19th July – 10th August 1942 – A Death in Rome – Part II – The Knife Edge
One of the few people who seemed genuinely horrified, and even grief stricken, by the death of Mussolini was Adolf Hitler. Whether this was the result of some genuine attachment to Il Duce or anxiety that he might also be targeted by treacherous elements in the Axis is difficult to be sure of, especially given Hitler’s increasingly unstable mental state and escalating drug dependence. Publicly Hitler was full of fury, blaming the murder on the usual suspects, Jews, and Communists, though conspicuously not pointing the finger at the Allies, perhaps feeling that such accusations might backfire by implying the British and Americans might backfire, implying the Allies were operating a network of agents even in one of the capitals of the Axis. That the authorities in Rome so swiftly put the blame on a mentally unstable Blackshirt with a personal vendetta speaks volume about the different priorities in the two regimes, though the Ciano government hastily amended these initial reports so as not to appear to be contradicting Hitler, helping to sow the confusion and conspiracy theories that were already flourishing [1].
Given that there were genuine anxieties about some larger plot it was considered unwise for Hitler to travel to Rome for the funeral, not only was security for Hitler in Rome an issue but there were concerns that if there was some conspiracy afoot that reached into Berlin his absence might encourage them to act. The reality was that at this time plans to remove Hitler and end the war existed only as the unspoken desires of those who had been against Hitler practically since he came to power, and they would not take on any concrete for many more months. There was also the fact Case Blue was now in full swing and Hitler was reluctant to take his eye off the details of the evolving battle even for a few days. After some discussion it was decided that the Reich would be represented by Goering and von Ribbentrop. Goering was far from happy about being away from Berlin either, though he could hardly demur given it was a direct command from the Fuhrer. He was also aware that this trip was about more than just paying respects to Mussolini, which would have been awkward for Goering regardless as he had precisely none for the Italian dictator, it was a crucial opportunity to take the measure of the new Italian government and its commitment to continuing the war [2].
Count Ciano was keenly aware of the larger purpose of the German delegation and having to deal with them so soon put Italy’s situation in the summer of 1942 into sharp relief. The war had been an unmitigated disaster for Italy. Its overseas empire was gone and there was little prospect of it being restored even if the war could be settled on terms short of an Axis surrender, an outright victory being seen as nothing but a hopeless fantasy in Rome. This gloom about future prospects was deepened as the British were already making effusive promises about the future of Ethiopia, in no small part as a reaction to the rumbling discontent over their treatment of Greece that still occasionally surfaced even in mid-1942. The Ethiopians had allied themselves with the British and the British wanted to make it clear that they would help such allies wherever they could. In practice such commitments would be difficult to deal with as once the Italians were gone not everyone in Ethiopia was happy about the return of the emperor, which was no comfort to the Italians in 1942 [3].
Greece and the Balkans were the one area where Italy could argue that they had enjoyed some success, if acquiring control of hostile populations who required large and expensive garrisons to maintain order and lands that had little to offer in the way of resources could be considered a success. The rising strength of the partisan movements in Greece and Yugoslavia, who were being aided by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Special Services (OSS), was a constant drain on Italian manpower and the morale of the armed forces. RAF and FAA aircraft operating out of ‘Fortress Crete’ had all but closed Greek ports to Italian shipping, with the first operational Monarch Barracuda squadrons being ‘blooded’ in the attacks on Italian shipping trying to hug the coast as they moved south. Moving supplies overland was fraught owing to poor infrastructure and the aforementioned partisans. The Mediterranean was to all intents and purposes a British lake, the only other warships that dared operate there were those belonging to the Free French, who were doing their best to make their presence felt in the interests of bolstering De Gaulle’s desire for France to be treated as a full ally with a say in the future conduct of the war. On top of this the Italians were expecting an Allied attack somewhere in the Mediterranean or the Balkans, at best an assault on Corsica or Sardinia. At worst they would invade Sicily and what price the survival of the Fascist regime then?
All of this provided excellent reasons for Italy to seek an exit from the war on any terms short of Allied occupation. After all Italy did not occupy the same tier of existential threat the Third Reich did, and the demise of Mussolini could be spun by Ciano as a clear sign that Italy was willing to turn against the Axis cause, which was another reason to muddy the waters about the events surrounding Mussolini’s death. This did not mean that Ciano was willing to embrace the idea of an exit strategy even in private. The prospect of German occupation at the first sign of Italy showing signs of losing faith in the Axis was the obvious reason to eschew an otherwise sensible course of action. If the Germans decided Italy was unreliable it would suffer the same fate as Vichy France, at best, and this in turn might encourage an Allied invasion regardless of what else they might be planning, turning Italy into a battleground. Also, it must be remembered that no one in Rome had suddenly been converted to the cause of freedom and democracy, some were acutely aware their power and position rested on the continuation of the Fascist regime, and it still seemed in mid-1942 that the renewed German offensive in the USSR might succeed, especially considering the rapid advances the Wehrmacht was making towards the Caucasus at the height of the summer. If the USSR did capitulate it might force the Western Allies to reconsider the continuation of the war, or at the very least end any talk of unconditional surrender, not yet adopted as the official policy of the Western Allies. It was a slender hope but so long as it persisted, and Italy’s northern defences were so thin, Ciano had no choice but to do his best to reassure Goering of Italy’s intentions to prosecute the war even more vigorously than it had under Mussolini [4].
The means of doing so involved both offering more Italian troops to take part in Case Blue and a ‘tribute’ of raw materials for the German industry. There had been rumours that Mussolini had been hoarding certain critical resources, including fuel, since war broke out and Ciano now ‘founds’ this hoard and offered the lion’s share of it to the Germans [5]. Ciano placed this attempt at bribery alongside a shopping list of manufactured goods that the Italians needed to modernize their military, with aeroengines being top of the list, alongside technical assistance with producing a new generation of Italian tanks and aircraft. In effect he was offering to bolster the German war effort and persuade them that he was in earnest about modernizing the Italian war machine, while making it clear it was unlikely his country could do so in the near future without aid he suspected would not be forthcoming. It was a delicate balancing act, but in what was undoubtedly his greatest diplomatic achievement Ciano successfully forestalled German intervention. Goering was more than happy to return from Rome with some practical benefits from his visit, while having no intention of delivering on any of Italy’s requirements, barring some technical assistance, and this apparent generosity was inspired by the desire to find out if there was anything the Italians had in development that might be ‘borrowed’ by the Wehrmacht, however unlikely that might seem [6].
This outcome was what Ciano had expected, and he fully intended to draw the reinforcements for Germany from the ranks of the Blackshirts, while other Italian army units would be redeployed from the Balkans to Italy, ostensibly to potentially to act as reserves for a successful Case Blue, in actuality as part of a move to start shoring up defences on the northern border, while removing elements who might object to a more rational foreign policy, if the opportunity arose for one. The major unknown in Italian calculations was how would the Allies react to the death of Mussolini?
The answer to that question was a subject of heated debate between Washington and London. To summarize the viewpoints; on the one side were those who felt that the death of Mussolini made Italy ripe for invasion and rapid capitulation, on the other were those who felt it removed the already questionable rationale for an invasion of Italy altogether and allowed for prioritization of a landing in France. Churchill was firmly in the former camp, while Roosevelt was almost as firmly in the latter. The fundamental difference was that Roosevelt had almost unanimous support for his position in Washington, while there were plenty of dissenters in London who opposed Churchill’s scheme.
The death of Mussolini brought a rare moment of unanimity between the Germany First and Japan First factions in Washington, both seeing an opportunity to strengthen their hands. Eliminating dubious plans for an assault on Italy would allow an uninterrupted build up for an invasion of Northwest Europe while allowing an increased allocation of men and equipment to the Pacific, a win-win scenario for both camps. There had been considerable political pressure in Washington for an offensive operation in the Pacific, especially in the light of the fresh British victory during Operation Yari and Operation Watchtower, the invasion of Guadalcanal, was already scheduled for late July [7]. There was now vigorous lobbying for further plans to be made to continue operations beyond Guadalcanal sooner rather than later. The confident view in Washington was that either Italy would descend into civil war, rendering it irrelevant. Even in the absence of civil war it would inevitably be occupied by the Germans, ending any notion of Italy as a soft target as the Wehrmacht was correctly viewed as a very different proposition from the Italian armed forces. Such a diversion of German resources would also weaken their defences in Western Europe, increasing the likelihood of a landing in France being successful.
In London Alanbrooke opposed the invasion of the Italian mainland for slightly different reasons, though he would not have argued against the ideas prevalent in Washington. Alanbrooke and his senior subordinates took the view that the removal of Mussolini would strengthen Italy’s defensive capabilities rather than weaken them. General O’Connor, hero of the Libyan Campaign, opined that, ‘Mussolini was worth an entire corps to the 8th Army’. Without Mussolini’s endless interference in the organization of the Italian armed forces they could be a far more formidable force and the Imperial General Staff knew that whatever the public perception of them there were plenty of highly capable Italian troops who would doggedly resist any Allied invasion. If one were going to face a dogged defence, likely bolstered by strong Wehrmacht forces, would it not be better to face them while liberating an ally and opening a far more direct route to Berlin? [8]
Any concept of an invasion of the Balkans received even less support. Even those such as Anthony Eden who were unhappy about the British treatment of the Greeks in 1941 had little enthusiasm for any attempt to liberate them by mounting an invasion. He was persuaded that the shortest route to liberating Athens lay in having an Allied army march into Berlin. With lukewarm support at best from his cabinet and military advisors, and Roosevelt’s resolute stance against an invasion of mainland Italy Churchill chose to concede gracefully in the interest of the Anglo-American alliance. This decision would do nothing to calm Ciano’s anxieties as while an actual invasion was no longer on the cards the threat of one formed a large part of Allied deception plans in the build up to Operation Millennium. Ciano would at least be able to use the threat of invasion to explain the construction of extensive defences in Italy, under the bombastic claim that, ‘Italy would fight all the way to the Alps against a foreign invader’. That those lines of defence would work just as well retreating from the line of the Alps was carefully ignored in Italian propaganda. Ciano’s ministry was doing its best to put together a coherent strategy to protect Italy from its enemies, and its allies. It was not his fault that other saw things differently and began to meddle in ways that invited catastrophe [9].
[1] Chaos, confusion, and deliberate obfuscation, hardly surprising ‘who really killed Mussolini?’ turned into a cottage industry.
[2] In essence the Nazis need to decide if Ciano can be trusted to run Italy or if they need to take direct control, which is a headache they don’t need ATM.
[3] No the British couldn’t have saved Greece, no that hasn’t stopped various elements complaining about it, so Ethiopia is chance to make some good PR.
[4] Ciano has little option but to double down at this point since he can’t count on much actual support from the other senior figures in Rome.
[5] When the Germans occupied Italy IOTL they were astounded, and aggravated, to find that despite pleading poverty Mussolini had been squirreling away vital war materiel.
[6] The Italians did have some solid designs, some of which made it into service, but far too late to do anything about the terrible reputation of Italian tanks and aircraft.
[7] Watchtower will kick off a couple of weeks earlier than OTL, given the weaker Japanese position and end of operations in North Africa, of course other plans in Europe and the Med mean the Pacific First supporters aren’t going to get all they want, just that but more than OTL.
[8] Yes, we are heading for D-Day 1943.
[9] The best laid plans… as they say.
