahead of OTL. If nothing else changes Britain will reach El Aghelia on the 19th of January. Not that other things wont change. The faster advance will likely catch Italian units and positions completely flat footed.
The captured Italian trucks will be a great help, yes not all of them can be put into service straight away but while not ideal is not much of a problem. Having the ability to put a few into service straight away is a nice bonus but also having a reserve of trucks isn't a bad thing. As the British trucks wear out and break down it becomes possible to train the driver on the Italian trucks and put him back into supplying the WDF. This sort of thing has already been considered see here
So while you aren't getting a massive surge of new(ish) trucks instead you hopefully have a much more consistent level of supply across the campaign. This will only improve as time goes on as more and more people get familiar with the Italian equipment and ports closer to the front open up reducing the wear on the trucks.
What does this all mean, well a quicker resumption of the advance. Britain can't just decide it is going to Tripoli and set off. Supply dumps and maintenance stations lines of communication etc need setting up on the way. How easy this is depends on what sort of resistance the Italians are able to mount. If they aren't able to mount any sort of serious and organised resistance the British will know. Patrolling will give the British an idea of what is in front of them and it likely won't be much. At that point while a large portion of the WDF may sit in place resting and refitting before the next big move I would not be surprised to see a smaller formation sent ahead to capture convenient locations for supply dumps etc. Think of it as a reconnaissance in force that is laying the groundwork for the main force to move up behind. Then when the main force does mover it has supplies of food, POL and water ready to supplement those it is bringing with it. How far that advance force Might go depends but Sirte is as good a place as any to aim for and set up a more permanent base of operations to launch the next push from. It is pretty much half way from El Aghelia and Misrata so as a point to move the main force too before starting the next push it may well be considered convenient.
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I seem to remember that one of the forward points for the UK and one of the stop points for the Axis had marshes basically from just inland of the coast to who cares- it's too far to go around. I don't think it was too far forward of El Agheila but I have been known to be wrong before. SHMBO keeps telling me! If Rommel, assuming he does appear on the scene, wants to smash his head against this position because he cannot outflank it, and in addition comes up against the Valiants, all to the good.
That may be a convenient stop point for the WDF as it does provide a narrow front with little capacity to outflank it. I may be able to find time tomorrow to look it up.
That may be a convenient stop point for the WDF as it does provide a narrow front with little capacity to outflank it. I may be able to find time tomorrow to look it up.
Derek Pullem
Donor
Not sure Sirte is a big enough base to support what is close to an army. That would be Benghazi.
Looking at the map then a forward base at El Aghelia or even Agedabia would seem to be sensible - perhaps concentrate on reinforcing the supply lines to Benghazi.
It might be worth sending out a reconnaissance in force to see if the italian positions on the road to Tripoli will collapse but they don't have the logistical capability yet to assault Tripoli itself
Looking at the map then a forward base at El Aghelia or even Agedabia would seem to be sensible - perhaps concentrate on reinforcing the supply lines to Benghazi.
It might be worth sending out a reconnaissance in force to see if the italian positions on the road to Tripoli will collapse but they don't have the logistical capability yet to assault Tripoli itself
A thing people haven't really considered about the trucks that the ones that have scavenged parts are going to intermittently break down more often than British trucks or new Italian trucks due to the differing wear on the various scavenged parts mixed in with the other somewhat newer parts that are in the trucks so breakdowns will come at random points which will affect the various transportation and logistics schedule.
Its why engineers and mechanics tend not to like using scavenged parts in more normal times due to the unpredictability of scavenged parts though they are used in a pinch like the current situation.
Edit: There are also scavenged parts you don't use like drive belts or gaskets.
Its why engineers and mechanics tend not to like using scavenged parts in more normal times due to the unpredictability of scavenged parts though they are used in a pinch like the current situation.
Edit: There are also scavenged parts you don't use like drive belts or gaskets.
Fixed, I always forget the second n so went to quickly edit it and selected the wrong word apparently.
I was using the term "Base" loosely there. As you say the ability to assault Tripoli wont be there right away. In addition seeing if the Italians on the road to Tripoli will fold is worth it if you can supply the force, ITTL you probably can and have enough to spare to try. You still have to move the rest of the Army up the road however. Assuming Benghazi is captured relatively intact and the port can be opened quickly the British will have a lot of supplies landing at either Tobruk or Benghazi that will be arriving to not only support the army but also to build up supplies for the next stage of the advance. Diverting some of those "Surplus" supplies to points up the road already captured and secured saves the work of doing it later and lets the main force move along the road much more smoothly so that when they do get to the point of the next big push the force is in better overall condition.
it is going to be a given that the WDF will have to halt somewhere just to rest and repair. Using that time and hopefully better logistics to make the journey forwards easier isn't a bad plan to me.
From my notes for a lecture I gave some years ago,
PORT CAPACITIES
Tobruk Feb 1941 – could unload 900 tons/day (German est max 800 tons/day) Creveld suggests in theory 1500tons/day but rarely reached 600tons/day under German control.
Tripoli
Coastal shipping – theoretical 50000 tons month ie 1500 tons/day. Only enough shipping for 15000 tons/month. ie 500 tons /day due to lighterage problems.
Discharge at piers 1000-1750 tons/day (german est 70000 metric tons/month = 2300tons day, rather optimistic.)
4-5 berths depending on size of ships. 5 cargo ships or 4 troopships. Creveld claims only 1500 tons/day with no air raids etc.
Benghazi – 750 tons/day (German est 1000 tons day) Creveld suggest 700-800 was only exceptionally reached . Poss due to air raids etc. Eventually by 43 was doing 2700tons/day. Of course this was after the Axis forces were somewhere like Tunisia and the base forces had been able to clear the port of block ships, sunken ships, mines etc and power up the port facilities free of bombing raids etc.
Sollum – only 2 lighterage piers in 1941.
These were the main ports in the area. Places like Sirte, Mersa Braga, etc were not even considered as part of the logistic plan.
PORT CAPACITIES
Tobruk Feb 1941 – could unload 900 tons/day (German est max 800 tons/day) Creveld suggests in theory 1500tons/day but rarely reached 600tons/day under German control.
Tripoli
Coastal shipping – theoretical 50000 tons month ie 1500 tons/day. Only enough shipping for 15000 tons/month. ie 500 tons /day due to lighterage problems.
Discharge at piers 1000-1750 tons/day (german est 70000 metric tons/month = 2300tons day, rather optimistic.)
4-5 berths depending on size of ships. 5 cargo ships or 4 troopships. Creveld claims only 1500 tons/day with no air raids etc.
Benghazi – 750 tons/day (German est 1000 tons day) Creveld suggest 700-800 was only exceptionally reached . Poss due to air raids etc. Eventually by 43 was doing 2700tons/day. Of course this was after the Axis forces were somewhere like Tunisia and the base forces had been able to clear the port of block ships, sunken ships, mines etc and power up the port facilities free of bombing raids etc.
Sollum – only 2 lighterage piers in 1941.
These were the main ports in the area. Places like Sirte, Mersa Braga, etc were not even considered as part of the logistic plan.
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