12.47 French Indo china and the defence of the Far East
12.47 French Indo china and the defence of the Far East.
The occupation of the whole of French Indo-China by Japan in July 1941 had sent alarm bells ringing all over Whitehall, The Air Ministry was not alone in seeing this as a direct threat to both Malaya and Singapore, Thailand whilst purporting to be neutral was now being considered as a distinct liability.
This had serious repercussions for the security of both Burma and of Eastern India itself.
Both the AM and the CAS were agreed that reinforcements were required in the area as soon as possible so as to hopefully deter any Japanese expansionist plans and to offer a robust defence if any incursion should occur. Along with the Admiralty the AM were looking very hard at what resources could be scrounged and from where to bolster the Asian defences.
It was not just a question of aircraft and manpower there was also the matter of providing a robust and competent leadership.
In India the situation in Bengal was being reviewed and plans made for new air bases closer to the Burmese Border. Since the reopening of the Burma Road in early 1941 the defence of the region had been causing much vexation. It was not good country for airfields on the whole and communications were really confined to the major river systems. Though plans had been made for a series of airfields to link India and Singapore the realities of fighting a European war had meant that little progress had been
The Indian Army was currently in the middle of a huge expansion from its pre-war level of two hundred thousand men to an initial target of one million men under arms with provision of this increasing further to two million men. This enormous expansion was not only absorbing vast resources from India but also meant that the existing forces were being thinned out to provide core cadres for the new formations. All this meant that whilst keeping the existing Indian divisions in the Middle East and Africa supplied with officers and men those new divisions being raised would not be combat worthy for many months.
The problems for the RAF were much the same, finite resources spread too thin.
The RAF and the staff at the Air Ministry had been tasked by the government to review the defence of the far East and to provide a plan. Some would call it no more than a wish list. Sir Philip as Air Minister and Sir Hugh Dowding as Chief of the Air Staff were determined to do what was practicable and to present the Government with a coherent set of options.
Hence their current discussion with selected members of their staff’s at the AM. One of the hottest topics was the Command structure and those currently in it for the Far East. Was it and were they fit for the job. These were very difficult questions to answer. However by looking behind the official communications, especially those from the Foreign Office and the various Governors and High officials, as well as confidential reports from various sources it was possible to get a feel for the situation.
Sir Hugh Himself very much wanted to visit the Far East Commands to see for himself but that was just not a practical proposition at this time. So one point of discussion was who could be sent to carry out such an assessment and was there actually time for such a review.
The consensus was that action was needed now and that as of July 194, the consensus was that the Japanese would if they were going to attack, do so somewhere in the next six to nine months as the latest trade embargoes and sanctions imposed by the Americans and the others would by then start to seriously impact the Japanese fuel supplies and other crucial war materials.
The attack on Russia by the Germans was also of significance as this altered the resources that the communists were willing to commit to the Far East to contain the Japanese. This could well encourage the Japanese to deploy their forces in other areas.
There were those who discounted the Japanese as a threat because of their own perceptions and prejudices. To Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh who had both read the confidential reports from the conflict in China and watched the graphic newsreel footage (often the unedited raw stock not suitable for public viewing) there was no do doubt of the threat the Japanese posed.
Air Marshal Brooke-Popham had been appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command responsible for the defence of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya and Burma. Both the AM and CAS were acutely aware of the difficulties under which Brooke-Popham laboured to prepare his Command for a war which many of the people he had to deal with thought would never come.
The fact that the Commander in Chief Brook-Popham had no operational control of the Naval forces in his command area and that the civil authorities took their instructions from the Foreign Office in London was well known to the AM and CAS. This alone could hamstring the Commander in Chief's planning and preparations for conflict and from the reports being submitted was certainly the case with the civil administration.
In the light of the changing strategic position in the Far East instructions had been given to Brooke-Popham to write a new appreciation of the defence requirements for his command and to include recommendations and a succinct war plan. It was requested that these be ready for presentation to the Prime Minister and the Government by early August.
In all reality both Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh considered that in real terms Hong Kong was indefensible from an attack by the Japanese forces already in China and that the defences there should be reinforced as little as politically acceptable.
Also both men were considering whether the defence of Burma should be given to the Indian High Command as the two counties shared a border and any forces for the defence of Burma would almost certainly come across that border or sail from Indian ports. His would also allow the command structure in Singapore to concentrate on the defence of Malaya and Singapore as well as the containment of the new Japanese presence in French Indo china.
Much discussion took place at this time with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Supply regarding the shipping of essential to the Far East and the allocation of shipping within the region. Cargoes for the defence of Burma would go via the ports, principally Rangoon, as ships unloaded their warlike materials they would embark exports, mainly timber and rice for shipment to India and the rest of the empire shipping to Malaya and Singapore would work on the same methodology.
Potential reinforcements for the Far East would greatly depend on the state of the conflict in the Middle East. Already the eradication of Italian forces in East Africa and the quelling of the insurrection in Iraq had freed up considerable forces and resources. The decision now was as to what of those resources would be needed to help drive the axis out of North Africa and what could be redirected to the Far East.
With that in mind the Air Ministry were assessing what resources they had available and in discussion with the Ministry of Supply how they could be moved to the east
Just as the invasion of Russia had effect the planning of the Japanese it also had a direct effect on the availability of hardware for the Far East Command. The British Government was committed to the supply of material including aircraft to the Soviets to bolster their defence of the motherland. In light of the huge losses suffered by the Soviets in the first weeks of the campaign these supplies could prove vital in keeping Russia in the war. Sir Hugh as CAS was very much inclined to the view that Britain’s strategic requirements should be paramount but aware of the political necessity of aiding the Soviets in blunting the German assault. The Soviets were screaming for fighters to replace their losses and as the initial tranche of Brewster Buffaloes were being made ready for the fight north from Persia pressure was being applied to the AM to sanction the shipping of Hurricanes from Canada to Murmansk. The Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty had been quick to point out the vulnerability of convoys around the north cape during the summer period of twenty four hour daylight.
Using this opportunity The AM were pushing for the shipment of Hurricanes from Canada’s west coast across the pacific to Singapore. It was hoped to send the first such shipment in August. The other source of fighters for the Far East could be the shifting of P40’s from the Middle East. The AM and RAF was working on the precept that if better fighters could be got to the Middle East in numbers then the objection to the transfer of the P40 Warhawks to the Far East could well be muted.
The occupation of the whole of French Indo-China by Japan in July 1941 had sent alarm bells ringing all over Whitehall, The Air Ministry was not alone in seeing this as a direct threat to both Malaya and Singapore, Thailand whilst purporting to be neutral was now being considered as a distinct liability.
This had serious repercussions for the security of both Burma and of Eastern India itself.
Both the AM and the CAS were agreed that reinforcements were required in the area as soon as possible so as to hopefully deter any Japanese expansionist plans and to offer a robust defence if any incursion should occur. Along with the Admiralty the AM were looking very hard at what resources could be scrounged and from where to bolster the Asian defences.
It was not just a question of aircraft and manpower there was also the matter of providing a robust and competent leadership.
In India the situation in Bengal was being reviewed and plans made for new air bases closer to the Burmese Border. Since the reopening of the Burma Road in early 1941 the defence of the region had been causing much vexation. It was not good country for airfields on the whole and communications were really confined to the major river systems. Though plans had been made for a series of airfields to link India and Singapore the realities of fighting a European war had meant that little progress had been
The Indian Army was currently in the middle of a huge expansion from its pre-war level of two hundred thousand men to an initial target of one million men under arms with provision of this increasing further to two million men. This enormous expansion was not only absorbing vast resources from India but also meant that the existing forces were being thinned out to provide core cadres for the new formations. All this meant that whilst keeping the existing Indian divisions in the Middle East and Africa supplied with officers and men those new divisions being raised would not be combat worthy for many months.
The problems for the RAF were much the same, finite resources spread too thin.
The RAF and the staff at the Air Ministry had been tasked by the government to review the defence of the far East and to provide a plan. Some would call it no more than a wish list. Sir Philip as Air Minister and Sir Hugh Dowding as Chief of the Air Staff were determined to do what was practicable and to present the Government with a coherent set of options.
Hence their current discussion with selected members of their staff’s at the AM. One of the hottest topics was the Command structure and those currently in it for the Far East. Was it and were they fit for the job. These were very difficult questions to answer. However by looking behind the official communications, especially those from the Foreign Office and the various Governors and High officials, as well as confidential reports from various sources it was possible to get a feel for the situation.
Sir Hugh Himself very much wanted to visit the Far East Commands to see for himself but that was just not a practical proposition at this time. So one point of discussion was who could be sent to carry out such an assessment and was there actually time for such a review.
The consensus was that action was needed now and that as of July 194, the consensus was that the Japanese would if they were going to attack, do so somewhere in the next six to nine months as the latest trade embargoes and sanctions imposed by the Americans and the others would by then start to seriously impact the Japanese fuel supplies and other crucial war materials.
The attack on Russia by the Germans was also of significance as this altered the resources that the communists were willing to commit to the Far East to contain the Japanese. This could well encourage the Japanese to deploy their forces in other areas.
There were those who discounted the Japanese as a threat because of their own perceptions and prejudices. To Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh who had both read the confidential reports from the conflict in China and watched the graphic newsreel footage (often the unedited raw stock not suitable for public viewing) there was no do doubt of the threat the Japanese posed.
Air Marshal Brooke-Popham had been appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command responsible for the defence of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya and Burma. Both the AM and CAS were acutely aware of the difficulties under which Brooke-Popham laboured to prepare his Command for a war which many of the people he had to deal with thought would never come.
The fact that the Commander in Chief Brook-Popham had no operational control of the Naval forces in his command area and that the civil authorities took their instructions from the Foreign Office in London was well known to the AM and CAS. This alone could hamstring the Commander in Chief's planning and preparations for conflict and from the reports being submitted was certainly the case with the civil administration.
In the light of the changing strategic position in the Far East instructions had been given to Brooke-Popham to write a new appreciation of the defence requirements for his command and to include recommendations and a succinct war plan. It was requested that these be ready for presentation to the Prime Minister and the Government by early August.
In all reality both Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh considered that in real terms Hong Kong was indefensible from an attack by the Japanese forces already in China and that the defences there should be reinforced as little as politically acceptable.
Also both men were considering whether the defence of Burma should be given to the Indian High Command as the two counties shared a border and any forces for the defence of Burma would almost certainly come across that border or sail from Indian ports. His would also allow the command structure in Singapore to concentrate on the defence of Malaya and Singapore as well as the containment of the new Japanese presence in French Indo china.
Much discussion took place at this time with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Supply regarding the shipping of essential to the Far East and the allocation of shipping within the region. Cargoes for the defence of Burma would go via the ports, principally Rangoon, as ships unloaded their warlike materials they would embark exports, mainly timber and rice for shipment to India and the rest of the empire shipping to Malaya and Singapore would work on the same methodology.
Potential reinforcements for the Far East would greatly depend on the state of the conflict in the Middle East. Already the eradication of Italian forces in East Africa and the quelling of the insurrection in Iraq had freed up considerable forces and resources. The decision now was as to what of those resources would be needed to help drive the axis out of North Africa and what could be redirected to the Far East.
With that in mind the Air Ministry were assessing what resources they had available and in discussion with the Ministry of Supply how they could be moved to the east
Just as the invasion of Russia had effect the planning of the Japanese it also had a direct effect on the availability of hardware for the Far East Command. The British Government was committed to the supply of material including aircraft to the Soviets to bolster their defence of the motherland. In light of the huge losses suffered by the Soviets in the first weeks of the campaign these supplies could prove vital in keeping Russia in the war. Sir Hugh as CAS was very much inclined to the view that Britain’s strategic requirements should be paramount but aware of the political necessity of aiding the Soviets in blunting the German assault. The Soviets were screaming for fighters to replace their losses and as the initial tranche of Brewster Buffaloes were being made ready for the fight north from Persia pressure was being applied to the AM to sanction the shipping of Hurricanes from Canada to Murmansk. The Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty had been quick to point out the vulnerability of convoys around the north cape during the summer period of twenty four hour daylight.
Using this opportunity The AM were pushing for the shipment of Hurricanes from Canada’s west coast across the pacific to Singapore. It was hoped to send the first such shipment in August. The other source of fighters for the Far East could be the shifting of P40’s from the Middle East. The AM and RAF was working on the precept that if better fighters could be got to the Middle East in numbers then the objection to the transfer of the P40 Warhawks to the Far East could well be muted.
