June 22nd – August 15th – 1940 – The Battle of France – Part II – The End of Gamelin and the Belgian Surrender
It was in the afternoon of the 24th that Gamelin finally decided to share his information about what was happening on the Meuse with the British. Major-General Howard Vyse, chief of the British Military Mission to the French High Command found himself summoned to meet with Gamelin after several days of being denied any meaningful access to the French Commander in Chief. He was now briefed on Gamelin’s appreciation of the situation and then send them off by staff car to Gort’s HQ with little opportunity for discussion. Gamelin’s briefing had been full of assurances that the 7th Army would hold the line against what could surely only be a modest force. Given that the French maps clearly showed attacks on at least three critical points on the line of the Meuse Vyse expressed severe doubts about Gamelin’s confidence when he spoke with Gort. Vyse’s assessment of the situation, and the fact that he was receiving this news almost as an afterthought, certainly led Gort to entertain doubts of his, or more accurately amplified those he already had. As has been said Gort was a cautious man and in this case caution dictated that he assumed the worst, that the advancing German forces if they broke through on the Meuse would turn towards the coast, not towards Paris, aiming to cut off the BEF and the cream of the French armies in Belgium [1].
Gort dispatched a lengthy message to London that evening, the main points of which can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the BEF and the French armies facing the Escault would have to form second flank facing south in the event that the Germans did turn towards the coast. Secondly that the necessity of forming such a flank while still fighting in the north would preclude the forces in the ‘perimeter’ from mounting major offensive actions. Thirdly, if such a situation arose then the forces inside the perimeter could only be relieved by decisive counterattacks by the large numbers of French troops to the south of this German flanking manoeuvre. Finally, if such counterattacks were not mounted, or failed to defeat the German forces then the plans for a possible evacuation of the BEF would have to be revisited. By the time this message reached London and a late-night session of the cabinet was convened to discuss it the questions of whether the Germans would breakthrough and what direction they would turn had already been answered [2].
In theory the advantage in combat usually lies with the defender and the attacker needs a substantial advantage in numbers to assure victory. In practice 7th Army was infantry facing tanks with no air support, while at the same time their rear areas were relentlessly attacked by the Luftwaffe. 7th army was also expected to protect a broad section of the line of the Meuse and the Panzer divisions could concentrate at their chosen points achieving overwhelming local superiority, this was at the heart of much of their success in the Summer of 1940. Had their enemies been able to concentrate their own forces at any given point to block the Panzers Manstein’s entire plan would have unravelled. It was the speed of their advance that constantly wrong footed the Allies and ensured that during the initial advance the advantage invariably lay with the Wehrmacht. Given these circumstances and the fact that the German troops leading the assault were the elite of the German army and many of those opposing them were second line formations it is hardly surprising that the 7th soon gave way, with divisions being forced to scatter east and west of the breakthrough. The Panzers had opened a fifty-mile-wide gap in the Allied lines, still with no sign of any counterattack.
This is not to say that Gamelin wasn’t planning to counterattack, he certainly proposed ideas, though none of it struck Gort or his staff as particularly realistic. To put it simply Gamelin was proposing thrusts from the north and south simultaneously to sever the lines of communications of the Panzer divisions and that the BEF would put in a major contribution to the attack from the north. While sound in principle This plan ignored the fact that the BEF was heavily engaged on the Escault and Gort felt it was necessary to devote much of their reserve to establishing a flank to the south, protecting their lines of communication with the vital Channel ports. Gort was prepared to mount a more modest operation aimed at disrupting German operations in support of a major counteroffensive from the south, in effect proposing a modest raid rather a full-blown attack and the British felt they had made this clear to Gamelin. In what appears to be a case of hearing what he wanted to hear Gamelin proceeded to act as if the BEF were conforming to his intentions [3].
The plans for an attack from the south were equally detached from the situation on the ground as the available French forces were in disarray after the rapid German advance. Orders were issued and lines drawn on maps at the French HQ, but the forces in the south were lacking in armoured support in addition to their other problems. Which brings us to the question of the fate of the Armoured Divisions and the clear illustration of what might have been provided by one Colonel Charles de Gaulle and his 4th Armoured division. After days of constantly changing instructions 1st and 2nd Armoured had fallen into the grip of ‘order, counterorder, disorder’. They were disorganized and the sense that their commanders had no idea what was going on eroded morale among the ordinary rank and file. In addition, some tank units were running low on fuel and had not been resupplied with ammunition after the fighting on the Escault. The 2nd put in an attack on the 27th against 5th Panzer, though it took the form of several individual skirmishes where elements of the 2nd attacked without infantry support and were driven off with heavy losses.
The attempt to engage the following day by the 1st fared even worse, with some tanks having to be abandoned as they ran out of fuel. By the beginning of July, the 1st and 2nd Armoured were finished as effective fighting formations, while the 3rd Armoured Division had been dispersed to support the infantry fighting in the north or to help secure a perimeter to the south. And yet as events elsewhere showed there had nothing inevitable about the failures of the attacks by the 1st and the 2nd, they had been undone by the disruption caused by Luftwaffe attacks and contradictory orders. These failures were the final straw for Prime Minister Reynaud who finally decided that enough was enough and Gamelin had to go. When he was dismissed on the 30th Gamelin to all intents and purposes shrugged his shoulders and went off to lunch with his staff. The immediate effect of this decision was to bring a halt to all operational planning awaiting the arrival of Gamelin’s successor, this was far from ideal, and some might argue this was the wrong moment for such a change. The reality was that Gamelin should probably have been relieved of his position after his poor performance in the Battle of Belgium and with his assessment of the situation after the battle now proven hopelessly wrong Reynaud felt Gamelin had to be replaced in the hope that his successor could still retrieve the situation [4].
Beginning on the 14th of June the French sought to form a 4th Armoured Division under Colonel Charles de Gaulle. By applying the full force of his personality de Gaulle had brought the 4th up to about two-thirds of its paper strength, a substantial achievement given that vehicles intended for the 4th had repeatedly been syphoned off for other commitments. De Gaulle was also robust in persuading his troops that they were the spearhead of the French Army and would turn the tide against the Germans. As the Germans raced to the coast after crossing the Meuse de Gaulle had repeatedly requested permission to mount a counterattack in the direction of Montcornet and cut in behind the leading edge of the Panzers to disrupt their supply lines and res-establish communications with the Allied to the north. He was finally given permission to attack on the 29th, practically the last order Gamelin issued. De Gaulle was however advised to wait 24 hours pending the arrival of some last-minute reinforcements. These never materialized, and de Gaulle was deeply frustrated by this pointless delay. 4th Armoured moved out on the 30th of June and their attack on Montcornet showed what French armour could do when it was well organized, well lead and possessed of a clear plan.
Despite coming under attack from the Luftwaffe and discovering the fearsome destructive power of the 88mm flak gun in the anti-tank role they successfully routed the defenders and pressed on attacking several other German strong points in the hours after the initial breakthrough. The attack was at the tactical level a complete success and it could have been a critical strategic victory for the French, if it had been exploited. This can be laid squarely with the problems caused by the summary dismissal of Gamelin on the 30th. Simple logic dictated that the change should have been put into effect only after his successor had been fully briefed and was able to assume command. In the event the cancellation of much of the final plans put in place by Gamelin to await the arrival of the new Commander in Chief meant that units earmarked by Gamelin to move up and support De Gaulle in the event 4th Armoured Division achieved a breakthrough were ordered to stand down. De Gaulle’s response when he discovered what had happened is probably unprintable, but unsupported and facing German counterattacks as well as further bombing by the Luftwaffe he had no choice but to withdraw. Even in retreat the 4th acquitted themselves well putting a series of ‘stopping blows’ that dissuaded German troops from pressing the pursuit too closely.
Some Anglocentric historians have referred to this battle as the ‘French Arras’, but it was nothing of the sort. This was a far more powerful attack and one that if Gamelin’s orders had not been cancelled would have been a disaster for the Germans as there were forces available to support it. There are even those that argue that Montcornet was a clear sign that Gamelin had finally gotten a grip on the battle and might yet have turned things around, placing the blame for all that came after on Reynaud’s decision to dismiss him. This seems an optimistic assessment, but it cannot be denied that it created great anxiety among the German commanders, which had barely died down when the actual battle of Arras took place.
After the battle de Gaulle’ suggested that the four rather battered armoured divisions be consolidated into two stronger divisions and further organized into an Armoured Corps, preferably to be commanded by de Gaulle himself. This idea found no favour at the French High Command and the 4th continued to operate as distinct formation. It launched one more attempt to break the German lines days later at Abbeville, but by this point it was low on fuel and supplies. Also, its losses from Montcornet had no been made good and it had suffered further attrition from mechanical breakdowns and air attacks. The attack was a failure that finished the 4th as an effective fighting formation. It is intriguing to speculate what might have been if the 4th at the peak of its strength had been able to attack from the south when 1st Army Tank Brigade struck at Arras, the entire course of the war might have changed. Instead, de Gaulle would find himself defending the honour of France in a very different role [5].
If the French were looking for new blood in command Weygand was an odd choice. He had already served as Chief of the Army Staff and been replaced by Gamelin, whereupon he retired in 1935. Weygand had been recalled to service in 1939 and had then been dispatched to Syria as commander-in-chief for the Orient Theatre of Operation, he was thus anything but well versed in the developments on the continent in the years since his original retirement. Weygand was also seventy-three years old, five years older than the man he now replaced. His major recommending feature appears to have been that he served as Chief of Staff to Ferdinand Foch during WWI. However, little of that great man’s energy, or intelligence, seems to have rubbed off on Weygand. He treated his return to France as a personal triumph affecting an air of confidence upon his arrival, which changed rapidly once he acquired a full appreciation of the situation on the ground. He was heard to bitterly complain that if he had known how bad the situation was, he would not have accepted the post, apparently more worried about his reputation than the fate of France and he seemed to settle into a defeatist mindset almost from the start of his tenure. He was still talking in terms of counteroffensives, however the preconditions he began to layout raised serious doubts about the seriousness of his intentions [6].
When Weygand was appointed on the 30th the British could still entertain some hopes he might represent a change for the better and their largest concern at that moment was the looming prospect of a Belgian collapse. It was obvious that the length of the line being held in the north would have to be shortened and what was left of Belgium would fall into German hands. The Belgian government was talking about following the Poles and Norwegians and forming a government in exile. The king however was convinced that only a full surrender to the Germans could save Belgium from ruin and he was perfectly prepared to go behind his government’s back to negotiate one. In the end the Allies got twenty-four hours’ notice of the surrender, which would take place on the 1st of July [7].
By this point the situation facing the Allies was critical, the German drive to the coast was unrelenting and with the collapse of the Belgians as well as the defensive line in the south being far from consolidated meant there was a real threat of BEF, and the French forces now falling back from the Escault and desperately trying to pivot to form a new line of defence, being enveloped and destroyed. What the Allies needed above all else was breathing space, time to prepare and be ready when the Panzer and their supporting infantry inevitably reached the coast and turned north. The event that bought this precious time would be seen by the French as the British yet again failing to deliver on their promises and by the British as ‘The battle that saved the BEF’ [8].
[1] Vyse is an OTL character and wrote a report on the conduct of the French HQ after the battle. He was dispatched to England in OTL to argue against the plans for a British redoubt in France and a second BEF by Alanbrooke, and quite likely will be again ITTL.
[2] Different timing but pretty much what Gort concluded OTL.
[3] This ‘misunderstanding’ was the cause of much recrimination later.
[4] So obviously timings are different, but this is pretty much what happened to 1st and 2nd Armoured historically.
[5] The Battle of Montcornet also happened, though here the 4th is stronger than OTL having had more time to prepare, and their attack pushes a bit further than it did OTL, unfortunately though the reasons are different the lack of support did force a withdrawal. It is a perfect illustration of the fact that Germans were very lucky the French weren’t able to get their act together in time.
[6] Given time to organize Weygand did a decent job of fighting Case Red after Dunkirk but he does seem to have been pretty defeatist from the start.
[7] And these are the actions that led the Belgians to consider whether Leopold had committed treason.
[8] It’s a Britwank, did you think I wouldn’t have a Battle of Arras? Though I do promise one big change in the OTL battle that will probably make some people happy…
