7.6 Pining for the Fiords.
To say the start of the Norwegian campaign had been muddled and confused would be a bit of an understatement. The weather in early April was not conducive to Ariel reconesonse and patrols over the coast of Norway. With plans for operation Wilfred well advanced and the operation it’self commencing on the 5th April every endeavour was made by Maritime Air Command to maintain a regular patrol of RDF equipped aircraft up and down the Norwegian coast from the North Cape to as close to the Skagerrak as was practical. At night aircraft could close the coast of Demark and examine the Skagerrak with RDF but in daylight the risk of interception by long range Luftwaffe fighters was to high. So it was that part of RN force proceeded towards Narvik on the 7th of April and the balance headed further south to lay mine fields. Radio intercepts over the previous days had indicated movements of German naval forces and operational preparations. The Admiralty had to judge whether these were indications of a plan to break out units into the north Atlantic or some other operation.
As of the morning of the 7th April the Admiralty was positioning assets not involved in Operation Wilfred so as to cover a potential break out. Early on the 7th of April Winterbottom requested an urgent meeting with the CAS and Sir Phillip. In a nutshell Winterbottom explained that radio intercepts from the Y service had been analysed and there were indications of a concentration of Luftwaffe air transport on the Baltic coast and of Army units on the Danish border. These along with other intelligence the sources, of which he was not at liberty to then divulge, all indicated an imminent invasion of Both Norway and Denmark by Germany in violation of those countries neutrality. When asked Winterbottom stated that he thought the intelligence both reliable and urgent, he had passed a dossier on it to the Admiralty via the usual channels but had come strait to the AM to brief the Ministers and the CAS due to the time critical nature and the covert sources involved. Sir Phillip immediately put a call into the Admiralty to talk to Churchill. This latest assessment had not yet reached Churchill so Sir Phillip gave him a very brief summary and suggested that Winterbottom proceeded to the Admiralty with all dispatch to give Churchill and the First Sea Lord the fullest possible briefing. Sir Phillip closed the call by reiterating that Maritime Command would pull out all the stops to locate German Naval units as soon as they cleared the Naze. Little changed for the rest of the day other than the weather continued to cause problems with poor visibility and scudding clouds. A group of kreigsmarine vessels had been found about 100 miles south of the Naze at 0.800 that morning but it was not until nearly 6pm that another report placing them some seventy miles further north at about four pm reached the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. As a result of the delay in this new position being received due to the standing orders regarding radio silence , Air Marshall Sir Fredrick Bowhill, instigated an immediate change in procedure that any sighting of a German vessel was to be radioed in instantly. Further if in addition to the coded Morse message for the RAF copies should be sent on frequencies used by the Admiralty signal stations as well. Thankfully after the exercises in early 1938 and with the advent of airborne RDF not only do all Maritime Command aircraft have radio’s working on Naval frequencies but there are common voice frequencies for the control of fighters and for aircraft to ship communications. Morse by Aldiss light was found in the exercises to be too slow and inconsistent for the rapid communication of complex information. Whilst radio discipline was considered essential prior to any enemy contact, the reaction to such contact had be communicated rapidly. The fitting of both HF/DF and RDF transponders to HM ships was proceeding apace but as of early 1940 only the major warships had been outfitted and nothing below cruiser size so far. It would take at least a few days and many procedural queries from lower formations before the adoption of the revised sighting reporting protocol achieved universal adoption within Maritime air control.
A case in point was the loss of HMS Gloworm on the 8th of April when she encountered Hipper and her escorts in the early morning fog. The nearest allied assets to her were two MAC patrol air craft, one on station to the north and one transiting to a patrol line to the south. Both picked up Gloworms sighting report but did not have the codes to decipher it. Nothing further was heard from the Destroyer and neither aircraft had an RDF contact.
Late on the 8th of April Lieutenant Commander Grudzinski commanding the Polish submarine Orzei reported intercepting a German ship carrying troops south of Bergan, this information finally convinced the Admiralty that the invasion of Norway was imminent though it could not discount entirely that a breakout of ships to the Atlantic was not also occurring.
Everything changed on 9 April, the British battlecruiser HMS Renown in company with HMS Courageous were appraised of the location speed and course of the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, by a LRMP Stirling. In the adverse whether conditions an airstrike was sent at long range and no torpedo hits achieved. The dive bombers claimed hits on both ships but did not do enough damage to slow either of the German ships. Renown got close enough to exchange a few artillery salvos with the German ships which were screening the destroyers that had been landing troops at Narvik, causing further damage to Gneisenau. In detoriating conditions and with the LRMP aircraft having had to return to base the German ships made good their escape into the gloom of the short artic night. Closing with Courageous and their escorts Renown head towards Narvik fiord. As they close the coast they are joined by The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla—under Commodore Bernard Warburton-Lee and comprising five H-class destroyers (HMS Hardy (flagship), Hotspur, Havock, Hunter and Hostile. The Admiral on Renown decided to send in the 2nd flotilla following an air attack by the D/B and TBR aircraft from Courageous as there were reports of between six and seven German destroyers having entered the fiord. The Admiral considered it paramount that the German naval forces were attacked befor they could establish themselves. The intention is that not only will the air attack distract the German destroyers from advancing British destroyers the aircraft will also be able to keep Commodore Bernard Warbuton -Lee appraised of the location and manoeuvring of the German Destroyers and auxiliary ships. As the airstrike went it was reported that there were three German destroyers in the Herjangsfjord, two more in Ballangen Bay, whilst another two destroyers were refuelling from a tanker near Narvik and a further five more and an auxiliary ship were at Narvik itself where there were moored up to a dozen merchant vessels. Despite the German forces being larger than expected Warbourton-Lee sealed his intention to engage the five outer lying destroyers first and inflict as much damage as possible before either retiring or continuing on to Narvik as the situation evolved. The admiral on Renown did not demure but brought the battle cruiser and two further destroyer’s close to the fiord entrance to as he later stated to ‘cork the bottle’. Courageous air group consisted of 18 Bristol 148 Buccaneers, 18, swordfish and 12 Follond Fulmars, Four swordfish had been retained for anti submarine patrols and (though no Luftwaffeaircraft was expected this far north yet the Admiral was being cautious) six Follands provided a CAP over the Carrier, Renown and their escorts. Therefore as the destroyers entered the fiord at 4.30 am, the air attack commander found himself with no less that 12 German destroyers as targets plus two auxiliaries of which one was a valuable tanker, to add to this he had another dozen merchant ships of unknown nationality. With so many targets the raid leader had no option but to divided his forces so he instructed the Dive bombers to concentrate on the five destroyers at Narvik whilst the Torpedo aircraft would attack the two destroyers refuelling from the tanker and the destroyers in both Hejangsfjord and Ballagan Bay.
One flight each of the Sword fish attacked the destroyers in Hejangsfjord and Balagan Bay. Attacking in vics of three the TBR attacked two destroyers in Ballagan Bay and another pair in Hejangsfjord. Due to the constricted waters the aircraft could only carry out a single axis attack. However the very constraints of the waters acted in favour of the torpedo aircraft as the destroyers lacked manoeuvring room to avoid the Torpedoes. One destroyer In Ballagan Bay was hit in the bow and slowed rapidly the other took a hit aft the other four torpedoes expended themselves on the shore of the bay two swordfish were damaged. In Hejangsfjord the story was similar as two destroyers were hit, here the lead ship in dodging the first torpedoes masked their track from her consorts behind her. The second German Destroyer collected two torpedoes in quick succession and capsized before she lost way the final destroyer caught a tin fish amidships which completely disabled here boilers leaving here dead in the water shrouded in steam. One of the attacking Swordfish had pushed to close to the leading destroyer and crashed into the water amid a hail of cannon shells. Even as the German crews assessed the damage from the attack the 2nd Flotilla was crossing their bows in the main fiord and pouring 4.7inch shells at them. With the information relayed from the raid leader and the TBR pilots Warburton-Lee had divided his force with, Hardy Hotspur and Havock pressing ahead to engage the destroyers in Hejangsfjord whilst Hunter and Hostile hung back to engage the two destroyers in Ballagan bay. Warbourton-Lee was relying on the Dive bombers to keep the remaining German destroyers busy until his forces had completed the destruction of the German forces outside of the harbour. The eighteen Buccaneers each carrying a 500lb GP bomb, split into their three six plane flights, one flight targeted the two destroyers and the oil tanker and the remaining aircraft went for the remaining five destroyers lying at Narvick.
The claimed hits and the after action inspection of the wrecks never quite tallied, part of this was due to the devastating effect of the first bombs dropped on what turned out to be the whaleing ship turned tanker ‘Jan Wellem’ at least two of the first three bombe dropped hit either her or the destroyer on her portside. Even as the second set of three bomber were lining up for their dives the targets disappeared in a series of large explosions as a combination of ammunition and oil exploded. By the time the targets became visible again it was clear that all three vessels were doomed to sink or burn. The last two bombers had aborted their dives and pulled up. Whether the lead aircraft had been hit by flak or debris from the explosion will nether be known as it simply disappeared for ever into the smoke as it dived.
Against the stationary targets in the harbour the story was much the same despite concentrated flak being put up by all six vessels those caught stationery were either hit or badly damaged by the concussion from near misses. In minutes four of the five destroyers were seen to be damaged, later the raid commander was criticised for not hold more of his aircraft back to access the results of an initial attack. Hind sight is always wonderful but with the second flotilla fighting at odds the raid commander felt time was of the essence.
Warbourton-Lees second flotilla had not escaped undamaged from their fight. The undamaged destroyer in the Hejangsfjord had managed to fire a full spread of torpedoes before it succumbed. HMS Havock was the recipient of no less than two of the torpedoes fired by Wolfgang Zenker. This was a phiaric victory as the Wolfgang Zenker had already taken damage from the destroyers guns and the concentrated fire of the remaining two H class destroyers soon overwhelmed her. Even as Havock foundered all five German destroyers in the out zone were either sunk or beached, whilst Warbourton-Lee had lost one ship and had significant damage to his own. Hunter and Hostile had disposed of the two crippled destroyers in Bagallan bay by the simple expedient of firing an overwhelming spread of eight twenty one inch torpedoes. This was half of their available load and when later criticized the Half Leader on Hostile, responded that he considered it imperative in the circumstances that he completed the destruction of the two now stationary German destroyers with as little delay as possible so as to be able to re-join his flotilla leader with dispatch. As his two destroyers approached the entrance to the Hejangsfjord they were able to rescue a large proportion of the survivors from HMS Havock.
As the four remaining RN destroyers approached the harbour at Narvick the raid commander asked them to hold off whilst his two remaining dive bombers attacked the last undamaged destroyer that was attempting to get clear of the merchant vessels and it’s damaged consorts. Of the two bombs dropped neither scored a clean hit but in manoeuvring to avoid the attack the German destroyer clipped a rock with her screws and rudder causing her to run ashore. On seeing this occur Wharbourton-Lee ordered his four remaining ships to advance and finished of the five remaining German destroyers. In the ensuing mellie the bridge of Hardy was struck by several shells and Warbourton-Lee mortally wounded.
By noon the RN was in possession of the harbour and returning fire against any of the German troops ashore who fired on them. Having no Troops with them there was little the flotilla could do at this time other than take possession of all the merchant shipping and sail from the fiord.
Thus did the first battle of Narvik draw to a close.
To say the start of the Norwegian campaign had been muddled and confused would be a bit of an understatement. The weather in early April was not conducive to Ariel reconesonse and patrols over the coast of Norway. With plans for operation Wilfred well advanced and the operation it’self commencing on the 5th April every endeavour was made by Maritime Air Command to maintain a regular patrol of RDF equipped aircraft up and down the Norwegian coast from the North Cape to as close to the Skagerrak as was practical. At night aircraft could close the coast of Demark and examine the Skagerrak with RDF but in daylight the risk of interception by long range Luftwaffe fighters was to high. So it was that part of RN force proceeded towards Narvik on the 7th of April and the balance headed further south to lay mine fields. Radio intercepts over the previous days had indicated movements of German naval forces and operational preparations. The Admiralty had to judge whether these were indications of a plan to break out units into the north Atlantic or some other operation.
As of the morning of the 7th April the Admiralty was positioning assets not involved in Operation Wilfred so as to cover a potential break out. Early on the 7th of April Winterbottom requested an urgent meeting with the CAS and Sir Phillip. In a nutshell Winterbottom explained that radio intercepts from the Y service had been analysed and there were indications of a concentration of Luftwaffe air transport on the Baltic coast and of Army units on the Danish border. These along with other intelligence the sources, of which he was not at liberty to then divulge, all indicated an imminent invasion of Both Norway and Denmark by Germany in violation of those countries neutrality. When asked Winterbottom stated that he thought the intelligence both reliable and urgent, he had passed a dossier on it to the Admiralty via the usual channels but had come strait to the AM to brief the Ministers and the CAS due to the time critical nature and the covert sources involved. Sir Phillip immediately put a call into the Admiralty to talk to Churchill. This latest assessment had not yet reached Churchill so Sir Phillip gave him a very brief summary and suggested that Winterbottom proceeded to the Admiralty with all dispatch to give Churchill and the First Sea Lord the fullest possible briefing. Sir Phillip closed the call by reiterating that Maritime Command would pull out all the stops to locate German Naval units as soon as they cleared the Naze. Little changed for the rest of the day other than the weather continued to cause problems with poor visibility and scudding clouds. A group of kreigsmarine vessels had been found about 100 miles south of the Naze at 0.800 that morning but it was not until nearly 6pm that another report placing them some seventy miles further north at about four pm reached the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. As a result of the delay in this new position being received due to the standing orders regarding radio silence , Air Marshall Sir Fredrick Bowhill, instigated an immediate change in procedure that any sighting of a German vessel was to be radioed in instantly. Further if in addition to the coded Morse message for the RAF copies should be sent on frequencies used by the Admiralty signal stations as well. Thankfully after the exercises in early 1938 and with the advent of airborne RDF not only do all Maritime Command aircraft have radio’s working on Naval frequencies but there are common voice frequencies for the control of fighters and for aircraft to ship communications. Morse by Aldiss light was found in the exercises to be too slow and inconsistent for the rapid communication of complex information. Whilst radio discipline was considered essential prior to any enemy contact, the reaction to such contact had be communicated rapidly. The fitting of both HF/DF and RDF transponders to HM ships was proceeding apace but as of early 1940 only the major warships had been outfitted and nothing below cruiser size so far. It would take at least a few days and many procedural queries from lower formations before the adoption of the revised sighting reporting protocol achieved universal adoption within Maritime air control.
A case in point was the loss of HMS Gloworm on the 8th of April when she encountered Hipper and her escorts in the early morning fog. The nearest allied assets to her were two MAC patrol air craft, one on station to the north and one transiting to a patrol line to the south. Both picked up Gloworms sighting report but did not have the codes to decipher it. Nothing further was heard from the Destroyer and neither aircraft had an RDF contact.
Late on the 8th of April Lieutenant Commander Grudzinski commanding the Polish submarine Orzei reported intercepting a German ship carrying troops south of Bergan, this information finally convinced the Admiralty that the invasion of Norway was imminent though it could not discount entirely that a breakout of ships to the Atlantic was not also occurring.
Everything changed on 9 April, the British battlecruiser HMS Renown in company with HMS Courageous were appraised of the location speed and course of the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, by a LRMP Stirling. In the adverse whether conditions an airstrike was sent at long range and no torpedo hits achieved. The dive bombers claimed hits on both ships but did not do enough damage to slow either of the German ships. Renown got close enough to exchange a few artillery salvos with the German ships which were screening the destroyers that had been landing troops at Narvik, causing further damage to Gneisenau. In detoriating conditions and with the LRMP aircraft having had to return to base the German ships made good their escape into the gloom of the short artic night. Closing with Courageous and their escorts Renown head towards Narvik fiord. As they close the coast they are joined by The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla—under Commodore Bernard Warburton-Lee and comprising five H-class destroyers (HMS Hardy (flagship), Hotspur, Havock, Hunter and Hostile. The Admiral on Renown decided to send in the 2nd flotilla following an air attack by the D/B and TBR aircraft from Courageous as there were reports of between six and seven German destroyers having entered the fiord. The Admiral considered it paramount that the German naval forces were attacked befor they could establish themselves. The intention is that not only will the air attack distract the German destroyers from advancing British destroyers the aircraft will also be able to keep Commodore Bernard Warbuton -Lee appraised of the location and manoeuvring of the German Destroyers and auxiliary ships. As the airstrike went it was reported that there were three German destroyers in the Herjangsfjord, two more in Ballangen Bay, whilst another two destroyers were refuelling from a tanker near Narvik and a further five more and an auxiliary ship were at Narvik itself where there were moored up to a dozen merchant vessels. Despite the German forces being larger than expected Warbourton-Lee sealed his intention to engage the five outer lying destroyers first and inflict as much damage as possible before either retiring or continuing on to Narvik as the situation evolved. The admiral on Renown did not demure but brought the battle cruiser and two further destroyer’s close to the fiord entrance to as he later stated to ‘cork the bottle’. Courageous air group consisted of 18 Bristol 148 Buccaneers, 18, swordfish and 12 Follond Fulmars, Four swordfish had been retained for anti submarine patrols and (though no Luftwaffeaircraft was expected this far north yet the Admiral was being cautious) six Follands provided a CAP over the Carrier, Renown and their escorts. Therefore as the destroyers entered the fiord at 4.30 am, the air attack commander found himself with no less that 12 German destroyers as targets plus two auxiliaries of which one was a valuable tanker, to add to this he had another dozen merchant ships of unknown nationality. With so many targets the raid leader had no option but to divided his forces so he instructed the Dive bombers to concentrate on the five destroyers at Narvik whilst the Torpedo aircraft would attack the two destroyers refuelling from the tanker and the destroyers in both Hejangsfjord and Ballagan Bay.
One flight each of the Sword fish attacked the destroyers in Hejangsfjord and Balagan Bay. Attacking in vics of three the TBR attacked two destroyers in Ballagan Bay and another pair in Hejangsfjord. Due to the constricted waters the aircraft could only carry out a single axis attack. However the very constraints of the waters acted in favour of the torpedo aircraft as the destroyers lacked manoeuvring room to avoid the Torpedoes. One destroyer In Ballagan Bay was hit in the bow and slowed rapidly the other took a hit aft the other four torpedoes expended themselves on the shore of the bay two swordfish were damaged. In Hejangsfjord the story was similar as two destroyers were hit, here the lead ship in dodging the first torpedoes masked their track from her consorts behind her. The second German Destroyer collected two torpedoes in quick succession and capsized before she lost way the final destroyer caught a tin fish amidships which completely disabled here boilers leaving here dead in the water shrouded in steam. One of the attacking Swordfish had pushed to close to the leading destroyer and crashed into the water amid a hail of cannon shells. Even as the German crews assessed the damage from the attack the 2nd Flotilla was crossing their bows in the main fiord and pouring 4.7inch shells at them. With the information relayed from the raid leader and the TBR pilots Warburton-Lee had divided his force with, Hardy Hotspur and Havock pressing ahead to engage the destroyers in Hejangsfjord whilst Hunter and Hostile hung back to engage the two destroyers in Ballagan bay. Warbourton-Lee was relying on the Dive bombers to keep the remaining German destroyers busy until his forces had completed the destruction of the German forces outside of the harbour. The eighteen Buccaneers each carrying a 500lb GP bomb, split into their three six plane flights, one flight targeted the two destroyers and the oil tanker and the remaining aircraft went for the remaining five destroyers lying at Narvick.
The claimed hits and the after action inspection of the wrecks never quite tallied, part of this was due to the devastating effect of the first bombs dropped on what turned out to be the whaleing ship turned tanker ‘Jan Wellem’ at least two of the first three bombe dropped hit either her or the destroyer on her portside. Even as the second set of three bomber were lining up for their dives the targets disappeared in a series of large explosions as a combination of ammunition and oil exploded. By the time the targets became visible again it was clear that all three vessels were doomed to sink or burn. The last two bombers had aborted their dives and pulled up. Whether the lead aircraft had been hit by flak or debris from the explosion will nether be known as it simply disappeared for ever into the smoke as it dived.
Against the stationary targets in the harbour the story was much the same despite concentrated flak being put up by all six vessels those caught stationery were either hit or badly damaged by the concussion from near misses. In minutes four of the five destroyers were seen to be damaged, later the raid commander was criticised for not hold more of his aircraft back to access the results of an initial attack. Hind sight is always wonderful but with the second flotilla fighting at odds the raid commander felt time was of the essence.
Warbourton-Lees second flotilla had not escaped undamaged from their fight. The undamaged destroyer in the Hejangsfjord had managed to fire a full spread of torpedoes before it succumbed. HMS Havock was the recipient of no less than two of the torpedoes fired by Wolfgang Zenker. This was a phiaric victory as the Wolfgang Zenker had already taken damage from the destroyers guns and the concentrated fire of the remaining two H class destroyers soon overwhelmed her. Even as Havock foundered all five German destroyers in the out zone were either sunk or beached, whilst Warbourton-Lee had lost one ship and had significant damage to his own. Hunter and Hostile had disposed of the two crippled destroyers in Bagallan bay by the simple expedient of firing an overwhelming spread of eight twenty one inch torpedoes. This was half of their available load and when later criticized the Half Leader on Hostile, responded that he considered it imperative in the circumstances that he completed the destruction of the two now stationary German destroyers with as little delay as possible so as to be able to re-join his flotilla leader with dispatch. As his two destroyers approached the entrance to the Hejangsfjord they were able to rescue a large proportion of the survivors from HMS Havock.
As the four remaining RN destroyers approached the harbour at Narvick the raid commander asked them to hold off whilst his two remaining dive bombers attacked the last undamaged destroyer that was attempting to get clear of the merchant vessels and it’s damaged consorts. Of the two bombs dropped neither scored a clean hit but in manoeuvring to avoid the attack the German destroyer clipped a rock with her screws and rudder causing her to run ashore. On seeing this occur Wharbourton-Lee ordered his four remaining ships to advance and finished of the five remaining German destroyers. In the ensuing mellie the bridge of Hardy was struck by several shells and Warbourton-Lee mortally wounded.
By noon the RN was in possession of the harbour and returning fire against any of the German troops ashore who fired on them. Having no Troops with them there was little the flotilla could do at this time other than take possession of all the merchant shipping and sail from the fiord.
Thus did the first battle of Narvik draw to a close.
