AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
Yes, HMS Ulysses. Massacres a surfaced U-boat crew trying to man the deck gun. Was it the cruiser Stirling?
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
Don't think they were - 20mm Oerlikons & 40mm Bofors IIRC was the Ulysses AA protection. I'll have to find one out of the hardback / paperback / Kindle versions I have!
I did have a quick look on an on line version but had to dash to the pub before i could find it
Someone who was also very wrong....from the kindle version.
It was a massacre. The Vectra had two Bolton-Paul Defiant night-fighter turrets, quadruple hydraulic turrets complete with astrodome, bolted to her fo’c’sle, and these had opened up simultaneously, firing, between them, something like a fantastic total of 300 shells every ten seconds. That often misused cliché ‘hail of lead’ was completely accurate here. It was impossible for a man to live two seconds on the exposed deck of that U-boat, to hope to escape that lethal storm.
MacLean, Alistair. HMS Ulysses (p. 314). HarperCollins Publishers. Kindle Edition.
I wuld have put good money on it being the Ulysses that had those turrets.
Meh. Alistair referred to a 15" KGV in the book. Perhaps he served in a better timeline.
12.40 Getting Serious about Syria
12.40 Getting Serious about Syria.
With the closing of the campaigns against the Italians in East Africa and the putting down of the revolt in Iraq there still remained the problem of Vichy Syria, which stood poised to stab the allies in the back by enabling the Luftwaffe to attack the Oil fields so vital to the allies. The British Government had been aware of this threat since the fall of France in the summer of 1940 but until now could do nothing about the Neutral Vichy Syria. However with the mounting evidence of the German breaches of Vichy neutrality in Syria, Wavell and Tedder were gathering what forces could be spared from other fronts to provide a force capable of invading, subduing and ultimately occupying the country. The make-up of this force was of great political concern, whilst there were now six Free French Battalions available it was not considered advisable vis a vis the Arab response that any intervention in Syria should be a solely a French affair. By late May a force consisting of the Free French , an Indian infantry Brigade, an Australian Division and Parts of the first Cavalry division had been assembled. In addition the Greek Government in exile had agreed to make available for garrison duties in Syria as many troops as possible, though their availability would of course greatly depend on whether there was an assault on Crete by the Axis.
Though not a huge air components Tedder had managed despite all the demands elsewhere to assemble two squadrons of cannon armed Hurricane’s being Number 208 and 80 squadrons with X flight being attached also flying Hurricanes. The Royal Australian Air Force were supplying a squadron of Tomahawks. Eighty Four squadron which had recently converted to Wellingtons would be the principle Bomber force. No. Eleven squadron though due to also convert to Wellingtons at the moment still retained its Blenheim Mark V’s. A flight’s worth of Bisley’s had been rounded up to provide a long range fighter component and these were attached to Eleven squadron for logistics purposes. There were also some Bisleys attached to 203 Squadron who were still based on the oil pipeline at pump station H4 from which they carried out reconnaissance over Syria.
Sometimes reality can read like fiction and no assault on either Lebanon of Syria could commence until the Diplomatic niceties had been completed. Prior to the fourteenth of May there had been no irrefutable proof of axis aircraft using Vichy airfields in either country and a formal complaint to General Dentz the Vichy High Commissioner for Syria had been ignored. Finally on the Fourteenth of May Flying Officer A. Watson flying a Blenheim from 203 squadron based at H4 managed to get clear photographs of a Ju.90 being refuelled at Palmyra. Upon return to base with this evidence of a clear breach of their neutrality Flying Officer Watson requested permission to take a Bisley and strafe the airfield. This request had been duly passed up the chain of command. When confronted by Major-General Clarke the Commander of ‘Habforce’ at his nearby Headquarters as to whether as a lowly Flying Officer, Watson thought that war should be declared on Syria, Flying Officer Watson simply replied that ‘it would be a bloody good idea’ which delighted the assembled staff. Having received clearance from Cairo in mid afternoon Flying Officer A. Watson duly led a quartet of Bisleys to strafe and bomb the airfield at Palmyra, In the following days airfields at Damascus and Rayak had also been attacked.
In the Lebanon a major petrol dump containing aviation fuel in Beirut had also been bombed. It was not until the twenty eighth of May that the military forces were gathered and the invasion of Lebanon and Syria commenced on the eighth of June. Four thrust were aimed at the Vichy colonies, the two principle ones were from Haifa in Palestine towards Beirut and from Amman in Trans Jordon towards Damascus. The other assaults were from Habbaniya towards Aleppo which for the three hundred and fifty odd of the four hundred mile advance would follow the Euphrates River. Whilst ‘Habforce’ would advance from its base at the H4 pumping station on the oil pipeline in Trans Jordon towards Palmyra and Homs.
The opposition to the thrust towards Damascus and Beirut was stubborn and tenacious as the cities were approached by the Allied troops with the Vichy forces determined to uphold the honour of ‘la Belle France’. To support the Ground Forces the RAF contingent had been vigorously suppressing the Vichy air force and attacking their airfields as often as possible. Here the comparatively long range of the Kittyhawks and that of the Bisleys was exploited to the full. On the twenty first of June Damascus fell to the Free French and accompanying Indian troops. Due to events elsewhere making the capture of Syria very much a side show progress was slow but the eventual release of further forces enable progress to be sustained, Tedder was able to reinforce Browns air component with two additional squadrons , Numbers forty five and two sixty squadrons, the pressure on the Vichy airfield and Air force was maintained. Beirut Harbour was bombed and air attacks on supply shipping used to enforce a virtual blockade on the Lebanon.
By the third of July Palmyra had fallen and ‘Habforce’ were rapidly advancing on Homs and the coast. The fall of Beirut on the ninth of July after a combined sea and air bombardment had shattered the last Vichy line of resistance, combined with the force approaching Aleppo coming up the Euphrates river meant that the Vichy positions was becoming untenable. Adding to this the total domination of the airspace by the allied air forces and the systematic destruction of any reinforcements coming by sea resulted in General Dentz seeking terms on July twelve with an armistice being signed significantly on Bastille day July fourteenth.
The Commanding officer of the force approaching Aleppo was some what surprised to be greeted at the gates to the Citadel by a fellow old Etonian, one, Wilfred Patrick Thesiger, who apparently had been in the city for some time for an organisation known as SOE. The intelligence and local knowledge supplied by Thesiger, especially his contacts with those in the city well disposed to the free French Cause much eased the occupation and change of governance of the city and the province as a whole.
Whilst the occupation forces took control and both Wavell and Tedder made plans as to where the forces no longer required there could b redeployed in light of the unfolding and rapidly developing events elsewhere. The two air commanders in this campaign met to discuss the recent conflict. General Jeannequin confirmed that Brown’s concentration on suppressing the Vichy airfields was a major factor in the success of the Allies campaign. It was also in the French Generals estimation one of the primary reasons why the air battle had been so one sided. In ground strafing the loss ratio had been around twenty to one, with three allied fighters lost for the confirmed destruction of sixty Vichy and German aircraft with many more damaged. The Vichy French also noted how much more damage was caused by the Hurricanes with their twenty millimetre cannons than the Kityhawks armed with machineguns. The incessant attacks on the Vichy air bases had forced General Jeannequin to move his fighters further and further from the front line till only airfields in the north of the country were being used. In the French General’s opinion the appearance of long range fighters over Aleppo was the final straw and did much to persuade General Dentz to seek a cease fire.
One other interesting piece of intelligence to come out after the cease fire was that when the dates recorded by the Vichy Government of bombing attacks on the city and docks of Beirut were compared with the dates of attacks made by the RAF and RN several anomalies came to light. Bombs had been dropped onto the city of Beirut on several nights when there had been no allied air activity at all. The only conclusion the RAF intelligence officers could reach was that these bombs had been dropped by Luftwaffe bombers based out of the Dodecanese Islands. Whether these bombs had been dropped in error, perhaps by aircraft mistaking Beirut for Haifa, or had been dropped deliberately on the city by the Luftwaffe in an attempt to generate propaganda against the allies for their merciless bombing of innocent Lebanese civilians could not at this stage of the war be determined. Whatever the case the campaign had been successfully completed and the Allies oil supply was now secure and in light of recent events and the change in the strategic situation the safe guarding of the trans Persian route to Russia had taken on a whole new significance.
With the closing of the campaigns against the Italians in East Africa and the putting down of the revolt in Iraq there still remained the problem of Vichy Syria, which stood poised to stab the allies in the back by enabling the Luftwaffe to attack the Oil fields so vital to the allies. The British Government had been aware of this threat since the fall of France in the summer of 1940 but until now could do nothing about the Neutral Vichy Syria. However with the mounting evidence of the German breaches of Vichy neutrality in Syria, Wavell and Tedder were gathering what forces could be spared from other fronts to provide a force capable of invading, subduing and ultimately occupying the country. The make-up of this force was of great political concern, whilst there were now six Free French Battalions available it was not considered advisable vis a vis the Arab response that any intervention in Syria should be a solely a French affair. By late May a force consisting of the Free French , an Indian infantry Brigade, an Australian Division and Parts of the first Cavalry division had been assembled. In addition the Greek Government in exile had agreed to make available for garrison duties in Syria as many troops as possible, though their availability would of course greatly depend on whether there was an assault on Crete by the Axis.
Though not a huge air components Tedder had managed despite all the demands elsewhere to assemble two squadrons of cannon armed Hurricane’s being Number 208 and 80 squadrons with X flight being attached also flying Hurricanes. The Royal Australian Air Force were supplying a squadron of Tomahawks. Eighty Four squadron which had recently converted to Wellingtons would be the principle Bomber force. No. Eleven squadron though due to also convert to Wellingtons at the moment still retained its Blenheim Mark V’s. A flight’s worth of Bisley’s had been rounded up to provide a long range fighter component and these were attached to Eleven squadron for logistics purposes. There were also some Bisleys attached to 203 Squadron who were still based on the oil pipeline at pump station H4 from which they carried out reconnaissance over Syria.
Sometimes reality can read like fiction and no assault on either Lebanon of Syria could commence until the Diplomatic niceties had been completed. Prior to the fourteenth of May there had been no irrefutable proof of axis aircraft using Vichy airfields in either country and a formal complaint to General Dentz the Vichy High Commissioner for Syria had been ignored. Finally on the Fourteenth of May Flying Officer A. Watson flying a Blenheim from 203 squadron based at H4 managed to get clear photographs of a Ju.90 being refuelled at Palmyra. Upon return to base with this evidence of a clear breach of their neutrality Flying Officer Watson requested permission to take a Bisley and strafe the airfield. This request had been duly passed up the chain of command. When confronted by Major-General Clarke the Commander of ‘Habforce’ at his nearby Headquarters as to whether as a lowly Flying Officer, Watson thought that war should be declared on Syria, Flying Officer Watson simply replied that ‘it would be a bloody good idea’ which delighted the assembled staff. Having received clearance from Cairo in mid afternoon Flying Officer A. Watson duly led a quartet of Bisleys to strafe and bomb the airfield at Palmyra, In the following days airfields at Damascus and Rayak had also been attacked.
In the Lebanon a major petrol dump containing aviation fuel in Beirut had also been bombed. It was not until the twenty eighth of May that the military forces were gathered and the invasion of Lebanon and Syria commenced on the eighth of June. Four thrust were aimed at the Vichy colonies, the two principle ones were from Haifa in Palestine towards Beirut and from Amman in Trans Jordon towards Damascus. The other assaults were from Habbaniya towards Aleppo which for the three hundred and fifty odd of the four hundred mile advance would follow the Euphrates River. Whilst ‘Habforce’ would advance from its base at the H4 pumping station on the oil pipeline in Trans Jordon towards Palmyra and Homs.
The opposition to the thrust towards Damascus and Beirut was stubborn and tenacious as the cities were approached by the Allied troops with the Vichy forces determined to uphold the honour of ‘la Belle France’. To support the Ground Forces the RAF contingent had been vigorously suppressing the Vichy air force and attacking their airfields as often as possible. Here the comparatively long range of the Kittyhawks and that of the Bisleys was exploited to the full. On the twenty first of June Damascus fell to the Free French and accompanying Indian troops. Due to events elsewhere making the capture of Syria very much a side show progress was slow but the eventual release of further forces enable progress to be sustained, Tedder was able to reinforce Browns air component with two additional squadrons , Numbers forty five and two sixty squadrons, the pressure on the Vichy airfield and Air force was maintained. Beirut Harbour was bombed and air attacks on supply shipping used to enforce a virtual blockade on the Lebanon.
By the third of July Palmyra had fallen and ‘Habforce’ were rapidly advancing on Homs and the coast. The fall of Beirut on the ninth of July after a combined sea and air bombardment had shattered the last Vichy line of resistance, combined with the force approaching Aleppo coming up the Euphrates river meant that the Vichy positions was becoming untenable. Adding to this the total domination of the airspace by the allied air forces and the systematic destruction of any reinforcements coming by sea resulted in General Dentz seeking terms on July twelve with an armistice being signed significantly on Bastille day July fourteenth.
The Commanding officer of the force approaching Aleppo was some what surprised to be greeted at the gates to the Citadel by a fellow old Etonian, one, Wilfred Patrick Thesiger, who apparently had been in the city for some time for an organisation known as SOE. The intelligence and local knowledge supplied by Thesiger, especially his contacts with those in the city well disposed to the free French Cause much eased the occupation and change of governance of the city and the province as a whole.
Whilst the occupation forces took control and both Wavell and Tedder made plans as to where the forces no longer required there could b redeployed in light of the unfolding and rapidly developing events elsewhere. The two air commanders in this campaign met to discuss the recent conflict. General Jeannequin confirmed that Brown’s concentration on suppressing the Vichy airfields was a major factor in the success of the Allies campaign. It was also in the French Generals estimation one of the primary reasons why the air battle had been so one sided. In ground strafing the loss ratio had been around twenty to one, with three allied fighters lost for the confirmed destruction of sixty Vichy and German aircraft with many more damaged. The Vichy French also noted how much more damage was caused by the Hurricanes with their twenty millimetre cannons than the Kityhawks armed with machineguns. The incessant attacks on the Vichy air bases had forced General Jeannequin to move his fighters further and further from the front line till only airfields in the north of the country were being used. In the French General’s opinion the appearance of long range fighters over Aleppo was the final straw and did much to persuade General Dentz to seek a cease fire.
One other interesting piece of intelligence to come out after the cease fire was that when the dates recorded by the Vichy Government of bombing attacks on the city and docks of Beirut were compared with the dates of attacks made by the RAF and RN several anomalies came to light. Bombs had been dropped onto the city of Beirut on several nights when there had been no allied air activity at all. The only conclusion the RAF intelligence officers could reach was that these bombs had been dropped by Luftwaffe bombers based out of the Dodecanese Islands. Whether these bombs had been dropped in error, perhaps by aircraft mistaking Beirut for Haifa, or had been dropped deliberately on the city by the Luftwaffe in an attempt to generate propaganda against the allies for their merciless bombing of innocent Lebanese civilians could not at this stage of the war be determined. Whatever the case the campaign had been successfully completed and the Allies oil supply was now secure and in light of recent events and the change in the strategic situation the safe guarding of the trans Persian route to Russia had taken on a whole new significance.
Members of the Palmach, including Moshe Dayan, were attached to the Australian division
en.wikipedia.org
Moshe Dayan - Wikipedia
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
Bonza mate!
A recent podcast with the author of a book about the Aussies in OTL's campaign. Apparently the Foreign Legion objected to fighting itself! Also the Brits setting things up so they could take the credit or avoid the blame as the situation required. Coalition warfare, isn't it great!
ww2podcast.com
A recent podcast with the author of a book about the Aussies in OTL's campaign. Apparently the Foreign Legion objected to fighting itself! Also the Brits setting things up so they could take the credit or avoid the blame as the situation required. Coalition warfare, isn't it great!
149 - Australia's war with France
With the fall of France, Syria and Lebanon remained loyal to the Vichy regime, potentially threatening the British in Egypt.
ww2podcast.com
French National Pride is like nitro-glycerine highly unstable and likely to blow up at the slightest disturbance, so ITTL as in OTL the British and their allies have tried to balance the forces going into Syria to pander to the sensibilities of the Vichy officials running the country. Not having the Free French run amok and hang any Vichy B@st~rd they can is important if you want to talk other Colonies into turning their coats.
12.41 Barborossa
12.41 Barborossa
To say that the invasion of Russia by the Germans had put the ‘cat amongst the pigeons’ would be an understatement in the best English tradition. The political furore it caused in the UK had ramifications that would reverberate for decades. To that select group of high officials and military officers who were party to the appropriate intelligence from ‘Ultra’ at Bletchley Park of course the reaction was tempered by prior knowledge. For those around Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister and Sir Hugh Dowding some of their recent decisions and instructions suddenly became very apposite. The reaction within Churchill’s government was swift and certain in reaching out to support Russia in its conflict with its erstwhile ally.
Churchill’s statement that “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favourable reference of the Devil in the house of Commons” was perfectly in line with his previous anti-communist stance and would go down in History as one of the great quotes pertraining to pragmatic real politics.
The immediate reaching out by the British Government to the Soviet Government to offer material support was to some surprising but was to most people logical on the premise that ‘My enemies enemy is my friend’. However there were many who could not forget the Molotov –Ribbentrop pact of 1939 which could be deemed to have facilitated the attack by German on France and the Low countries. Certainly for the two years since the signing of that pact the communists in the UK had of necessity kept a very low profile. Also Britain and France had gone to War to preserve the independent nation of Poland, half of which had been occupied by Russia, was there not a case here ‘That my friends enemy is also always my enemy’ and that Russia should be held to account for its occupation not just of Polish territory but that of the Baltic states as well.
There were some within the Government who would continue to see Russia as a threat whilst others would regain their faith in the communist cause. Whatever ever side you took there were real political decisions to be made. The advent of lend lease from the USA had made some things easier for the AM but had also raised some dilemmas. Now the request by the Government that the AM come up with a scheme to supply aircraft to the USSR as soon as possible raised an awkward point, would the US baulk at supplying aircraft to Britain if Britain was supplying aircraft to other nations. Now in the case of the Empire and the occupied nations of Europe agreement had been reached that the UK could pass lend lease aircraft onto co-belligerents.
With the signing of the Anglo- Soviet Pact on the twelve of July the supply of aid to the Soviets was formalized, with the political niceties put aside until a formal treaty could be drawn up. One concession wrung out of the Soviets at this stage which was the release of all Polish Military personnel being held in Russia and the transporting of all of them who wanted to leave Russia to Tehran in Persia for onward transit to the West.
The Air Ministries quickest response to the need to supply aid to Russia was to divert the ships carrying the Brewster Buffaloes up to the Persian Gulf so that the aircraft could be assembled and flown from there to Russia.
When queried in the Cabinet as to why Britain was going to send aircraft marked for the Far East Command to Russia, Sir Phillip had responded that the Buffalos were inferior to our own Hurricanes and had the advantage that the Wright Cyclone engine installed in the Buffalo was basically the same as the license built Shvetsov M-25 engine already being built in Russia and used by the Soviet air force. This meant that they had ground staff familiar with the mechanics and maintenance of the engine and should be able to manufacture and supply their own spare parts. This in itself was a major advantage and would help the Soviets absorb and use the Buffalos more quickly than most other types available.
Quietly in the AM there was a rubbing of hands at the disposal of the Buffalos to Russia as there would now be a better case for getting Hurricanes and possibly even Spitfires out to the Far East Commands.
As it stood the first shipment of Hurricanes for Singapore was already being planned and lend lease was being looked at to supply some aircraft as well. The Kittyhawk was now proving itself flying from rough desert airstrips and was being considered as a possible aircraft for the Far East. RAAF squadrons currently flying the Kittyhawk in North Africa were bound to be transferred to the east if Australia should come under threat and having the same aircraft type out in the region would be a sensible logistical move.
One thing had been absolutely made clear to the Prime Minister by the AM and the CAS was that none of the AM’s ‘crown jewels’ should be made available to the Russians, No RDF, No Jet Engines, none of the latest marks of aero engines (the Merlin XX in the Hurricane was already being eclipsed by follow on Marks), no advance earthquake bombs and no course setting bombsite either. The AM issued security notices making it clear that divulging of any restricted material to any other nation or their agents was an act of treason whether that nation was an ally or a co-belligerent.
Discussions were held with the MAP and the ministry of supply as to the routes that could be used for the supply of war material to Russia. Flying aircraft from Iran and Iraq was already being planned and a survey of infrastructure that require improving to make this a viable and realistic proposal made for sobering reading. As for an overland route by road and rail that would require almost a complete new set of roads and railways but probably more importantly a vast expansion of the docking facilities in both Iraq and Iran.
The Arctic route via the North Cape to Murmansk would require escorted convoys and Home Fleet ships in support as well as air support from Maritime Command. Twenty four hour daylight in the summer and the ferocious winter gales would only serve to complicate matters for those responsible for ensuring the safe arrival of the convoys to their Russian destination.
A third possible supply route was from the pacific ports of Canada across the high latitudes of the Pacific Ocean to the Russian port of Vladivostok. This could be a useful route especially for the delivery of Canadian built Hurricanes and Tanks. But all of this was in the future, the stunning victories and huge advances made by the Germans only added to the urgency with which plans were made and implemented.
Even by the end of July there were worries within the Air Ministry that Russia would collapse into complete defeat before any aid from the west could be delivered let alone put to use. This fear certainly galvanized some of the more reticent participants in these projects to redouble their efforts.
Whatever the setbacks being suffered by the Soviets, in North Africa and the Mediterranean the transfer of major components of the Luftwaffe to the east had continued much to the relief of those besieged on both Crete and Malta. With the North African coast almost as far as Tripoli now firmly under allied control convoys to Malta from Alexandria could be given air cover along the entire route. This facilitated the running of several tankers full of fuel from the gulf refineries through to the island to ensure that there were sufficient reserves available on the island to support constant operations by both the RAF and the RN.
Though air raids continued they were no longer on the scale or frequency experienced earlier and were once again being made principally by the Regia Aeronautica.
Through June and July a constant supply of replacement Hurricanes had been flying in via the Benghazi airfields and Club runs from Gibraltar.
With both Syria and Lebanon captured and with the Islands of Malta and Crete securely held more resources were now available to finish of the remaining Axis forces in North Africa.
Overtures were being made to Vichy Regimes in both Algeria and Tunisia to persuade them to ‘turn their coats’ to the allied cause.
What was obvious to the AM was that if Russia did not fold then the aircraft ferry route via Persia would only become more important. Not only that but this would focus both Soviet and American political interest in the area. With that in mind the AM were in early discussions with the Foreign Office as to what action and plans could be made to ensure that British interests in the region remained paramount.
To say that the invasion of Russia by the Germans had put the ‘cat amongst the pigeons’ would be an understatement in the best English tradition. The political furore it caused in the UK had ramifications that would reverberate for decades. To that select group of high officials and military officers who were party to the appropriate intelligence from ‘Ultra’ at Bletchley Park of course the reaction was tempered by prior knowledge. For those around Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister and Sir Hugh Dowding some of their recent decisions and instructions suddenly became very apposite. The reaction within Churchill’s government was swift and certain in reaching out to support Russia in its conflict with its erstwhile ally.
Churchill’s statement that “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favourable reference of the Devil in the house of Commons” was perfectly in line with his previous anti-communist stance and would go down in History as one of the great quotes pertraining to pragmatic real politics.
The immediate reaching out by the British Government to the Soviet Government to offer material support was to some surprising but was to most people logical on the premise that ‘My enemies enemy is my friend’. However there were many who could not forget the Molotov –Ribbentrop pact of 1939 which could be deemed to have facilitated the attack by German on France and the Low countries. Certainly for the two years since the signing of that pact the communists in the UK had of necessity kept a very low profile. Also Britain and France had gone to War to preserve the independent nation of Poland, half of which had been occupied by Russia, was there not a case here ‘That my friends enemy is also always my enemy’ and that Russia should be held to account for its occupation not just of Polish territory but that of the Baltic states as well.
There were some within the Government who would continue to see Russia as a threat whilst others would regain their faith in the communist cause. Whatever ever side you took there were real political decisions to be made. The advent of lend lease from the USA had made some things easier for the AM but had also raised some dilemmas. Now the request by the Government that the AM come up with a scheme to supply aircraft to the USSR as soon as possible raised an awkward point, would the US baulk at supplying aircraft to Britain if Britain was supplying aircraft to other nations. Now in the case of the Empire and the occupied nations of Europe agreement had been reached that the UK could pass lend lease aircraft onto co-belligerents.
With the signing of the Anglo- Soviet Pact on the twelve of July the supply of aid to the Soviets was formalized, with the political niceties put aside until a formal treaty could be drawn up. One concession wrung out of the Soviets at this stage which was the release of all Polish Military personnel being held in Russia and the transporting of all of them who wanted to leave Russia to Tehran in Persia for onward transit to the West.
The Air Ministries quickest response to the need to supply aid to Russia was to divert the ships carrying the Brewster Buffaloes up to the Persian Gulf so that the aircraft could be assembled and flown from there to Russia.
When queried in the Cabinet as to why Britain was going to send aircraft marked for the Far East Command to Russia, Sir Phillip had responded that the Buffalos were inferior to our own Hurricanes and had the advantage that the Wright Cyclone engine installed in the Buffalo was basically the same as the license built Shvetsov M-25 engine already being built in Russia and used by the Soviet air force. This meant that they had ground staff familiar with the mechanics and maintenance of the engine and should be able to manufacture and supply their own spare parts. This in itself was a major advantage and would help the Soviets absorb and use the Buffalos more quickly than most other types available.
Quietly in the AM there was a rubbing of hands at the disposal of the Buffalos to Russia as there would now be a better case for getting Hurricanes and possibly even Spitfires out to the Far East Commands.
As it stood the first shipment of Hurricanes for Singapore was already being planned and lend lease was being looked at to supply some aircraft as well. The Kittyhawk was now proving itself flying from rough desert airstrips and was being considered as a possible aircraft for the Far East. RAAF squadrons currently flying the Kittyhawk in North Africa were bound to be transferred to the east if Australia should come under threat and having the same aircraft type out in the region would be a sensible logistical move.
One thing had been absolutely made clear to the Prime Minister by the AM and the CAS was that none of the AM’s ‘crown jewels’ should be made available to the Russians, No RDF, No Jet Engines, none of the latest marks of aero engines (the Merlin XX in the Hurricane was already being eclipsed by follow on Marks), no advance earthquake bombs and no course setting bombsite either. The AM issued security notices making it clear that divulging of any restricted material to any other nation or their agents was an act of treason whether that nation was an ally or a co-belligerent.
Discussions were held with the MAP and the ministry of supply as to the routes that could be used for the supply of war material to Russia. Flying aircraft from Iran and Iraq was already being planned and a survey of infrastructure that require improving to make this a viable and realistic proposal made for sobering reading. As for an overland route by road and rail that would require almost a complete new set of roads and railways but probably more importantly a vast expansion of the docking facilities in both Iraq and Iran.
The Arctic route via the North Cape to Murmansk would require escorted convoys and Home Fleet ships in support as well as air support from Maritime Command. Twenty four hour daylight in the summer and the ferocious winter gales would only serve to complicate matters for those responsible for ensuring the safe arrival of the convoys to their Russian destination.
A third possible supply route was from the pacific ports of Canada across the high latitudes of the Pacific Ocean to the Russian port of Vladivostok. This could be a useful route especially for the delivery of Canadian built Hurricanes and Tanks. But all of this was in the future, the stunning victories and huge advances made by the Germans only added to the urgency with which plans were made and implemented.
Even by the end of July there were worries within the Air Ministry that Russia would collapse into complete defeat before any aid from the west could be delivered let alone put to use. This fear certainly galvanized some of the more reticent participants in these projects to redouble their efforts.
Whatever the setbacks being suffered by the Soviets, in North Africa and the Mediterranean the transfer of major components of the Luftwaffe to the east had continued much to the relief of those besieged on both Crete and Malta. With the North African coast almost as far as Tripoli now firmly under allied control convoys to Malta from Alexandria could be given air cover along the entire route. This facilitated the running of several tankers full of fuel from the gulf refineries through to the island to ensure that there were sufficient reserves available on the island to support constant operations by both the RAF and the RN.
Though air raids continued they were no longer on the scale or frequency experienced earlier and were once again being made principally by the Regia Aeronautica.
Through June and July a constant supply of replacement Hurricanes had been flying in via the Benghazi airfields and Club runs from Gibraltar.
With both Syria and Lebanon captured and with the Islands of Malta and Crete securely held more resources were now available to finish of the remaining Axis forces in North Africa.
Overtures were being made to Vichy Regimes in both Algeria and Tunisia to persuade them to ‘turn their coats’ to the allied cause.
What was obvious to the AM was that if Russia did not fold then the aircraft ferry route via Persia would only become more important. Not only that but this would focus both Soviet and American political interest in the area. With that in mind the AM were in early discussions with the Foreign Office as to what action and plans could be made to ensure that British interests in the region remained paramount.
We are now finally getting to some serious differences with OTL.
ITTl as of June 1941, The British and Allied forces are approaching Tripoli and eyeing up Tunisia and the rest of French North Africa.
Crete has held and is now becoming an important strategic asset as far as air control of the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned.
How the holding of Crete effects the Dodecanese islands and their Occupation could be interesting.
As to Tunisia, what happens depends a lot on whether the Axis Forces in western Libya try to retreat through the Vichy country. Do the Vichy fight the Axis or simple step aside, do they resist the allies as was done in Syria?
All these are possibilities I am trying to resolve plausibly in the context of both OTL and ITTL.
ITTl as of June 1941, The British and Allied forces are approaching Tripoli and eyeing up Tunisia and the rest of French North Africa.
Crete has held and is now becoming an important strategic asset as far as air control of the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned.
How the holding of Crete effects the Dodecanese islands and their Occupation could be interesting.
As to Tunisia, what happens depends a lot on whether the Axis Forces in western Libya try to retreat through the Vichy country. Do the Vichy fight the Axis or simple step aside, do they resist the allies as was done in Syria?
All these are possibilities I am trying to resolve plausibly in the context of both OTL and ITTL.
Certainly progressing well but what about the bomber offensive? Peirse should be OC of Bomber Command at this point and if he avoids the various fiasco's that saw him moved on in OTL Harris will be stuck running 5 Group. Though Peirse could still get moved on if he carries on his OTL habit of sleeping with other men's wives.
It seems that Britain/Empire actually has time to think ITTL, rather than going from crisis to crisis as in OTL.
Currently Peirse is doing important things elsewhere and Portal is still (if somewhat reluctantly) OC Bomber Command ITTL. As too Harris, he currently Commanding a a Bomber Group.
Of course I forgot. A Portland led Bomber Command isn't going to diverge that much from what Peirse was doing, I know this is a "RAF makes optimal decisions" tl but politically not hitting Berlin is simply unacceptable while the casualties from hitting Berlin will torpedo any OC Bomber Command. Poor Portal.