Here in lies the rub. I am trying to writing this firmly lodged in the knowledge base of the time. So Sir Phillip, Dowding and others do not have the true figures for the Luftwaffe losses. The AM has to work on a 'Best Guess' bases as in OTL ate the time. It was only later after the war that the Luftwaffe losses could be truly assessed when their own document became available to the allies. Even then Historians have been debating some of these figures ever since. Here in the ATL of the PAM there is a greater effort to not only verify kills, but to investigate the wrecks when possible to see how the aircraft was brought down and what lessens can be learnt. at this early stage of the campaign Fighter command is still learning to use the new tactics and technology so kills and losses are not that different to OTL other than the effect of having cannons. So at the moment I am keeping RAF losses as OTL and adding about 10% to Luftwaffe losses. Is this logical and reasonable?
 
9.2 Coastal Targets and Convoys Hit Again
9.2 Coastal Targets and convoys hit again

July Eleventh,

Day. Convoys attacked off Suffolk. Portland harbour raided.

Night. Activity over South west England, East Anglia, Yorkshire coast and Portsmouth.

Weather, Channel overcast, cloud base 5,000ft. Visibility fair. Thunderstorms and bright intervals in the midlands and north. (1)


The summary made bland reading and could in no way convey the drama of the days fighting. The weather favoured the attacking force, providing cover and making interceptions difficult. Once again the Luftwaffe tactical approach appeared to be to try and split the defences by multiple probes and forcing the RAF to react to protect convoys and vital installations. The first round commenced at 7.30 am when a convoy crossing Lyme bay came under attack from a formation of aircraft from Luftflotte 3. RDF located the enemy formation as it left the Cherbourg peninsular and 10 Group dispatched eight Spitfires and eight Hurricanes from Warmwell to intercept. Unfortunately the controller at Middle Wallop made a tactical error and assigned the eight Spitfires to cover the convoy whilst vectoring the Hurricanes to intercept the approaching enemy formation. Later reading the intelligence summaries, Sir Phillip appreciated both the limitations of the information available to the controllers from the RDF station and the need to make rapid assessments and tactical decisions based upon the available threat pictured displayed on the control room situation map. Currently the number and height of aircraft could only be estimated. Here was a clear illustration of the importance of the role of the observer corps for they could not only give a count of aircraft seen and give an estimate height but could also differentiate between bombers and fighters, though the twin engine Me110 was frequently reported as a bombers.

The formation approaching the convoy in Lyne bay consisted of some ten JU87 Stuka dive bombers escorted by twenty Me109 fighters. As the Hurricanes swept in to attack the Stukas, they were in turn attacked by the defending Me109s. In the initial pass one Hurricane was shot down. As the Stukas lined up to attack the convoy, four of the eight Spitfires engaged them as the other four engaged the remaining elements of the top cover as they tried to defend the Ju87’s. Two Spitfires were lost in this engagement. Two Me109’s and four Ju87’s were claimed, two allied pilots and the majority of the surviving Luftwaffe aircrew were picked up by boats from the convoy and then transferred to the Brixham based ASR launch.

Elsewhere the rescue of pilots became the focus of sharp actions, a pilot from 564 squadron on his fourth patrol of the day was shot down when his flight attacked a Heinkel 59 seaplane with red crosses flying low over the sea escorted by a loose formation of around a dozen Me109’s. Since the Heinkel 59’s were armed and such aircraft had been found following convoys and radioing position reports they had been declared as combatants and fair game. In this action, Air Commodore A. C. Deere was leading B flight and after colliding head on with a ME109 he managed to glide his crippled Spitfire to within five miles of Manston and made a successful crash landing, emerging bruised and unbowed from the wreck. Including the Me109 downed in the collision another Me109 was shot down and the Heinkel 59 forced to alight on the sea, where it was captured and towed into Ramsgate Harbour. Some 30 Heinkel 59 Sea planes were used by the Luftwaffe to rescue pilots and a private war was emerging between the ASR services of the RAF’s Maritime Command and the Luftwaffe rescue services. A few days earlier it was reported that a Supermarine Walrus and a Heinkel 59 had engaged in an inconclusive dog fight for over an hour around an east coast convoy. The Shagbat pilot later reported that as dogfights went it had been a very sedate affair and in reality more a game of cat and mouse between two tired old and wary tomcats.

After the earlier raid on Portland Luftflotte 3 sent of another raid later in the day, this sortie consisted of some twelve He 111’s escorted by a dozen Me 110’s.This raid was plotted as it left the Cherbourg area and was tracked as it approached the Isle of Wight. Once again No 601 squadron was scrambled from Westhampnett and directed to make an interception as the enemy aircraft made their landfall over Shanklin on the Isle of Wight. The heavy AA battery at Bembridge and the 9.2 coastal Gun Battery on Culver Down both providing General Pyle, the director of UK AA, a real time running commentary on both the raid and the interception. The Head Quarters of the British AA command was at Bentley Priory adjacent to that of Fighter Command and came within Dowding’s remit as CO of Air defense UK, this meant that the filter room and therefore the plot at Fighter Command in this instant along with the Observer Corps reports had accurate information as to numbers of aircraft in the raid. The eight Hurricanes from 601 Squadron split into two sections of four with one section climbing to Keep the Me110’s occupied whilst the remain four tackled the twelve He 111’s. Once again the RAF fighters were fighting at odds, out numbered but on this occasion not out maneuvered. As the enemy fought their way towards their target, apparently Portsmouth naval dockyard. Under continuous assault the surviving He111’s jettisoned their bombs over Spithead and the remaining bombers and their escort turned east away from Portsmouth towards Chichester and thence south over West Wittering and out to sea to escape back to France. The Hurricanes biggest problem in this engagement was their limited cannon ammunition of only one hundred and twenty rounds per gun. Being belted ammunition this was twice as much as the sixty rounds in the original drum magazine designed for the gun but still at ten rounds a second only gave twelve seconds of firing. This engagement was decidedly a success for 601 squadron not only did they claim four He111’s destroyed but an additional one probable and two damaged. Of the Me110’s two were claimed shot down and one damaged. 601 squadron did not get of scot free however two Hurricane were shot down one crashing into the sea near Spits Sand fort in the Solent and the second one making a crash landing and burning at Westhampnett, both pilots were safe but suffered minor injuries.

As a result of this action there was a substantial bonus for the RAF and that was the recovery of a virtually undamaged Me 110. This aircraft from the 4th Staffel Aufkel. Gr 14 with the code letters 5F+CM was forced down in the Goodwood area of Sussex not far from Tangmere and it’s satellite airfield at Westhampnett. This aircraft was rapidly repaired and was used for comparative trials with the ‘Enemy Aircraft Unit’ based at Boscombe Down.

This day saw some four hundred plus day sorties by Fighter Command while the night saw a follow up raid on Portsmouth by a further thirty aircraft which caused nine fatalities and injured another fifty civilians. Other raids saw night fighters attempting to intercept bombers in all group areas except 14 Group. Some fifty night fighter sorties were flown but only three confirmed kills achieved.

(1) Dailey summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
 
This thread seems to be generating zero comments other than likes! Is it worth continuing? If I continue to write TTL what changes to style or content would improve it?
 
Don't be so hard on yaself my friend. I don't know why folks ain't commening much on this, its a darn good time line :( The RAF is still on its learning curve here but its learning fast if sometimes painfully. The 20mm cannons are a big help for sure, and the double ammo loads of the original design means that they can still cause a lot of damage. The .303's are drawback but this isn't a full on tech wank. I'm not too aware of how close this is to the OTL BoB in terms of attacks and then losses/wins and kills, but the RAF seems to be doing a bit better than before, and with introducing things like the finger 4, you can reduce vulnerability and fix some of the inflexibility issues by eliminating the 3 craft flights.
I'd honestly love to contribute more but my knowledge is more at the naval end of the spectrum.
 
People usually comment when something is wrong. Likes and silence might seem less than the bravo bravissimo that they actually are.
 
. Don't get dishearted this is good .
I like the way thr RAF are slowly building momentum.
I cannot add anything to the tech front as battleships are my "thing "
Keep up the good work .
 
Thanks for the support, one problem is that I am away from my private research resource for some months and I am useless at computer research, now stick me in the British National Archives at Kew and you will lose me for months at a time!!
 
Greatly enjoying timeline. No comments as no perceived errors or political judgements that I would have considered would almost certainly have been other. In other words nothing to argue about!
 
I just know too little to comment, really. It still is fascinating.
Likewise in terms of specifics, but that applies to most timelines here the depth of knowledge of a lot of the posters here is frankly amazing.
In terms of the story I like the way this is building towards a different Battle of Britain. I can see a much earlier switch to night time bombing, but will the timeline repeat in terms of accidental bombing of London on 24/8 and the retaliatory raid on Berlin, Hitlers reply with the blitz on London taking the pressure off the RAF stations. So for me the questions are will this butterfly the accident of the 24th, or will the same type of tragic error happen earlier because the RAF are more effective? Similarly without the provocation and response is the RAF in it's current form robust enough to survive the coming storm. So as those who like cricket are prone to saying - it's all to play for.
 
This thread seems to be generating zero comments other than likes! Is it worth continuing? If I continue to write TTL what changes to style or content would improve it?

It IS worth continuing. Don't let the lack of comments be your guide. Many, including me, wouldn't know how to write something like this and don't know enough to contribute.
 

formion

Banned
What is the status of Malta and Egypt ITTL regarding RAF ?

Also, Belgium and Norway are occupied. The last client for british aircraft is Greece, with the Greco-Italian war 3 months away. Have the butterflies made in differences from OTL in the case of Greece ? A few months ago there was an interesting timeline on the Greek Air Force. As @Lascaris had mentioned, Greece had ordered 24 Spitfires and 36 Blenheims.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-a-different-wwii-greek-airforce.435976/

PS: You are doing a great job sonofpegasus !
 
Top