10. 06. The pace quickens some more, and the battle comes ashore.
Monday August the twelve.
Day Sharp raid on Portsmouth. Convoy in Thames Estuary, radar stations and coastal airfields attacked.
Night, Widespread harassing raids.
Weather Fine except for mist patches (1).
The RAF weather forecasters were predicting that the high pressure down towards the Azores would continue to build and come north to give a period of calm clear weather. Ideal for Luftwaffe air operations and also for the RAF defence as clear skies meant nowhere for the attackers to hide. If the Luftwaffe stayed true to form the first attack would be early and at Dover. They did not disappoint by half past seven darting attacks made as a distraction wore occurring at Dover. Eleven Group countered with measured responses without over committing resources. At nine o’clock the Luftwaffe announced their new intent with attacks on no less than five CH RDF stations. One of the first RDF stations to be damaged was that at Dunkirk in Northern Kent, here a one thousand pound bomb landed close enough to the concrete protected transmitting hut to actually physically move it several inches but that was as much damage as was done despite the total destruction of two wooden Hutson the site. Nothing vital was damaged and the site remained operational. A few miles away at the Dover the transmitting and receiving masts were damaged by blast but again no real damaged was done. Along the coast at Rye once again the somewhat fragile wooden huts were blown to pieces but the hardened transmitting and receiving stations remained undamaged. With the use of the Standby generator Rye was back in service before noon. Further west Penensey was taken out of service by a string of five hundred kilogram bombs that severed some of the power lines, Here again using supplies stored on site the cables were soon repaired and the RDF station resumed operations. In the midst of these attacks the airfield at Lympne was heavily bombed.
An hour later the coastal convoys once again came under attack. Despite the high losses suffered by the Ju87’s recently a force was committed to attacking two convoys, ’Agent and Arena’ in the Thames Estuary. Simultaneously to the west Luftflotte 3 sent a large, heavily escorted group of JU88’s to attack Portsmouth by flying through the balloon barrage gap caused by the Western Solent , Spithead and the harbour entrance, on the way a small formation attacked the convoys ‘cable and ‘snail’ in the channel in an attempt to draw fighters away from the main target. Despite intense AA fire both Portsmouth old town and the Naval dockyard were hard hit. At the same time a force of fifteen JU88’s peeled of and attacked the CH RDF station perched on top of Ventnor down. Accurate bombing did serious damage to the station exacerbated by the lack of water on the hill top to douse the subsequent fires. Ventnor CH would be out of action for a considerable time.
Early in the afternoon Manston came under heavy attack. Whilst 54 Squadron tried to deflect the heavily escorted bomber force whilst the spitfires of No65 Squadron took off through a hail of bombs to climb into the dogfights of whirling fighters now taking place above the airfield. This melee had stripped the fighter escort away from the formation of KG2’s Dorniers who were then badly mauled as they flew back towards France by the Hurricanes of No 56 Squadron. Over one hundred and fifty bombs had been aimed at Manston, cratering the airfield, damaging two hangers and wrecking the workshops, the airfield was unserviceable until the thirteenth. Like Manston Hawkinge airfield was attacked this time b y a force of Ju 88’s again two hangers were wrecked and the workshops smashed with no less than twenty eight bomb craters littering the airfield, five dead and seven casualties were the human cost to the RAF on the ground. Whilst operations were impeded by the damage the station was fully operational again on the morning of the thirteenth.
Not that far away the airfield at Lympne was also subjected to a concentrated bombing attack at around three PM. Having already received some one hundred and forty-one bombs in the mornings raid. This afternoons raid resulted in the dropping in another two hundred and forty-two bombs being dropped, whilst seventy of these fell into the field border the airfield the rest did sufficient damage to render the airfield unusable. To finish the days raids Luftflotte 2 bomb both Hastings and Dover again.
The night action saw wide spread raids by single of braces of bombers to harass the defences and to spread the night fighter response. As usual the mine layers were busy dropping their nasty eggs around the coast.
Tuesday August the thirteenth,
Day, Opening of ‘Eagle Day’ misfires. Heavy raid on East-church followed by afternoon raids on Portland, Southampton and airfields in Hampshire and Kent, 1.485 German sorties.
Night, Light raids on midlands, Wales and west.
Weather, Mainly fair, early morning mist and slight drizzle in places. Channel some cloud. (1)
What might have seemed to the RAF as just another deception plan by the Luftwaffe was actually the result of miscommunication and confusion. The thirteenth was supposed to be ‘Eagle Day” the start of the operation to destroy Fighter Command and the RAF’s ability to defend the airspace over southern England. The day was meant to start with large scale raids but due to the weather these were delayed until the afternoon. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe not all units received the postponement in time. One of these ‘rogue’ formations comprised some seventy four Dornier 17s escorted by Me 110’s. Shortly after five thirty Am the 110’s received the recall signal leaving the Dornier Bombers from KG 2 to fly on unescorted base the cloud base which was currently at some four thousand feet. This force in two segments approached Eastchurch Airfield and Sheerness docks at around seven A.M. due to the RDF stations underestimating the formation size and the Observer corps unable to give visual confirmation due to the low cloud cover Eleven group controllers only sent a single squadron to intercept. 74 squadron from Hornchurch intercepted the raid as it came clear of the cloud near Whistable and an intense fight coerced with the rear elements of the bomber formation. Calls to the controllers from 774 Squadron quickly appraised the operations rooms of the size of the attack and the need for reinforcement. By attacking the rear of the formation 74 squadron left the leading elements under the command of General Fink were able to bomb Eastchurch unmolested causing heavy damage and casualties. The final toll would be twelve dead and forty injured. As the enemy formation turned on course for France the RDF stations guided the Hurricanes from 111 and 151 squadrons to intercept. Despite the Dorniers dodging in and out of the cloud both squadrons managed to make successful attacks and duly take a toll of the enemy bombers. Well to the west flying in two formations with a heavy fighter escort Ju 88’s from KG54 intending to bomb the Royal Aircraft establishment at Farnborough and the airfield at Odiham were initially intercepted over the coast by Hurricanes from No 43 squadron at Tangmere shortly joined by more Hurricanes from 601 squadron and the Spitfires of 64 Squadron. Continually pounced on by the fighters and disorientated by the heavy cloud cover neither bombing formation hit it’s intended target.
Shortly before noon another incoming formation was plotted by RDF, despite CH Ventnor still being out of action the other RDF units covering the coast from Portland to Pevensey were able to tract the formations. This was identified as a twenty plus raid leaving the Cotin peninsular and heading for Ports mouth. Unknown at the time to the RAF the raid was a complete shambles the bombers from KG54 did not make their rendezvous and the escorting Me 110’s headed off towards Portland on their own. Two squadrons from 10 group were tasked to intercept the incoming raid and promptly bounced the Me 110’s sending half dozen spiralling down into the waters off Portland in the space of five minutes whilst the rest including several damaged and smoking aircraft dived for the safety of France some eighty miles to the south.
If the morning had been busy for fighter command the afternoon would prove more so as the true main thrust of the Luftwaffe ‘attack of the Eagles’ was unleashed.
No 10 Group policy was to counter attacks with the largest possible number of fighter Squadrons, this tactic was based on the fact that the Luftwaffe would be operating either beyond or at the very limit of Me109 fighter cover range and therefore all fighters could be concentrated on the bomber formations experience so far had shown 10 group controllers and pilots that to all intense and purposes the formations of Me 110 fighters could be treated liked bombers in the initial bounce. Early after noon would see this policy well and truly tested as the RDF station covering Ten Groups southern frontage reported a series of formations heading north from around the location of Jersey. These Formations of twenty plus, fifty plus, thirty plus and a final thirty plus had actually originated from the units of Fliegercorps VIII based around Orleans Bricy,
This armada appeared in three distinct waves and No 100 group responded by scrambling 152 squadron from Warmwell, 238 squadron from Middle wallop and 213 squadron from Exeter to the west. All to patrol line over the coast, simultaneously 609 squadron from Warmwell were instructed to orbit Weymouth. Finally No 10 Group requested assistance from 11 Group to cover the eastern side of the line of attack and Tangmere dispatched 601 squadron to cover the isle of Wight.
The German bomber formations were preceded by a large force of heavy fighters intended to sweep the line of advance clear of RAF fighters. This sweep was duly engaged by both 213 and 152 squadrons Whilst another formation of Me110’s tasked with covering the Ju 87’s was stripped away by an attack by 238 squadrons Hurricanes. Due to this most of the Ju 8’s which managed to evade 601 squadron got to Southampton and caused damage to the docks, warehousing an surrounding industries. To balance this defensive failure the thirteen Spitfires of 609 squadron found themselves ideally placed above a formation of Ju 87‘s whilst half of the escorting Me 110’s were distracted by engagement of their compatriots by the Hurricanes of 238 squadron. As bonus 601 squadron diving out of the sun on the way to attack the Ju 87’s did a perfect bounce on five Me 109’s damaging two and send a third to smear a field with fire, carrying strait on into the Stuka formation, nearly a dozen of which were quickly shot down, many in flames and others with dead hands on the controls. At his debrief one pilot from 601 squadron quipped that it should have happened yesterday, that being the ‘Glorious 12th’. The surviving Ju ‘s dropped a scattering of bombs over the country side and fled. Some bombs did hit Andover airfield but this was od no consequence to Fighter Command as it was not one of their fields.
Miles to the East over Kent another thrust was developing where Luftflotte 2 had Rochester and the airfield at Detling as it’s major targets Here again the bombers had a very heavy escort, 65 Squadron who were sent to intercept the bombers got snarled up with the escort. This permitted a part of the bomber force to get an unopposed run at Detling, Rochester escaped any bombs due to being obscured by cloud and this portion of the bombing force jettisoned their bomb loads over Canterbury as they were attacked by 56 squadron from Rochford. Further small raids resulted on bombs falling Ramsgate and Lympne again.
Damage at Detling was severe with hangers set on fire, the operations room flattened and the cookhouse and messes destroyed, Amongst the dead was the station commander. Despite all this essential services including the communications systems were functioning once again by midday on the fourteenth of August.
On a hard fought day Fighter Command had flown over seven hundred sorties and had lost thirteen aircraft in response to some one thousand four hundred and eighty five sorties from the Luftwaffe. RAF claims at the time were for eighty seven enemy aircraft destroyed. (later revised to fifty four, post war records would show that on that day the Luftwaffe units involved suffered an actual loss sixty four aircraft to all operational causes). Luftwaffe claims for the day mounted to seventy spitfires and Hurricanes destroyed in aerial combat and fifteen Blenhiem bombers destroyed on the ground.
That night Luftwaffe bomber aircraft from Luftflotte 5 raided Scotland, where the GCI network had yet to be extended and therefore the raiders only lost a single aircraft to AA fire. Further south the other Luftflotte sent raiders to the West country. Wales and the midlands. In the east Norwich was also targeted. The major raid of the night was on Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich where the German beam navigation system was detected as being used. Eleven bombs were successfully dropped on the target and some damage was caused. Judices work by the counter measures team was instigated to exaggerate, for aerial reconnaissance purposes the actually damage done. In response to the Luftwaffe huge number of bomber sorties thirty six aircraft from bomber command flew the longest raid yet of the war covering some sixteen hundred miles to bomb the Caproni and Fiat works at Milan and Turin, no damage was observed to the targets,
Wednesday, August the fourteenth.
Day Targets, south-east England, airfields and communications, airfields in the west.
Night, little activity.
Weather, Mainly cloudy with Bright patches. Channel Cloudy. (1)
Todays weather was no so conducive to large scale operations and hence the Luftwaffe flew far fewer sorties. Somewhere around only a third of the number achieved the previous day. Loftflotte 2 and 3 were both scheduled to attack RAF ground organisation facilities and aircraft industrial sites. Just before noon the coastal RDF sites recorded Germans formations assembling around Bologne and Calais. By midday formations of German fighters were carrying aggressive sweeps over the airfields of Kent and Dover. Around one PM whilst the defending fighters were drawn off elsewhere a dozen bomb carrying Me 110’s exploited a gap in the defences and succeeded in bombing Manston airfield reducing four hangers to rubble and twisted steel. However ground fire did bring down two of the attackers, one hit by an Army Bofors 40mm gun and the other by an Hispano 20mm aircraft cannon fitted to an extemporised mount and crewed by a mixed bag of RAF armourers and erks. Not long after this while three and a half squadrons from various eleven Group stations were chasing assorted Me 109’s and 110’s above the cloud the enemies main force attacked, little was achieved by this force other than once more ruining the day of the Dover barrage balloon squadron and sinking the unarmed Goodwin Lightvessel.
In the afternoon Luftflotte three under the command of General Sperle entered the fray applying his policy of simultaneous widely spread attacks of fairly small formations in an attempt to disperse and confuse the defence. No less than eight airfields were attacked as well as railways and other targets of opportunity. Ten Group was not ignored with an attack on Middle wallop that did some damage and caused a number of casualties.
Far to the north in Cheshire two Heinkel 111’s managed to attack the M.U. at Sealand causing both casualties and considerable damage, though the commanding officer was able to report the following day that a full days shift with overtime had been worked. On the Welsh Borders no7 O.T.U. despite not being an operational unit upon hearing explosions and machine gun fire in the locality a battle flight of four aircraft took off, the four spitfires were flown by a Wing Commander, a Squadron leader and two flight leaders as wingmen. The result was a marauding Heinkel 111 intercepted and shot down to crash near the city of Chester.
Despite the weather restraining aerial activity to some point both eleven and ten group had a busy day with several airfields within their operational area receiving damage.
Despite traffic analysis predicting a large night raid on northern England only small nuisance raids occurred with night fighters chasing and engaging bombers throughout the areas covered by GCI RDF systems. As was the accepted pattern now the controllers would calmly talk their ‘Nighthawks’ towards the ‘Maggots’ on their screens. All to often they came close without gaining a firm contact but there was a growing cadre of Pilots and RDF operators who had the knack of using the still finicky technology and were slowly building a credible score of downed enemy aircraft.
So the first week of intense Luftwaffe operations came to a close, the defences were being sorely tested and strained at times but the lessons learned earlier were bearing fruit.
As to the Luftwaffe, whatever the propaganda people said or claimed, as far as the frontline personnel were concerned there was no hiding the empty chairs at dinner or the broken bodies leaving in the ambulances in ever increasing numbers.
(1) Dailey summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster