Garrison
Donor
I thought I had edited that, clearly not, will do it now thanks
ETA: My bad, I have edited that in the version due to go up today.
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Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
ETA: My bad, I have edited that in the version due to go up today.
June 22nd – August 15th – 1940 – The Battle of France – Part V – Dynamo - Dunkirk
Garrison
Donor
June 22nd – August 15th – 1940 – The Battle of France – Part V – Dynamo - Dunkirk
The ‘miracle of Dunkirk’ is a part of British mythology in which the idea that army was rescued by the ‘little ships’ looms large. It made for useful propaganda in the aftermath of what had a military disaster in France and Belgium, emphasizing the idea that the nation had come together and were united in their determination to fight on. This not only ignored the reality that in some cases the crews of civilian merchant ships ordered to Dunkirk had outright refused, it also tended to gloss over the contributions made by many so many soldiers, sailors, and airmen to make the ‘miracle’ possible. RAF fighters engaged the Luftwaffe even after the last squadrons had withdrawn from France, taking a toll on the bombers trying to strike the beaches and sink the ships carrying away the BEF. Goering had been full of assurances to Hitler that the Luftwaffe could crush the BEF practically unaided. Unfortunately for the BEF these claims seem to have been greeted with the far more scepticism by OKH than they were by Adolf Hitler and the ground attacks continued unrelentingly. That Goering was able to survive repeatedly making such promises and failing to deliver, when others were summarily dismissed for far lesser offences to the Fuhrer, remains one of the mysteries of the Nazi regime. Much of the RAF’s efforts took place well behind the beaches, leading to many in the army believing that the RAF was simply sitting safe at home in Britain while they were struggling to escape. This unjust belief led to much friction between ordinary serving soldiers and RAF personnel, with many a drunken brawl being fuelled by ill-judged accusations [1].
As for the little ships, the flotilla of small craft private vessels that ventured to Dunkirk certainly made their contribution, but it was largely in terms of transporting troops from the beaches to larger vessels waiting offshore. Most of the soldiers were carried away by larger commercial vessels, some with Royal Navy crews or navy personnel aboard to stiffen the resolve of the civilians, and by the destroyers of the Royal Navy who ran the gauntlet of the Luftwaffe, and later artillery attacks, to embark troops. The largest part of the evacuation was carried out from the East Mole at Dunkirk harbour itself. This structure was meant to act as a breakwater for the outer part of the harbour and was never intended to have ships dock at it. It was Royal Navy Captain William Tennant, placed in charge of the naval shore parties trying to organize the flow of troops on to the evacuation ships, who had the idea to try it regardless as simply trying to lift men off the beaches proved a painfully slow process and much of the rest of the port infrastructure had already been put out of action. The gamble paid off and vast numbers of soldiers found their way out of France through the Mole. At the same time efforts were made to facilitate the removal of the men trying to find shelter on the beaches and waiting there for rescue. Some of the men of the Royal Engineers demonstrated considerable ingenuity and created impromptu piers using abandoned vehicles that stretched out into deeper water, allowing larger ships with deeper drafts to approach the beaches and take off the tens of thousands of soldiers [2].
The fighting on the perimeter allowed for no sweeping flanking manoeuvres and the opportunities for German troops to demonstrate their greater tactical flexibility were few and far between. This was the kind of grinding battle that gave Adolf Hitler nightmares. At least some of the Germans developed a respect for their opponents, or more cynically wished to explain how so much of the BEF slipped through their fingers, without implying any failure of tactics or strategy on the part of the Heer. An intelligence analysis prepared by the German IV Corps after the battle, who had fought the British all the way from the attack on Belgium to the final evacuation, offered the following conclusion (with apologies to the Scots, Welsh, and Irish):
‘The English soldier was in excellent physical condition. He bore his own wounds with stoical calm. The losses of his own troops he discussed with complete equanimity. He did not complain of hardships. In battle he was tough and dogged. His conviction that England would conquer in the end was unshakeable....
The English soldier has always shown himself to be a fighter of high value. Certainly, the Territorial divisions are inferior to the Regular troops in training but where morale is concerned they are their equal....
In defence the Englishman took any punishment that came his way.[3]’
The English soldier has always shown himself to be a fighter of high value. Certainly, the Territorial divisions are inferior to the Regular troops in training but where morale is concerned they are their equal....
In defence the Englishman took any punishment that came his way.[3]’
And what of the French forces? It was certainly not wise after the Fall of France for any officer of the Heer to suggest that French troops had put up a stiff fight whenever given the opportunity. Such talk might lead one to speculate that the Wehrmacht had not won because of the superiority of the German soldier versus the miscegenated, dissolute, French, but that it had come down to luck and poor French leadership as much as it had to any strategic insight or tactical brilliance. A fair assessment would be that wherever the French Army had been given clear orders, decent leadership, and a defensible position they invariable fought well and as was seen at Montcornet they were perfectly capable of taking to the offensive. Time and again their efforts had been undermined by a lacklustre French High Command directed by men who were either past their prime, out of their depth, or both. There was also the self-inflicted handicap of the lack of modern communications between the front lines and the high command [4].
Operation Dynamo was officially ended on the 27th of July, though the bulk of the evacuation had been concluded by the 26th. The last day, or rather night, of the evacuations was one of the trickiest as the British were intent on offering a chance of escape for as many of the French rear-guard as possible. Experience from Calais suggested that as soon as it was clear the last ships were arriving all manner of stragglers and deserters would come out of the woodwork and make the task far harder. The solution was to allow it to be known that the last ships would be leaving on the 25th, with the rear-guard making obvious preparations to withdraw. This had the desired effect and many of what were referred to as ‘riff-raff’, at least in polite company, sought passage aboard the evacuation ships and created a degree of chaos that would certainly have hampered a withdrawal by the French rear-guard. This would not have been an even trade as most of the French troops evacuated that night were repatriated to France as soon as the Armistice was signed. The final ships slipped in the following night and the rear-guard, including most of the survivors of 12th Motorized Division, were successfully carried away, with many joining to nascent Free French forces. Some though had to remain behind to prevent the Germans discovering their departure and rushing to seize the port, these soldiers would all be taken prisoner when the port finally fell on the 27th, though they were treated with respect by the Germans troops they surrendered to for the tenacious fight they had put up [5].
The British efforts to evacuate French troops and their clear intent to continue the fight certainly made an impact on de Gaulle. He was already leaning towards the idea that France should follow the example of other nations and fight on from overseas if Metropolitan France fell and he was now convinced that the future of France rested on continuing the fight. Weygand and the French High Command naturally chose to see things rather differently. As far as they were concerned, they had been let down at every turn by their allies. The Dutch, the Belgians, and the British had all failed to meet their responsibilities and, in some cases, outright lied about their intentions. Some blame was directed towards Gamelin, which begs the question as to why he was kept in place in 1940 with communications arrangements at his HQ that would have been unacceptable in WWI? By the 20th of July his successor Weygand had also given up the role of Chief of the Army Staff. One might think he would have been dismissed and replaced in the same way as Gamelin given his lack of success in turning the battle around, instead he had been made Minister of National Defence and was responsible for organizing for what became known as the Weygand Line and adopting the ‘Hedgehog’ tactic, better known as the ‘Brigade box’ by the British.
Despite the sudden show of energy in creating what was a well thought out, and potentially highly effective defensive plan to counter the inevitable German thrust towards Paris, Weygand had by the time Dunkirk fell concluded that a French victory was unlikely and along with many other senior French officers believed that an armistice would have to be sought. In this light the evacuation of the BEF was simply prolonging the agony of France and the bombastic talk of fighting on from overseas being voiced by Prime Minister Reynaud was both foolhardy and dishonourable. France would have to seek the best terms possible and Britain would have little choice but to follow suit, after all with France defeated the war was over. Weygand could not at this moment imagine either the rapacious nature of the German occupation, or that the British would see fighting on alone almost as a relief rather than a burden. Just how alone they were is a topic for later.
Between Calais and Dunkirk around four hundred thousand British and French soldiers had been evacuated, along with enough of their equipment to at least provide a nucleus for rebuilding. This was not the end of the story for the British forces in France. There were still significant numbers fighting south of the corridor the Germans had created in their drive to the coast and these troops would have to make their own escape, even as the French forces were making their last stand [6].
[1] There was much resentment from the soldiers trying to escape from the beaches about the lack of RAF support because the bulk of the aerial engagements took place well behind the beaches.
[2] Basically just trying to give a more complete picture of what happened during the evacuation, and I think its one of the areas that the Christopher Nolan film scores pretty high on.
[3] This quote is real and a personal favourite, so here it is.
[4] You can take this as summing up my view of the French army in 1940, by and large good soldiers let down by an appalling high command and weak political leadership.
[5] Obviously OTL there was no Calais evacuation and much of the French rear-guard was prevented from escaping by the, let’s call them riff-raff to keep this 12A/PG13.
[6] So this is rather more men rescued than OTL and substantially more equipment, and as will be explained in the next update the Royal navy isn’t quite done with dramatic rescues yet.
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David Flin
Gone Fishin'
I think the second sentence here actually belongs with the first rather than being a standalone.
Garrison
Donor
I watched that trailer this morning, seeing the plane take off in the middle of it and thinking, if that just crashed right now...
June 22nd – August 12th – 1940 – The Battle of France – Part VI – Case Red & Armistice
Garrison
Donor
June 22nd – August 12th – 1940 – The Battle of France – Part VI – Case Red & Armistice
The final phase of the Battle of France began on the 28th of July. As mentioned previously the French had adopted the Hedgehog tactic. In essence this meant units were formed into individual boxes combining infantry units and artillery separated by ground covered by obstacles and minefields and in range of artillery from the boxes. The intention was to break up an attack as it moved forward, progressively destroying its cohesion and putting enemy forces under attack from multiple directions. In the end the attack would either breakdown or be repulsed by well-timed counterattacks. One potential drawback to the scheme was that it required highly motivated troops, willing to fight on when surrounded by the enemy [1].
Given previous events this might have seemed to have been a lot to ask of the French troops in the face of a fresh German onslaught. Oddly the morale of the French forces on the ‘Weygand Line’ was relatively high. Few of the troops knew any real details about what had happened in Belgium and in the battle for the Dunkirk perimeter. At the same time their officers had been fully briefed on the efficacy of French weapons versus their German equivalents, the message was hammered home repeatedly, French artillery and French armour had demonstrated itself to be superior to that of the enemy. Weygand had also managed to assemble reserves, including partially mechanized units, to launch counterattacks with heavy artillery available to support the Hedgehog positions. This constituted a drastic revision of French tactics and a successful one as demonstrated by the fact the German forces were reduced to grinding their way forward in the opening stages of Case Red.
There were two major issues with the Weygand Line. The first was the lack of French air support, leaving the boxes vulnerable to bombing. Second was the defeatist attitude that had overtaken Weygand himself. The soldiers and officers manning the line may have been relatively confident, however the Chief of the General Staff saw the defence not in terms of winning but of forcing the Germans to offer better terms in the inevitable peace talks. Such an attitude may have been realistic in some ways, it was not though the mindset apt to respond aggressively to the inevitable reverses that would occur in battle.
Almost fifty German divisions were deployed to strike on both flanks to break through and seize Paris. For two days these attacks made precious little progress while taking heavy losses. It fell to the Luftwaffe to suppress French artillery and prevent the French reserves from concentrating to mount counter attacks. On the third day the Germans finally made a breakthrough and began to push through. Their forces were once again greatly overextended, but Luftwaffe attacks again prevented any major counterattack by the French. The difficulties faced by the Germans in the early stages of the battle would have been far worse had von Rundstedt not initiated the Halt Order and regrouped his Panzers. Those who were adamant after the war that the Panzers should have been thrown immediately into the fighting around the Dunkirk perimeter tend to ignore the fact that there was still much fighting to be done after the ‘cornered’ BEF had been dealt with [2].
This collapse led to one dramatic rescue on the part of the Royal Navy as they were called upon to aid the 51st Highland Division. The division had been fighting alongside the French and had been part of an abortive counterattack as the main French line crumbled. Much of the 154th Brigade had been detached for other duties, but in the aftermath of the failed attack the 152nd and 153rd Brigades, along with the remnants of the French 9th Corps, fell back towards the coast in the direction of Le Havre. It was soon clear that the port was untenable, and it swiftly fell to German forces. In the end the 51st were forced to make for the harbour at Saint Valery-en-Caux. This was not an ideal place for an evacuation as it was overlooked by high cliffs that would make an ideal position for German artillery to range on the town and any docked ships. The 51st finally received some luck as after the heavy fighting around Calais and Dunkirk, and of course Case Red, the Germans were running short on troops to spare for what were now seen as secondary objectives. The German force at Saint Valery-en-Caux consisted of three somewhat understrength companies with nothing heavier than mortars to oppose any attempts to evacuate the 51st. Admiral William James had assembled a force of ships to carry out the rescue and they took full advantage of the weak German investment of the town, with the first ships arriving on the afternoon of the 6th of August and the evacuation continuing through the night, with the Royal Navy making good use of all the lessons learned at Dunkirk to carry out the embarkation of soldiers as rapidly as possible.
The German forces could see what was happening and put in urgent calls for support, particularly for the Luftwaffe to bomb the ships in the harbour. The initial messages were either garbled in transmission or copied inaccurately upon receipt, with the result that what was happening at Saint Valery-en-Caux was regarded as a few men getting away in fishing boats and thus not a priority. By the time the error was corrected night had fallen. On the morning of the 7th of July, the Luftwaffe turned up in strength and the German force on the cliffs had been substantially reinforced, and it was all in vain. The Luftwaffe did inflict damage on the destroyer HMS Icarus as she departed at 05:15 hours, but she survived to return to port. Icarus was only carrying about half her possible compliment of evacuees, and these were all French troops. the last party of the 51st, including their commanding officer Major General Sir Victor Fortune had departed before dawn. Fortune had insisted on remaining to the end, despite messages from London insisting that he should not risk the Germans capturing such a senior officer. The last few ships had purely been sent into rescue the French, with many of the survivors of the 9th choosing to join the soldiers they had fought alongside in withdrawing to Britain, many to fight on with the Free French. Some inevitably thought better of this in the cold light of day on the 7th and tried to break out to the south instead or remained in the town to surrender to the Germans, though there were few who chose the latter course [3].
With the Weygand Line broken open Paris and the Germans rapidly advancing Paris was declared an open city on the 6th of August. On the on the 7th Italy declared war and launched an attack through the Alps. Though this attack met with stiff resistance from French forces and made no ground it was the final straw for Weygand, who is reported to have stormed into Prime Minister Reynaud’s office and insisted that France must have an armistice. Reynaud resisted at this point, suggesting that France could fight on from her North African colonies. This idea was dismissed by Weygand and more importantly Petain. The hero of Verdun had been summoned from retirement in the hope that he might be able to once again ‘save France’. Instead, he firmly sided with those calling for an end to the war.
Even as the determined French defence was crumbling Churchill made one last trip to France on the 8th of August in a final bid to persuade the French to fight on by offering a full-blown union between the two countries. On the 9th Reynaud put this idea to his cabinet and when it was rebuffed, as were his plans for France to continue the war from exile, he felt he had no choice and resigned his post. He was succeeded by Petain and negotiation were soon underway for an Armistice. Hitler relished the chance to undo the humiliation of 1918, even to insisting on using the same railway car where Foch had presented his Armistice terms twenty-two years earlier. The terms were harsh, including the partitioning of France itself. They were accepted and the Armistice went into effect on the 15th of August [4].
With France gone and Nazi Germany the masters of Europe it is hardly surprising that many in the French Vichy government, named after the city in which it was based, and the German high command thought the war in the west was over, Britain surely had no choice but to make the best peace it could, or face being conquered just as France had been. Hitler was even prepared to offer what to his mind were generous terms. These however were based on a complete misunderstanding of British interests and failed to address the obvious problem that Hitler was regarded as completely untrustworthy by the British, any treaty he signed would be broken as soon as it suited him. Hitler’s entire strategic scheme would founder on the intransigence of the British, and far from being over the war was still closer to its beginning than its end.
[1] So this is my shorthand description of the strategy. It proved very effective during WWII, especially when the defending side was able to achieve air superiority.
[2] And this is my assessment of the idea of throwing the Panzers against Dunkirk without regrouping and resupplying.
[3] Of course in OTL the German presence was far stronger and there was fog during the night, leaving Admiral James no choice but to call the evacuation off and dooming the 51st to being captured.
[4} Churchill made the equivalent trip in OTL, with exactly the same result.
Garrison
Donor
Well obviously the fact this is mid August not June will impact some decision making going forward, both British and Axis. The next series of posts will cover the British in the aftermath of the Fall of France. One about the general situation, one each for the service branches and a late addition covering just how 'alone' Britain really was. Funnily enough the alone update was something I was working on for the post 1938-42 TL but I decided it would fit better here.
I would expect much less, if any at all, invasion scare. The British Army is not suffering from the equipment shortages it had in OTL, and the weather window for the Germans is just six weeks at most. So the British can take a breath and prepare for the summer of 1941. This should allow them to be much more calm and deliberate about arms production. My ignorance can only summon one example: get 6lb anti-tank into production sooner rather than focusing on 2lb-er; I am sure there are many many more.
OTL, it took the Luftwaffe about three weeks to regroup and re-equip between the end of the Battle of France and the start of the Battle of Britain (22 June - 10 July). Here, even discounting the inevitably heavier losses of a much longer continental campaign, that takes them into early September.
Their options are to either postpone till the spring, (and let the old BEF spend the winter turning the south cost into something that makes the old Hindenburg Line they got a good look at after they smashed their way through it look like a walk in the park) or attack immediately (and discover how well a bunch of river barges cope with the RAF, the Royal Navy, an army that still has most of its kit, and the old BEF (who are unlikely to be happy to see that chasing the German army halfway across France wasn't enough to make it wind its collective neck in)).
They don't have the barges or logistics set up for the land/sea side. There is no way they can get it in place before the weather turns or get the needed temporary air superiority over the channel ( let alone attrition the RAF ).
The fog and low cloud provides concealment from the RN and protection from the RAF. Moreover, the stronger the winds, the harder it is to predict where the paratroopers will land, thereby confounding the enemy's defences. Clearly Autumn is the perfect time to attack!
More seriously, no immediate invasion threat allows better planning on top of the improvements already resulting from the original POD.
There's also the consideration of the French armistice. The boundaries are likely a bit different than OTL but overall terms are likely similar or identical.
Italy's position is interesting. Did they attack France? Do they attack Egypt and the East African territories both of which were influenced by the fall of France and by perceived British weakness.
It is my understanding that one of the criticism of the Tizard mission was that the British gave the Americans a great deal of advance technology for free. Some feel that it would have been better for Britain to license the technology so that there was a revenue flow. Will you be discussion any changes to the Tizard mission with a stronger British situation?
"The Tizard Mission, officially the British Technical and Scientific Mission,[1] was a British delegation that visited the United States during the Second World War in order to obtain the industrial resources to exploit the military potential of the research and development (R&D) work completed by the UK up to the beginning of World War II, but that Britain itself could not exploit due to the immediate requirements of war-related production. It received its popular name from the programme's instigator, Henry Tizard. Tizard was a British scientist and chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee, which had propelled the development of radar.
The mission travelled to the United States in September 1940 during the Battle of Britain. They intended to convey a number of technical innovations to the U.S. in order to secure assistance in maintaining the war effort."
"The Tizard Mission, officially the British Technical and Scientific Mission,[1] was a British delegation that visited the United States during the Second World War in order to obtain the industrial resources to exploit the military potential of the research and development (R&D) work completed by the UK up to the beginning of World War II, but that Britain itself could not exploit due to the immediate requirements of war-related production. It received its popular name from the programme's instigator, Henry Tizard. Tizard was a British scientist and chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee, which had propelled the development of radar.
The mission travelled to the United States in September 1940 during the Battle of Britain. They intended to convey a number of technical innovations to the U.S. in order to secure assistance in maintaining the war effort."
The Empire is no use to the British in the UK if they can't exploit it, and to exploit it (to protect their homeland) they need to be able to move stuff across hundreds or even thousands of miles of open water and with the Germans (who now have Norway and France and their coastlines, plus there are the Italians in the Mediterranean) able to outflank the UK in deploying surface raiders and submarines to hit anything approaching the UK.
The British really need a working teleport system in late 1940. Either that or, in this timeline, a veritable mountain of escort ships which they didn't have in the original timeline which have been built since this timeline's Munich. (Churchill in the original timeline was desperate enough to go begging to the USA for fifty obsolete and washed-out destroyers - see the 'Destroyers for bases' deal.)
Sure, it's possible to make fun of 'alone'; but there was at the very least an element to the UK being 'isolated', 'cut off', and/or 'under siege' in terms of bad things happening to ships coming to the UK. (And then there's the angle of the Germans, with France in their possession and the air force options the Germans have in 1940, being able to shut down UK ports in the south of the UK at the very least.)
I don't remember the specifics but I believe the escort program was begun sooner, which should be a huge boost to the RN. Not to mention the KGV's and carriers should be completed sooner to contain raiders.
