Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
... what I said....
(No, I don't seriously think the war will be over by the end of the next update. But still, it can't be *that* far away.)
Without an Operation Torch, is the battlecry of the British paratroopers still going to be 'Wahai Mohammad'?
Is the lack of equipment taken from the BEF in 1940 making itself felt ITTL? Or has that more or less been made good by the extra squeeze on French and Italian industries?
Garrison
Donor
Goering is nothing if not a survivor, everyone else may end up under the bus but not him.
The Germans have certainly tried to squeeze more out, but in the absence of extra raw materials there's hard limit on what they can do. Ironically the best they could take from the Italians would be some of their designs for fighters and AFVs, but the likes of MAN and Messerschmitt will never agree to making 'Italian rubbish'.
I think that can be fairly said about several of Hitler's henchmen.
28th August – 10th September 1943 – Paris – Liberation and Revenge
Garrison
Donor
28th August – 10th September 1943 – Paris – Liberation and Revenge
As the Allies approached Paris the city erupted, weapons that had been stashed away for months or years were broken out by resistance members, barricades were raised on streets and ordinary men and women who had simply done their best to survive under the iron rule of the German now turned on their oppressors, even if that meant nothing more than simply refusing to turn up for work and making it that little bit harder for the Germans to keep the city functioning under their control. In some place telephone exchanges and public buildings fell into the hands of the resistance as the German forces prepared for the inevitable withdrawal, with the functions of those offices taken over by those who claimed to speak for Free France. The great fear of everyone was that the city might be laid waste in a final spasm of violence by the Germans to punish the French. In the end the temporary absence of Hitler and fear of the consequences on the part of the senior officers prevented that. The commander of the Paris garrison, General Dietrich von Choltitz, tried to retain some sense of personal honour by refusing to give his surrender to the rabble that called themselves the resistance. Von Choltitz had only been appointed to the role of commander of Greater Paris on the 12th of August was adamant that he would only surrender to proper military authorities, to his chagrin the delegation he handed over the city to was led by French officers, men who had slipped away to continue the fight in 1940 [1].
After the war von Choltitz would make great play of the fact that he had refused to carry out the scorched earth orders emanating from Berlin demanding that he raze Paris to deny this prize to the Allies. The orders from Berlin were certainly drastic, but to what extent OKH expected them to be carried out is debatable. There are accounts from some functionaries on von Choltitz’s staff of phone calls from Berlin from which everyone barring von Choltitz were excluded and after these conversations the General seemed far more resolute about his decision to ignore the orders handed down from Goering. As time has gone on historians have increasingly dismissed von Choltitz’s claims, arguing that even had he been determined to carry through on the orders to destroy Paris he could not have done so. The actions of the French resistance in taking to the streets and disrupting German communications were what prevented any attempts at large scale demolition or any prolonged attempt to hold the city. Von Choltitz’s insistence that he saved Paris did achieve what it was doubtless intended to, establishing him as a ‘good German’ and ensuring that he would die of old age as a free man [2].
De Gaulle had naturally been insistent that Free French forces lead the way into Paris and for once there had been little argument from the Allies over his demand. The French soldiers who had chosen to continue the fight after the Armistice had done so at considerable risk to themselves and any loved ones who remained in Metropolitan France. They had fought when there was no certainty that France could be freed from Nazi occupation and while others had dismissed Churchill’s insistence that Britain would fight on alone if need be as foolhardy rhetoric. It would have been a massive slap in the face to the Free French if they had not been the ones to lead the liberation of Paris, though certain Allied Generals saw things rather differently and there some unpleasant traffic jams on the approaches to the city as different contingents tried to claim the honour for themselves, fortunately there was enough glory to go around as the advance through France offered the clearest proof possible to the public in Britain and the USA that the war was being won and all the senior Allied Generals in the west got their chance for a photo opportunity in Paris [3].
While there was an outpouring of joy in many quarters as Paris was freed from its long occupation, there was plenty of fear and anxiety to go around as well. The Wehrmacht officers charged with the defence of France had ever reason to worry about the consequences of failure. With Goering demonstrating that he was ever bit as bombastic and tempestuous as Hitler no one wanted to deliver any more bad news from the frontlines and the liberation of Paris resonated every bit as much in Berlin as it did in Washington or London, and someone was going to have to pay the price for failure. This was why von Manstein was removed from command and ordered back to Berlin, but wasn’t the only whipping boy selected to suffer for being unable to prevent what had been inevitable since the Allies established their bridgehead in Normandy [4].
A considerably larger group with reason to worry about their fates were to be found among those French citizens who were affixed with the dreaded label ‘collaborator’. The term was a broad brush that covered a multitude of sins, and even what might have been seen as virtues according to some. There were men and women who had used collaboration as a way to access the inner workings of the occupation of France, risking their lives to pass information to the Resistance and the Allies, indeed some of the most senior figures in the resistance were held in high regard by the Germans for their diligent efforts to carry out the occupiers’ plans. The secretive nature of their efforts, and the fractious nature of the Resistance, meant that some of these people faced real peril as the occupying forces departed and long hidden anger bubbled to the surface some sought vengeance against those who had worked with the Germans, especially those who had co-operated with the Gestapo and the SS [5].
Those who had actively worked against the occupation were only a small fraction of those who had collaborated, while the overwhelming majority were those for whom there had been little choice, or who had convinced themselves that by collaborating they were helping their families, friends, and neighbours. Certainly, helping to keep the lights on or the telephone system running aided the Germans, but it was also important to the ordinary people of France. A doctor who refused to treat Germany patients not only faced an ethical dilemma in terms of their training but knew that such a refusal meant that they would be not only dismissed but possibly imprisoned. Likewise, the factory worker who helped, however inefficiently and lackadaisically, to manufacture equipment for the Wehrmacht certainly aided the German war effort, but when the alternatives was being shipped off to work as a ‘guest’ to work in some German factory or simply watch their families go hungry as they could no longer put food on the table what choice did they really have [6]?
Some of those women who had become the lovers of German troops offered the same argument, after all when some German officer made their desires clear how were they supposed to refuse? A few tried to claim they had genuinely fallen in love, which did them no favours with their outraged neighbours who needed some to take their pent-up anger on and targeting those who ‘had whored for the Germans’ was the easy option. There were also those among the ranks of factory workers, civil servants, police officers, indeed people in every walk of life, who had collaborated enthusiastically, either for personal gain or because they sympathised with Nazi ideals. Those who had served the Vichy regime and continued willingly to work with the Germans when the last pretence of Vichy independence was stripped away could expect no mercy from the liberators of Paris. Some had fled along with the retreating Wehrmacht forces, spending the remainder of the war in relative luxury, though no less prisoners than if they had remained in France and only postponing the day of retribution as the Third Reich faced its inevitable demise [7].
For those who chose to remain, or were denied the opportunity to run, there would be no reprieve from retribution. No one was listening to the protestations of the men who had run Vichy that they had acted for the good of France, even when such claims were uttered by the hero of Verdun himself. Remembering his past service There were still those few willing to defend Petain, though they hardly did so in flattering terms, calling him a ‘dupe’ or a ‘puppet’, an old man taken advantage of by far more sinister forces, too feeble witted to be held to account for his behaviour. In the years since the Armistice of 1940 Petain certainly had been reduced to the role of figurehead, but no one could ignore his actions during that summer of 1940, or the actions he had endorsed, figurehead or not. The execution of French sailors after the mutiny at Mers El Kebir and Toulon, which was a heroic act of resistance to the Free French, the dispatch of ordinary French men and women to Germany as slave labour, and the ruthless enforcement of laws that targeted the Jewish population of France, all of these were things that none of Petain’s defenders could shield him from and he was duly tried and found guilty of treason.
Sentencing Petain was a tricker matter, the handing down of the death penalty was all but automatic when the charge was treason, however there were heated arguments about whether to carry it out or commute it. The Marshal’s actions during World War I were once again offered up, this time as a reason for clemency and such was Petain’s status that commutation was seriously considered. What prevented any revision of the sentence was the campaign by the families of the sailors executed after the mutiny/revolt by the Marine Nationale. At the time the families of those convicted in the hastily convened court-martials had pleaded for clemency, even appealing to Petain himself. He had refused to intervene, publicly denouncing the convicted sailors as traitors to France. The argument of the relatives was one of simple justice, if their sons and husbands had received no leniency for their ‘treason’ from Petain, why should he be offered any now? This cry was taken up by several prominent French newspapers and in the end, it seems to have been enough to sway De Gaulle against commuting Petain’s sentence. Despite objections, appeals, and attempts to have Petain given a new trial, he was finally executed by firing squad at early in the morning of the 9th of June 1945. There was no such agonizing over the fate of the other members of the Vichy government who fell into French hands, or for many of the lower-level figures who sought to fall back on the discredited notion they were ‘just obeying orders’. Some may have had a genuine case to make but France had suffered a long humiliation at the hands of Vichy and Nazi Germany and these people would pay the price to allow the nation to move on and rebuild [8].
[1] I retained von Choltitz because the role he filled didn’t exist until after the Allied landing and it seemed possible that he might still be available to fill the role given the different sequence of events elsewhere.
[2] Von Choltitz’s melodramatic tale just doesn’t align with reality, and the real credit for Paris being captured intact lies with the Resistance.
[3] More chance of a punch up between the French and American troops in the city than there was of serious German resistance.
[4] Goering is only jovial when things are going his way, when they aren’t he is every bit as vengeful as Hitler.
[5] Naturally the Germans were quite happy to abandon most of the rank and file collaborators to their fate.
[6] Everyone likes to think they would be the noble hero, but with a family to feed or the prospect of imprisonment and torture if you refuse most of us would find a way to rationalize collaboration.
[7] These are the people for whom I have zero sympathy, some of them were outright Fascists before the Germans set foot in France.
[8] It’s the alt-Mers el Kebir that tips the balance for Petain here and will lead to decades of biographies that try to absolve him of published in France and elsewhere.
Garrison
Donor
I suspect, based on entirely on watching demolition documentaries, that it would require some specialist work, probably involving shaped charges and/or Thermite.
I've long held the view that any occupied population will fall into one of three camps:
- 10% - active resistance
- 10% - active collaboration
- 80% - keep your head down and survive
That sounds about right....and I know there are a lot in the UK that make comments on collaboration but they have not had that issue to deal with.
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A good update.
My one question: wouldn't Petain have been guillotined rather than shot?
My one question: wouldn't Petain have been guillotined rather than shot?
I believe, though I can't say for sure, beheading by guillotine was for regular crimes, and anything military, war included, related crime warrants a firing squad, like Paul Polo and others who were shot for treason back in 1918.
Firing squad for a military crime, guillotine for a civilian one was the standard. So if a soldier was handed over to the civilian courts for justice he was guillotined, if court martialled, shot. Therefore as long as he was tried as a Marshal of France, rather than a politician, he would be shot.
8th September – 13th September 1943 – Philippines – Part I - The Return
Garrison
Donor
8th September – 13th September 1943 – Philippines – Part I - The Return
After the liberation of the Dutch East Indies there was little consensus among the senior US leadership over where to strike next, beyond the necessity of shifting the focus of US operations back to the Pacific rather than being drawn deeper into South East Asia. The option that was being pushed the hardest was the liberation of the Philippines and it was not only Douglas MacArthur who was determined that the islands be liberated, there were other voices who felt that the defeat there had to be avenged and that the US was honour bound to liberate the Filipinos, though these concerns were presented as being of secondary importance compared to the strategic value of retaking the Philippines. This strategic value was sharply questioned by critics, who pointed out that the victories in South East Asia and the Dutch East Indies had largely negated the strategic importance of the Philippines to the Americans, and that a continuation of the island-hopping drive to the north offered a much quicker route to final victory in the Pacific. The Japanese garrison in the Philippines could be left to wither on the vine and rolled up once the Japanese had been defeated [1].
Increasingly however the notion that Japanese would simply lay down its arms in the face of inevitable defeat was looking unrealistic and there was an increasing fear that the Japanese army would fight to the bitter end regardless of what happened on the Home Islands, and that in the meantime the garrison in the Philippines would inflict ever more brutality on the Filipinos to secure their own continued survival and to cow the resistance movement that was constantly harassing the occupying forces with US aid. Reports from the resistance made it clear that such worries were not simply theoretical. As the Japanese lines supply progressively collapsed the Philippines garrison seized whatever it could from the locals and carried out ruthless acts of reprisal in response to any perceived act of resistance, which might amount to little more than hiding a sack of rice, so a farmer’s family didn’t starve. Genuine acts of resistance brought forth appalling acts of mass murder and yet the resistance did not cease their attacks, convinced that whatever lives were lost had to be weighed against the far worse consequences of leaving the Japanese in control [2].
Such considerations weighed heavily in Washington, but Nimitz was strongly in favour of bypassing the Philippines for the time being at least and placing the priority further north. With powerful political and military supporters on both sides of the debate what emerged was an unhappy compromise. The Philippines campaign would be launched as soon as possible, with preparations for a swift follow up operation pushing along the islands of the Pacific leading towards the Marianas, Formosa, and Okinawa, though even with the war in Europe still raging and drawing in the lion’s share of US resources how swift such a follow up could be remained an open question and the date for an attack aimed at the Marianas kept being pushed back. This decision also meant that would there be no American manpower available to support any British or French plans, and that vital equipment such as landing craft would be in short supply, which fortunately played into the hands of the British planners in their own battles over the next target for their own now completely independent operation in South East Asia, if an amphibious operation was currently out of the question that provided an excellent reason to resist French demands for an attack on Indochina [3].
Settling on the Philippines as their next priority inevitably raised the question of who would command the operation, or more specifically whether Douglas MacArthur would be given the job he had been lobbying for ever since he was unceremoniously recalled from Australia. Even after the better part of two years in Washington MacArthur still saw the Philippines as his personal responsibility, or kingdom according to his critics, even framing it as an almost sacred duty in his more pompous moments discussing the matter. The problem for MacArthur was that having spent those two years in Washington mean that it was easy for those who opposed giving him command to argue that he was far too ‘rusty’ for such a critical operation and that there were other officers who had proved their ability in the field in the meantime. In the end the best MacArthur was offered the poor consolation prize of taking command of the administration of the islands once the Japanese has been driven out, operational command would fall to General Walter Krueger [4].
After what had happened off Borneo some might also have expected Admiral William ‘Bull’ Halsey to be shuffled off to some administrative role at least temporarily. Instead, he was once again in charge of the USN carrier forces assigned to take part in the landings. Whatever admonishments might have been delivered in private had done nothing to impede Halsey’s career and far from being chastened by the near disaster off Borneo when he was lured out of position Halsey was more determined than ever to destroy the IJN as a fighting force and wipe the stain off his record. This presumed that the IJN would intervene in strength in the Philippines, but Halsey was quite certain that they would do so, the alternative was for the Japanese warships to simply sit in harbour and wait for the US to conduct their own version of Pearl Harbor, ‘only we will do the job properly’ as Halsey observed [5].
Halsey may have been overly aggressive sometimes, but he was completely correct in his assessment of the likely response of the IJN to an assault on the Philippines. The Japanese had drawn exactly the conclusion Halsey assumed they would, that the fleet had to intervene or become essentially useless as fuel stocks dwindled. There was also the more intangible question of the honour of the Imperial Japanese Navy, they could not stand aside in the face of a fresh US assault, even if the idea of maintaining a fleet in being still made strategic sense. The plan they formulated to respond to a US invasion was basically a rehash of what they had attempted in the DEI, which after all had almost succeeded from their perspective and they convinced themselves that the Allies had not realized that they were being deceived. One major difference was that this time the carriers would be expected to get in the first strike at any cost as the consequences of the USN or RN getting their blow in first would be potentially catastrophic. The only way the IJN could guarantee this was if their airwings launched from well beyond the effective range of the USN carrier planes, and since the Japanese strike planes had similar operational ranges to their enemy counterparts this meant that the Japanese pilots would be making a one-way trip. This embrace of the Kamikaze ethos did not sit well with everyone in the IJN, but the sense of desperation that had set in as they were driven back on all fronts meant that any objections were brushed aside, the IJN had to strike a blow that would derail the operation in the Philippines and show the Americans that pressing their offensive in the Pacific all the way to the Japanese Home Islands would come at too high a cost, forcing Roosevelt to offer peace on some terms that Japan would be able to accept [6].
Whatever one’s opinion of the state of mind of the Japanese leadership the USN was already taking measures to combat the Kamikaze threat. These included more escorts for the big capital ships, more anti-aircraft guns installed on all warships, a higher percentage of fighters in the air groups of the Fleet Carriers and more escort carriers to cover them. The ranks of the Fleet Carriers had now been bolstered by the arrival of the first Essex Class carriers, the USS Essex itself and the USS Valley Forge, [7] with fighter complements now made up of the F6F Hellcat, a significant improvement over the previous F4F Wildcat. The Americans were also determined to wear down the IJAAF forces in the Philippines before the landings, meaning a series of air raids and acts of sabotage against the Japanese squadrons based there. The former was greatly assisted by the paucity of Japanese radar coverage over the islands, allowing IJAAF fighters and bombers to be repeatedly caught on the ground. The acts of sabotage were carried out by the Filipino resistance, assisted by the OSS and American commandos. All of this meant that the strength of the IJAAF in the Philippines, some four hundred aircraft on paper, was little more than one hundred aircraft, a fact that was not shared with the IJN as they prepared their operation [8].
As far as defending against the landings went the Japanese command in the Philippines were no more willing to risk their troops against the weight of firepower the US forces could bring to bear against the landing zones than their counterparts in the Dutch East Indies. Drawing the US forces inland to prepared defensive positions that took advantage of the natural terrain was the best of a bad set of choices, it was after all notable that to date allowing an amphibious assault to establish a beachhead had proven fatal to the defenders in almost every case. However well the defenders fought unless the lines of supply of the enemy could be cut, or superior reinforcements delivered to relieve the defenders then defeat was just a matter of time if the invading force was willing and able to pay the price. With the US forces still intent on crushing Japan they had both the will and the means. The battle for the Philippines might be bloody and brutal but barring a miracle from the IJN there was only going to be one outcome [9].
[1] the OTL Japanese concern that the Philippines could be used as a base to attack their conquests in the DEI and SEA have been inverted here, with the Allies able to cut off the lines of communication with the Philippines with forces operating from Singapore, Java, and Borneo.
{2] The fear is that these garrisons might not believe that any surrender order was genuine, not to mention how thoroughly they could booby trap the islands left to their own devices.
[3] The French will get their way eventually, but not nearly as soon as they would like.
[4] So Krueger seemed like a good alternative since MacArthur is not going to escape from Washington any time soon, and he will not be getting anywhere near Tokyo.
[5] Halsey is taking the attitude ‘fool me once…’
[6] The Japanese are still locked into looking for a military solution to their problems.
[7] So the naming sequence for the Essex Class has been somewhat shuffled, with the Valley Forge now being CV-10, what became the replacement Yorktown IOTL. I settled on Valley Forge mainly because I really didn’t like Bon Homme Richard.
[8] This is essentially what happened in OTL, the IJN was counting on land-based support that didn’t exist anymore.
[9] And we will review the Japanese stockpile of miracles in the next update but as a hint its less than one…
If you were looking at the naming conventions of the Carriers then, you have the Revolutionary war battles and famous ships. Going forward on that theme you can use the Monitor, Ironsides, Constitution, and The Susquehanna ( Commodore Peary's flagship when he opened Japan in 1853) Susquehanna Battles if you want to go past the Revolutionary War are War of 1812, Mexican American war( not many with US names), and the CIvil War. Maybe have a earlier Gettysburg named ship.