I always wondered if you loaded the 106 RR on the ONTOS with beehive rounds, how might that work when they attacked the USMC posts. 6 rounds of Beehive are going to make anyones day worse or better depending on your perspective.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Much less a matter of weight than a matter of priority and command emphasis. Westmoreland (an artilleryman and airborne officer) was resistant to tanks in Vietnam. To the degree the tanks assigned to cavalry squadrons were initially planned to be warehoused. Once tanks were introduced, and especially after their use in offensive operations, armored units were repeatedly moved down the list for withdrawal. Of course by the the appetite for introducing new tanks models to theater was non-existent. The M48A3 was chosen as a standardized tank for Vietnam use because it had the less flammable, more reliable and more rugged diesel (although some M48A2s were sent in early days), incorporated improvements from M60A1 development, and was felt to be capable enough against the expected target set of troops and bunkers in SEA despite being outmoded against Soviet first-line armor which the M60A1 was being brought in to defeat. As it turns out, while the M48A3 was adequate against the PT-76s encountered at Ben Het in 1968 and overmatched the T-34s encountered in 1972, the NVA T-54 encountered in 72 were a different matter and should have been an overmatch threat. As is was, the ARVN tankers were better trained and led, leading them to win the majority of engagements despite losses of men and material. With regards to weight, the M60A1 combat loaded was similar to the M48A3, but had more power available.
The lesson for Malaya in 41 is that the M60A1 was the gold standard kit, rapidly coming into the system to counter the most dangerous threat, a Soviet led invasion of Europe. The M48A3 was “good enough” kit which was sent to what was felt to be a less vital/critical area with a more limited set of threats. Little help if you’re an Armor crewman moving from and M60A1 equipped unit to an M48A2/A3 unit.
The lesson for Malaya in 41 is that the M60A1 was the gold standard kit, rapidly coming into the system to counter the most dangerous threat, a Soviet led invasion of Europe. The M48A3 was “good enough” kit which was sent to what was felt to be a less vital/critical area with a more limited set of threats. Little help if you’re an Armor crewman moving from and M60A1 equipped unit to an M48A2/A3 unit.
Lessons: lay two or more phone lines to your fire support, far from each other. Frequently check their functionality. Have a backup plan.
Got to hang out this weekend with a friend of mine who was in the Argyll’s before they merged. Somehow, the discussion of Singapore came up. Learned from him that 2nd battalion‘s mess silver was largely crated and later recovered, but that other items, like the battalion communion service, were looted with the remnants smuggled through the camps.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Ok, so apologies with my tardiness, again, I hear you mutter, and you know, you’re right, it’s becoming a feature of my postings. I really enjoyed the postings of Zheng He, Galveston Bay and Fester, exciting alternatives to a history I knew quite well, taking me off in in unexpected tangents, they had me holding my breath for the next instalment which came in days, sometimes, hours! They encouraged me to write, for as they say, I have a story in me too. I so wanted to be as exciting, but well don’t be holding your breath on my account, I’ll kill you waiting! I’m failing quite miserably at the mo, real life has its hooks in me, and my writing time, even more so, my researching time has been clipped back.
I’ll have to move to a twice a week posting for a while, ha you say, that’ll be nice, once a week at the mo! While I work through a few of life’s struggles, but I’m confident I’ll get there. A few more posts and then I’ll do a summary of where we are, and then it’s the lead in to the big moment, bullets zinging past your ears, ha ha!
I should take this opportunity to discuss a few points about the Japanese preparations, which were extensive and well thought out, unlike my own! Further research suggests the Japanese convoys sailed at 14 knots down the eastern coast of French Indo-China, and possibly even slower when joined by other ships, more on that in a future post. The other thing is the deployment of a large Japanese air force, both IJA and IJN, into French Indo-China. Despite my efforts to confirm or deny, other than Don Muang near Bangkok, which I believe had a hard runway, I have decided to cast all other airfields as grass, despite quite intensive Japanese efforts in creating and developing airfields in the south over a number of months.
The Japanese weren’t idiots, they knew hard runways were best in the rainy climate, but a lack of resources and equipment severely limited their airfield construction in the short term. Consequently, I expect the airfields to have decent drainage, be well organised, but overcrowded, with limited maintenance facilities. This plan will work provide they move on quickly, as the army advances. And we’ll read much more on that later too!
Ok, so back to Friday 5th December 1941, and it’s raining, again!
I’ll have to move to a twice a week posting for a while, ha you say, that’ll be nice, once a week at the mo! While I work through a few of life’s struggles, but I’m confident I’ll get there. A few more posts and then I’ll do a summary of where we are, and then it’s the lead in to the big moment, bullets zinging past your ears, ha ha!
I should take this opportunity to discuss a few points about the Japanese preparations, which were extensive and well thought out, unlike my own! Further research suggests the Japanese convoys sailed at 14 knots down the eastern coast of French Indo-China, and possibly even slower when joined by other ships, more on that in a future post. The other thing is the deployment of a large Japanese air force, both IJA and IJN, into French Indo-China. Despite my efforts to confirm or deny, other than Don Muang near Bangkok, which I believe had a hard runway, I have decided to cast all other airfields as grass, despite quite intensive Japanese efforts in creating and developing airfields in the south over a number of months.
The Japanese weren’t idiots, they knew hard runways were best in the rainy climate, but a lack of resources and equipment severely limited their airfield construction in the short term. Consequently, I expect the airfields to have decent drainage, be well organised, but overcrowded, with limited maintenance facilities. This plan will work provide they move on quickly, as the army advances. And we’ll read much more on that later too!
Ok, so back to Friday 5th December 1941, and it’s raining, again!
MWI 41120512 The Ship Killers
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 05 December;
The wheels of the big twin engined bomber briefly touched ground, skipped and then touched more firmly, taking the weight of the aircraft and ran along the runway, a light spray of water flicking off the grass. It was a good landing made by an experienced pilot. The aircraft slowed and then turned and began taxiing back alongside the landing strip towards the group of men. Another was now touching down, with a further 34 aircraft enroute, some already banked up in the sky, waiting their turn.
Rear Admiral Sadaichi Matsunaga, CO of the 22 Naval Air Flotilla, stood in the light rain, a small satisfied smile on his face. Ever since the message from Admiral Yamamoto telling him that he was being reinforced with part of the Kanoya Air Group last Sunday, he’d waited in anticipation. The news of the arrival of the battleship Prince of Wales in eastern waters had sent a ripple of professional excitement around IJN senior officer circles, but for him it was also the weight of expectation on his shoulders to ensure that the threat was neutralised. His two air groups, Mihoro and Genzan, were first class units, but were equipped with the older Type 96 Rikko, while the Kanoya’s had just been equipped with the new Type 1. The Kanoya air group was arriving with three of her four Hikotai or squadrons of nine aircraft, each with three reserves.
The G4M Model 11 was the latest IJN attack bomber, replacing the G3M, although variants of that aircraft would remain in production until 1943. The G4M was a bigger aircraft, being over 3,000 lb heavier, but fitted with two Mitsubishi MK4A Kasei 11 14-cylinder air-cooled radial piston engines, each providing 1,530 hp. This delivered a top speed at altitude of 270 mph, 40 mph faster that the G3M, a cruising speed of nearly 200 mph, and an increase in range over the G3M. This performance was assisted by the continued practice of maintaining a structural lightness and an almost total lack of protection for the crew, with no armour plating or self-sealing fuel tanks.
The bomber had been guided to a stand, close to the Admiral. The aircrew climbed out and one walked over to him, stopped just short and saluted. Standing beside the Admiral, Captain Naoshiro Fujiyoishi, CO of the Kanoya Air Group, who had flown in two days before in a Ki 46, introduced him to Lt Cmdr Shichiso Miyauchi, the leader of the flight and an expert in torpedo operations. With the arrival that morning in Saigon of the transport Keiyo Maru, carrying aviation fuel, stores and more importantly Type 91 Kai 2 aerial torpedoes, the move would soon be complete.
The Tan Son Nhut airfield was crammed with aircraft far beyond its capacity, already home to the Ki-21 Sally’s of the 98th Heavy Air Regt, and the G3M Nell’s of the Genzan air group, now they were squeezing in the Kanoya’s, who’s allocated part of the airfield, despite continuing work, had the wettest and roughest ground, great care being needed when taxiing to their stands. The only saving grace was the aircrew would be accommodated in a couple of commandeered hotels in nearby Saigon, quite what their ground crews thought of that, living and working in the small tented village around the airfield, wasn’t known, but no one would be bothering to ask them anyway.
20 kilometres up the road was the old Saigon civil airfield, Thu Dau Moi, also being shared by the IJN and IJA air forces. Here they were struggling to accommodate the 48 G3M Nells of the Mihoro Air Group along with a squadron of Ki 32 light bombers and a smaller unit of Ki 59 light transports. And 90 miles south-west of Saigon, on the edge of the Mekong delta, was the Soc Trang airfield, now home of the Yamada Air group, the fighter component of 22 Air Flotilla, with 25 Zero’s and another 11 Claude fighters.
The wheels of the big twin engined bomber briefly touched ground, skipped and then touched more firmly, taking the weight of the aircraft and ran along the runway, a light spray of water flicking off the grass. It was a good landing made by an experienced pilot. The aircraft slowed and then turned and began taxiing back alongside the landing strip towards the group of men. Another was now touching down, with a further 34 aircraft enroute, some already banked up in the sky, waiting their turn.
Rear Admiral Sadaichi Matsunaga, CO of the 22 Naval Air Flotilla, stood in the light rain, a small satisfied smile on his face. Ever since the message from Admiral Yamamoto telling him that he was being reinforced with part of the Kanoya Air Group last Sunday, he’d waited in anticipation. The news of the arrival of the battleship Prince of Wales in eastern waters had sent a ripple of professional excitement around IJN senior officer circles, but for him it was also the weight of expectation on his shoulders to ensure that the threat was neutralised. His two air groups, Mihoro and Genzan, were first class units, but were equipped with the older Type 96 Rikko, while the Kanoya’s had just been equipped with the new Type 1. The Kanoya air group was arriving with three of her four Hikotai or squadrons of nine aircraft, each with three reserves.
The G4M Model 11 was the latest IJN attack bomber, replacing the G3M, although variants of that aircraft would remain in production until 1943. The G4M was a bigger aircraft, being over 3,000 lb heavier, but fitted with two Mitsubishi MK4A Kasei 11 14-cylinder air-cooled radial piston engines, each providing 1,530 hp. This delivered a top speed at altitude of 270 mph, 40 mph faster that the G3M, a cruising speed of nearly 200 mph, and an increase in range over the G3M. This performance was assisted by the continued practice of maintaining a structural lightness and an almost total lack of protection for the crew, with no armour plating or self-sealing fuel tanks.
The bomber had been guided to a stand, close to the Admiral. The aircrew climbed out and one walked over to him, stopped just short and saluted. Standing beside the Admiral, Captain Naoshiro Fujiyoishi, CO of the Kanoya Air Group, who had flown in two days before in a Ki 46, introduced him to Lt Cmdr Shichiso Miyauchi, the leader of the flight and an expert in torpedo operations. With the arrival that morning in Saigon of the transport Keiyo Maru, carrying aviation fuel, stores and more importantly Type 91 Kai 2 aerial torpedoes, the move would soon be complete.
The Tan Son Nhut airfield was crammed with aircraft far beyond its capacity, already home to the Ki-21 Sally’s of the 98th Heavy Air Regt, and the G3M Nell’s of the Genzan air group, now they were squeezing in the Kanoya’s, who’s allocated part of the airfield, despite continuing work, had the wettest and roughest ground, great care being needed when taxiing to their stands. The only saving grace was the aircrew would be accommodated in a couple of commandeered hotels in nearby Saigon, quite what their ground crews thought of that, living and working in the small tented village around the airfield, wasn’t known, but no one would be bothering to ask them anyway.
20 kilometres up the road was the old Saigon civil airfield, Thu Dau Moi, also being shared by the IJN and IJA air forces. Here they were struggling to accommodate the 48 G3M Nells of the Mihoro Air Group along with a squadron of Ki 32 light bombers and a smaller unit of Ki 59 light transports. And 90 miles south-west of Saigon, on the edge of the Mekong delta, was the Soc Trang airfield, now home of the Yamada Air group, the fighter component of 22 Air Flotilla, with 25 Zero’s and another 11 Claude fighters.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Blimey Guys, there's a lot of you on speed dial, I can barely post before I get a hit!
Driftless
Donor
The same airfield as used a quarter century later by the USAF during the US-Viet Nam War?
It's hard to tell whether the British are doing better or worse. That is TBD by the German/Italian forces. Only the antagonist can
attest to that question.
Sort of like the HAWAF/USN is doing well at 0730W 7 DEC 41 and doing worse at 0800W.
Or MG Murray-Lyon who was afraid that his 11th Indian Division would scare away the IJN. Something about the IJN not being a
suitable opponent for his brigades...I think that he is in the African theatre now. Right where PM Churchill wants him, as he is the
very model of a "modern fighting major general".
Yep. The Brits are better in the Org charts. In the field, perhaps not so much. Is DAK stopped at Suez, Damascus, Tehran or at
Aden (for the tobacco)
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Driftless, well its the same location, but any Japanese pilot returning back to it 25 years later probably wouldn't recognise it!
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Viper91, yes your right, outside of the British Far Eastern defence forces, there should be little change, certainly none from American or Japanese historical paths, and very little in the Middle East. I'll summarise all the changes in a few posts time.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Nevarinemex, Murray-Lyon, an expert bagpipe player, is still very much in command of the Indian 11th Division in Northern Malaya, your thinking of Lt Gen Lewis Macclesfield Heath, who historically was commander of the III Indian Corps in Malaya (the 11th Indian being one of its two divisions), but is now in North Africa, commanding the British XIII Corps through Operation Crusader, and to be fair to him, he's doing ok (just following the British historical path to be honest). This is the big change in the Middle East, as Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen, who historically was leading XIII Corps, finds himself commanding the Indian III Corps in Malaya. This is very much a what if, within a what if, as I want to see how well Godwin-Austen can do, I personally thought he was a good general, a victim of circumstances.
Crusader is a very difficult battle to describe, but this gives a good impression of how battles work at a higher level - the generals have very incomplete information about enemy location and intention (and sometimes about their own forces!), initiative is important, and the key to initiative is having, and creating, units in reserve to throw in when necessary.
Ah yes a Zeng He Sunday morning update - made Sundays so much better
I miss them and hope he is well.
As for you....well I suppose if you think real life is more important than entertaining us then we will just have to put up with it wont we.
(Sounds of grumbling under breath)
As for things like grass airstrips over concrete - that was probably the case for most of the airstrips in the region and I think you have performed admirable due diligence with your research so yeah crack on with that assumption.
"Victory goes to the side with the last formed reserve."
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Oh dear the Japanese have made a major mistake, one that just might see them suffer an embarrassing defeat. So used to operating in China, where there was little to no chance of their airfields being subjected to either ground or air attacks, they have overloaded the airfields with aircraft. There can be no question that the British via their extensive intelligence network will soon be informed of this large collection of bombers, and the airfields on which they are based, plus the lack of defensive support either passive or aggressive. Park will have added these targets to his list of possible raids to be conducted after the outbreak of hostilities. Although the advantage seems to be with the Japanese, as they appear to have the stronger numbers, things are not quite as they seem, and in some ways the principal advantage is with the British. Unlike his opponents Park is not only a very experienced, having flown as a fighter pilot in the Great War, and held numerous commands during the interwar period, plus being one of those who established fighter command pre war, and had commanded Number 11 group during the Battle of Britain. He has had nearly a year in command to build up his command and plan for the oncoming conflict. He knows from experience how vital the defence of his airfields is, and has taken every opportunity to make them resilient to enemy attacks. He also is in a position to attack his opponents airfields once hostilities commence, something that is going to come as a tremendous shock to the Japanese. And unlike the Japanese, he has a well developed support structure in and around Singapore, to provide the essential services his combat forces require. I do not doubt that he has already prepared a system of relief for his front line units, so that they can rest and absorb replacements for combat casualties. The Japanese also have the problem, do they retain these bombers for an attack against Force Z, or do they risk losing aircraft and crews supporting the land assault.
RR.
RR.