ITTL Berlin is and will be bombed but proportionately as there are other better targets.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Driftless
Donor
Wouldn't there be/wasn't there a bit of public perception to be worked in any bombing campaign against Berlin? By that I mean the British PR effort says "We're bombing Berlin back into the Stone Age". Nazi PR says: "Pffft, mere pin pricks, nothing more". Both countries public (and the British Parliament to some extent) is none-the-wiser either way. Neutral observers are steered towards what Goebbels wants them to see and away from what he doesn't want them to see.
The reality is that either version is highly subjective at this point of the war.....
The reality is that either version is highly subjective at this point of the war.....
In fact, iTTL one of those key opportunities for an attack on Berlin has already passed
Molotov's mission to extend the Ribbentrop pact in Nov 1940 was interrupted by an early British raid
leading him to remark cuttingly that if England's fate was sealed, why they were talking in an air raid shelter.
(Yes I know the talks were doomed any way BUT ... )
Added Later: the interruption was deliberate. Churchill claimed it and Stalin was quite impressed at the time
and said so even as late as 1942
As confirmation of Britains resolve it was probably quite significant
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It would just end in a Finnish victory, most likely. The Finnish pilots were better trained, on average, and especially their shooting was better (it was the view of FAF pilots in the Winter War that their Soviet counterparts couldn't hit the side of a barn even if being inside it). The Finnish tactics would also be more modern. I also suspect that maintenance would be better on the Finnish side, reducing various issues with plane reliability, etc.
Basically the main Soviet strength, as expected, would be to swamp the Finns with sheer numbers.
As the Soviets are getting just 200 F2A's does anyone think that they will request more on lend lease?
They'll request anything with wings and an engine but I suspect they'd prefer something other than the Buffalo. Those cannon armed Hurricanes for example...
The Russians might well fit the domestically produced ASh-62 engine for 1000hp or even the later ASh-63 giving 1100hp. Though that does not give them any more power it does mean they can keep the planes flying.
The Fins designed and built a wooden version of the Buffalo, perhaps ITTL the Russians do this for strategic material reasons.
The Fins designed and built a wooden version of the Buffalo, perhaps ITTL the Russians do this for strategic material reasons.
Driftless
Donor
I may have asked this question elsewhere, but was there any appreciable difference in starting and warm-up times between air-cooled radials and liquid-cooled inline engines in the cold conditions of the Arctic?
I'm sure external measures were taken where possible to provide some outside heat source to keep the lubricating oil from gelling too much in the cold
I'm sure external measures were taken where possible to provide some outside heat source to keep the lubricating oil from gelling too much in the cold
12. 42 Towards the capture of Tripoli, Algeria and Tunisia
12. 42 Towards the capture of Tripoli, Algeria and Tunisia.
With O’Connor’s troops fighting along the coast towards Tripoli there was a vast open flank on their left leading down into the Sarah Desert. Whilst forces were in place to guard this flank the LRDG with RAF support had been charged with a long sweep out to the south and west to where the borders of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria all met. Their task was threefold. Establish a route from the forward British bases to the Tunisian and Algerian borders. This would include mapping any wells and water supplies as well as the location of suitable landing areas for the establishment of forward airfields to defend and supply the route. The second task was to reconnoitre the Libyan town of Ghadamis to observe the Italian presence in the Old walled town and assess the Oasis as a potential supply base.
The third task was to facilitate the insertion of Free French personnel into the Algerian town of Bordi Messaoudia from where some of them would proceed to Tunisia to sound out the Vichy French attitudes there.
Though the town of Ghadames was almost five hundred kilometres from Tripoli the Army staff were considering instigating a very long left hook around the Axis forces now in Libya by sending a mobile force into Tunisia via the oasis at Ghadames. The capture of the oasis and the establishment of an airbase there could have a much wider strategic influence than would be assumed at first glance.
The close support being supplied by the RAF to the Army in this desert campaign as it transitioned into the hillier country of the far west of Libya was proving fundamental to the Armies success. Whatever the limitations of the rocket firing Hurricanes in terms of accuracy were, nobody could doubt their effectiveness in suppressing and pinning in place Axis units. Also their effect on the logistics and supply lines could not be over emphasised. The pilots had been made very aware that a supply convoy or even a single lorry was as significant target as any artillery piece, tank or infantry formation.
The RAF efforts from Malta as well as basis in Tripolitania to prevent supplies landing in the Libyan ports or being sent towards the front line in coastal shipping were also bearing fruit. Combined with the navy’s efforts the British intelligence services were calculating that between seventy five and ninety percent of supplies and personnel being sent to the Axis forces in Libya were being intercepted and destroyed.
With the Spitfires now effectively controlling the airspace over Malta the RAF there under directions from Sir Keith Park were using the Hurricane squadrons on the island aggressively in the daylight interdiction of any Axis air transport or shipping within range of Malta. At night the ASV equipped bombers, torpedo aircraft and the night fighters were continuing what was in effect a blockade of Tripoli and the Libyan coast
It soon became evident that supplies and personnel for the Axis in Libya were now being shipped to ports in both Tunisia and Algeria in what was supposedly neutral Vichy shipping. Mindful of the political implications if the RN and RAF summarily sunk Vichy shipping carrying civilians warnings by political channels had been issued and broadcast. Whilst the ports were not attacked directly by the RAF Any shipping that had been tracked from an Axis port was attacked. An extra burden now fell on the RAF Maritime Command in the Mediterranean in that they were given the task of trying to track every ship leaving a Vichy controlled port and sailing to North Africa.
Throughout June O’Connor’s force now being called the ‘Desert Army ‘ was pushing forward towards Tripoli, The earlier wild charges across the desert and huge territorial gains of the advance from Egypt had been replace by a slow and deliberate advance against an enemy who whilst fighting a defensive battle would counter attack and exploit any weakness to the full. Both sides were constrained by the frailty of their logistics and this campaign would be dictated by two factors. Firstly who could keep his forces supplied and able to manoeuvre and which air force had command of the skies over the battlefield and its hinterland.
Despite having by fare the longer logistic tail by the end of June it was becoming clear that the Allies were winning on both counts in the war in Tripolitania.
The big question now for the Allies was what would the Axis do in response. Would they chuck in their hand and abandon Tripolitania completely and evacuate their troops, or retreat into Tunisia where the Mareth line could well be held.
War is so often about the happenstance of timing, the German assault on Russia came at the perfect time for the allies to enable them to continue their advance towards Tripoli. If the Axis had been able to carry out their planned assault on Crete and had succeeded in capturing that island the whole viability of the logistical support of an allied army in the western desert could have become problematical. With the successful occupation of the Vichy controlled Lebanon and Syria in early July that axis of threat was removed.
With the Levenant, Arabia and east Africa all now secure Wavell and Tedder could in mid July carry out a major reallocation of forces.
With Agreement of the Greek Government those Greek units training in Egypt that were available were sent to continue training in the Levanent. This enable particularly British and Colonial forces to be withdrawn and give the semblance to the French colonial people that they were not an occupied country merely hosting the army of another occupied nation.
With the agreement of the South African Government as many of the SAAF squadrons in the Middle East as possible were being gathered together in North Africa to form a cohesive unit of South African composition much in the model of the Polish Air Contingent.
Another feature of the desert war had been the use of RAF ground units to provide security at air fields and the field squadrons including armoured cars for reconnaissance of forward landing fields, the seizing of enemy airfields and the defence thereof. This released Army units for the main forces and gave the Desert Air force a degree of independence and operational flexibility. By June 1940 under Tedder’s command there were three types of ground force squadrons in North Africa. These were airfield Defence (Guard Squadrons), Anti Aircraft Squadrons and Ground Reconnaissance Squadrons.
These were all distinct to the Forward Ground Controllers who were embedded with and part off the Army units that hosted them.
By the end of June Wavell had the following land forces available under his Command.
7th Armoured Division.
2nd Armoured Division. Currently minus one Brigade that was rebuilding after action in Syria.
6th British Division
9th British Division
22th British Division
4th Indian Division
7th Australian Division
9th Australian Division
6th Australian Division rebuilding
1st New Zealand Division rebuilding
1st South African Division
1st Light Free French Division forming in Syria
Polish Independent Carpathian Brigade currently on Crete with the PAC.
Two Greek Divisions reforming, one on Crete the other in Egypt.
As of July the Greek Division in Egypt relocated to Syria where it takes up security duties and continues to train.
The ANZAC divisions where possible are deployed in one or two Corps.
Where possible the RAF Command will keep RAAF squadrons with the ANZAC Divisions and the SAAF squadrons with the South African Divisions.
In July the ad hoc RAF airfield defence units have been formed into Squadrons with Squadrons numbers in the Seven hundred range, this has taken place in the UK and the Mediterranean theatre.
With these forces available Wavell could keep two full two Corps engage in Tripolitania and either rotate out individual Divisions or the entire Corps as they became battle worn and tired. The limiting factor on keeping a greater force engage in the offensive was a combination of the logistics of supplies inro Egypt and then from Egypt to the front. Currently supplies were arriving in Egypt and a rate greater than they could be moved forward into Tripolitania to support more than two Corps.
Action was being taken to improve this flow forward which included the extension of the railway west through to Benghazi, which was a long term project working both from Benghazi east wards and from Mersa Metruth westwards. The improvement of port facilities all along the coast was also in hand as was the finding and allocation of suitable shipping. However the situation would not be greatly improved until Tripoli and its port could be captured.
It was a given that the Germans and the Italians would do everything in their power not only to hold Tripoli as long as possible but to ensure that if and when it was lost it was as a port completely and utterly destroyed.
How to capture Tripoli and its port in as intact condition as possible was vexing the minds of all commands in the middle east.
With O’Connor’s troops fighting along the coast towards Tripoli there was a vast open flank on their left leading down into the Sarah Desert. Whilst forces were in place to guard this flank the LRDG with RAF support had been charged with a long sweep out to the south and west to where the borders of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria all met. Their task was threefold. Establish a route from the forward British bases to the Tunisian and Algerian borders. This would include mapping any wells and water supplies as well as the location of suitable landing areas for the establishment of forward airfields to defend and supply the route. The second task was to reconnoitre the Libyan town of Ghadamis to observe the Italian presence in the Old walled town and assess the Oasis as a potential supply base.
The third task was to facilitate the insertion of Free French personnel into the Algerian town of Bordi Messaoudia from where some of them would proceed to Tunisia to sound out the Vichy French attitudes there.
Though the town of Ghadames was almost five hundred kilometres from Tripoli the Army staff were considering instigating a very long left hook around the Axis forces now in Libya by sending a mobile force into Tunisia via the oasis at Ghadames. The capture of the oasis and the establishment of an airbase there could have a much wider strategic influence than would be assumed at first glance.
The close support being supplied by the RAF to the Army in this desert campaign as it transitioned into the hillier country of the far west of Libya was proving fundamental to the Armies success. Whatever the limitations of the rocket firing Hurricanes in terms of accuracy were, nobody could doubt their effectiveness in suppressing and pinning in place Axis units. Also their effect on the logistics and supply lines could not be over emphasised. The pilots had been made very aware that a supply convoy or even a single lorry was as significant target as any artillery piece, tank or infantry formation.
The RAF efforts from Malta as well as basis in Tripolitania to prevent supplies landing in the Libyan ports or being sent towards the front line in coastal shipping were also bearing fruit. Combined with the navy’s efforts the British intelligence services were calculating that between seventy five and ninety percent of supplies and personnel being sent to the Axis forces in Libya were being intercepted and destroyed.
With the Spitfires now effectively controlling the airspace over Malta the RAF there under directions from Sir Keith Park were using the Hurricane squadrons on the island aggressively in the daylight interdiction of any Axis air transport or shipping within range of Malta. At night the ASV equipped bombers, torpedo aircraft and the night fighters were continuing what was in effect a blockade of Tripoli and the Libyan coast
It soon became evident that supplies and personnel for the Axis in Libya were now being shipped to ports in both Tunisia and Algeria in what was supposedly neutral Vichy shipping. Mindful of the political implications if the RN and RAF summarily sunk Vichy shipping carrying civilians warnings by political channels had been issued and broadcast. Whilst the ports were not attacked directly by the RAF Any shipping that had been tracked from an Axis port was attacked. An extra burden now fell on the RAF Maritime Command in the Mediterranean in that they were given the task of trying to track every ship leaving a Vichy controlled port and sailing to North Africa.
Throughout June O’Connor’s force now being called the ‘Desert Army ‘ was pushing forward towards Tripoli, The earlier wild charges across the desert and huge territorial gains of the advance from Egypt had been replace by a slow and deliberate advance against an enemy who whilst fighting a defensive battle would counter attack and exploit any weakness to the full. Both sides were constrained by the frailty of their logistics and this campaign would be dictated by two factors. Firstly who could keep his forces supplied and able to manoeuvre and which air force had command of the skies over the battlefield and its hinterland.
Despite having by fare the longer logistic tail by the end of June it was becoming clear that the Allies were winning on both counts in the war in Tripolitania.
The big question now for the Allies was what would the Axis do in response. Would they chuck in their hand and abandon Tripolitania completely and evacuate their troops, or retreat into Tunisia where the Mareth line could well be held.
War is so often about the happenstance of timing, the German assault on Russia came at the perfect time for the allies to enable them to continue their advance towards Tripoli. If the Axis had been able to carry out their planned assault on Crete and had succeeded in capturing that island the whole viability of the logistical support of an allied army in the western desert could have become problematical. With the successful occupation of the Vichy controlled Lebanon and Syria in early July that axis of threat was removed.
With the Levenant, Arabia and east Africa all now secure Wavell and Tedder could in mid July carry out a major reallocation of forces.
With Agreement of the Greek Government those Greek units training in Egypt that were available were sent to continue training in the Levanent. This enable particularly British and Colonial forces to be withdrawn and give the semblance to the French colonial people that they were not an occupied country merely hosting the army of another occupied nation.
With the agreement of the South African Government as many of the SAAF squadrons in the Middle East as possible were being gathered together in North Africa to form a cohesive unit of South African composition much in the model of the Polish Air Contingent.
Another feature of the desert war had been the use of RAF ground units to provide security at air fields and the field squadrons including armoured cars for reconnaissance of forward landing fields, the seizing of enemy airfields and the defence thereof. This released Army units for the main forces and gave the Desert Air force a degree of independence and operational flexibility. By June 1940 under Tedder’s command there were three types of ground force squadrons in North Africa. These were airfield Defence (Guard Squadrons), Anti Aircraft Squadrons and Ground Reconnaissance Squadrons.
These were all distinct to the Forward Ground Controllers who were embedded with and part off the Army units that hosted them.
By the end of June Wavell had the following land forces available under his Command.
7th Armoured Division.
2nd Armoured Division. Currently minus one Brigade that was rebuilding after action in Syria.
6th British Division
9th British Division
22th British Division
4th Indian Division
7th Australian Division
9th Australian Division
6th Australian Division rebuilding
1st New Zealand Division rebuilding
1st South African Division
1st Light Free French Division forming in Syria
Polish Independent Carpathian Brigade currently on Crete with the PAC.
Two Greek Divisions reforming, one on Crete the other in Egypt.
As of July the Greek Division in Egypt relocated to Syria where it takes up security duties and continues to train.
The ANZAC divisions where possible are deployed in one or two Corps.
Where possible the RAF Command will keep RAAF squadrons with the ANZAC Divisions and the SAAF squadrons with the South African Divisions.
In July the ad hoc RAF airfield defence units have been formed into Squadrons with Squadrons numbers in the Seven hundred range, this has taken place in the UK and the Mediterranean theatre.
With these forces available Wavell could keep two full two Corps engage in Tripolitania and either rotate out individual Divisions or the entire Corps as they became battle worn and tired. The limiting factor on keeping a greater force engage in the offensive was a combination of the logistics of supplies inro Egypt and then from Egypt to the front. Currently supplies were arriving in Egypt and a rate greater than they could be moved forward into Tripolitania to support more than two Corps.
Action was being taken to improve this flow forward which included the extension of the railway west through to Benghazi, which was a long term project working both from Benghazi east wards and from Mersa Metruth westwards. The improvement of port facilities all along the coast was also in hand as was the finding and allocation of suitable shipping. However the situation would not be greatly improved until Tripoli and its port could be captured.
It was a given that the Germans and the Italians would do everything in their power not only to hold Tripoli as long as possible but to ensure that if and when it was lost it was as a port completely and utterly destroyed.
How to capture Tripoli and its port in as intact condition as possible was vexing the minds of all commands in the middle east.
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
The NZ part of that is somewhat political. This was discussed between the three Governments and their Theatre representatives OTL 1940-41. Administration (including Freyberg's right to communicate directly with the NZ Government) and training of NZ troops would remain the responsibility of 2nd NZEF, everyone was ok with that. Operational control (subject to NZ Government veto of theatre of operations) was with the British in any case, and nearly anything would be agreed to in emergency situations e.g. OTL's ANZAC Corps in Greece. When an ANZAC Corps of 2 divisions was being discussed mid-1941 the British 'offer' was that Freyberg (British Army, seconded to NZ) would command (while also retaining command of 2NZEF, but not 2nd NZ Division (note not 1st NZ Division, that was the command for defence forces in NZ itself)). There doesn't seem to be any record of a formal reply from the Australian Government...
Overall, Freyberg was quite willing to challenge a Brit superior (as were the commanders of the Australians and South Africans) on behalf of the NZ Government (especially after Greece), and was concerned that getting an order from an Australian that he felt was counter to NZ's interests would add a third unnecessary party to an already difficult situation. The Dominion commanders each had varying amounts of political capital to spend with the British, and were careful about spending it.
Notes on today’s post.
As can be seen from today’s post the effects of the Butterflies are now being seen.
The allies have avoided the losses of the Greek Campaign and of the fall of Crete. There is also more Greek shipping available and Greek troops to do garrison work whilst they train in backwater areas.
All in all this give Middle East command the wherewithal not only to form a proper multi Corps Desert Army but also allows it to be concentrated where it is needed. With Spitfires of Malta the ability to interdict shipping from Italy to Libya is also far more effective, basically choking off any expansion of the Africa Corps.
As to the Political situation with the ANZAC’s ITTL they are of course much better as the losses of OTL in dead headed interventions have not occurred.
Now how radically this will effect any attempt at capturing Tripoli and securing North Africa is something I am still working on. TTL is about the RAF and AM bur by necessity I am having to research and write just as much about the Army, Navy and Politics.
Comments suggestions and critique is always welcomed.
As can be seen from today’s post the effects of the Butterflies are now being seen.
The allies have avoided the losses of the Greek Campaign and of the fall of Crete. There is also more Greek shipping available and Greek troops to do garrison work whilst they train in backwater areas.
All in all this give Middle East command the wherewithal not only to form a proper multi Corps Desert Army but also allows it to be concentrated where it is needed. With Spitfires of Malta the ability to interdict shipping from Italy to Libya is also far more effective, basically choking off any expansion of the Africa Corps.
As to the Political situation with the ANZAC’s ITTL they are of course much better as the losses of OTL in dead headed interventions have not occurred.
Now how radically this will effect any attempt at capturing Tripoli and securing North Africa is something I am still working on. TTL is about the RAF and AM bur by necessity I am having to research and write just as much about the Army, Navy and Politics.
Comments suggestions and critique is always welcomed.
@sonofpegasus on a different note, with the improvements to Maritime Command and cooperation with the RN, what percentage reduction in Atlantic shipping losses are we looking at compared to OTL?
At this juncture, with better ASV radar (no centimetric radar yet) and the availability of VLRMPA I have been working on 25% less losses on all convoys. Butterflies taking off in Mid 1941 will make that a solid 50% less.
Sounds about right in aggregate, though some convoys will suffer more and others less. Balances out in the end.
What response do you think the Germans can make to this discouraging trend? More VLR aircraft to find convoys for the wolf packs, faster development of better U-boats, suspect Enigma is broken or ??
During WWII, the Finnish Air Force used heated "huts" to warm up plane engines. Oil would also be preheated. In the Continuation War, some air heaters were acquired from the Germans. Engine maintenance was brutal on the mechanics as they often could not wear gloves while working, needing to feel what they were doing, but then the tools were frozen enough to strip their flesh off. Blowtorches were used to warm up tools so that they could be used.
I have unfortunately not seen comments on what differences there were in warming up engines of different types. As for particular planes, it is said that the Fiat G.50 was problematic during the winter as its pneumatic system was prone to freezing, and the ricin oil used as a lubricant would gel up. I can't remember off-hand comments about similar issues with other planes, the Fiat is the one example where issues with the cold tend to come up repeatedly.
An engine warming hut used in April 1942:
Oil being preheated in March 1942:
A German air heater used in January 1942:
All three photos are from the Tiiksjärvi airfield in occupied Soviet East Karelia.
In the first picture above you can see on the left hand side an oil heater stove and if you look to the left hand side of the protective tent in front of the aircraft you can just discern the outline of what could well (it might also be a small tractor for moving aircraft) be a German supplied air heater.
So this gives a good idea of how all three element were used together when required.
So this gives a good idea of how all three element were used together when required.
It's a tractor, it can be seen in another photo in the same series, pulling the Morane-Saulnier M.S.406.