Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
MWI 41082600 Matador Is Born
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 26 August;
The joint public declaration of the Atlantic Charter hid the realistic need for Britain to do more herself, for the defence of her empire in the Far East. The realisation that the USA would mostly be passive of any breakup of the Empire meant Britain had to be more forceful in her own strategy and diplomacy. It was part of a gradual change in Churchill’s attitude to defending the Far East, and as a result of that, both in the UK and Malaya, Government Departments were encouraged into a more active role.
Now it was possible to loosen the purse strings, a less constrictive imposition of finances. And going forward, where possible, Malaya would get a better share of the resources, while when dealing with Japanese behaviors, they’re response would be firmer, and some of the hard stands that they would have liked to take, would be taken.
Planners in the War Office, were working long into the night to fashion a better-balanced Army for Malaya, some units were being rushed out, some being promised in the near future. Headquarters staff numbers in Malaya and Singapore were being increased, with a decent number of experienced officers being sent. And Gort was responding, sharing the idea of Operation Etonian, the occupation of the Kra Isthmus in Thailand. It had been received with major reservations about the political issues it raised, but a more detailed plan had been requested, with the operation being renamed Matador.
Gort now formed a dedicated planning committee, tasked with planning ‘Matador’ in more detail, as well as other smaller, supporting operations with the Navy. As a minimum they would have to take Hat Yai, Songkhla and Pattani, but consideration was being given as to how far up the Kra Isthmus they should go. Somewhere a little north of Hat Yai, to provide some depth to its defence, a second option was to go up to Surat Thani, taking the airfields at Surat Thani and Nakhon, and protecting the line of advance to Phuket Island or a third option of all the way up to Chumphon, taking its airfield as well.
Held in secret, the committee’s members included not only officers from Malaya Command HQ, III Indian Corps and Australian 8th Division, but also RAF and a few Royal Navy too. The Australian Division was to be the main component for Matador, supported with additional troops. Realistically, it was the only major unit capable of performing such a task. Other units would be assigned to supporting operations, while both the Royal Navy and RAF were being consulted on what they could realistically do, and what operations they would be able to support. However, in tandem, but separate, another planning team, mainly drawn from III Indian Corps, worked on the idea of a better backstop defensive line at Gurun, while still publicly working on the Jitra Line.
One thing that had quickly been agreed was what to do with British North Borneo. Gort had proposed and the Chiefs of Staff endorsed, that no attempt should be made to defend North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and Labuan Island. The Governors of North Borneo, Labuan and the Raj or Sarawak had been informed that the Sarawak Rangers (Volunteers), other local militias and police were to be used solely for the maintenance of internal security. Detailed plans were being put in place for the destruction of key parts of the oil instillations at both Miri and Seria, along with the refinery at Lutong, which in part would be the removal of certain pumps, valves and electric motors, in the event of war. The single company of the 2/15 Punjab Regt was being withdrawn back to join the rest of the regiment in Penang.
The joint public declaration of the Atlantic Charter hid the realistic need for Britain to do more herself, for the defence of her empire in the Far East. The realisation that the USA would mostly be passive of any breakup of the Empire meant Britain had to be more forceful in her own strategy and diplomacy. It was part of a gradual change in Churchill’s attitude to defending the Far East, and as a result of that, both in the UK and Malaya, Government Departments were encouraged into a more active role.
Now it was possible to loosen the purse strings, a less constrictive imposition of finances. And going forward, where possible, Malaya would get a better share of the resources, while when dealing with Japanese behaviors, they’re response would be firmer, and some of the hard stands that they would have liked to take, would be taken.
Planners in the War Office, were working long into the night to fashion a better-balanced Army for Malaya, some units were being rushed out, some being promised in the near future. Headquarters staff numbers in Malaya and Singapore were being increased, with a decent number of experienced officers being sent. And Gort was responding, sharing the idea of Operation Etonian, the occupation of the Kra Isthmus in Thailand. It had been received with major reservations about the political issues it raised, but a more detailed plan had been requested, with the operation being renamed Matador.
Gort now formed a dedicated planning committee, tasked with planning ‘Matador’ in more detail, as well as other smaller, supporting operations with the Navy. As a minimum they would have to take Hat Yai, Songkhla and Pattani, but consideration was being given as to how far up the Kra Isthmus they should go. Somewhere a little north of Hat Yai, to provide some depth to its defence, a second option was to go up to Surat Thani, taking the airfields at Surat Thani and Nakhon, and protecting the line of advance to Phuket Island or a third option of all the way up to Chumphon, taking its airfield as well.
Held in secret, the committee’s members included not only officers from Malaya Command HQ, III Indian Corps and Australian 8th Division, but also RAF and a few Royal Navy too. The Australian Division was to be the main component for Matador, supported with additional troops. Realistically, it was the only major unit capable of performing such a task. Other units would be assigned to supporting operations, while both the Royal Navy and RAF were being consulted on what they could realistically do, and what operations they would be able to support. However, in tandem, but separate, another planning team, mainly drawn from III Indian Corps, worked on the idea of a better backstop defensive line at Gurun, while still publicly working on the Jitra Line.
One thing that had quickly been agreed was what to do with British North Borneo. Gort had proposed and the Chiefs of Staff endorsed, that no attempt should be made to defend North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and Labuan Island. The Governors of North Borneo, Labuan and the Raj or Sarawak had been informed that the Sarawak Rangers (Volunteers), other local militias and police were to be used solely for the maintenance of internal security. Detailed plans were being put in place for the destruction of key parts of the oil instillations at both Miri and Seria, along with the refinery at Lutong, which in part would be the removal of certain pumps, valves and electric motors, in the event of war. The single company of the 2/15 Punjab Regt was being withdrawn back to join the rest of the regiment in Penang.
Sounds like they are beginning the process of demystifying the jungle. “Defeat Into Victory” has a great section on Slim’s work with 14 Army in India, to include small unit tactics, jungle acclimatization camps, and teaching units to operate when isolated. Sounds like something similar here. The jungle isn’t hard if you’re expecting it, but you do have to get used to some different ways of doing things and accept that you will likely be wet/slimy all the time you’re not under a tarp.
Another change under Slim was the uniform and equipment of the soldier. Aertex jungle greens might be a stretch, but even the adoption of practical long sleeve/long pants with puttees would be beneficial in lowering casualties to jungle ulcers, etc. Procurement and issue of more canteens/bladders, ammunition clip bandoliers (lets you carry more grenades and Bren mags in pouches), and golock/bolo type knives (we have one in our family that was fabbed up from a piece of leaf spring) to assist in mobility and position construction seem like they might be in the realm of the possible and will all help soldiers sustain themselves longer in the jungle without outside supply.
Service as the opposing force battalion may be a great finishing school. Typically the opposing force operates at numerical disadvantage to the training unit and must depend on decentralized execution, small unit initiative, and agility to win. This can be a great incubator for good small unit leaders in the rest of the force.
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Driftless
Donor
With any Opfor operations, there should be a commitment to do the unexpected, as a real enemy might just do. To paraphrase from the bandits in Treasure of the Sierra Madre: "Rules? We don't need no stinking Rules!!!"
How will this effect agreements with USN Asiatic Fleet? There were anchorage/basing and fueling arrangements for Tarakan and Balikpapan, on Borneo. Tarakan was to be a fall back basing for the USN Cruiser DD Task Force, and Balikpapan for a Destroyer Tender and Destroyers fuel and service If Manila or Davo are unuseable. The Agreement for American DD was made about time of U.S. War Warning, Balikpapan . They arrived at Balikpapan on 30 November*.. Were to head for Singapore after service and clearing for war on 10 Dec. they were in company of AD Black Hawk ( Max Speed 13kts)
*https://www.history.navy.mil/our-co...betical-listing/b/uss-black-hawk--ad-9-0.html
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Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Butchpfd, I'm unaware there were many agreements between the US and Britain regarding working together in the Far East. Previous conferences in this theatre had seen an America that was decidedly dragging its feet with regard to any military co-operation with the British or the Dutch. We have the exchange of liaison officers, and they did agree on lines of demarcation for military operations, sharing information from maritime air patrols, submarine operating areas, and more secretly, working together to crack Japanese codes. But the best Admiral Hart could do, until just before war broke out, was an agreement with the Dutch, allowing him to shift his surface fleet south into Dutch East Indies waters, away from certain destruction. There is this complete disjointed approach to defending the Philippines between him, being very realistic about his forces chances of survival, and MacArthur's view on what to do.
Any change to this historical line would be a major point of diversion, which is outside my remit, and to be honest, I find it hard to think of an alternative for the USA in this situation, without major changes to policy a good 12 months earlier, to give them any hope of doing better than they did. I think defending the Philippines is a more hopeless case than Malaya!
MWI 41082900 August Ends On A High
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 29 August;
August closed out quite well for the British in Malaya, as yet more reinforcements arrived. Convoy WS.9BX, detached from WS.9B, arrived in Singapore on Tuesday 26th, with the usual escort of a C class Cruiser, HMS Colombo doing the honours this time. In Bombay, the two detached ships of the UK convoy had been joined by another two, for the onward journey to Singapore. The convoy had been a fast one, at 15 knots, the two Indian ships joining them instead of sailing later with the slower convoy BM.8. On closing on Malaya, both Indian ships had turned off, to dock at Penang, allowing the UK ships to pile on yet more steam and reach Singapore the next day.
On board the UK ships was the air and ground crews of RAF 151 Wing, and her two fighter squadrons RAF 81 and 134. Both squadrons had been hastily formed, many of the officers and men being assigned to them joined just in time to embark on their troopship and had never met before. So, for many, the outward voyage was one of introductions to the squadron.
There was a good spread of experience pilots among them though, indeed the Wing had extra pilots, but on arrival in Singapore, a number of the veterans would be transferred to the newly forming Article XV squadrons as flight and squadron leaders. The aircraft the Wing would operate, would be Canadian built Hurricanes, that had either already been shipped to Singapore, and assembled, or were on their way in the next two months.
Other notables onboard were half a dozen RAF Controllers, Battle of Britain veterans of the RAF Filter and Control rooms, who would train and lead new control staffs in Malaya and Singapore. Both the Army and Royal Navy had a number of personnel, mostly newly trained with technical skills, including a few staff officers and a dozen ECO’s for the Indian battalions. Deep in the holds of the ships were four more ASDIC sets and a dozen 20mm Oerlikon cannons for the Navy, a small smattering of specialist vehicles, smaller technical equipment and yet more spare parts for the various parts of the war machine.
Meanwhile disembarking from one of the Penang ships was the 20th and 27th Indian Combined General Hospitals, along with their equipment and stores, and another draft of new Indian Army recruits. The second ship, had a sizeable cargo of munitions, mostly small arms ammunitions, as well as more war material, clothing, tentage, leather goods, and the paraphernalia of an Indian Army’s needs. The 20th Hospital would move to Taiping, taking over 500 beds in the hospital there, while the 27th was accommodated at Chung Ling high school, and was now installed in part of Penang General Hospital.
However, the real excitement of the month had been the arrival four days earlier on the Blue Funnel steamer SS Ulysses, of Rear Admiral ‘Jackie’ Spooner, and his wife, who was better known as Megan Foster, an accomplished soprano singer, who had performed in concert halls throughout Europe before the war, and on BBC radio. Spooner had arrived to take over command of the Naval Dockyard and Rear Admiral ‘Malaya’. Along with him was Captain Edward Longsdon, former commander of the Seventh Submarine Flotilla, to take command of the Fourth Flotilla from Commander Hugh Browne. However, the country was hungry for stars, and in the coming months any society dinner or dance wouldn’t be complete without the presence of the superstar ‘Megan’ and her husband.
August closed out quite well for the British in Malaya, as yet more reinforcements arrived. Convoy WS.9BX, detached from WS.9B, arrived in Singapore on Tuesday 26th, with the usual escort of a C class Cruiser, HMS Colombo doing the honours this time. In Bombay, the two detached ships of the UK convoy had been joined by another two, for the onward journey to Singapore. The convoy had been a fast one, at 15 knots, the two Indian ships joining them instead of sailing later with the slower convoy BM.8. On closing on Malaya, both Indian ships had turned off, to dock at Penang, allowing the UK ships to pile on yet more steam and reach Singapore the next day.
On board the UK ships was the air and ground crews of RAF 151 Wing, and her two fighter squadrons RAF 81 and 134. Both squadrons had been hastily formed, many of the officers and men being assigned to them joined just in time to embark on their troopship and had never met before. So, for many, the outward voyage was one of introductions to the squadron.
There was a good spread of experience pilots among them though, indeed the Wing had extra pilots, but on arrival in Singapore, a number of the veterans would be transferred to the newly forming Article XV squadrons as flight and squadron leaders. The aircraft the Wing would operate, would be Canadian built Hurricanes, that had either already been shipped to Singapore, and assembled, or were on their way in the next two months.
Other notables onboard were half a dozen RAF Controllers, Battle of Britain veterans of the RAF Filter and Control rooms, who would train and lead new control staffs in Malaya and Singapore. Both the Army and Royal Navy had a number of personnel, mostly newly trained with technical skills, including a few staff officers and a dozen ECO’s for the Indian battalions. Deep in the holds of the ships were four more ASDIC sets and a dozen 20mm Oerlikon cannons for the Navy, a small smattering of specialist vehicles, smaller technical equipment and yet more spare parts for the various parts of the war machine.
Meanwhile disembarking from one of the Penang ships was the 20th and 27th Indian Combined General Hospitals, along with their equipment and stores, and another draft of new Indian Army recruits. The second ship, had a sizeable cargo of munitions, mostly small arms ammunitions, as well as more war material, clothing, tentage, leather goods, and the paraphernalia of an Indian Army’s needs. The 20th Hospital would move to Taiping, taking over 500 beds in the hospital there, while the 27th was accommodated at Chung Ling high school, and was now installed in part of Penang General Hospital.
However, the real excitement of the month had been the arrival four days earlier on the Blue Funnel steamer SS Ulysses, of Rear Admiral ‘Jackie’ Spooner, and his wife, who was better known as Megan Foster, an accomplished soprano singer, who had performed in concert halls throughout Europe before the war, and on BBC radio. Spooner had arrived to take over command of the Naval Dockyard and Rear Admiral ‘Malaya’. Along with him was Captain Edward Longsdon, former commander of the Seventh Submarine Flotilla, to take command of the Fourth Flotilla from Commander Hugh Browne. However, the country was hungry for stars, and in the coming months any society dinner or dance wouldn’t be complete without the presence of the superstar ‘Megan’ and her husband.
To see just how independent and tactically innovative (read devious) you can get as an OPFOR small unit leader I’d encourage you to grab “The Battle for Hunger Hill” by Dan Bolger. It’s set in the 90s, but offers some insight into how lightly equipped small units led by junior NCOs and officers acting mission orders can wreak havoc on much larger formations. Especially when they can exploit restrictive terrain and the inertia of a centralized command structure.
There’s probably a good argument for a dedicated airbase ground defence unit a la the RAF Regiment in Malaya at this juncture. With the increased air presence and its importance to operations they’ll present a tempting target for an asymmetric attack by light forces or saboteurs in addition to airborne or naval landings at the start of hostilities.
RAF Regiment proper wasn’t constituted yet, but maybe it’s possible that the need is recognized and filled locally. Such a force could form the antecedents of the OTL RMAF Regiment and the Field Defense Squadrons of the Singapore Air Force.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
This is a big historical change, this wing was sent to Russia, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Benedict
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Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
I think the change in the Ukrainian Army after 2014, moving from the old Soviet style central control to this, is a major factor in their current success.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Well defending the airfields is what started the need to defend the whole of Malaya, and a primary threat is the paratrooper. Having said that about all Percival is going to have is a few battalions of Indian State troops, locally raised militia or volunteers, along with arming the RAF ground crews with rifles and pistols!