25 February 1938. 10:00hrs. London, England.
The letter from the Secretary of State for War (Leslie Hoare-Belisha) was the subject of much discussion. Ever since he took office the Secretary of State it seemed that he had come under the influence of Basil Liddell Hart, some had taken to calling it ‘The Partnership’. It seemed to many in the War Office that Hoare-Belisha was trying to use Liddell Hart’s book “Europe in Arms” as the blue print for the future of the army. There had been in December 1936, while Duff Cooper was Secretary of State for War, an expectation that should war break out on the Continent that the initial response of sending five Regular Divisions would be backed up with twelve Territorial Divisions, two of which would be fully equipped for the job initially. In a written memorandum Mr Cooper had explicitly stated that a future war would not be fought under conditions of ‘limited liability.’ Liddell Hart on the other hand had advocated that Britain should avoid becoming involved in a continental land war and rely on the Royal Air Force as its offensive arm. When Field Marshall Cyril Deverell, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) had expressed opposition to this view, Hoare-Belisha had fired him. Liddell Hart had suggested John Dill and Archibald Wavell as replacements, both of whom had been interviewed, but the decision was made to make Lord Gort, his former military secretary, CIGS.
Nobody in the War Office were under any illusions that as the demands of air defence were becoming insistent and the cost of naval programmes was mounting, the prospects of an army adequate for war in Europe were going to be continually reassessed. With financial limitations paramount, a policy favouring the Air Force at the expense of the Army appeared to be inescapable. In December 1937, the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, had come to the conclusion that the policy of continental commitments no longer suited Britain's circumstances and that a number of recent events in the international field justified this change of policy. He gathered that France no longer looked to Britain in the event of war to supply an expeditionary force on the scale hitherto proposed in addition to her all-important cooperation on the sea and in the air. He argued that Germany had guaranteed the inviolability and integrity of Belgian territory and there seemed good reasons for thinking that it would be in Germany's interests to honour that agreement.
Inskip’s chief argument was since resources were limited, rearmament must be concentrated on the vital objective. Most vital of all was, in his opinion, the survival of Great Britain herself from air attack. Next came the preservation of the trade routes and, in the third place, the defence of British territories overseas. The fourth objective, which could only be provided for after the other objectives had been met, was cooperation in the defence of the territories of any allies Britain might have in war. On the basis of this policy 'the continental hypothesis' ranked fourth in order of priority. The primary role of the Regular Army became 'the defence of imperial commitments, including anti-aircraft defence at home'. The role of the Territorial Army was to be adjusted accordingly. Instead of providing reinforcements for the expeditionary force on the Continent, it would merely be called upon to assist in anti-aircraft defence and to perform ‘duties in connection with the maintenance of order and of essential services in this country in time of war’.
Knowing full well the policy of 'limited liability' meant that Hoare-Belisha’s memorandum came as less of a shock. Just as the War Office was formulating the first really ambitious plans of reequipment, it confirmed that in matters of supply all war plans should be based on what might be termed a war of 'limited liability', and from the end of 1937 to the spring of 1939 the equipment of the five divisions was geared down to the level of 'colonial warfare in operations in an Eastern theatre'. An army thus equipped could not be used in Europe except in a defensive role and could not be brought up to full fighting efficiency without a large increase in ammunition, a partial reequipment of tank forces, and other material changes.
Therefore, the Secretary of State for War found it necessary to issue this special warning to the General Staff that potential allies should be left in no doubt as to the possibilities of direct assistance on the part of Great Britain. There-in lay the problem for the War Office. It was bad enough having to warn their liaison officers in friendly countries and allied governments, that Britain’s response to hostilities would come primarily from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The Regular army’s five Divisions would need much longer to be in a position to move to a war footing, and that of the Territorial Army would be even worse.
One of the few saving graces from this state of affairs was that the decision to affirm that one of the five Regular Divisions would be a Mobile Division, rather than a Cavalry Division. Having been formed the previous year, General Alan Brooke, appointed General Officer Commanding, reported The Mobile Division was formed from two Mechanised Cavalry Brigades, the Army Tank Brigade, with attached artillery, engineers and signals. Its paper strength was 620 armoured fighting vehicles but 7⁄8 of these were reconnaissance vehicles and some were simulated by trucks. The tank brigade was to be made up of heavier tanks but only had obsolete medium tanks currently. With the ‘limited liability’ measures in place, although the tanks for the Division were part of the allocated funding, the possibility of an expansion of the Mobile Division was remote at best.
