9th – 30th August 1943 – Shattering the Axis – Part III – Friendly Fire in the West
The working relationship between von Manstein and von Rundstedt was already strained before the assassination attempt on Hitler. The Wehrmacht had been forced into a slow grinding retreat since D-Day and it had taken the Allies far longer to take some of their objectives than they had hoped for. Caen for example only fell on the 26th of July, rather than on D-Day plus one as originally intended. Nonetheless it had been taken and by August it was clearly no longer a question of if the Allies broke out Normandy but when, or at least so it seemed von Rundstedt, in whom a deep pessimism about the conduct of the campaign in the west had taken hold. Von Manstein on the other hand was not ready to accept that a breakout was inevitable, even as members of his own staff pointed out the weaknesses of their position in Northern France. The Cherbourg Peninsula was regarded as highly vulnerable to the Allies as it had not been prioritized during the initial construction phase of the Atlantic wall and work to prepare its port facilities for demolition in the event of an Allied attack had been intermittent at best. Even after D-Day von Manstein still remained focused on driving the Anglo-American forces back rather than preparing contingencies for the evacuation of the peninsula and the fate of Cherbourg had become a flashpoint in the arguments between the two German commanders. Von Rundstedt wanted to strengthen the defences in the Peninsula to buy the time needed to prepare the port facilities for destruction and leave nothing of use to the Allies. Von Manstein wanted to concentrate the available forces in the hopes of mounting a counterattack, something that might yet drive the Allies back into the sea as his masterstroke of strategy in 1940 had. After the war von Manstein himself admitted this strategy was driven more by desperation than optimism, a retreat however well execute was tantamount to an admission of defeat, and he unleashed his pent-up tensions with accusations that von Rundstedt had lost his nerve. This would have been a serious enough situation even in more normal circumstances, the news of the attempt to kill Hitler rendered such a suggestion potential lethal, especially as von Rundstedt’s hand were not entirely clean when it came to Valhalla [1].
Von Rundstedt had been in contact with some of those involved in the conspiracy, these conversations had been carefully couched in terms of the original intent of the Valhalla plan, ensuring continuity and stability in the event of a disaster in the Reich. To what extent there was a subtext to these discussions that made von Rundstedt complicit in the bomb plot was unclear then and later, as von Rundstedt never had the opportunity to lay out a proper account of his actions, only the vehement denials he made while being interrogated by Gestapo officers dispatched to France under the direction of the new head of the SS, Heinrich ‘Gestapo’ Muller. There was a marked lack of evidence against von Rundstedt and OKH came to his defence. Goering however was in no mood to listen and there is a strong sense that he wanted to send a reminder to the Heer as to who was in charge. Von Rundstedt was promptly removed from command on the 11th of August and ordered back to Berlin, ostensibly because of dissatisfaction with his performance in Normandy. The uncertainty about how whether he had known anything about the bomb plot itself did at least spare him from a firing squad or being forced to take the ‘honourable’ way out offered to some of his comrades. He was instead one of those shipped off to the eastern front and did play a role in saving Army Group Centre from annihilation after Orel was taken by the Soviets, only to be killed during an artillery bombardment in November 1943, though the possibility that someone in Berlin had decided he was a traitor after all and ordered his execution cannot be ruled out as there were few surviving witnesses to his death [2].
Von Manstein now inherited von Rundstedt’s role and having a unified command should have rendered the task of defending France at least a little easier, however the Allies and Goering swiftly complicated the matters further. Only two days after von Rundstedt had been recalled von Manstein found himself also summoned to an urgent meeting with Goering himself. This was far from the ideal moment for von Manstein to leave for Berlin, but he could hardly refuse to go and he departed full of uncertainty about when, or if, he would return. The only good news for the general was that Goering wasn’t planning to either relieve him or court-martial him, facing the Reichsmarschall at his most bombastic and pompous was barely any better. Firstly, it was made clear in no uncertain terms that he would follow the chain of command in future. Von Manstein had used his personal standing with Hitler to bypass OKH on multiple occasions since he had presented the plan for the Manstein Sweep directly to the Fuhrer. Goering was no stranger to using his personal connections, but it was a prerogative he was determined to reserve to himself and being one of Hitler’s ‘pets’ did not endear von Manstein to Goering. Goering’s second demand was far mor strategically damaging for the French situation. Far from receiving expected reinforcements von Manstein was informed that two SS Divisions, 4th SS Polizei Panzergrenadier Division and 9th SS Panzergrenadier Division
Hohenstaufen, were to be sent to Italy with immediate effect. Again von Manstein had no choice but to comply and its arguable the loss of the two divisions was less of blow to the defence of France than it might have at first seemed and they achieved a notorious reputation as they carried out brutal reprisals against Italian civilians in response to acts of resistance against the occupying forces [3].
The fate of Italian civilians did not trouble von Manstein, all he cared about was that his thin reserves were being further weakened and Goering warned that this might not be the last contribution the armies fighting in the west would have to make to put down the treacherous Italians, or to stiffen the lines of defence in the east. While in Berlin von Manstein secured a meeting with von Kleist on the 14th of August, though the Chief of the General Staff proved less than sympathetic to von Manstein’s plight. Von Kleist later claimed he was happy to see SS Divisions removed from the west, indeed he would have preferred to see them all sent to the east where they could exercise their barbarity on the Soviet hordes that von Kleist feared just as much as anyone else in the Nazi hierarchy but sending them to Italy was an acceptable alternative. Whether von Kleist was thinking in terms of removing the SS from the west making it easier to seek terms from the British and Americans is unclear from the surviving records, what is certain that even after Valhalla failed there were people in Berlin still looking to fulfil some of their goals and keeping the war in the west ‘clean’ fitted in with those objectives, as absurd as the record of the Heer divisions in France made such a concept. Von Manstein pleaded his case as forcefully as he could, veering towards outright insubordination according to von Kleist’s diaries. The only thing von Manstein got for his troubles was the assurance that units would be withdrawn from the garrison forces in the Netherlands and Denmark at the earliest possible moment, without any hard and fast date for this happening. This left von Manstein dismayed, he had been under the impression that such a transfer was already underway. In fact, troops had been pulled out of both countries, however they had been sent east not west and there were fears that withdrawing too many troops from those nations might precipitate uprisings if it were seen as a sign of weakness and the Heer couldn’t afford to fight on any more fronts than it already was. It was deemed best to keep a tight grip in these comparatively quiet corners of occupied Europe. This was why the huge garrison forces in Norway remained untapped, as well as the fact that some on the General Staff had not wholly abandoned the idea that the Allies might still try a landing there [4].
Von Manstein spent the night of the 15th in Berlin, planning to mount some fresh appeal to the General Staff and/or Goering in the morning, his time had however run out. In the early hours of the morning of the 16th of August the Allies launched Operation Dragoon, a fresh amphibious landing in southern France aimed at seizing Toulon and Marseilles, as well as drawing off German forces from the fighting further north, where the US forces under Patton launched Operation Cobra on the 17th, intended to breakout of the bocage country and drive towards Brittany, aided greatly by the fact the port of Cherbourg would captured partially intact and swiftly put back into service, exposing the folly of von Manstein’s determination to launch a counteroffensive [5].
The initial Allied plans had envisioned that Dragoon would happen at the same time as Millennium, but the resources for two simultaneous amphibious operations just weren’t available, but they had worked to mount Dragoon as soon as possible, with Patton equally determined to mount Cobra at the same time, while the British would launch a fresh offensive from Caen driving east and north. The timing of the operations could not have been better for the Allies, which naturally has stoked the theories that they knew exactly when Valhalla would go ahead, but all evidence suggests that this was simply a happy coincidence for the Allies, though naturally Patton pressed to move up the date of Operation Cobra when word of what had happened in Berlin reached SHAEF [6].
For von Manstein the situation had gone from bad to catastrophic in the space of two days. He found himself stuck in Berlin and communications with his HQ in France were patchy owing to actions by the French resistance and the disruption caused by the change of command and the demands of sending units to Italy. Critically the SS Divisions continued their move to Italy, eschewing any requests to delay executing their orders, in the aftermath of 9th August no one wanted to show any signs that they might be inclined to take matters into their own hands. This also impacted the orders that von Manstein did manage to send out as he made hasty arrangements to return to his headquarters from Berlin, especially those orders calling for units to retreat and regroup. Flying back to France was considered too risky and so von Manstein faced a frustrating trip by rail and road, with several interruptions caused by sections of track being blown up, creating serious traffic jams on the French rail network [7].
By the time he did finally arrive the situation was irrecoverable, the Allies were threatening to cut off much of the German forces in southern France as O’Connor’s troops were driving a wedge through the German defensive lines. At the same time Patton was rapidly pressing on towards Cherbourg, inflicting heavy German losses as the Americans advance. Von Manstein had little choice but to abandon the south and the Cherbourg Peninsula as he ordered his troops to conduct a fighting retreat to the east, even worse Paris itself would have to abandoned for the Wehrmacht to have any hope of forming a new defensive position. Goering was outraged by these orders and instead of withdrawing divisions were ordered to mount a futile counterattack, ending in the encirclement of the bulk of 5th Panzer Army, with 13,000 men killed and 65,000 being taken prisoner. This disaster paled beside the list of French cities liberated by the Allies. Toulon fell on the 25th of August and Marseilles on the 26th. Paris itself was officially liberated on the 28th and marked both the official endpoint of Operation Millennium and of the Allied breakout as the Anglo-American supply lines were badly overstretched by this point and despite protests from Patton a halt had to be called [8].
The end of the Allied offensive also spelt the end for von Manstein, relieved of duty and ordered back to Berlin in disgrace on the 1st of September. He lingered in Berlin for several weeks, with the distinct possibility of a court-martial hanging over him, or indeed simply being put up against a wall and shot. There was some considerable irony in the fact that it fell to von Kleist to argue that he was too valuable to waste in such a fashion. In the end von Manstein was only spared by the sudden shift of power in Berlin in mid-September as Adolf Hitler rose from his supposed death bed and reclaimed the reins of power. To say he was displeased with the situation he found would be a considerable understatement [9].
[1] The Cherbourg Peninsula is far less heavily defended than OTL and von Manstein is not inclined to prepare to completely abandon the position, demonstrating the same over aggressive attitude that he did during Operation Citadel OTL.
[2] Not a great time to disrupt the command structure in France but given OTL hardly out of character for the Nazi regime, especially in the climate of uncertainty over whether Hitler will return.
[3] With things far from stable on the Eastern Front and Goering determined to punish the treacherous Italians the decision making isn’t that surprising. There may even be those in Berlin thinking that if the war is lost then better to be conquered by the Anglo-Americans than the Soviets.
[4] And speaking of uprisings I have not forgotten about the Warsaw Ghetto uprising; it just hasn’t happened yet because of butterflies. When the time does come things will be different.
[5] Which is a huge relief as despite better weather the sole Mulberry is suffering issues.
[6] In effect the Allies may have been a bit more stretched when it came to mounting D-Day than OTL but that has been more than offset by the issues the Germans faced in building their defences and they’ve paid the price at Cherbourg.
[7] And you can also assume has been issuing some ‘helpful’ advice and orders direct from Berlin.
[8] German casualties are worse and the Allied rate of advance that bit faster than OTL.
[9] Furious, enraged and apoplectic are also a bit on the mild side…
