If the Soviets lose transit rights through Austria though, that makes maintaining such forces much more difficult.
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
1st August 1944 – 1st February 1945 - The Spoils of War – Operation Paperclip and Operation Newton
Garrison
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1st August 1944 – 1st February 1945 - The Spoils of War – Operation Paperclip and Operation Newton
The disposition of German scientists and engineers after the end of the war in Europe, and the research they carried out, was a thorny subject at the time and remained problematic across the years as the association of Nazi scientists with high profile technological projects constantly attracted scrutiny of their war records. This is because it is impossible to disentangle the often astounding achievements of German scientists and engineers across multiple disciplines from the terrible cost in human lives required to bring them to fruition. In the field of medicine aside from the medical horrors carried out by Mengele and others in the pursuit of their racial theories they also produced genuinely useful data on the mechanics and treatment of hypoxia, hypothermia and the radiation exposure. The moral dilemma at the heart of using this data lay in the fact that it had been obtained by the same sort of human experimentation, primarily carried out on concentration camp inmates, as Mengele’s efforts to prove his ludicrous theories on eugenics. The data gathered from these more often than not lethal experiments offered scientists in the USA and Britain a wealth of information that could never be reproduced in any ethical way and in the eyes of some this made it irrevocably tainted. This was a minority view however and the rationalization that this knowledge would prove invaluable in saving lives in the future won out in the end. This willingness on the part of senior figures in the medical research community to rationalize away appalling experiments being perpetrated on marginalized people, all in the name of some greater good, may go some way to explaining such post war tragedies such as the Tuskegee syphilis experiments [1].
When it came to the fruits of Nazi aerospace research there was no real attempt to rationalize the use of both the technologies and the men who had developed them. Werner von Brawn and General Walter Dornberger could hardly claim to have been acting to save lives and reduce future suffering when they helped create weapons that were intended to rain down destruction all across Europe, which had only bee prevented by the rapid collapse of the Third Reich. That the weapons had been brought into service at all had only been achieved by the expenditure of slave labour on a prodigious scale and attempts by von Braun, who had become a member of the SS in 1940, and others to pretend that they hadn’t known how the weapons based on their work had been produced rang extremely hollow. Luckily for them the British who had taken most of the German rocket scientists’ prisoner were willing to overlook such considerations when it came to when it came to rocket and aerospace technology, burying the worst of their actions under the blanket of ‘national security’ for decades, and they extended this same strategy to the men who had worked on Germany’s nuclear program [2].
Werner Heisenberg was among those physicists who found themselves in British hands as the war ended, and initially they had been dubious about his value as the German nuclear program had been heading into a dead end even before the accident that destroyed their experimental reactor. Heisenberg astounded his captors by offering up a series of calculations that showed he did possess an understanding of the real parameters of an atomic bomb. His explanation for this was that he had knowingly provided the leaders of the Third Reich with false numbers in a deliberate act of sabotage designed to force them to abandon their research. It would be an understatement to say this claim has been treated with scepticism ever since regardless of how many times Heisenberg repeated it. The most accepted interpretation of events is that Heisenberg did initially make a mistake and by the time he realized his error the febrile atmosphere in Nazi Germany meant that he was afraid to reveal this fact for fear that it would lead to accusations of treason and sabotage. Regardless of the truth the British saw the opportunity to put him to work along with von Braun and his comrades to aid in reverse engineering the Nazi’s missile technology and perhaps find a way make a working atomic bomb before the Allies were faced with having to make a landing in the Japanese Home islands [3].
As we can see there was little debate among the Western Allies over whether the Germans scientists and engineers should be put to work, what did provoke serious disputes was where they would work and under whose direction. The Americans were extremely eager to acquire the services of the German rocket scientists and move them to a secure location in some desolate spot in the middle of the desert. The British were far from enthusiastic about such a plan, particularly given the way that the Americans had sought to restrict access to information about the production of enriched Uranium and Plutonium. Matters were not improved by the belief among the British that the Americans were taking advantage of their opportunities to interrogate the German scientists to try and ‘poach’ them, that is trying to persuade the scientists that they would have greater opportunities and better conditions in the USA. That the Americans were hardly subtle about this provoked a great deal of anger that reached to the highest levels in Whitehall and the new Labour government. What arose from this was an insistence that if some of the German rocket engineers were to be handed over there had to be a quid pro quo in terms of the sharing of technical data in all fields, but especially that relating to the construction of an atomic bomb [4].
This provoked a strong reaction in Washington, where neither of the prospective candidates were happy about what they saw as unreasonable demands by the British, but London stood firm. They had captured the scientists and had control of Peenemunde; they were not going to give up their prizes for nothing. Nazi Germany was defeated, and Britain would have to accept that the USA was destined to be the most powerful nation on Earth, with the USSR also clearly rising to prominence. There was no desire to accept a future in which the USA was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb even if the USA were to remain a close ally, something that the British experience of the shifting global political landscape in the first four decades of the twentieth century meant could hardly be taken for granted [5].
Things were settled with some very intense horse trading that set the parameters for the release of German scientists from British custody, though int the end the British retained the services of a substantial number of them, though not von Braun himself. Far from being disconsolate about being left behind some of them men who remained in Britain were only too happy to get out from under the thumb of von Braun to explore their own ideas; and get credit for them. The British also retained the services of Heisenberg and most of the other nuclear scientists, who would find themselves deeply involved in British nuclear plans up until the 1950s. The transfer of these scientists to serve their new masters would be called Operation Paperclip by the Americans and Operation Newton by the British and it was done without any public discussion or debate in either nation [6].
The German scientists sent to Britain had found themselves initially incarcerated at Farm Hall, a country estate near Cambridge in England. The rocket and nuclear scientists may have been confined to the grounds, but Farm Hall was hardly a prison and indeed many of the scientists who were held there retained fond memories of their time ‘imprisoned’ there. Items such as cigarettes, coffee and chocolate that had become almost unheard-of luxuries in Germany were freely provided, along with access to wine, beer, whiskey and brandy. Every bit as importantly they were allowed to openly talk and share information. Free of the omnipresent threat of the Gestapo and the insistence on strict compartmentalization the scientists discussed everything, which was precisely what the British wanted. Contrary to what some of scientists believed the British were perfectly willing to engage in ‘Gestapo tactics’ when it came to bugging every inch of the house and grounds and they gained a great deal of valuable information in doing so, especially the conversations between Helmut Groettrup, a senior member of the V2 team, and several of the nuclear physicists. This was where the British learned of the concept of the ‘Amerika rocket’ a next generation rocket capable of delivering a payload from launch sites in Europe to the continental USA, a first-generation ICBM and one that Adolf Hitler had demanded be fitted with a nuclear warhead. When this information was shared with the Americans, along with what were now obviously preliminary designs for such a missile, they became even more determined to acquire their fair share, or more than their fair share of the German rocket scientists. This was understandable given that in the same way that aerial bombing had ended the idea of the English Channel as a bulwark against attacks on British cities ICBMs meant that the Atlantic Ocean was no longer a shield against hostile powers intent on attacking the USA [7].
One matter of policy on which the British and Americans were in accord was restricting Soviet access to the research facilities currently under their control. The allocation of the Soviet zone in Germany meant that Augsburg and other centres of German aircraft development and production were scheduled to be handed over to them. The Soviets were also keen to have access to sites such as Peenemunde to do their own inspections and acquire information about the work done there. The Western Allies had to abide by the letter of the agreements they had made, but nothing in those agreements required them to make things easy for the Soviets. large amounts of equipment were shipped out of Augsburg and Peenemunde before any Soviets set foot in the facilities and they would have to make do with piecing together the scraps that the Allies left behind for them. This certainly hampered Soviet efforts to develop their own jet and rocket technology, but if the Western Allies believed it would completely cripple their ability to make progress, they severely underestimated the capabilities of Soviet scientists and engineers [8].
Those German scientist and engineers who did fall into Soviet hands were whisked away to the USSR, though much of the bounty was squandered as critical equipment and tooling was badly handled, being left exposed to the elements at railway sidings in some cases, important documents were lost and the Germans found themselves sent to sites markedly lacking in the facilities needed to further the research they were supposed to carry out. They were also barred from working with their Soviet counterparts, largely owing to fears that they would learn just how far behind the USSR was in what were now classed as research of national importance. It was fortunate for their rocket and atomic bomb programs that the Soviets possessed men of the calibre of Sergei Korolev and Andrei Sakharov, though the Soviets would in the end deny them the credit they were entitled to and ultimately alienated them [9].
What the attempts to frustrate the Soviets did achieve was a further cooling of relations between east and west, at the same time as the Anglo-American alliance was under increasing strain. There was a great irony in the fact that in defeat Germany was able to do more to prise apart the grand alliance against them than they had ever achieved while prosecuting the war. Still despite all this wrangling the scientific and engineering knowledge of Nazi Germany would be put to work and would help to shape the future, for good and for ill [10].
[1] Just a small reminder that people in other countries believing ‘it couldn’t happen here’ was wishful thinking.
[2] It’s not that British are hostile to the US, its more that they are rather less trusting that their ally will follow through on their promises to share their own breakthroughs in aerospace and nuclear technology.
[3] So I’m taking a middle ground here between Heisenberg’s version of how he got the numbers wrong and the far more likely version that he simply made a mistake and failed to recognize it.
[4] The British are not truly determined to have their own rocket program, or at least most of them aren’t, and if they can trade the scientists for a more open exchange over the bomb, well then that will be a win.
[5] Look at the constantly shifting patterns of alliances across those decades and without 20-20 hindsight who could be sure that the USA would always be a friend to the British?
[6] No, no, these guys weren’t really Nazis. Why if they were we would be putting them on trial for war crimes, wouldn’t we?
[7] This is the driving force behind the missile programs in the major nations, the belief that the only way to be safe is to threaten an enemy with the prospect of retaliation, or of course a first strike to destroy their capability to retaliate.
[8] So the Soviets are going to have to make do with less captured material in some areas than OTL.
[9] This part is what happened IOTL, the Soviets squandered a lot of what they captured.
[10] This is one of those things that might be discussed if I do decide to write some addendums.
With Soviet puppet states to east and an occupation zone of Southern Germany to the west, Austrian leadership might not be in a position to deny the Soviets those transit rights. Due to Austria's strategic position for the Soviets, I myself would guess that Austria will undergo "Finlandization" soon after the Cold War kicks off, if not worse. With the Czechs firmly in the Western orbit, Austria might have the TTL equivalent of the 1948 Czechoslovak coup.
I'm looking at the map and I want to say "What Hungary?!"
I can't see it at all. OK, reality check. Looking at the map, going clockwise, there's Romania, clearly enough, and just south of it is Bulgaria--south of that is of course Greece and Turkey, and it looks like Turkey somehow winds up with a western extension in IIRC Thrace, that is the European salient in eastern Greece--did Turkey somehow annex Salonika? Well gosh I might have forgotten something from earlier in the thread. But I think I'd remember something like that...meanwhile Turkey is shaded a suspicious shade of red. Of course plenty of territories that clearly aren't Communist or in any way associated with the USSR are red, but I'd think the mapmaker would avoid shading anything on the Soviet border any shade of red to avoid confusion, unless they are telling us yep the Soviets have the upper hand there. As they clearly do in Manchuria and Mongolia--it also looks to me like the USSR annexed some territory the Japanese claimed for Manchukuo (which the Chinese Republic and Qing Dynasty had managed to hang on to in previous rounds of Russian Empire expansionism). But that might be a mistake on my part.
Anyway back to playing "where's Waldo?" with Hungary. Romania as OTL is rewarded, or anyway gets a booby prize for being under Soviet control, with Transylvania, check. In fact it looks to me like Romania is larger than OTL. Resuming the clockwise sweep, we have clearly the part of Yugoslavia that is not Croatia or Slovenia beyond it, without further subdivision beyond the fact that as OTL there is Albania separate from it at around "8:00"...
OK I found Hungary. It is mighty hard to distinguish from Croatia with the similar colors used for the two countries! Yep, despite Hungary being under the Soviet umbrella (and should I assume Yugoslavia as OTL is apparently as much a Soviet "captive nation" as any others, but as OTL there is at least a sporting chance Tito, having largely gotten control in pre-Red Army invasion partisan days, will be able to walk off on his own if it suits him?) Anyway there is Hungary looking to my casual eye distinctly smaller than it wound up being OTL. Which politically speaking makes sense to me; the Hungarian regimes were always pretty ready to join into Axis schemes without a lot of arm-twisting, not even the sort of polarized factionalism one found in Romania and Yugoslavia where the Nazis essentially promoted (and dominated and controlled) one faction and assisted in repressing the other--as far as I know the only anti-Nazi "factions" in Hungary were those who were repressed and banned and largely reduced to irrelevance from the late 1910s on, as soon as Bela Kun was defeated. Not accusing an entire people of being actual Nazis to be sure, but I am saying it was an authoritarian society where the authorities were quite comfortable with Nazi hegemony. So you can see why if in fact Hungary were partitioned right off the map, I would not be too amazed, except for the awkwardness of asking Romanians, Slovaks and Yugoslavs to rule the disgruntled Magyars--which to the Soviets could be a feature rather than a bug; on paper they have no trouble with these fraternal peoples and in reality know damn well if they manage to wiggle out from Soviet domination they will be in a heap of trouble trying to keep these demographic poison pills down, so they are stuck with Big Brother and his Red Army to keep order.
Welp, that didn't happen and perhaps I just am not familiar enough with OTL eastern European borders to see Hungary is much the same as OTL? At least I can see it is there at all--and in fact while it might have lost slices of territory here and there, it seems it also gains the former eastern tip of Slovakia, that's IRRC "Ruthenia." Why in the name of Ned would Stalin give the puppet Red Hungary that bit rather than as OTL simply annex it into Soviet territory?
Rounding things out--there's East Poland as advertised, beyond the Curzon Line, though I have to wonder if the Soviets aren't going to get around to renaming it "West Belarus" or some such--demographically that eastern part of interwar Poland was a zone where Poles (and Jews) were a majority of the urban center populations but the countryside was essentially Belarusian. I recall the author saying at this early date Stalin is still intriguing to get control of the rest of Poland and so he doesn't want to alienate them pointlessly, and labels don't matter too much to his mind. I think Poland has a different and longer border, not actually the Curzon Line come to think of it, with East Poland, which zigs farther west in the north just south of the Polish border with the Soviet half of former East Prussia, then zags farther east in Poland's southeast where it seems the Western Allies were able to push somewhat farther east than average. Slovakia looks to me like it might have lost some territory other than Ruthenia to Poland as well. Czechia--is that going to be called Bohemia or what here? is much as OTL, but I am not sure it is settled yet whether the W-Allies are going to be able to prevent it from going Communist--OTL it was the closest thing to a voluntary Soviet ally in the Warsaw Pact at first, if we discount Yugoslavia for that honor. Surely many Czechs would resist a Communist takeover, the question is would enough of them, along with whatever level of help this faction gets from the Western allies, be able to prevent a domestic Communist victory that promptly calls in the Red Army for help?
Surely the ability of the Soviets to keep South Germany compliant under occupation is not in doubt at this early moment. The question becomes what happens to Communist authority if the Western powers get into a Cold War with the Soviets later in the decade? As OTL I suppose the likeliest fate for Austria is to be neutralized; that republic never did join NATO while the Cold War lasted OTL. So surely there is no threat to a Soviet-bloc South Germany from that direction, nor from Switzerland--but assuming Czechia/Bohemia does not go Red itself (which honestly is how I would bet notwithstanding the relative sympathy for Communism and the Russians in interwar Czechoslovakia and the relatively high degree of legitimacy the Czechoslovak Communist Party had in the later '40s) neutral Austria by the same token of neutrality cannot be expected to give passage to Soviet troops--for them to withdraw out of Germany sure, but for replacements for Soviet forces relieved of occupation duty to sustain the domination, not so much. That would throw their neutrality into doubt, not to mention the presence of such troops and their gear transiting back and forth would be a practical threat.
I honestly think that denied boots on the ground in northeast Germany, Stalin would insist on some kind of assurance of control over Austria seeing as he had actual forces there--OTL he could be persuaded to give that up for other prizes but these are largely lacking ITTL, so why ever leave Austria?
Now perhaps the fine print of Austrian neutrality does provide for the Soviets retaining special transit rights to move specified levels of force across Austria, and maybe it is open ended enough that in addition to moving stuff from western Slovakia to eastern Bavaria, the Russians can also move people and things across the west tip of Austria from North Italy? North Italy is Euro-Communist and I gather even a semi-liberal pluralistic democracy (well, perhaps with some restrictions) and not a Soviet puppet, but it might prove to be a willing Soviet ally in the right circumstances.
Even so, Soviet domination of South Germany seems to be hanging by a very thin thread indeed here. If a domestic South German insurgency is ever in a position to pin down the Soviet and possible "fraternal ally" forces present there they could very plausibly expect to get Western ally help and force the Soviets to either risk starting WWIII or accept their forces being escorted east across Austria one last time then the door slamming shut. Naturally one expects the Soviet secret police with whatever initialisms they are using at the time along with the domestic Red-loyalist Stasi equivalent to prevent things ever getting that close to out of hand, but between German disgruntlement and Western allied strategic concerns (overcoming discomfort and reluctance on the part of French and Czech nations in particular to aid Germans, but of course the big border with Western powers is the one with North Germany, which is the direct aid for an anti-Soviet coup might be most reasonably expected to flow from at least once we get to the period where former occupied North Germany is spun off as a republic) we can expect many in the West to be tempted to promote and support such revolutions. Though of course on the assumption that the Soviets will indeed acquire nuclear weapons and will in any case maintain a huge military establishment, any such moves are playing with fire.
Actually it is possible North Germany might be restricted from developing much of a military at all. The only place North Germany faces the Soviet bloc is with the four Laender that border South Germany, one of those just barely does; if some Western occupying power (it seems we might not have a formal and strong allianc e like NATO here to be sure) takes up the duty of guarding that border with its forces, the North Germans might themselves be placed under a treaty stipulation similar to that on Japan OTL where they are allowed only "Self-Defense Forces." OTL that was a non-starter for West Germany however nervous France and other victims of the Reich might have been about it; East Germany was integral with the Soviet Bloc. But however politically aligned the South German state is with the USSR, logistically speaking it is an island that in a serious crisis Western powers can interdict by closing any passage through Austria, nor would neutral Austria be integrated into Soviet bloc mobilization or defensive plans even if they were suddenly occupied by Red forces overnight. The Soviets would actually have a hard time trying to take even a weakly self-defended Austria swiftly too, as their only sure reliable puppet bordering Austria (other than South Germany itself of course) is Slovakia, and that on a thin front. Conceivably if North Italy and Yugoslavia act in close concert or are absorbed under Soviet control outright, they could pincer over Croatia and Slovenia--but I think that is going to be far fetched at worst, because we have every reason to anticipate the Yugoslavs and North Italians having their own notions and not wanting to get caught in a meatgrinder like that. (Assuming the Western powers don't give them too much grief anyway).
Oh dear I got distracted from one more major question--is Turkey colored red by coincidence, or is the reason the Turks could annex so much more of European Thrace ITTL is that Turkey wound up going Red somehow and as a puppet of Stalin's, he insisted on rewarding them for their submission with Salonika? Also, another dynamic at work there might be that the Greek Communists as OTL bid for control there, and the Western powers more or less get their act together enough to support the anti-Communists as OTL, but the refugee Greek Reds are numerous enough that they need a refuge, and that the western part of Turkey is on paper integral with the Turkish Worker's Republic or whatever they call it, but is de facto an autonomous zone ruled by exilic Greek Communists who have agreed to accept nominal Turkish citizenship on the theory that under Communism all nations are fraternal brothers anyway? In fact in this scenario Ankara would have little to say about what goes on much west of Istanbul, but on paper they are loyal Turkish worker-citizens--and all happy to enjoy Soviet protection of course....
Unless the color is just an unfortunate coincidence much like the incredibly close tones of greenish tan that almost completely fail to distinguish Croatia from Soviet-ruled rump Hungary.
I can't see it at all. OK, reality check. Looking at the map, going clockwise, there's Romania, clearly enough, and just south of it is Bulgaria--south of that is of course Greece and Turkey, and it looks like Turkey somehow winds up with a western extension in IIRC Thrace, that is the European salient in eastern Greece--did Turkey somehow annex Salonika? Well gosh I might have forgotten something from earlier in the thread. But I think I'd remember something like that...meanwhile Turkey is shaded a suspicious shade of red. Of course plenty of territories that clearly aren't Communist or in any way associated with the USSR are red, but I'd think the mapmaker would avoid shading anything on the Soviet border any shade of red to avoid confusion, unless they are telling us yep the Soviets have the upper hand there. As they clearly do in Manchuria and Mongolia--it also looks to me like the USSR annexed some territory the Japanese claimed for Manchukuo (which the Chinese Republic and Qing Dynasty had managed to hang on to in previous rounds of Russian Empire expansionism). But that might be a mistake on my part.
Anyway back to playing "where's Waldo?" with Hungary. Romania as OTL is rewarded, or anyway gets a booby prize for being under Soviet control, with Transylvania, check. In fact it looks to me like Romania is larger than OTL. Resuming the clockwise sweep, we have clearly the part of Yugoslavia that is not Croatia or Slovenia beyond it, without further subdivision beyond the fact that as OTL there is Albania separate from it at around "8:00"...
OK I found Hungary. It is mighty hard to distinguish from Croatia with the similar colors used for the two countries! Yep, despite Hungary being under the Soviet umbrella (and should I assume Yugoslavia as OTL is apparently as much a Soviet "captive nation" as any others, but as OTL there is at least a sporting chance Tito, having largely gotten control in pre-Red Army invasion partisan days, will be able to walk off on his own if it suits him?) Anyway there is Hungary looking to my casual eye distinctly smaller than it wound up being OTL. Which politically speaking makes sense to me; the Hungarian regimes were always pretty ready to join into Axis schemes without a lot of arm-twisting, not even the sort of polarized factionalism one found in Romania and Yugoslavia where the Nazis essentially promoted (and dominated and controlled) one faction and assisted in repressing the other--as far as I know the only anti-Nazi "factions" in Hungary were those who were repressed and banned and largely reduced to irrelevance from the late 1910s on, as soon as Bela Kun was defeated. Not accusing an entire people of being actual Nazis to be sure, but I am saying it was an authoritarian society where the authorities were quite comfortable with Nazi hegemony. So you can see why if in fact Hungary were partitioned right off the map, I would not be too amazed, except for the awkwardness of asking Romanians, Slovaks and Yugoslavs to rule the disgruntled Magyars--which to the Soviets could be a feature rather than a bug; on paper they have no trouble with these fraternal peoples and in reality know damn well if they manage to wiggle out from Soviet domination they will be in a heap of trouble trying to keep these demographic poison pills down, so they are stuck with Big Brother and his Red Army to keep order.
Welp, that didn't happen and perhaps I just am not familiar enough with OTL eastern European borders to see Hungary is much the same as OTL? At least I can see it is there at all--and in fact while it might have lost slices of territory here and there, it seems it also gains the former eastern tip of Slovakia, that's IRRC "Ruthenia." Why in the name of Ned would Stalin give the puppet Red Hungary that bit rather than as OTL simply annex it into Soviet territory?
Rounding things out--there's East Poland as advertised, beyond the Curzon Line, though I have to wonder if the Soviets aren't going to get around to renaming it "West Belarus" or some such--demographically that eastern part of interwar Poland was a zone where Poles (and Jews) were a majority of the urban center populations but the countryside was essentially Belarusian. I recall the author saying at this early date Stalin is still intriguing to get control of the rest of Poland and so he doesn't want to alienate them pointlessly, and labels don't matter too much to his mind. I think Poland has a different and longer border, not actually the Curzon Line come to think of it, with East Poland, which zigs farther west in the north just south of the Polish border with the Soviet half of former East Prussia, then zags farther east in Poland's southeast where it seems the Western Allies were able to push somewhat farther east than average. Slovakia looks to me like it might have lost some territory other than Ruthenia to Poland as well. Czechia--is that going to be called Bohemia or what here? is much as OTL, but I am not sure it is settled yet whether the W-Allies are going to be able to prevent it from going Communist--OTL it was the closest thing to a voluntary Soviet ally in the Warsaw Pact at first, if we discount Yugoslavia for that honor. Surely many Czechs would resist a Communist takeover, the question is would enough of them, along with whatever level of help this faction gets from the Western allies, be able to prevent a domestic Communist victory that promptly calls in the Red Army for help?
Surely the ability of the Soviets to keep South Germany compliant under occupation is not in doubt at this early moment. The question becomes what happens to Communist authority if the Western powers get into a Cold War with the Soviets later in the decade? As OTL I suppose the likeliest fate for Austria is to be neutralized; that republic never did join NATO while the Cold War lasted OTL. So surely there is no threat to a Soviet-bloc South Germany from that direction, nor from Switzerland--but assuming Czechia/Bohemia does not go Red itself (which honestly is how I would bet notwithstanding the relative sympathy for Communism and the Russians in interwar Czechoslovakia and the relatively high degree of legitimacy the Czechoslovak Communist Party had in the later '40s) neutral Austria by the same token of neutrality cannot be expected to give passage to Soviet troops--for them to withdraw out of Germany sure, but for replacements for Soviet forces relieved of occupation duty to sustain the domination, not so much. That would throw their neutrality into doubt, not to mention the presence of such troops and their gear transiting back and forth would be a practical threat.
I honestly think that denied boots on the ground in northeast Germany, Stalin would insist on some kind of assurance of control over Austria seeing as he had actual forces there--OTL he could be persuaded to give that up for other prizes but these are largely lacking ITTL, so why ever leave Austria?
Now perhaps the fine print of Austrian neutrality does provide for the Soviets retaining special transit rights to move specified levels of force across Austria, and maybe it is open ended enough that in addition to moving stuff from western Slovakia to eastern Bavaria, the Russians can also move people and things across the west tip of Austria from North Italy? North Italy is Euro-Communist and I gather even a semi-liberal pluralistic democracy (well, perhaps with some restrictions) and not a Soviet puppet, but it might prove to be a willing Soviet ally in the right circumstances.
Even so, Soviet domination of South Germany seems to be hanging by a very thin thread indeed here. If a domestic South German insurgency is ever in a position to pin down the Soviet and possible "fraternal ally" forces present there they could very plausibly expect to get Western ally help and force the Soviets to either risk starting WWIII or accept their forces being escorted east across Austria one last time then the door slamming shut. Naturally one expects the Soviet secret police with whatever initialisms they are using at the time along with the domestic Red-loyalist Stasi equivalent to prevent things ever getting that close to out of hand, but between German disgruntlement and Western allied strategic concerns (overcoming discomfort and reluctance on the part of French and Czech nations in particular to aid Germans, but of course the big border with Western powers is the one with North Germany, which is the direct aid for an anti-Soviet coup might be most reasonably expected to flow from at least once we get to the period where former occupied North Germany is spun off as a republic) we can expect many in the West to be tempted to promote and support such revolutions. Though of course on the assumption that the Soviets will indeed acquire nuclear weapons and will in any case maintain a huge military establishment, any such moves are playing with fire.
Actually it is possible North Germany might be restricted from developing much of a military at all. The only place North Germany faces the Soviet bloc is with the four Laender that border South Germany, one of those just barely does; if some Western occupying power (it seems we might not have a formal and strong allianc e like NATO here to be sure) takes up the duty of guarding that border with its forces, the North Germans might themselves be placed under a treaty stipulation similar to that on Japan OTL where they are allowed only "Self-Defense Forces." OTL that was a non-starter for West Germany however nervous France and other victims of the Reich might have been about it; East Germany was integral with the Soviet Bloc. But however politically aligned the South German state is with the USSR, logistically speaking it is an island that in a serious crisis Western powers can interdict by closing any passage through Austria, nor would neutral Austria be integrated into Soviet bloc mobilization or defensive plans even if they were suddenly occupied by Red forces overnight. The Soviets would actually have a hard time trying to take even a weakly self-defended Austria swiftly too, as their only sure reliable puppet bordering Austria (other than South Germany itself of course) is Slovakia, and that on a thin front. Conceivably if North Italy and Yugoslavia act in close concert or are absorbed under Soviet control outright, they could pincer over Croatia and Slovenia--but I think that is going to be far fetched at worst, because we have every reason to anticipate the Yugoslavs and North Italians having their own notions and not wanting to get caught in a meatgrinder like that. (Assuming the Western powers don't give them too much grief anyway).
Oh dear I got distracted from one more major question--is Turkey colored red by coincidence, or is the reason the Turks could annex so much more of European Thrace ITTL is that Turkey wound up going Red somehow and as a puppet of Stalin's, he insisted on rewarding them for their submission with Salonika? Also, another dynamic at work there might be that the Greek Communists as OTL bid for control there, and the Western powers more or less get their act together enough to support the anti-Communists as OTL, but the refugee Greek Reds are numerous enough that they need a refuge, and that the western part of Turkey is on paper integral with the Turkish Worker's Republic or whatever they call it, but is de facto an autonomous zone ruled by exilic Greek Communists who have agreed to accept nominal Turkish citizenship on the theory that under Communism all nations are fraternal brothers anyway? In fact in this scenario Ankara would have little to say about what goes on much west of Istanbul, but on paper they are loyal Turkish worker-citizens--and all happy to enjoy Soviet protection of course....
Unless the color is just an unfortunate coincidence much like the incredibly close tones of greenish tan that almost completely fail to distinguish Croatia from Soviet-ruled rump Hungary.
Turkey hasn't annexed anything in Thrace, the entire country is as OTL, they definitley don't have Salonika which is well within Greek territory, and the red is part of the THICC colour scheme which I typically use. Republican Turkey is that red colour. Russia hasn't taken anything in Manchuria either. Hungary keeps Ruthenia (it was annexed in 1938) because its cur off from Ukraine by East Poland. And those are just the THICC colous for reublican Croatia and communist Hungary. The East/West Polish border is the OTL border that the USSR got in 1939 after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Slovakia has not lost any territory to Poland, and regained some territory in the south from Hungary that had been lost in 1938.
OK then in general...I am glad you made a map at all and now that I can see Hungary it was just kind of fun having been confused by the continuity of colors between Croatia and that nation. Ruthenia makes sense now that you remind me that some direct contact to the Soviet Union would be desired by Stalin and gang, and they'd be plenty cynical enough to let ill gotten gains from the Axis regime lie if it suits their purposes.
Which of course still leaves the question about Austria all the more pointed--with no reliable land contact with South Germany other than through Austria, and with the Soviets not having more important gains elsewhere to entice them to let Austria go as OTL, why ever leave there?
And Manchuria is very puzzling in that case. On Wilsonian terms, I suppose the Manchurians themselves might not mind staying separated from China--but who is asking them, cynically speaking? The Republic of China was an Allied nation, one granted (permanent and veto holding) Security Council status OTL, and the likely ways Japan is eventually brought down ITTL seem likely to me to only strengthen the Chinese Republics claims and status beyond OTL levels. If the collapse of Imperial Japan does not involve a Soviet invasion of Manchuria, or that does happen as OTL but Stalin gives up occupation of it as OTL, why would a victorious UN Alliance that is making a victor's peace in East Asia not grant the Chinese government all its claims, at least in the north (barring Tibet that is) that the Soviets don't already securely control?
Manchuria could be a buffer state, but I don't see why either the coalition of Western capitalist and generally anti-Communist European major powers plus the USA nor the Chinese would think a nominally independent Manchurian buffer state is a superior solution to any threats a buffer state might address versus simply letting China reassert its claim to include the place integrally in China.
If the Republic of China were generally wiped off the map in favor of Balkanized regional states, then a non-Communist Manchuria would fit among them just fine. But that has not happened either apparently, so why hive off Manchuria--granted that it is not a puppet state Stalin set up?
It doesn't seem very probable to me Manchuria would self-liberate itself with a very strong nationalistic patriotic insurgency. Korea maybe, but Manchuria I think lacked the track record of nationhood, and the state that went by that name (Japanese version of it to be sure) was a creation and puppet of the Japanese.
so you can see I was not jumping to the conclusion Manchuria must be a Soviet client state just on the basis of color alone (that was more the case with my perception of Turkey as a possible Soviet client, which certainly did seem far fetched to me, and depended mainly on the color alone, plus some rather vague and distant OTL prospects in the era and the possibility the Soviets moved into Anatolia with major force to simply create Red Turkey by naked conquest). Mainly I am scratching my head how Manchuria can stand alone at all without Soviet maneuvering to make it so. As an abstract game I suppose any territory can be defined as an ATL nation, but in the concrete reality of the cast of national players it was and still is difficult for me to see who else besides Stalin might want it and be in a position to enforce it as well.
Is it just some headstrong Yankee whim or what? Nor can I see much motive for US leaders of any plausible stripe to get a bee in their bonnet about independent Manchuria; again Americans with much interest in China at all tended to support the Nationalists. (Or Red Americans, or those fellow-travelers of a very pinkish hue, might prefer to follow a Stalinist line.
And the Monuments Men ?
Since the Western Allies have been first to Berlin and occupied much of Germany before the Soviets get their zone, I surmise a whole lot more of the artworks looted by the Nazis are going to find their way back home rather than to Moscow.
Since the Western Allies have been first to Berlin and occupied much of Germany before the Soviets get their zone, I surmise a whole lot more of the artworks looted by the Nazis are going to find their way back home rather than to Moscow.
Garrison
Donor
Some version of it will, but with events such as the Katyn Massacre now publicly blamed on the Soviets there will be rather more sympathy for those who don't wish to be returned home.
Not something I had thought about but yes and in fact I am simply going to say that ITTL this particular item does not vanish:
Amber Room - Wikipedia
10th August – 1st December 1944 – Britain – A Land Fit for Heroes
Garrison
Donor
10th August – 1st December 1944 – Britain – A Land Fit for Heroes
The swift nature of the handover of power in Britain had the potential to create problems as the incoming government, which might have spent many years on the opposition benches, sought to find its feet. In 1944 Clement Attlee and the Labour Party had the distinct advantage that they had been involved in the running of the country since the national government was formed in 1940. They were well aware of the state of the country and of the British strategic situation in post-war Europe and in the continuing war in the Pacific. When it came to domestic policy the Labour government would mark a dramatic change from what had gone before and despite much doomsaying from their political opponents, institutions such as the NHS would become part of the bedrock of British society over the following decades. Such matters are not the focus of this discussion, but Labour’s desire for substantial social and industrial reform, and the freeing up of the resources needed to achieve this, must be borne in mind when it comes to the Labour governments discussions of the conduct of the war against Japan [1].
Unconditional surrender remained the official position of the British government and no one was prepared to question this stance in public, no one wanted to offer the Japanese any false hope that British resolve was wavering, nor did they want to create any unnecessary problems with the USA. Of course, the importance of trying to stay in step with the USA grew considerably harder as the prospect of a Dewey victory increased. Thomas Dewey was not sympathetic towards Socialism, seeing it as merely a steppingstone to full blown communism, or at least such was the rhetoric of the campaign trail. Given the amount of blood and treasure Britain had already expended to bring about the defeat of Nazi Germany it was all but inevitable that whatever the public stance there would be private discussions as to what would constitute an acceptable peace with the Japanese [2]?
There could be no question of allowing Japan to retain any of its conquests, indeed driving them out of those that were left was accepted as a necessary precondition to force the Japanese to accept the reality of defeat and no one who had read the reports of the combat in South East Asia could be under any illusion that would be enough by itself. This precondition would mean that further military operations would have to be conducted by British and imperial forces and even before the election all parties had agreed that the liberation of Hong Kong would be the next step. Beyond that however things became rather hazy, after all Hong Kong represented the last objective where one could argue there was a genuine British interest. To push the Japanese back further would mean offensives in mainland China and invading the Mariana islands, Okinawa, perhaps even Korea, and how many British, or Australian, or Indian, lives should be sacrificed to drive the Japanese back to the Home Islands? There were voices suggesting that after Hong Kong it might be best for the British Empire to ‘take a breath’ to await the outcome of the Kuomintang offensive in China and the Soviet intervention [3]?
Doing so would open the British up to accusations of choosing British lives over those of Soviet, Chinese, or American soldiers but after five years of war there were legitimate questions as to whether Britain could afford to sacrifice many more lives in the war. The pool of available manpower was running dry in the summer of 1944, and the same was true for Australia, New Zealand and Canada. India might still have reserves, but the Nationalists were not going to see Indians used as cannon fodder to spare the British, indeed trying to do so might well unravel the political settlement that had been agreed and precipitate unrest that would cost Britain dearly to suppress. The Americans would not be happy if the British began to dial back their efforts, but there was a pragmatic argument to be made beyond the question of Britain’s own national interest. If defeating Japan did come down to a full-scale invasion of the Home Islands Britain would have to conserve its manpower and build up its resources to take part in that operation, in essence it was a question of when and where Britain made its final major effort of the war [4].
This was not to say that the British were sanguine about the idea of such an invasion. Every analysis that came out of Washington and the Imperial General Staff was worse than the last when it came to the estimates of Allied casualties in such an operation, as well as those likely to be suffered by the Japanese civilians. Of course, if inflicting greater casualties on the latter saved more of the former then that would be an acceptable though hardly a desirable option, no one wanted to take on the problems of running another country in ruins. Having had the opportunity to analyse its effectiveness in both Britain and Germany there was considerable scepticism about the idea that the strategic bombing of Japan could be bombed into submission, the Germans had after all fought on even as their cities were burned and smashed by the 8th Airforce and Bomber Command and in the end it was only when the Allies took Berlin that the war in Europe finally ended. This did not mean that Atlee and his cabinet were against pursuing a major bomber offensive by the RAF in the Pacific, it did at least offer the prospect of undermining the Japanese capacity to equip and maintain their armed forces [5].
The new cabinet was far more sanguine about the prospects for a naval blockade. This played to British strength’s; it was a traditional British tactic and one that had served them well in the past. Destroying Japan’s oceanic and coastal trade offered the prospect of crippling both their industries and their food distribution system, especially in concert with the bombing campaign. The Royal Navy and the USN had resources at their disposal the Kriegsmarine could only wistfully imagine possessing one day in the future if Plan Z ever came to fruition. The British and Americans could completely close the seas around Japan, especially once the last remnants of the IJN’s surface fleet and submarine force were destroyed or penned up in port by fuel shortages. A blockade would be relatively low cost in British lives and hunger had brought Germany to the brink of revolution in World War I, though even then it required military defeats on land to finally drive Germany to seek peace, and that peace had fallen somewhat short of an unconditional surrender [6].
Whatever strategy the government looked at the same question always arose, what terms were the British prepared to accept to put an end to the war with Japan? Would it be acceptable to forgo the sort of war crimes trials that were being prepared in Europe? Perhaps allow the Japanese to retain the position of Emperor? Even the question of whether the Allies would be willing to contemplate a Japanese ‘surrender’ without an occupation of the Home Islands? This latter was rejected as a step too far, Japan would have to be demilitarized to ensure that there was no repeat of their 1941-42 offensives in the future. If there was one overriding lesson to be drawn from the end of World War I, it was that the people of a defeated nation must be shown unequivocally that they were defeated. If it seems like the new government was going around in circles when it came to the strategy for Japan this simply reflects the reality of the situation. Those options that offered the prospect of a swift and decisive defeat of Japan would come at a high price in British and Allied lives. Those that conserved the soldiers of Britain, and its empire, would be slow and less certain, the last thing a government committed to rebuilding Britain wanted to contemplate [7].
There was a set of options that might meet both the desire to reduce Allied casualties, but no one was willing to count on the Manhattan Project producing a working weapon in an acceptable time frame, especially one that could level a city in a single blow and the biological and chemical weapons at the disposal of the British created a far greater of moral unease than the possible use of atomic weapons. From a modern perspective this seems bizarre, at the time however the perception was that a nuclear weapon was simply a very large bomb that potentially concentrated the power of tens of thousands of tonnes of conventional explosives. The reports of the effects of radiation gleaned from the Auschwitz SP site told a different story but that information percolated its way to the highest levels of the British government and military very slowly and the attitude of the government would remain that the atomic bomb should be used if and when it became available, especially since it was likely the Americans would use it regardless of the opinion of the British [8].
This latter point illustrated the single biggest unknown for the British in the campaign in the Pacific, what would the Americans do? Their desire for vengeance against the Japanese for Pearl Harbor seemed unwavering, but what would happen once Roosevelt left the White House, might his successor be willing to contemplate something short of the complete destruction of Japan, especially in the face of mass casualties among US forces? It seemed unlikely but as they contemplated 1945 the British government had to consider all these possibilities and juggle them against creating ‘a land fit for heroes’ [9].
In summary the British remained determined to defeat Japan, but not at any cost and if that created issues with their allies, well so be it.
[1] You can safely assume that Labour is going to carry out the same domestic agenda as OTL, for good and ill.
[2] There is a palpable concern that invading Japan will be worse than the battle for Germany.
[3] Remember that here they aren’t looking at three or four months more fighting in the Pacific and the A-Bomb is still some way off.
[4] But of course what they would like to do isn’t the same as what they will have to do.
[5] So they are being more realistic about the power of bombing, but unlike OTL Bomber Command will be appearing over Japan.
[6] And you can bet the Royal Navy is assuring Whitehall they can deliver victory where the RAF can’t.
[7] You can have a quick victory or a cheap victory, but not both unless…
[8] …You have a ‘super bomb’, which the British would like to ensure they also get.
[9] The British are ready to move on from the war, just as soon as the Japanese decide to do the same.
The UK will need an air-base to bomb the Home Islands from. In the original timeline Churchill said there was an offer of a base on Okinawa in 1945:
The Second World War volume VI, 'The Defeat of Japan' (Winston Churchill)
(The offer was made in June, I think; the reply to it which he made which Churchill publishes is dated 12 June, 1945)
What might make most sense for the British (besides ensuring support to whatever Indian National Congress wants to do) is to work with the American advance from the Philippines, at least until there's an island available for the British big enough to park bomber fleets on in range of the Home Islands.
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If Attlee is sufficiently brothers-in-arms with Stalin, I guess they could maybe get a base in the Kuril Islands which could be interesting.
Korea seems a bit too alien space bat too me, although I know it's a popular move in some computer games where supplying the place isn't something a player has to meaningfully worry about.
Garrison
Donor
Well you say that, but it helps if you have Hong Kong and/or Guangzhou as ports along the way.
Atlee and the British Labour Party hated and despised Stalin, and the feeling was very much mutual.
What about Japanese war crimes!
Britain, even more than the US, has a list of horrors to be answered for. As the war continues and Japanese forces are cleaned out of occupied cities, the record will only get worse.
But the gang in control of Japan will never submit to judgment until crushed. Nor will they accept occupation and demilitarization.
The cost of continued war will be deterring, but how could the Allies agree to any peace which leaves the butchers of Hong Kong in power?
Maybe they pretended to do so in public, but nevertheless Attlee's government gifted Stalin with the Nene jet engine. So someone in the original timeline was in private actually best buddies...