Derek Pullem
Donor
Using your data the average lifetime of a British tank in combat in NWE 1944 due to enemy action wasn't much more than six months as well!
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
- Status
The heavier than expected losses of Cromwell due to the stand and die orders of the Heer and the slower than expected delivery of Sherman's resulted in Comet being delayed as you say - it was expected to ramp up production taking over from Cromwell in Late July but the Comet Workforce was shifted to Cromwell production (which it was able to do seamlessly) resulting in a ramp up of Cromwell instead.
Had it been built as intended about a 1000 odd would have been combat ready before Xmas 44 - which would have been enough to equip several divisions with the type
I probably should have caveated that more, I can't remember the figure but excepting some very specific periods like the Normandy battles where the levels of attrition were so high the lifespan of a tank was measured in days and weeks no month on the Italian front and post Falaise the substantial majority of tank replacements were due to non-battle damage/breakdown of Shermans. Figures for Cromwells and Churchills were even higher. These were vehicles being designed right to the edge of what was mechanically possible and then being used in extremely demanding circumstances by moderately, at best, trained crews.
Last edited:
Derek Pullem
Donor
Interesting data - looks to me like the root cause was not meeting the production targets earlier in 1944 rather than the additional losses post D-Day. If they had met their targets there would have been enough Cromwells in reserve to cope with the attrition. Does show the perils of changing over production in the middle of an active campaign though.
marathag
Banned
Per WO 291/1186, armor losses, by cause
SP Guns 24.4%
AT guns 22.7%
Mines 22.1%
Tanks 14.5%
Bazooka 14.2%
Other 2.1%
US First Army tanks lost (destroyed and damaged) between 6 June and 30 November 1944.
Mines 18.2%
AT/Tank guns 46.2%
Artillery 7.3%
Mortars 1.8%
Bazooka 13.6%
Other 12.9%
Now with better protected tanks, it's likely that there will be fewer losses by Nazi cannons, but the other causes mostly unchanged
while Coopers _Death Traps_ has it problems, it does point out the issues with tank recovery and repair.
Pretty much if the tank didn't burn, ruining the armor, or the obvious exploding, most would be returned to service, holes patched, and blood mostly washed out, and new replacements put inside, and off to the Front.
Sometime they would have upgrades, like to the extreme of 3rd Army, turning brand new E8s into field modified E2 Jumbos, with more armor added, cut from other tanks
Don't leave out that having tanks that protect the crew better, is a big morale boost
in 1942, the M4 had an awesome rep, as most of the German Tanks it faced were 50mm armed Mk III, that the 75mm in the Sherman could handle out to 2000 yards
1944 France, that wasn't the case anymore, even though was still superior to the Mk IV H. the M4 and 76mm gun was not up to dealing with the Cats.
With Better British Tanks, that by late 1943 are likely to be equal to the 1945 Comet, Commonwealth Tanks will be in a far better state than OTL, having fewer losses while being more effective against the Nazi armor
And better Tanks means more won battles; fewer casulties both amongst Tank Crews and their associated Infantry, which means more Veterans, which means better performance which means more won battles with fewer casulties, which means... Etc.
Hm, Wikipedia quotes some 220,000 British (and Imperial) casualties in the North African Campaign, with over 35,000 actually killed. An early victory there will result in only a tiny fraction of those losses being inflicted. Add in fewer losses in the Greek Campaign and the British side of the equation is looking decidedly more positive.
Last edited:
I think that only the Firefly models were allocated to that garrison, and not many of them at that.Some might have eventually ended up in the Falklands?
7 June 1941. Operation Battleaxe. Day 1.
allanpcameron
Donor
7 June 1941. Operation Battleaxe. Day 1.
The opening shots of Operation Battleaxe were fired from out at sea. Admiral Cunningham had sent a strong escort to two small convoys including the two fast minelaying cruisers HMS Abdiel and Latona to Malta and Benghazi. Force H had just the day before reinforced Malta with another 35 Hurricanes flown off from HMS Ark Royal and Furious. Escorted by two cruisers and four destroyers, HMS Formidable’s 806 Squadron FAA Fulmars and 805 Squadron’s Buffaloes, provided top cover for the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Valiant and Barham, with the cruisers HMAS Hobart, HMS Ajax, Coventry, Calcutta, Naiad, Neptune, Phoebe, and a strong destroyer escort. Initially following a course that would look as if they were heading to Malta, during the night of 6/7 June, the bombardment force split in two and made a dash to the vicinity of Sirte and Nofilia. While Wellingtons from Malta and Cyrenaica carried out heavy raids on the port of Tripoli, the battleships and their escorts pounded the areas which had been identified by aerial reconnaissance as being airfields, troop and vehicle concentrations, supply dumps and the small port facilities. 478 rounds of 15-inch shell and 1,500 of lesser calibre—about 530 tons in all had been fired in just a few hours. It was a rude awakening for the Italians and Germans at the beginning of the operation.
Just before the sun began to rise the British ships reversed course for Alexandria while the Fleet Air Arm and the RAF provided cover from any attacks. The fact that the full effort of the RAF to bomb the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica airfields happened almost as soon as the naval bombardment ended meant that very few efforts were directed towards the British fleet steaming for home, with some cruisers and destroyers making their way to Malta.
During the night hours 7th Armoured Division, with 4th Indian Division, had set off following a route that had been prepared for them by the Long Range Desert Group. Steering clear of known Axis reconnaissance patrols, and particularly difficult going, the two Divisions made good progress during the hours of darkness. Along the coast road the 6th Infantry Division, with 7th Tank Brigade in support, had also began their journey towards Nofilia in the dark.
The fact that something was about to happen was known to the Germans and Italians, their signals intelligence had noted that a lot of extra messages had been sent and received, but there were a lot of call signs that hadn’t been heard of before, and they interpreted that as being the arrival of more forces. The 9th Australian Division had been particularly lax in their radio procedures, and it was expected that this would be the force to be moving forward. There were a number of other radio signals that had been identified, eventually, as being sent in Hindi and Gaelic. All that General Rommel knew was that something was happening, but there was little more information than that.
The Italian forces at Nofilia had eventually to stop sending out reconnaissance forces too far towards the British positions at Ras El Ali, as so few of them returned. Even the aircraft of the Luftwaffe were finding it difficult to make much headway with reconnaissance over the British positions, as the RAF was strengthened, in the area. The arrival of the first two operational squadrons of P40 Tomahawks had given the Luftwaffe fighter pilots in their Bf109E a bit of a shock, as its performance, previously unknown, was discovered to be considerably better than the Hurricanes they were used to.
As expected, the 6th Infantry Division’s progress along the coast road began to slow as they encountered sizable minefields beginning at Wadi Matratin. Reconnaissance work had been done, and some of the Italian patrols that had been intercepted had various maps that gave a good starting point for working a way through them. Nonetheless progress was naturally slow, but steady. The Italians’ main position at Nofilia had been designed as a defence in depth. Between Wadi Matratin and Wadi Abyar, a distance of some thirty miles, minefields and small units were positioned to slow a British advance. This succeeded in as far as it took until evening for the main 6th Infantry Division force to arrive before the forward defensive positions at Wadi Abyar. This was as far as Operation Brevity had got, but the forces attacking were much stronger this time.
During the hours of darkness, the 6-inch medium howitzers of the 64th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery engaged in counter-battery fire against the Italian artillery covering the minefields, while the rest of the Divisional artillery regiments carried out selective bombardments. The men of 23rd Brigade covered the Royal Engineers 12th Field Company who made their way forward under the cover of darkness attempting to clear paths through the minefields. With 40th Bn RTR in support, it would fall to the 22nd Guards Brigade to make the first attempt to open up the road to Nofilia as soon as the paths had been cleared.
The progress of 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division, following the path mapped out for them, carried them much further south than that taken during Operation Brevity. The movement of 22nd Armoured Division to the left of 6th Infantry Division had given the Germans the impression that the British were trying almost exactly the same tactics that they’d used previously, just with stronger forces. Once more it looked as if the British had divided their forces and so General Rommel ordered the now complete 15th Panzer Division and 5th Light Division to advance to support the Italian Trento Motorised Division in their forward positions at Nofilia. The Ariete Division would remain at Sirte until ordered otherwise. Rommel intended, as he had before, to strike the British armoured force inland first, then swing round towards the sea to defeat the green Australian Division on the anvil of the Italian positions. It took a couple of hours for the German Divisions around Sirte to get themselves sorted out after the pre-dawn bombardment. While not too many casualties had resulted, there had been a great deal of disruption and some precious fuel supplies had been lost.
The opening shots of Operation Battleaxe were fired from out at sea. Admiral Cunningham had sent a strong escort to two small convoys including the two fast minelaying cruisers HMS Abdiel and Latona to Malta and Benghazi. Force H had just the day before reinforced Malta with another 35 Hurricanes flown off from HMS Ark Royal and Furious. Escorted by two cruisers and four destroyers, HMS Formidable’s 806 Squadron FAA Fulmars and 805 Squadron’s Buffaloes, provided top cover for the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Valiant and Barham, with the cruisers HMAS Hobart, HMS Ajax, Coventry, Calcutta, Naiad, Neptune, Phoebe, and a strong destroyer escort. Initially following a course that would look as if they were heading to Malta, during the night of 6/7 June, the bombardment force split in two and made a dash to the vicinity of Sirte and Nofilia. While Wellingtons from Malta and Cyrenaica carried out heavy raids on the port of Tripoli, the battleships and their escorts pounded the areas which had been identified by aerial reconnaissance as being airfields, troop and vehicle concentrations, supply dumps and the small port facilities. 478 rounds of 15-inch shell and 1,500 of lesser calibre—about 530 tons in all had been fired in just a few hours. It was a rude awakening for the Italians and Germans at the beginning of the operation.
Just before the sun began to rise the British ships reversed course for Alexandria while the Fleet Air Arm and the RAF provided cover from any attacks. The fact that the full effort of the RAF to bomb the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica airfields happened almost as soon as the naval bombardment ended meant that very few efforts were directed towards the British fleet steaming for home, with some cruisers and destroyers making their way to Malta.
During the night hours 7th Armoured Division, with 4th Indian Division, had set off following a route that had been prepared for them by the Long Range Desert Group. Steering clear of known Axis reconnaissance patrols, and particularly difficult going, the two Divisions made good progress during the hours of darkness. Along the coast road the 6th Infantry Division, with 7th Tank Brigade in support, had also began their journey towards Nofilia in the dark.
The fact that something was about to happen was known to the Germans and Italians, their signals intelligence had noted that a lot of extra messages had been sent and received, but there were a lot of call signs that hadn’t been heard of before, and they interpreted that as being the arrival of more forces. The 9th Australian Division had been particularly lax in their radio procedures, and it was expected that this would be the force to be moving forward. There were a number of other radio signals that had been identified, eventually, as being sent in Hindi and Gaelic. All that General Rommel knew was that something was happening, but there was little more information than that.
The Italian forces at Nofilia had eventually to stop sending out reconnaissance forces too far towards the British positions at Ras El Ali, as so few of them returned. Even the aircraft of the Luftwaffe were finding it difficult to make much headway with reconnaissance over the British positions, as the RAF was strengthened, in the area. The arrival of the first two operational squadrons of P40 Tomahawks had given the Luftwaffe fighter pilots in their Bf109E a bit of a shock, as its performance, previously unknown, was discovered to be considerably better than the Hurricanes they were used to.
As expected, the 6th Infantry Division’s progress along the coast road began to slow as they encountered sizable minefields beginning at Wadi Matratin. Reconnaissance work had been done, and some of the Italian patrols that had been intercepted had various maps that gave a good starting point for working a way through them. Nonetheless progress was naturally slow, but steady. The Italians’ main position at Nofilia had been designed as a defence in depth. Between Wadi Matratin and Wadi Abyar, a distance of some thirty miles, minefields and small units were positioned to slow a British advance. This succeeded in as far as it took until evening for the main 6th Infantry Division force to arrive before the forward defensive positions at Wadi Abyar. This was as far as Operation Brevity had got, but the forces attacking were much stronger this time.
During the hours of darkness, the 6-inch medium howitzers of the 64th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery engaged in counter-battery fire against the Italian artillery covering the minefields, while the rest of the Divisional artillery regiments carried out selective bombardments. The men of 23rd Brigade covered the Royal Engineers 12th Field Company who made their way forward under the cover of darkness attempting to clear paths through the minefields. With 40th Bn RTR in support, it would fall to the 22nd Guards Brigade to make the first attempt to open up the road to Nofilia as soon as the paths had been cleared.
The progress of 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division, following the path mapped out for them, carried them much further south than that taken during Operation Brevity. The movement of 22nd Armoured Division to the left of 6th Infantry Division had given the Germans the impression that the British were trying almost exactly the same tactics that they’d used previously, just with stronger forces. Once more it looked as if the British had divided their forces and so General Rommel ordered the now complete 15th Panzer Division and 5th Light Division to advance to support the Italian Trento Motorised Division in their forward positions at Nofilia. The Ariete Division would remain at Sirte until ordered otherwise. Rommel intended, as he had before, to strike the British armoured force inland first, then swing round towards the sea to defeat the green Australian Division on the anvil of the Italian positions. It took a couple of hours for the German Divisions around Sirte to get themselves sorted out after the pre-dawn bombardment. While not too many casualties had resulted, there had been a great deal of disruption and some precious fuel supplies had been lost.
In this time frame I am pretty sure the lingua franca of the Indian Army was Urdu, not Hindi. Its possible that that changed in the interwar years but from the Mutiny until WW1 there were only a few units from Southern or Central India. Those few were Brahmans' and were actually shown to be difficult to supply outside of India in WW1 as they required their food and clothing to have only been touched by another Brahman. Therefore these units were largely sidelined. Most units spoke the language(s) of their home territories and Urdu to communicate with each other. Therefore there was little Hindi involved.
Last edited:
Derek Pullem
Donor
If I'm reading this right then Rommel has completely missed 7th Armoured and 4th Indian flanking him. 22nd Armoured is not going to have a good day but potentially Rommel will have an even worse on the morning after.
You don’t just reduce tank losses though, the tank that isn’t lost can then carry on supporting the attacking infantry or destroy another enemy tank. Your losses in all arms would be reduced.
allanpcameron
Donor
Thanks, I've been trying to refind my source for the exchange of signals, I believe either during Op Sunflower, or after the Battle of Gazala, but have been unable to find it again. My memory was of Hindi, but certainly an Indian language. The presence in Egypt of 9th Highland Division gives the Gaelic a chance.
Empire 'Windtalkers'
During the Boar war the British sent messages in Latin.....
My priest during grad school (~1980) had been in the British (or Indian?) Army, and he said the language they used was Hindustani - basically smearing the difference between Hindi and Urdu, which are often considered different registers of one language, not two languages.
I also know that a kid in our parish who was raised bilingual Hindi/English is taking an Urdu class and neither he nor his parents really perceive it as being a different language....
NotBigBrother
Monthly Donor
The Boar war?😏 I heard about the Emu war of the Australian army but this is something new.🙂
From the little i heard the main difference is in the script as opposed to the spoken....but I am probably wrong........hearsay is not admissible
Gaelic is really unlikely to be used, only the Seaforth's and Cameron Highlanders would have any meaningful number of Gaelic speaking recruits and even then the vast majority would be monolingual English (well sort of) speakers. Gaelic by this point was really confined to the islands and some small communities on the West Coast.
- Status