IIRC the Fairey Swordfish was developed from the private venture TSRI of 1933 and that TSRI was built for a possible Greek order, so there would be a certain justice in the RN arranging some Swordfish for the Greeks ITTL. ITTL with the Fairey Albacore monoplane TBR in service as well as the Bristol 148 Brigand, there could well be some spare Swordfish available. Does anyone out there have a source for the order of spitfires and Blenheims by the Greeks that would be useful especially if it has a date. Earlier in this thread I intimated that some Hurricanes and other aircraft were being sent to British Overseas bases.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
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Banned
https://books.google.nl/books/about..._Disarmament.html?id=dLpQDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y p. 209: Initial order for 12 spits that was refused
https://books.google.nl/books/about/Power_and_Stability.html?id=48EQZ8vM0-UC&redir_esc=y p.259: Greek request for additional 24 Spits to the initial order of 12.
Also Greece wanted to purchase AA guns, AT guns, 4 destroyers, 2 submarines etc. Regarding bombers as I understand the order was for 24 Blenheims with plans for additional 38.
Edit: It would be a very interesting butterfly if Greece was operating Stringbags, especially if there was a sufficient period to acclimatize the aircraft. Flying from rudimentary bases in north-western Greece, the straits of Otranto as well as Taranto were in range. I doupt that the Grek Air Force/Navy could have developed a night torpedo strike doctrine and a day strike of unescorted biplanes against Taranto would be pure murder. Nevertheless, Swordfish sweeps in the Otranto Straits are quite possible. I doubt that the
Regia Aeronautica maintained a constant CAP above the straits.
https://books.google.nl/books/about/Power_and_Stability.html?id=48EQZ8vM0-UC&redir_esc=y p.259: Greek request for additional 24 Spits to the initial order of 12.
Also Greece wanted to purchase AA guns, AT guns, 4 destroyers, 2 submarines etc. Regarding bombers as I understand the order was for 24 Blenheims with plans for additional 38.
Edit: It would be a very interesting butterfly if Greece was operating Stringbags, especially if there was a sufficient period to acclimatize the aircraft. Flying from rudimentary bases in north-western Greece, the straits of Otranto as well as Taranto were in range. I doupt that the Grek Air Force/Navy could have developed a night torpedo strike doctrine and a day strike of unescorted biplanes against Taranto would be pure murder. Nevertheless, Swordfish sweeps in the Otranto Straits are quite possible. I doubt that the
Regia Aeronautica maintained a constant CAP above the straits.
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OK I feel compelled to answer just to show support. I like others have pointed out tend not to comment if I agree and enjoy what I am reading.
So I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that cannon armed fighters aren't going to create as big a difference as many expect. IOTL the eight 303's spat out a lot of lead which greatly increased the chances of hitting fast moving enemy aircraft. This caused damage and casualties which often wasn't apparent to the RAF pilots, but led to an increasing drain on skilled aircrew who became casualties and of aircraft that had to be written off. Here with cannons these damaged aircraft are now being destroyed in the air instead of being written off later. So in the big scheme of things it make less of a difference than people think.
I disagree with the general consensus that due to heavier losses sustained earlier the Germans would switch to night bombing. OTL this happened in part to the German response to the continued resistance of Fighter Command by providing their bombers with ever larger fighter support. This left a substantial amount of the German bomber fleet without fighters so if they didn't bomb by night (although if the Germans had decided to use several hundred bombers for maritime reconnaissance/attack it would be an interesting possibility) they wouldn't be doing anything at all.
The Germans also felt that the wround the clock bomber offensive against London would crack the capital's morale in much the same way the Wallies predicted their own bombing offensive would win the war in 44/45.
I believe that the main reason for the switch to night operations was mostly due to the autumn weather. Certainly by the end of September the Luftwaffe was looking rather ragged (of course so was the RAF). However they believed that the RAF was in as bad a state and probably worse. It just needed them to keep on going to win.
Here the Germans are up against a better RAF so their losses are going to be higher but not to such an extent that they will throw in the towel significantly earlier. Also the British night fighters where pretty pants in 1940 accounting for only a handful of German planes. ITTL with better night fighters bringing higher losses to the German bombers operating at night the rational that it is safer for bombers to act at night isn't as strong. So there is the possibility that the OTL Blitz doesn't happen at all or is radically different. Of course might this realisation not also radically effect Bomber Commands war?
So I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that cannon armed fighters aren't going to create as big a difference as many expect. IOTL the eight 303's spat out a lot of lead which greatly increased the chances of hitting fast moving enemy aircraft. This caused damage and casualties which often wasn't apparent to the RAF pilots, but led to an increasing drain on skilled aircrew who became casualties and of aircraft that had to be written off. Here with cannons these damaged aircraft are now being destroyed in the air instead of being written off later. So in the big scheme of things it make less of a difference than people think.
I disagree with the general consensus that due to heavier losses sustained earlier the Germans would switch to night bombing. OTL this happened in part to the German response to the continued resistance of Fighter Command by providing their bombers with ever larger fighter support. This left a substantial amount of the German bomber fleet without fighters so if they didn't bomb by night (although if the Germans had decided to use several hundred bombers for maritime reconnaissance/attack it would be an interesting possibility) they wouldn't be doing anything at all.
The Germans also felt that the wround the clock bomber offensive against London would crack the capital's morale in much the same way the Wallies predicted their own bombing offensive would win the war in 44/45.
I believe that the main reason for the switch to night operations was mostly due to the autumn weather. Certainly by the end of September the Luftwaffe was looking rather ragged (of course so was the RAF). However they believed that the RAF was in as bad a state and probably worse. It just needed them to keep on going to win.
Here the Germans are up against a better RAF so their losses are going to be higher but not to such an extent that they will throw in the towel significantly earlier. Also the British night fighters where pretty pants in 1940 accounting for only a handful of German planes. ITTL with better night fighters bringing higher losses to the German bombers operating at night the rational that it is safer for bombers to act at night isn't as strong. So there is the possibility that the OTL Blitz doesn't happen at all or is radically different. Of course might this realisation not also radically effect Bomber Commands war?
For losses in fighters I'd agree, losses in bombers not so much. Cannon against 1940 bombers was devastating compared to 303, the lack of amour meaning many aircraft will not make it home that did OTL. Hitting them was not the issue, doing damage was. 303 just was not that effective on larger aircraft with fighters shooting themselves dry on a regular basis, just causing cosmetic holes. Explosive 20mm would do far more damage per hit and weaken structure even if they don't break it.
Keep going, keep going. These day to day entries aren't going to get many comments. There is not much to say. Germans bomb. There is a dog fight. Something is learnt. It will take 3 or 4 entries for the pattern to emerge, a light bulb to go off, then the comments will flow. That's not a problem. That's just the way it is. Like a montage scene in a movie the reaction happens at the end. Unfortunately the montage has to be written. 
The effective trade-off is that the 8x.303 will have lots of hits but very little damage (on average) per hit while the 4x20mm will generate fewer hits (slower cyclical rate and shorter ammunition duration) but far more damage (on average) per hit.
This trade-off then encourages different skills/training regimes. The cannons encourage very accurate first shot/first pass shooting as that might be all that one gets. The lighter rifle caliber machine guns encourage the ability to stick to a target for a while as it is going to take a while to get a kill.
In the longer run, the iteration of the game is as follows:
Day 1: 10 ME-109s tangle with Spitfires
Cannon armed Spits get a pair of kills, two hard damages that will put their opponents down for a week or more and the last plane that got hit with a trio of 20mm shells behind the cockpit. That pilot makes it back to France and is told that his bird is down for at least the next four days.
OR machine gun armed Spits get a pair of kills, one hard damage, one moderately damage and the fifth bird got sprayed with 20 .303 hits behind the cockpit. That pilot makes it back to France. His crew chief looks at the damage and says that he'll have the bird ready by tomorrow afternoon.
Day 2: 5 ME-109s get chased off by Spitfires in an indecisive dogfight while Hurricanes make a coordinated pass on the bombers OR 4 ME-109s turn into the Spitfires as a 2 more 109's disengage and go after the Hurricanes that are going after the bombers. The bombers in Scenario 1 get hit hard while in Scenario 2, the bombers have a better chance.
That is the more likely cycle of advantage that cannon armed fighters versus machine gun armed fighters. Anyone one battle does not see much difference but the accumulation of tilts to the table begin to matter. Planes that were very lightly damaged by machine gun fire are moderately damaged; planes that are moderately damaged become hanger queens and planes that are heavily damaged are kills.
Regarding the Luftwaffe losses being increased by the fact that ITTL both Hurricanes and Spitfires have a pair of cannons and there are two aircraft, the Defiant and the Reaper with four cannons. I agree that in fighter engagements the effect will not at first be that apparent but it will be cumulative. for the Bombers however at times it might make little difference but occasional the difference will be cataclysmic for the Luftwaffe bomber crews.
Believe me I'm not. It is a stunning piece of work and I can't wait to see where you end up taking it
Seconded. I think the reason there hasn't been much in the way of comments recently is because we're all looking forward to the next post. :-D
Alt Pop Culture:
One phrase I've never heard in a fighter pilot movie but think would work well is "gun slug" for a slow, heavily armed fighter. Seems ITTL the Defiant was the original gun slug.
One phrase I've never heard in a fighter pilot movie but think would work well is "gun slug" for a slow, heavily armed fighter. Seems ITTL the Defiant was the original gun slug.
how about "gun dog" as a play on words, the Defiant might be called a "bit of Dog" for it's lack of performance compared to the Hurricane and especially the Spitfire ITTL but some pilots will love it's fire power and armour which in 1940 is not matched by any allied single seater.
9.3 Diversions, Divisions And Distractions
9.2 Diversions, Divisions and Distractions,
Sir Phillip sat at his desk in the Air Ministry and contemplated the mound of paper that seemed to cover every square inch of what was by no means a small piece of furniture. With the Luftwaffe assault from across the channel intensifying many in the Government, Air Ministry and the RAF seemed to have completely forgotten that there was more to the RAF than simply Fighter Command. At least thank god as far as Sir Phillip was concerned Sir Hugh Dowding was not one of these people. Sir Hugh seemed to be able to concentrate on the immediate task in hand whilst not losing sight of the bigger picture. Sir Phillip once more wished the same could be said of all the other heads of Commands within the RAF.
One in particular was a thorn in Sir Phillips side and that was Sir Charles Portal, who whilst being highly efficient was a resolute Trenchardian and an astute political operator. As far as Portal was concerned Bomber Command was the RAF, all other commands were there simply to support the bombers. Sir Phillip also was well aware that Portal was acting like the next Chief of the Air Staff designate and was being actively promoted as such to the Prime Minister by certain elements within the RAF both Past and present.
Whilst the country was fighting for its very existence Sir Phillip was not personally impressed by officers who were as concerned about self promotion by being highly visible in the success of their commands rather than the success of the RAF as a whole. Sir Phillip was convinced that if Portal was to become the next CAS then every command in the RAF would be playing second fiddle to Bomber Command and every theatre of operations world wide would be starved of resources to ensure that Bomber command got everything possible to fulfil Portals Trenchardian vision of air power.
Churchill seemed spellbound by Portal’s vision of the potential of Bomber Command to ’take the war to the enemy’ and this was compounded by the fact that Newall was becoming more and more ineffective as CAS by the week leaving more and more of the daily running of the RAF to his deputy CAS Sholto Douglass, now if a man ever new how to play the Whitehall System and at RAF professional politics, Sholto Douglas was it and he knew a rising star when he saw it and he was firmly hitching himself to Portal.
Sholto Douglass had no time for Sir Hugh Dowding at all, simply because Sir Hugh held him in such low esteem because as far as Sir Hugh was concerned Douglass was merely an incompetent place filler. This left Sir Phillip with a dilemma, at this juncture Portal was far too important for the future of Bomber Command, so Sir Phillip had reluctantly come to the conclusion that Douglass would need to side-lined and a far more competent man substituted. Sir Phillip and Sholto Douglas had clashed before, as it happened over the handling of the possible date of Sir Hugh Dowding’s retirement. This had occurred when Sholto Douglass was Director of Staff duties at the Air Ministry.
Sir Phillip could not Just sack the man so a side ways shunt to an active command would be the best option, the question was which command and where. Then Sir Phillip had a flash of inspiration, Sholto Douglass was known not to like Americans, so send him to America to join Beaverbrook’s mission as head of new the RAF purchasing mission.
The problem was finding the right man for the job to replace Sholto Douglas and as far as Sir Phillip was concerned that was Sir Wilfred Freeman. Sir Phillip sold this appointment to Churchill on the basis that as Dowdings’ successor at Research and Development Sir Wilfred had been instrumental in the selection and commissioning of the next generation of aircraft and RDF and therefore was extremely well versed in what was needed and would be an asset to both the AM and the MAP in getting the new aircraft types into service. Having primed Archibald Sinclair in advance to also advocate this appointment on behalf of MAP certainly helped sway the argument. By mid July all was arranged and the appointments made.
As to Portal it was obvious to Sir Phillip that he was a formidable administrator and a single minded exponent of the Trenchard doctrine to the exclusion of all else, unless it threatened the hegemony of the RAF over aircraft then he would fight like a cornered rat for the RAF’s Fiefdom. The Current bone of contention was the best use of the forces in Bomber Command, Portal was adamant that strategic bombing of pinpoint targets in Germany was the only priority. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned it would help if Bomber Command could at least hit the target but the photographs being brought back by the PRU aircraft all to often showed little or no damage on the targets and frequently no evidence of any bombs landing within a miles radius.
New navigation equipment and better trained navigators were well on the way and the new bombers, The Halifax and the Manchester would benefit from both but operational sorties by both types were still some weeks away. Prudent voices in the RAF was suggesting waiting till the longer nights of the Autumn before using the new big bombers and by then there would be at least a groups worth of both types available.
Portal was still kicking up a fuss that all the Stirlings were being built as LRMP aircraft for Maritime Command. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned he just could not credit that a man of Portal’s obvious intelligence could not grasp that with the seizure of the French Atlantic seaboard ports by Germany the threat to Britain’s trans oceanic trade had risen exponentially and that every measure had to be taken to protect the supply convoys.
They had also clashed over the cutting back of production of obsolescent bomber aircraft, to Portal so it seemed to sir Phillip numbers were everything. That argument had been won by pointing out that such production took materials and capacity away from the new production of the Manchester and Halifax. At least Portal seemed to be impressed by the Bomber version of the De Haviland Mosquito that had recently been demonstrated to him. Now of course true to form he was demanding priority on Mosquito production of them as well.
Sir Phillip sat at his desk in the Air Ministry and contemplated the mound of paper that seemed to cover every square inch of what was by no means a small piece of furniture. With the Luftwaffe assault from across the channel intensifying many in the Government, Air Ministry and the RAF seemed to have completely forgotten that there was more to the RAF than simply Fighter Command. At least thank god as far as Sir Phillip was concerned Sir Hugh Dowding was not one of these people. Sir Hugh seemed to be able to concentrate on the immediate task in hand whilst not losing sight of the bigger picture. Sir Phillip once more wished the same could be said of all the other heads of Commands within the RAF.
One in particular was a thorn in Sir Phillips side and that was Sir Charles Portal, who whilst being highly efficient was a resolute Trenchardian and an astute political operator. As far as Portal was concerned Bomber Command was the RAF, all other commands were there simply to support the bombers. Sir Phillip also was well aware that Portal was acting like the next Chief of the Air Staff designate and was being actively promoted as such to the Prime Minister by certain elements within the RAF both Past and present.
Whilst the country was fighting for its very existence Sir Phillip was not personally impressed by officers who were as concerned about self promotion by being highly visible in the success of their commands rather than the success of the RAF as a whole. Sir Phillip was convinced that if Portal was to become the next CAS then every command in the RAF would be playing second fiddle to Bomber Command and every theatre of operations world wide would be starved of resources to ensure that Bomber command got everything possible to fulfil Portals Trenchardian vision of air power.
Churchill seemed spellbound by Portal’s vision of the potential of Bomber Command to ’take the war to the enemy’ and this was compounded by the fact that Newall was becoming more and more ineffective as CAS by the week leaving more and more of the daily running of the RAF to his deputy CAS Sholto Douglass, now if a man ever new how to play the Whitehall System and at RAF professional politics, Sholto Douglas was it and he knew a rising star when he saw it and he was firmly hitching himself to Portal.
Sholto Douglass had no time for Sir Hugh Dowding at all, simply because Sir Hugh held him in such low esteem because as far as Sir Hugh was concerned Douglass was merely an incompetent place filler. This left Sir Phillip with a dilemma, at this juncture Portal was far too important for the future of Bomber Command, so Sir Phillip had reluctantly come to the conclusion that Douglass would need to side-lined and a far more competent man substituted. Sir Phillip and Sholto Douglas had clashed before, as it happened over the handling of the possible date of Sir Hugh Dowding’s retirement. This had occurred when Sholto Douglass was Director of Staff duties at the Air Ministry.
Sir Phillip could not Just sack the man so a side ways shunt to an active command would be the best option, the question was which command and where. Then Sir Phillip had a flash of inspiration, Sholto Douglass was known not to like Americans, so send him to America to join Beaverbrook’s mission as head of new the RAF purchasing mission.
The problem was finding the right man for the job to replace Sholto Douglas and as far as Sir Phillip was concerned that was Sir Wilfred Freeman. Sir Phillip sold this appointment to Churchill on the basis that as Dowdings’ successor at Research and Development Sir Wilfred had been instrumental in the selection and commissioning of the next generation of aircraft and RDF and therefore was extremely well versed in what was needed and would be an asset to both the AM and the MAP in getting the new aircraft types into service. Having primed Archibald Sinclair in advance to also advocate this appointment on behalf of MAP certainly helped sway the argument. By mid July all was arranged and the appointments made.
As to Portal it was obvious to Sir Phillip that he was a formidable administrator and a single minded exponent of the Trenchard doctrine to the exclusion of all else, unless it threatened the hegemony of the RAF over aircraft then he would fight like a cornered rat for the RAF’s Fiefdom. The Current bone of contention was the best use of the forces in Bomber Command, Portal was adamant that strategic bombing of pinpoint targets in Germany was the only priority. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned it would help if Bomber Command could at least hit the target but the photographs being brought back by the PRU aircraft all to often showed little or no damage on the targets and frequently no evidence of any bombs landing within a miles radius.
New navigation equipment and better trained navigators were well on the way and the new bombers, The Halifax and the Manchester would benefit from both but operational sorties by both types were still some weeks away. Prudent voices in the RAF was suggesting waiting till the longer nights of the Autumn before using the new big bombers and by then there would be at least a groups worth of both types available.
Portal was still kicking up a fuss that all the Stirlings were being built as LRMP aircraft for Maritime Command. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned he just could not credit that a man of Portal’s obvious intelligence could not grasp that with the seizure of the French Atlantic seaboard ports by Germany the threat to Britain’s trans oceanic trade had risen exponentially and that every measure had to be taken to protect the supply convoys.
They had also clashed over the cutting back of production of obsolescent bomber aircraft, to Portal so it seemed to sir Phillip numbers were everything. That argument had been won by pointing out that such production took materials and capacity away from the new production of the Manchester and Halifax. At least Portal seemed to be impressed by the Bomber version of the De Haviland Mosquito that had recently been demonstrated to him. Now of course true to form he was demanding priority on Mosquito production of them as well.
Driftless
Donor
In my case, my knowledge of radar and it's development history is next to nothing; so I just read and hopefully soak up some knowledge on the way
Unless you can magic up a British axial flow jet engine like the Beyrl several years earlier, Met Vickers started private work on the project in 1939 and had a ministry contract issued in 1940, So stop reading my notes!
Pushing Portal aside was a necessary evil, the man you really need to get rid of or sideline completely is Lord Trenchard,. And as usual, a superb update, very well written. Thanks to Reap the Whirlwind I became a lot more aware of just how much political infighting and empire building when on in the War years, you'd think that the UK couldn't afford petty politicking when caught in a struggle for national survival but oh well :s And hopefully this change will be for the better, Portal wasn't a bad leader, he was just a bit single minded.