Sooty
Banned
There are theories that crop circles are not produced by aliens, but by second lieutenant’s on navigational exercises!
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
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In this TL Bugs is probably Rommel with 7th Armoured & 4th(?) Indian as the bull.
Bugs ultimately wiped the floor with the Bull if remember this particular cartoon correctly.
All we want is perfection now. Is that so unreasonable?
More seriously, it's hard enough writing a half-coherent comment, and it's clear that writing an episode is a lot more work. Even more so when you consider that real life doesn't have to explain its outcomes like an author does.
I'm looking forward to reading Day 3 which could go many different ways for a dozen dìfferent reasons.
Edited to make it half-coherent, mere minutes after first posting it.
Last edited:
Well it was steaming up his tail.Bugs ultimately wiped the floor with the Bull if remember this particular cartoon correctly.
9 June 1941. Operation Battleaxe. Day 3. (Part 1)
allanpcameron
Donor
9 June 1941. Operation Battleaxe. Day 3.
The overnight preparations for the 6th Infantry Division’s attack on Nofilia’s Italian/German positions had included a raid by RAF Wellingtons. They had been guided onto the target by Fleet Air Arm Albacores which had dropped flares to mark the target. The main effort had been directed to the south and west of the main positions to provide enough clearance from the forward British positions, which had also used flares to designate their positions to prevent any casualties. There was some doubt about the sense and efficacy of this raid. Would the Wellingtons not be better off bombing known German airfields and supply dumps further back? Tripoli was often their main target.
Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, had been working with Lieutenant General O’Connor to fix some of the problems of communications and expectations between the army and RAF. The experience in Greece had reinforced the need for better cooperation, not only in protection from the Luftwaffe, but also in the kind of ground attack work that the army had been the victim of. Some of the problems with Operation Brevity had led to a conversation and some tentative plans, which had been tested during exercises. With a force of only about 100 bombers and 100 fighters to cover Operation Battleaxe, Tedder had agreed to using this force to its maximum capacity for four days. In the lead up to the action, strategic targets would be bombed, but once the operation got underway, the focus would be on army cooperation. Various lessons had been learned, especially by the squadrons working in East Africa. The use of coloured smoke and flares to mark friendly infantry and tank positions, and the Royal Artillery’s use of smoke shells to mark enemy targets had been tested and refined in the exercises leading up to the operation.
Each British Division had an RAF liaison team, in direct radio communication with 204 Group’s forward HQ at Agedabia, so that requests for air support could be processed as quickly as possible. A network of mobile radar sets had been established to protect Benghazi and the main British line at El Agheila. This had given the fighter squadrons some warning to intercept Luftwaffe raids. All of this had improved the security of the British build-up for the operations.
Using the Wellingtons of 257 Wing so close to the front line was a gamble, but the British army had learned the hard way that if the only aircraft you see are the enemy’s, then it is bad for morale. The men of 6th Infantry Division had a good view of the bombs going off a few miles away, and heartened that the RAF’s bombs hadn’t fallen on themselves, were assured that they were not alone. Once more at first light, the forward British positions covered themselves in smoke, and Blenheims and Marylands once more struck at low level, with the German and Italian artillery positions as their main target. Two Blenheims were shot down and one Maryland limped home with one of its engines destroyed by flak. For large parts of the day at least a flight of Hurricanes or Tomahawks were visible to the British troops assaulting the defences. A few efforts by the Luftwaffe to strike the British were made, but without much success.
44th Bn RTR, supporting the 23rd Brigade (2nd Bn York and Lancaster Regiment; 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment and 1st Battalion the Buffs), began to take casualties among the tanks. The presence of guns that could knock out the Valiant I Infantry Tank Mark III from the kind of distances they were being hit from was a bit of a shock. The British tank crews had gotten used to being pretty safe within their tanks at anything greater than short range. Being picked off without a clear reason was worrying. One survivor noted it was like being ambushed by a sniper, not knowing where the fatal shot had come from. Despite the best efforts of the CS tanks to lay down smoke and fire at potential threats, six tanks were destroyed before the initial assault had even begun. Frantic radio calls to the Royal Artillery to shift their fire to the presumed enemy positions were ineffective, as the range from which the fire was coming was underestimated.
Knowing that the Italians had had plenty of time to deepen their defences and with the intelligence that there was at least an Italian motorised Division plus the two German Panzer Divisions in the vicinity, Major-General John Evetts’ plan was for a measured approach, with plenty of artillery cover, starting at the enemy’s left flank on the sea.
When the planning had been looked at, it had been considered to use the Commandos in conjunction with the Royal Navy bombardment to land behind the enemy positions, cutting the road to Sirte, and holding there until relieved. General Wavell was still looking at eventually taking Rhodes, and he didn’t want to use up his only effective amphibious force in what might be a suicide mission. Instead, the Royal Navy’s ongoing support for Operation Battleaxe was provided by the Inshore Squadron, consisting of three Insect Class gunboats, HMS Cricket, Gnat and Ladybird, with two Australian destroyers HMAS Voyager and Vampire and two sloops, HMS Auckland and HMAS Parramatta. These ships had approached the coast during the night and spent two hours, beginning just after the Blenheims and Marylands of the RAF had bombed the Italian positions, adding the weight of their 6-inch and 4-inch guns to 6th Division’s Royal Artillery barrage. The timing of the ships’ bombardment had been worked out to make sure that their return to Benghazi was under a protective umbrella of fighters for as long as possible.
The intensity of the bombardment from air, sea and land had given the Italian commander cause for despair. Even with all the time he’d had to prepare, and the beach flank had had plenty of protection, withstanding the weight of fire on them was all but impossible for the defenders. The fact that the bombardment was followed up quickly by the assault companies of 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment and 1st Battalion the Buffs, following the tanks of 44th Bn Royal Tank Regiment, had the Italian left flank positions totally under British control by mid-afternoon.
When the focus of the bombardment was seen clearly at that end of the line, General Hans Von Ravenstein offered the Italian commander, Luigi Nuvoloni, to move some of his 5th Light Division assets to the second line of defence in that area. One of his panzer battalions, II Abteilung of 5th Panzer Regiment, had been put under the command of 15th Panzer Division. He was able to offer one of his Machine gun Battalions, an anti-tank company in addition to a company of Panzerjäger I self-propelled guns. This had been quickly agreed, and the German troops moved quickly to reinforce Italian troops.
This movement meant that as the 2nd Bn York and Lancaster Regiment tried to move forward through the positions captured by the rest of the Brigade they were immediately stopped. The Valiant tanks were within the kill range of the German Pak 38 5cm anti-tank gun and even the Czech 47mm guns. While the Close Support variants did their best to suppress the German anti-tank fire, the decision was made by the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Alexander Galloway, to hold the positions gained and prepare for the probable counter-attack.
As 23rd Brigade’s momentum was lost, General Evetts ordered Brigadier Cyril Lomax’s 16th Brigade to make an effort to attack the Italian line to the left of 23rd Brigade’s positions. The continuing loss of Valiant tanks to high velocity shots meant that the initial infantry assault by 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders went in with inadequate tank support, and very quickly bogged down.
Evetts had been primed to expect that his Division would perhaps have to prepare to be the subject of a German panzer counterattack. The Commanding Officer of 7th Tank Brigade, Brigadier Reginald Naesmyth, had prepared for this eventuality by having at least one Squadron of each tank Battalion held back from direct support of the infantry, to always be on overwatch for German panzers, working primarily with each Brigade’s anti-tank gunners. Between the towed 2-pdr guns of the anti-tank regiments, and those of the tanks, it was expected that any panzers would be hard pressed to break through.
The escarpment east of Nofilia extended some twenty-five miles along the coast before a route onto the coast road could be found at Wadi Matratin. It was this route that the 22nd Armoured Division (22nd Armoured Brigade & 3rd Indian Motor Brigade) had been protecting, covering 6th Infantry Division’s advance. It was this route that General Rommel wanted 15th Panzer Division to take, and get in behind the British on the coast road. The 15th Panzer Division had set off just after noon when it was judged that the Italians would hold with German help. With the information from the RAF’s reconnaissance, and their attempts to continue to bomb and strafe the German panzers, Major-General Gambier-Parry had forewarning that the arrival of German forces. He had taken up a primarily defensive position, with each of the armoured Regiments and Indian Cavalry Regiments supporting one another. Much had been learned during Operation Brevity by these two Brigades about fighting German panzers, and those lessons were put to good effect, especially as they were fighting over much the same ground as previously.
The 104th and 106th Royal Horse Artillery Regiments, attached to 22nd Armoured Brigade, supplemented by 234 Battery of 68th Medium RA from XIII Corps Troops, held their fire initially. The attempts at camouflage had been done in the hope of drawing the majority of the German Division into the killing zone. The Valiant I* tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade, (2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars (RGH), 3rd & 4th Sharpshooters, County of London Yeomanry (CLY)) numbered 112 tanks, some fifty-odd short of full strength. The crews had been bloodied and knew the limitations of their tanks and its gun, though each tank had two of the new APC 2-pdr shell. (The Indian anti-tank gunners had received five of these shells for each gun.)
The fact that the RAF had been bombing 15th Panzer Division’s columns regularly, causing losses and delays, had the Luftwaffe liaison at Rommel’s HQ endure a very sharp reprimand. General Neumann-Silkow had communicated his annoyance at the lack of Luftwaffe cover to protect the movement of his Division, but particularly concerning was the lack of reconnaissance about the whereabouts of the British Armoured Division. He had assumed, and General Rommel had agreed, that they were likely to be in the area of Wadi Matratin, either advancing towards Nofilia, or dug in protecting access to the coast road. Since the latter would be a waste of an Armoured Division, it was more likely to be what the British would be doing. The Division’s reconnaissance battalion (Aufklaerungs Abteilung 33) had been probing ahead of the main force, and they reported that they had begun to meet British positions at the top of the Wadi access. The reports noted that the British were in a defensive formation, exact numbers couldn’t be ascertained, but it certainly looked like they’d found the Armoured Division. The whereabouts of the Australian Division was still unknown.
The options available to the German commanders were to attack the British head-on, or to find a flank to try to turn and get behind to unseat them. There was in fact only one option, and that wasn’t to attack head on. The reconnaissance Battalion was already spreading out looking for another route to go around the British positions. One of the infantry regiments, with artillery and anti-tank support, along with the Panzer Battalion from 5th Panzer Regiment were ordered to fix the British in place, while the rest of the Division started about 14:00hrs towards Ras El Ali and the coast road.
When this had happened during Operation Brevity, the possibility of being flanked had caused the British to withdraw to Ras El Ali, giving up on capturing Nofilia. This time, it was the signal for the 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Divisions to move towards Nofilia from the south. The majority of German tanks were now thirty miles, and at least two hours, from the main line of resistance. Elements of the 9th Australian Division were in solid defensive positions at Ras El Ali, and with the 22nd Armoured Brigade in the vicinity, the expectation was that the Australians, with RAF support, could hold off the panzer attack for long enough. Even if the Germans managed to break through at Ras El Ali, the main line of defences at El Agheila were still manned by the rest of the Australian Division. Lieutenant General O’Connor was confident that once the Germans discovered a British Armoured Division and two Infantry Divisions were cutting off the panzers from any hope of resupply, that they would inevitably turn around back toward Nofilia.
The overnight preparations for the 6th Infantry Division’s attack on Nofilia’s Italian/German positions had included a raid by RAF Wellingtons. They had been guided onto the target by Fleet Air Arm Albacores which had dropped flares to mark the target. The main effort had been directed to the south and west of the main positions to provide enough clearance from the forward British positions, which had also used flares to designate their positions to prevent any casualties. There was some doubt about the sense and efficacy of this raid. Would the Wellingtons not be better off bombing known German airfields and supply dumps further back? Tripoli was often their main target.
Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, had been working with Lieutenant General O’Connor to fix some of the problems of communications and expectations between the army and RAF. The experience in Greece had reinforced the need for better cooperation, not only in protection from the Luftwaffe, but also in the kind of ground attack work that the army had been the victim of. Some of the problems with Operation Brevity had led to a conversation and some tentative plans, which had been tested during exercises. With a force of only about 100 bombers and 100 fighters to cover Operation Battleaxe, Tedder had agreed to using this force to its maximum capacity for four days. In the lead up to the action, strategic targets would be bombed, but once the operation got underway, the focus would be on army cooperation. Various lessons had been learned, especially by the squadrons working in East Africa. The use of coloured smoke and flares to mark friendly infantry and tank positions, and the Royal Artillery’s use of smoke shells to mark enemy targets had been tested and refined in the exercises leading up to the operation.
Each British Division had an RAF liaison team, in direct radio communication with 204 Group’s forward HQ at Agedabia, so that requests for air support could be processed as quickly as possible. A network of mobile radar sets had been established to protect Benghazi and the main British line at El Agheila. This had given the fighter squadrons some warning to intercept Luftwaffe raids. All of this had improved the security of the British build-up for the operations.
Using the Wellingtons of 257 Wing so close to the front line was a gamble, but the British army had learned the hard way that if the only aircraft you see are the enemy’s, then it is bad for morale. The men of 6th Infantry Division had a good view of the bombs going off a few miles away, and heartened that the RAF’s bombs hadn’t fallen on themselves, were assured that they were not alone. Once more at first light, the forward British positions covered themselves in smoke, and Blenheims and Marylands once more struck at low level, with the German and Italian artillery positions as their main target. Two Blenheims were shot down and one Maryland limped home with one of its engines destroyed by flak. For large parts of the day at least a flight of Hurricanes or Tomahawks were visible to the British troops assaulting the defences. A few efforts by the Luftwaffe to strike the British were made, but without much success.
44th Bn RTR, supporting the 23rd Brigade (2nd Bn York and Lancaster Regiment; 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment and 1st Battalion the Buffs), began to take casualties among the tanks. The presence of guns that could knock out the Valiant I Infantry Tank Mark III from the kind of distances they were being hit from was a bit of a shock. The British tank crews had gotten used to being pretty safe within their tanks at anything greater than short range. Being picked off without a clear reason was worrying. One survivor noted it was like being ambushed by a sniper, not knowing where the fatal shot had come from. Despite the best efforts of the CS tanks to lay down smoke and fire at potential threats, six tanks were destroyed before the initial assault had even begun. Frantic radio calls to the Royal Artillery to shift their fire to the presumed enemy positions were ineffective, as the range from which the fire was coming was underestimated.
Knowing that the Italians had had plenty of time to deepen their defences and with the intelligence that there was at least an Italian motorised Division plus the two German Panzer Divisions in the vicinity, Major-General John Evetts’ plan was for a measured approach, with plenty of artillery cover, starting at the enemy’s left flank on the sea.
When the planning had been looked at, it had been considered to use the Commandos in conjunction with the Royal Navy bombardment to land behind the enemy positions, cutting the road to Sirte, and holding there until relieved. General Wavell was still looking at eventually taking Rhodes, and he didn’t want to use up his only effective amphibious force in what might be a suicide mission. Instead, the Royal Navy’s ongoing support for Operation Battleaxe was provided by the Inshore Squadron, consisting of three Insect Class gunboats, HMS Cricket, Gnat and Ladybird, with two Australian destroyers HMAS Voyager and Vampire and two sloops, HMS Auckland and HMAS Parramatta. These ships had approached the coast during the night and spent two hours, beginning just after the Blenheims and Marylands of the RAF had bombed the Italian positions, adding the weight of their 6-inch and 4-inch guns to 6th Division’s Royal Artillery barrage. The timing of the ships’ bombardment had been worked out to make sure that their return to Benghazi was under a protective umbrella of fighters for as long as possible.
The intensity of the bombardment from air, sea and land had given the Italian commander cause for despair. Even with all the time he’d had to prepare, and the beach flank had had plenty of protection, withstanding the weight of fire on them was all but impossible for the defenders. The fact that the bombardment was followed up quickly by the assault companies of 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment and 1st Battalion the Buffs, following the tanks of 44th Bn Royal Tank Regiment, had the Italian left flank positions totally under British control by mid-afternoon.
When the focus of the bombardment was seen clearly at that end of the line, General Hans Von Ravenstein offered the Italian commander, Luigi Nuvoloni, to move some of his 5th Light Division assets to the second line of defence in that area. One of his panzer battalions, II Abteilung of 5th Panzer Regiment, had been put under the command of 15th Panzer Division. He was able to offer one of his Machine gun Battalions, an anti-tank company in addition to a company of Panzerjäger I self-propelled guns. This had been quickly agreed, and the German troops moved quickly to reinforce Italian troops.
This movement meant that as the 2nd Bn York and Lancaster Regiment tried to move forward through the positions captured by the rest of the Brigade they were immediately stopped. The Valiant tanks were within the kill range of the German Pak 38 5cm anti-tank gun and even the Czech 47mm guns. While the Close Support variants did their best to suppress the German anti-tank fire, the decision was made by the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Alexander Galloway, to hold the positions gained and prepare for the probable counter-attack.
As 23rd Brigade’s momentum was lost, General Evetts ordered Brigadier Cyril Lomax’s 16th Brigade to make an effort to attack the Italian line to the left of 23rd Brigade’s positions. The continuing loss of Valiant tanks to high velocity shots meant that the initial infantry assault by 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders went in with inadequate tank support, and very quickly bogged down.
Evetts had been primed to expect that his Division would perhaps have to prepare to be the subject of a German panzer counterattack. The Commanding Officer of 7th Tank Brigade, Brigadier Reginald Naesmyth, had prepared for this eventuality by having at least one Squadron of each tank Battalion held back from direct support of the infantry, to always be on overwatch for German panzers, working primarily with each Brigade’s anti-tank gunners. Between the towed 2-pdr guns of the anti-tank regiments, and those of the tanks, it was expected that any panzers would be hard pressed to break through.
The escarpment east of Nofilia extended some twenty-five miles along the coast before a route onto the coast road could be found at Wadi Matratin. It was this route that the 22nd Armoured Division (22nd Armoured Brigade & 3rd Indian Motor Brigade) had been protecting, covering 6th Infantry Division’s advance. It was this route that General Rommel wanted 15th Panzer Division to take, and get in behind the British on the coast road. The 15th Panzer Division had set off just after noon when it was judged that the Italians would hold with German help. With the information from the RAF’s reconnaissance, and their attempts to continue to bomb and strafe the German panzers, Major-General Gambier-Parry had forewarning that the arrival of German forces. He had taken up a primarily defensive position, with each of the armoured Regiments and Indian Cavalry Regiments supporting one another. Much had been learned during Operation Brevity by these two Brigades about fighting German panzers, and those lessons were put to good effect, especially as they were fighting over much the same ground as previously.
The 104th and 106th Royal Horse Artillery Regiments, attached to 22nd Armoured Brigade, supplemented by 234 Battery of 68th Medium RA from XIII Corps Troops, held their fire initially. The attempts at camouflage had been done in the hope of drawing the majority of the German Division into the killing zone. The Valiant I* tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade, (2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars (RGH), 3rd & 4th Sharpshooters, County of London Yeomanry (CLY)) numbered 112 tanks, some fifty-odd short of full strength. The crews had been bloodied and knew the limitations of their tanks and its gun, though each tank had two of the new APC 2-pdr shell. (The Indian anti-tank gunners had received five of these shells for each gun.)
The fact that the RAF had been bombing 15th Panzer Division’s columns regularly, causing losses and delays, had the Luftwaffe liaison at Rommel’s HQ endure a very sharp reprimand. General Neumann-Silkow had communicated his annoyance at the lack of Luftwaffe cover to protect the movement of his Division, but particularly concerning was the lack of reconnaissance about the whereabouts of the British Armoured Division. He had assumed, and General Rommel had agreed, that they were likely to be in the area of Wadi Matratin, either advancing towards Nofilia, or dug in protecting access to the coast road. Since the latter would be a waste of an Armoured Division, it was more likely to be what the British would be doing. The Division’s reconnaissance battalion (Aufklaerungs Abteilung 33) had been probing ahead of the main force, and they reported that they had begun to meet British positions at the top of the Wadi access. The reports noted that the British were in a defensive formation, exact numbers couldn’t be ascertained, but it certainly looked like they’d found the Armoured Division. The whereabouts of the Australian Division was still unknown.
The options available to the German commanders were to attack the British head-on, or to find a flank to try to turn and get behind to unseat them. There was in fact only one option, and that wasn’t to attack head on. The reconnaissance Battalion was already spreading out looking for another route to go around the British positions. One of the infantry regiments, with artillery and anti-tank support, along with the Panzer Battalion from 5th Panzer Regiment were ordered to fix the British in place, while the rest of the Division started about 14:00hrs towards Ras El Ali and the coast road.
When this had happened during Operation Brevity, the possibility of being flanked had caused the British to withdraw to Ras El Ali, giving up on capturing Nofilia. This time, it was the signal for the 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Divisions to move towards Nofilia from the south. The majority of German tanks were now thirty miles, and at least two hours, from the main line of resistance. Elements of the 9th Australian Division were in solid defensive positions at Ras El Ali, and with the 22nd Armoured Brigade in the vicinity, the expectation was that the Australians, with RAF support, could hold off the panzer attack for long enough. Even if the Germans managed to break through at Ras El Ali, the main line of defences at El Agheila were still manned by the rest of the Australian Division. Lieutenant General O’Connor was confident that once the Germans discovered a British Armoured Division and two Infantry Divisions were cutting off the panzers from any hope of resupply, that they would inevitably turn around back toward Nofilia.
allanpcameron
Donor
As I mentioned this has been complex to sort out. I thought I'd better post this half, while the rest of Day 3 gets sorted.
Allan
Allan
The odds are definitely against the axis, but both sides still face the possibility of success or disaster. No wonder it's been tough writing this.
The main difference being that the axis pretty much have to get a convincing win even to hold the position, while British forces only need to avoid a disaster to be able to have another go in a few months. Most other results merely change how long it takes for Tripoli to fall.
The main difference being that the axis pretty much have to get a convincing win even to hold the position, while British forces only need to avoid a disaster to be able to have another go in a few months. Most other results merely change how long it takes for Tripoli to fall.
What about HMS Terror? Why wasn't she with the Inshore squadron because I thought she has yet to be sunk?
Her guns are shot out, she'd have been withdrawn for a refit and new guns.
Yes, it seems so
It usually paid off against British formations due to poor tactics and weak Command and Control. Now??
Probably Not but we shall see.
Just a technical question.....
This segment spends a lot of time on the efficacy of German Long-Range anti tank guns.
In OTL, were the enemy forces able to conceal their antitank gun positions this effectively? I would have thought with the terrain, there would have been a huge advantage to the UK first with constant aerial overflights identifying enemy artillery positions to be targeted and destroyed by UK artillery and air attack, and then with spotting the tracing component of the rounds being fired, by artillery spotters and also by the RAF overhead. Short Version is it seems that if they avoided pre-attack detection, that they would have been identified and engaged after firing their first few rounds?
This segment spends a lot of time on the efficacy of German Long-Range anti tank guns.
In OTL, were the enemy forces able to conceal their antitank gun positions this effectively? I would have thought with the terrain, there would have been a huge advantage to the UK first with constant aerial overflights identifying enemy artillery positions to be targeted and destroyed by UK artillery and air attack, and then with spotting the tracing component of the rounds being fired, by artillery spotters and also by the RAF overhead. Short Version is it seems that if they avoided pre-attack detection, that they would have been identified and engaged after firing their first few rounds?
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