Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

Chapter 18: From Canada’s Fair Domain
  • Chapter 18: From Canada’s Fair Domain

    Spencerwood, Quebec City, Canada East, April 1862

    The palatial grounds of the Spencerwood estate were ideal as a retreat and home for the Governor General of the United Province of Canada. Originally built as a grand estate for the third governor of New France in the time of the French Regime in 1633 it was eventually property of the sisters of the Augustine order the Hôtel-Dieu in 1676, after the Conquest it became the home of Henry Powell in 1780 who expanded the grounds and built a grand villa with fresh English gardens for the grounds. These were expanded on again in 1833 with elms, oaks and trails; and finally again in 1854 when purchased by the government and made the official residence of the Governor General.

    The Viscount Monck had taken up residence in the castle like manor home early in November of the previous year. He had taken a liking to the home, but his ever adventurous wife, the Lady Elizabeth Monck, had taken to properly decorating the residence to be more suitable to her tastes. Not that Monck himself minded, he was more than happy for her to have something to do in order to distract herself from the distressing events taking place only so far away. She seemed to be in good spirits however, entertaining guests as though there were no unpleasantness to the south, even sparing time to make the socially awkward Lord Lyons laugh as he had passed through.

    Monck, large, comfortably built with square shoulders, strode casually amongst the gardens with his guests. The April rains had subsided for the afternoon, and he had spent so long trapped in the Citadelle at Quebec that he felt it was only fair that he stretch his legs in the beautiful gardens. None of his visitors seemed to mind the informal setting of the rather official meeting. In a combination of suits and uniforms they trailed him in the gardens. Col. Taché in his own red tunic stood next to Col. Lysons, and behind them came Cartier and Galt, all prepared to inform him on the state of the Province’s readiness for war.

    “It is a shame Premier Macdonald could not join us today. His illness is most inconvenient.” Monck said. Behind him the three Canadian ministers exchanged uneasy glances, all were aware of the exact nature of Macdonald’s “illness” this spring.

    “John has worked himself too hard since November sir, months without a proper rest. It is only natural he should have some malady befall him with his manic energy enveloping him in the last four months.” Cartier said.

    “I hope he returns to health soon. Send him my best, but you’re sure my doctor would not be able to help?”

    “John’s a tough old Scot my lord, a few drinks and he’ll be back on his feet.” Cartier replied mildly. In truth the drink had put him off his feet, and he would no doubt be off them for another week until he had recovered. The pattern of bursts of manic, brilliant energy, followed by weeks of heavy drinking were common to Cartier and Taché, but it would be better served that all the members of the Coalition not be made totally aware it this yet.

    “I am glad to hear it, but for now we must attend to business. How are the Province’s finances?”

    “So long as our loan from London is secure the Province stands to be able to lean on 18 million dollars to finance this year’s works for both warlike and civil expenditure.” Galt replied, but grimaced. “We have already borrowed a great deal, so we are currently running at a deficit. Though Macdonald’s efforts and those of other private parties have gathered 234,000 dollars for other expenditures as well throughout the winter and spring.”

    “The Province is of course not fighting this war alone.” Taché added quickly nodding to Lysons.

    “The Province has done a creditable job answering the call for men from Her Majesties government.” Lysons said looking immensely pleased without smiling.

    “I’m sure that the people of the Province have done all in their power to aid in the defence of Her Majesties domains here in North America. Though I would be greatly pleased to learn the entirety of the fruits of their labors.” Monck replied. Lysons nodded in a professional fashion retrieving a note from the pouch he carried.

    “As of this Sunday last, the Province of Canada has mustered fifty-six battalions of Volunteer infantry for service. There are four organized cavalry regiments, eleven organized batteries of artillery and three brigades of garrison artillery. There are also five companies of engineers available for service. Currently there are also drilling eight unorganized cavalry troops, and a dozen unorganized infantry companies, two further organized battalions alongside one organized negro corps. In total we have 54,000 men ready for duty as mustered by the Province of Canada.” Taché if possible the beamed broader behind his moustache as the tally was rattled off. He had played a creditable role in organizing this force after all and was responsible for overseeing all of it.

    “I am most pleased with the news gentlemen. I’m sure London will be pleased as well. Sir William will surely be happy to have such a force at his back.”

    “And beside him truth be told sir.” Lysons said. “Taché has led the charge on integrating the militia with the regulars, and Sir William has been most amicable to those plans. We already have one brigade of Canadian volunteers drilling at Montreal, and there are five other battalions attached to brigades within the Army of Canada. They’re splendid men; as good as the Volunteers back home in England.” The Canadians all seemed to stand straighter under such praise.

    Monck allowed some of his anxieties to relax. He had expected perhaps less considering Head’s warnings about the parochial concerns of the Canadians, but he was pleasantly surprised by their diligence. Perhaps he had a better chance of keeping things together than he thought.

    “And how do Captain- beg pardon, Commodore Collinson’s efforts go on the rivers?” Monck asked.

    “The ice is breaking up.” Taché said matter of factly “Soon boats will be flowing up the river and our worries about supplies will be partially alleviated. I have authorized the commission of funds for the purchase of gunboats, which we have been doing anyways since February. Many river captains and former sailors in Her Majesties Navy have come forward, and Collinson is putting together a good group of men down at Montreal.”

    “That’s a relief to hear Colonel.” Monck nodded and continued on his walk. In truth all this information was going in and out of Williams headquarters at St. Jean where he had moved to a week earlier almost daily. This information came to Monck in his weekly meetings with the chief ministers of the Province, while Lysons acted as the go between for the army, the Provincial government, and the Imperial government in Quebec. The man was doing the work of three men! Monck supposed he should be grateful for learning this much at least, his brief lectures on the last two conflicts in 1775 and 1812 from Taché had taught him that when the going got tough he could expect the military to take over. He hoped to avoid that, he needed the income.

    Instead of dwelling on unpleasant thoughts he turned to enjoy the cool air as the first signs of spring crept northwards. The flowers were not yet in bloom, and some snow clung to the shaded areas of the garden, but it was a far cry from the frigid air of March. He fancied riding later in the day.

    “I do look forward to the return of spring.” Monck said idly.

    “I do not.” All eyes, except Lysons who looked understanding, turned in surprise towards Taché. Galt laughed.

    “I understand you might find this climate more to your liking my dear Taché.” Galt said good naturedly “But surely you cannot deny that the warm weather will be far more pleasant for man and beast?”

    “Oh that I do not deny.” The old colonel replied “The skies clear, the roads dry out, the rivers cease to flood, and it becomes easier to move men and material. It is then though,” he added “that the real killing begins.”

    Rivière-du-Loup, Canada East, April 1862

    Despite the onset of spring, the winter chill had not yet subsided. Snow clung stubbornly to the ground beneath stands of trees, and where it had retreated, the land was transformed into a quagmire of sucking mud and flooded land. The quiet village of Rivière-du-Loup bustled more than usual, with a company of redcoats in attendance preparing to embark up the Grand Trunk Railway bound for Montreal. The reason for their overland journey was clear as great chunks of ice drifted up the river towards the sea.

    In a small cottage near the railroad the men responsible for overseeing this overland movement sat in quiet contentment seeking to keep the chill out. One of them, Lt. Colonel Garnet Wolseley, sat locked in desperate battle against an implacable foe. With a resigned sigh he watched as Major Anthony Home took his queen with a well placed knight.

    “Check mate.” Home said with a smile of amusement.

    “At what time did you become so good at the game?” Wolseley said scowling “I cannot recall you playing near so well in India.”

    “I have had much time to practice.” Home said smiling gesturing to their surroundings. Wolseley snorted.

    “I suppose we haven’t had much else to occupy our time when the men aren’t running about. The next batch will be in tomorrow I suppose and then on till the ice melts and the ships start running up to Montreal.”

    “Then we can finally go where we will do some good eh Garnet?” Home said resetting the board. Wolseley shuffled to his feet and stretched. The sudden appearance of his manservant, the old file Lough who never seemed to laugh or smile, waylaid him from looking for his Fenimore Cooper novel.

    “A message for you sir.” He said.

    “Where is it then Lough?” Wolseley said looking curiously at Lough’s obviously empty hands. The man’s face didn’t even change as he replied.

    “The messenger is holding on to it sir. He says you will want to see him.” Somewhat irritated Wolseley motioned for the man to be brought in. Lough returned leading a tall man in the fine red coat of an officer of the Queen’s cavalry, the gold braid proclaiming him a lt. colonel. A handsome face grinned at Wolseley from beneath a bearskin cap, the dark brown moustache and mutton chops stretching with his smile as he flourished a letter in soft gloved hands.

    “A special delivery from headquarters at Montreal.” Lt. Colonel Soame Jenyns said stepping into the confines of the cottage. Wolseley rushed forward and grasped the other man’s hand firmly in greeting.

    “Soame!” Wolseley said incredulously “What the devil brings you out to this lonely quarter of the empire?”

    “Precisely what I said.” He replied proffering the letter in his hand. “You’ve got orders for transfer out west.”

    “Warmer than here I hope.” Home said from behind.

    “Oh where have my manners gone!” Wolseley lamented “Major Anthony Home this is my friend Lt. Col. Soame Jenyns of Her Majesty’s 11th Hussars.”

    “A pleasure sir.” The Major said shaking his hand.

    “We met in Montreal shortly after I arrived. He’s helping to push the colonials into shape for the cavalry. Which I hope is going better than when we last conferred.”

    “Oh they’re all willing and full of pluck, but God knows they have some queer ideas about what a cavalry trooper should do. They’re shaping up though, but there’s damned few enough of them.” Soame said sadly.

    Wolseley pushed everyone towards the fire and had Lough bring out some warmed cider as refreshment which Soame took willingly to hand. Wolseley looked over his orders and heaved a sigh.

    “Kingston. The last truly important post in all of Canada.” Wolseley lamented.

    “You’re on the front lines though,” Home commented “that must be satisfying.”

    “Oh if everyone there isn’t a prisoner of war by fall that will be satisfying, otherwise I dare say it will be less so. These bloody colonials here in Canada have pluck aplenty, but pluck won’t do enough against numbers, and most of the regulars are in Montreal.” Wolseley sighed.

    “And how go the Maritime colonists?” Soame asked.

    “Oh Doyle’s chivying them into shape, there’s the rough process of weeding out the old grey beards and getting new blood in, but overall the Bluenoses seem to be taking to it with admirable energy. I hear we’ll have a brigade of them ready come summer if all goes well.” Wolseley said.

    “Good for Doyle. He’s the man for the job in those colonies, if it hadn’t been for him we would have been waist deep in snows with nowhere to sleep when I arrived back in November.”

    “Doyle’s a good man. Missed any of the fighting after Varna, but he knows his work moving men and material, he’s not battle tested though, makes me glad he’ll be holding the line on the border. With the winter road secure and no Yankees within a hundred miles of our fortifications at Houlton and Fort Fairfield we’ve got secure communications in our rear for the winter unless we manage to make a real mess of things this summer.”

    “With Williams in charge…well who knows?” Soame said shrugging. Wolseley grinned and took a drink which Soame shared in.

    “He’s no Wellington, but we can hope he’s a Prevost at least.” Wolseley said. Soame raised an inquiring eyebrow causing Wolseley to laugh. “A fellow from the 1812 war. Not inspiring but not wholly incompetent either, though how he managed to waste the advantage of three to one at Plattsburgh…” he trailed off as Soame grinned at him. “Well if this war has no other result, it will at least afford American historians something to write about, and save them from the puerility of detailing skirmishes in the backwoods or on the highlands of Mexico, as if they were so many battles of Waterloo or Solferino.” Wolseley said waving a hand. Soames nodded, and then grinned wolfishly.

    “They shan’t make it easy for us eh Wolseley?” That got a roguish grin in return.

    “Oh it will be a toughish work, but we are sure to stymy the best they have before they reach Quebec, they couldn’t manage it in 1775 or 1812 after all. If I don’t end up languishing in some Yankee prisoner of war camp this time next year I’ll wager you on it.”

    “What’s the wager?” Soame said, favoring him with a grin.

    “That horse of yours.” Wolseley said. Soame burst out laughing.

    “Perhaps another wager! You wouldn’t want to separate a cavalryman from his mount would you?”

    “I’ve always thought the cavalry could use some humility on occasion, perhaps riding into Montreal on a mule much as our Lord Christ did so long ago at Jerusalem would serve that purpose.”

    “Sir those are fighting words!” Soame said with mock severity and Wolseley grinned.

    “Then thank God I’m a fighting man, for its fighting men we need! Come then, I’ll have Lough bring us some dinner before I set to packing my things, then maybe we can see about finding something nicer about this part of the Empire before I’m shipped off to the edge of the earth.”


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    Well here's one last one before Christmas! Hopefully I can crank out another before the New Year but I'm not so sure! Hopefully it's enjoyed and we will get back to the meat of things in a dew weeks time :)
     
    Chapter 19: Come All You Bold Canadians
  • Chapter 19: Come All You Bold Canadians
    Come all ye bold Canadians,
    I'd have you lend an ear
    Unto a short ditty
    Which will your spirits cheer,
    Concerning an engagement
    We had at Detroit town,

    The pride of those Yankee boys
    So bravely we took down.
    The Yankees did invade us,
    To kill and to destroy,
    And to distress our country,
    Our peace for to annoy,

    Our countrymen were filled
    With sorrow, grief and woe,
    To think that they should fall
    By such an unnatural foe.

    Come all ye bold Canadians,
    Enlisted in the cause,
    To defend your country,
    And to maintain your laws;

    Being all united,
    This is the song we'll sing:
    Success onto Great Britain
    And God save the King.

    - Canadian Marching tune composed in 1812, attributed to private Cornelius Flummerfelt of the Third York Militia.

    “Spring had, as is the case in our fair country, turned the roadways to quagmire and flooded the roads disturbing our ability to drill for some time, and making a great mess of the fortifications being constructed across the Province. It did though, prove quite fortuitous in deterring Yankee aggression for a time. It was of little concern to many then though, as such was the energy displayed the populace of the province that normal times seemed forgotten. Instances of devotion to Queen and country were general. Business matters were but a secondary consideration. Merchants and their clerks left their shops, students their colleges, professional men their offices, farmers and craftsmen left their fields and workshops to take up their rifles to assist in the national defence. Those who were obliged by age or infirmities to stay at home were not idle, but nobly did their part in raising funds to assist the families of those bread-winners who had gone to serve in the Volunteer battalions. All over the country large sums were raised for this purpose, and the patriotic Relief Committees were exceptionally busy attending to the proper distribution of food and supplies, both among the Volunteers and the needy families who were depending upon them.

    As the politicians had been so alarmed by the events in the Caribbean with the hostile boarding of the R.M.S. Trent and the firing on of HMS Terror and the border troubles at St. Albans and Franklin, they had the foresight to call to arms the whole of our body of existing militia in November of 1861. Come 1862 they had brought yet more willing volunteers to arms, and there were some 50,000 men under arms by May.

    The Province had been divided into military districts, three in Canada West and two in Canada East. In Canada West the military districts were headquartered on London, Toronto, and Kingston respectively, while in Canada East they were headquartered in Montreal and Quebec. The Province had its own military districts in each province, but the active forces were placed under the Imperial designations upon the outbreak of hostilities to avoid confusion amongst the staff. Commanding the Volunteer forces in the West were a number of respectable militia officers.

    Commanding in Military District No. 1 London was Col. James Shanly, a prominent barrister who had involved himself with the militia movement since 1856 when he had organized the London Field Battery. Of good Irish stock he was an able administrator and proved himself invaluable in the opening months in handling the tasks at that most important city, having fortified Coombs Mound in the early spring.

    In Military District No. 2, Toronto, of course my father was in command of the forces of the Volunteers. Such a long and prestigious militia career such as his made the choice only natural. With the organizing of our own troop of cavalry since the 1837 rebellions and my father’s service there and my uncle Richard commanding the Toronto field battery since 1858, my family was prominent in the ranks of the Volunteers of York County.

    In Military District No. 3 there was a curious case of a regular officer also commanding the Volunteers. Col. Hugh P. Bourchier had a long and distinguished career in Her Majesties Imperial service. Having joined the army in 1814 he came to Canada’s shores in 1837 with the 93rd Regiment to put down the rebellion. In 1838 he became the adjutant at Fort Wellington before becoming the town major of Kingston. He helped organize the militia companies in 1855 and was a driver in the organization of the new battalions in 1861-62 and commanded Her Majesties forces at Fort Henry and Kingston. Due to these duties command of the Volunteer brigade fell to David Shaw, a solid Orangemen of good loyalist stock with experience in the militia companies since 1856.

    The ardor shown by the people of the Province paid great dividends in turning out men to drill, with over 50 battalions of Volunteers armed and organized. My own specialty was the cavalry however, and our troop, the York Dragoons, or more informally Denison’s troop, was attached to the new Canadian regiment, the 1st Canadian Volunteer Dragoons[1], under Lt. Col. D’Arcy E. Boulton, a stout local businessman who had first commanded mounted troops in 1837 at 23. He fell naturally into military life and worked hard to mold us into an effective unit. We were attached to the blooming 1st Division under Major General George Napier…” Soldiering In Canada, Recollections and Experiences of Brigadier General George T. Denison III, Toronto Press 1900[2]
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    Lt. General Sir Henry Dundas
    “Upon my assignment to Canada West I was placed under command of Lt. General Henry Dundas, a reliable old Scot who had served since 1819. He had served in Canada in 1837 putting down the rebellion there with much vigor, making his choice to command in Canada West was a natural one. With great service in India in 1847, capturing the fortress at Multan and helped smash the Sikhs at Gujrat before returning to Britain to take command in Scotland until 1860[3]. He had appealed to the Duke in order to obtain a posting in Canada and so came to command in Canada West. I was placed on his staff alongside other such capable officers as Patrick MacDougall the chief of the staff, John Wayland the chief aide-de-camp, and Richard Mountain, who was drilling the militia artillery.

    He had established his headquarters in the Queens Hotel of Toronto where he maintained easy communications with all points on the frontier. We were also kept in contact with our forces afloat through the person of Captain John Bythesea, VC. A regular war hero who had so ably demonstrated his courage in the Baltic under Dundas, the brother of our General Dundas. I daresay had it not been for him the forces available to us on Lake Ontario would have suffered much for it.

    Our forces in the field were under the command of perhaps the most mismatched pair of officers to have ever served together. One of course was Randall Rumley who had thirty years of experience under his belt. Most of his service had been with the Rifles and he was an infantry training specialist by reputation, something sorely needed by the Canadians in those early years, but had not seen any active service in the field prior to 1862.

    Commanding the division which was based out of London however was the newly minted Major General George T. C. Napier. Useless for any military purpose he was not considered a shining light by his peers. In that case my orders both from headquarters and Dundas specified I should “coach” him and prevent him from doing anything too foolish. Indeed he seemed delighted to have by him someone whose advice he could follow. Though in private a charming man, he was at all times useless as a military commander, and yet he was a fair specimen of the men then usually selected for military commands.

    After a brief stay in Toronto where I familiarized myself with the local organization of the militias and appointed a man to act in my place on the staff I went by train to London with a troop of volunteers for company.

    That part of the province which London is situated in is picturesque. Good green rolling country, crisscrossed by springs and rivers it is rich in agriculture with numerous small farms and orchards along the roads. The industrious nature of the Anglo-Saxon race is much in evidence with mills all along the rivers and many fine shops worked by the good peoples of the province. The more entrepreneurial nature of an Englishman freed from the base nature of French priestcraft thrived amongst the populace, which was well evidenced by the numerous towns and cities, in stark contrast to the rural and dour nature of the French in Quebec.

    London is the local seat of government in Middlesex County, an industrious city of 11,000 in those days. Its great importance was as a hub of rail travel for the Grand Trunk railroad leading to Detroit and the Great Western railroad connecting Sarnia to Hamilton, and numerous gravelled roads moving out from the city like spokes on a wheel besides. As such its control made an advance by the enemies from the Detroit frontier to the interior impossible without being contested, and left any advance up the Niagara frontier open from the flank, increasing the hazards any enemy force operating alone from either side might face.

    My first duty upon reaching London was the surveillance of our position there. Unfortunately it was an unenviable position for even a well-trained army to find itself in possession of. The position was separated by the Thames River, at that point flooded, and though there was high ground which protected the city at Coombs Mound and Komoka, these positions could not support one another in case of battle. Though they shielded the roads south and west from Chatham and north and west from Windsor, they were not suitable for the covering of the town, and despite my protests Napier insisted on selecting these positions to fight the coming battle at…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903[4]
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    Major General George Napier
    “By the spring of 1862 armies north and south of the border had been gathering for war. To the south, a large force had been gathered from all the armies previously turned against the Confederate forces in the West. Now though they stood ready in two armies facing the British in Canada.

    The newly created Department of the Lakes encompassed a broad swathe of the border from Michigan to the borders of Vermont. It was this great area which now lay under the responsibility of Major General Henry Halleck. Balding with gray mutton-chop side whiskers he looked considerably older in his years than he was, and had earned the nickname “Old Brains” amongst his fellow officers. His service in Mexico and his writings thereafter had distinguished him as a great military theorist amongst his peers, and his choice to command that vast front had been seen as obvious. He had gathered a creditable staff, both from his command in the West and from men who had come to the colors once again. These included his chief of staff Col. Carlos Waite, a long time veteran of 1812, and his chief engineer 53 year old Col. George Callum whose years of experience constructing bridges and fortifications would prove invaluable in the coming campaign.

    Commanding the newly christened “Army of the Niagara” or I Corps, Department of the Lakes, was Major General Charles F. Smith. The 55 year old Smith was a tall, handsome, long time service veteran who had graduated West Point in 1825 with distinction and had served as an instructor in that academy only four years after graduating. Serving in the artillery and infantry, he was brevetted three times for bravery in Mexico. He participated in military boards to devise new artillery mounts, and served in the Red River expedition of 1856 and the abortive Utah War of 1859-1860. Before the outbreak of the civil war he found himself briefly commanding the department of Maryland before being dispatched by his old chief, General Scott, to Kentucky where he displayed ample ability in preparing that state for war. He served under Grant at the battle of Fort Donelson, and was seen as instrumental in overrunning the Confederate entrenchments which lead to the surrender of the garrison. His choice to command the force then assembling to invade Canada was thus a natural one.
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    Major General Charles F. Smith
    He was at the head of an army, which though not entirely green like his Canadian counterparts, was one with mixed abilities. Fractious attitudes reigned between the officers, and many men had been pilfered from three different armies in the West, making their drill and training together from March to May of 1862 crucial in their early time in the field.

    Under him were four divisions worth of troops, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers, totalling over 30,000 men. Each division commanded by men who had been blooded in the Western theater.

    The first division was under the command of Brigadier General John McArthur, a Scottish immigrant to the United States he had been appointed colonel of the 12th Illinois Infantry and rose rapidly in the ranks to Brigadier General of Volunteers, leading a brigade with distinction at Donelson. His foreign mannerisms well on display, he eccentrically adopted the Scottish hat for himself and his men followed in that, earning his force the nickname of the “Scottish Division” after its commanding officer. The second division was under the command of Brigadier General Jacob Ammen, who had taken command for William Nelson who had returned to naval service on Lake Ontario. Ammen was a graduate of West Point in 1831 with honors and specializing in artillery and mathematics, he had retired to civilian life in 1837 to teach, but rejoined upon the outbreak of war and first seen action at Cheat Mountain in 1861. In the third division command rested upon the shoulders of Brigadier Benjamin Prentiss, a Virginian born loyalist to the Union he had served previously in the Mexican War and now commanded a division against the British. Finally the fourth division rested in the hands of Brigadier John M. Palmer. The 44 year old politician had never served in uniform before, but he made up for that shortcoming with remarkable determination and forthright character. Speaking his mind and riding his men hard he had worked his way to commanding a division without seeing a single full scale battle.
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    From left to right: McArthur, Ammen, Prentiss, Palmer

    These forces formed part of a broader stratagem by the Union in the spring of 1862. Lincoln and his generals knew that it would be unacceptable for the Union to merely sit on the defensive, with that came down the strategy of 1862. The cabinet knew that it needed to protect its coasts while also delivering a blow to the rebellion, but it needed a way to damage Britain, if not materially at least in prestige to force her to the negotiating table. Thus the obvious strategy of targeting Canada came about, and as one military theorist who served in that contest would later say: “There with Kingston and Montreal, by their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada, along and above the St. Lawrence, with the Sea Power of Great Britain. Then, as in the conflict of 1812, there was the direction for offensive operations.” Such stratagems rested perfectly with the Jominian view of war as espoused by Halleck.

    So he directed a long flanking movement with Smith’s army, designed to stretch the resources of British and Canadians thin, and to strike at the vital positions necessary to command the St. Lawrence. Palmer’s division would be sent across the Detroit frontier to push the British, while Ammen’s division would cross at Prescott and take Fort Wellington. Meanwhile, the major invasion force, directly under Smith’s command consisting of Prentiss and McArthur’s divisions would cross the Niagara frontier with the goal of pushing the British forces back to Kingston where they could be trapped and compelled to surrender.

    However, despite the knowledge that speed was essential, and timing supremely important, Halleck dithered until mid-May, fixating a ensuring that each wing of his army be prepared to march at the exact same time to pin the British in place. When the armies finally did begin advancing on the morning of May 17th, the British were well prepared to meet them.

    The invasion began in the early hours of the morning, just prior to dawn. On the Niagara frontier the British brigade under Col. James T. Mauleverer, a veteran of frontier fighting in India and Africa with service in the Crimean War at the Alma and Inkermen, led a bag of the best troops the Canadian Volunteers had to offer. Comprising of the Volunteer battalions from Toronto and York county, most of these men had been drilling since November of the previous year, and each unit had an attached wing of regular troops to act as stiffeners in the defence. The 2nd Battalion of Volunteer Infantry (the Queens Own) under Lt. Col. William Smith Durie, a long time militia officer, had been formed in 1860 and as such had been called out in November in response to the border raids. The 10th Battalion of Volunteer infantry was younger, having been formed provisionally in November and established officially at the beginning of December under Lt. Col. Frederic Cumberland. Finally there was the 12th Battalion of Volunteers, also formed in December under Lt. Col John Worthington. They had been drilling alongside the 30th Foot since December, even as a brigade, and thus were well prepared for the opening battles. The addition of a “wing” of soldiers from the 30th meant each battalion was over 1000 men strong.

    Scattered from Niagara to Chippewa, and Fort Erie, they occupied temporary fortifications, not meant to engage in direct battle, but slow the invaders and harass their flanks. This would be done with the support of the 1st Canada Dragoons under Lt. Col. Boulton who had attached a troop to each battalion, and two more at Mauleverers headquarters at Thorold, putting fully half the units’ strength on the peninsula.

    Diversionary landings were made at Queenston and Chippewa by McArthur’s division, but the full might of Prentiss’s division and a detached brigade from McArthur’s landed at Fort Erie on the morning the 17th. Crossing the lake from Buffalo under the guns of the “Lake Erie Squadron” under Commodore Silas Stringham in the USS Michigan, the only actual warship on the Lakes, a horde of steamers, tugs, and barges deposited the American troops on the Canadian shore. The invasion alarm flashed out across the country by telegram, and the forces which had been readying for war since November began embarking for positions chosen in the previous months…

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    The Niagara Frontier[5]

    …On the Detroit frontier, only a single division had been tasked with making a sweeping attack from Windsor to Sarnia. Palmer’s Division, supported by a single brigade of Michigan militia and Home Guards, crossed the frontier. Palmer and his main force crossed from Detroit, while a reinforced brigade crossed at Sarnia and advanced towards Komoka. Palmer and his attached force laid siege to the newly reoccupied Fort Malden. After two days, with just enough resistance to satisfy honor, the single Royal Canadian Rifle company and attached militia gunners under Captain Alexander Gibson surrendered, hauling down the Union Jack to see the Stars and Stripes raised above the old fort made it the first post in British North America to surrender to an enemy since 1812.

    Palmer’s force was, after detaching its militia element to act as the garrison on the Detroit frontier, totalling 7,500 men and 18 guns. Comprised thusly:

    4th Division, I Corps, Department of the Lakes: BG John M. Palmer commanding

    1st Brigade (Col. James R. Slack): 34th Indiana, 47th Indiana, 43rd Indiana
    2nd Brigade: (Col. Graham N. Fitch) 46th Indiana, 22nd Missouri, 64th Illinois “Yates Sharpshooters”

    Division Artillery: 2nd Battery Iowa Artillery (Cpt. Nelson T. Spoor), 7th Battery, Wisconsin Artillery: (Cpt. Richard R. Griffiths), Battery C, 1st Michigan Artillery (Cpt A. W. Dees)

    7th Illinois Cavalry (Col. William P. Kellog)

    Palmer’s forces advanced east towards London, skirmishing with Canadian militia the whole way. The militia troops fell back towards London, aiming only to slow the invaders down. As the telegraph wires flashed out the invasion signal, troops began advancing to their positions.

    Major General Napier had command of the 2nd Division, Upper Canada Field Force, which had been tasked with defending London and stopping any American advance inland. His force, totalling some 8,800 men and 18 guns was arranged like so:

    2nd Division, Upper Canada Field Force: MG George T. Napier Commanding

    Division Troops: 2nd Canadian Field Brigade (Maj. John Peters), 3rd Canadian Volunteer Dragoons (Maj. Norman T. Macleod) 5cos

    1st Brigade, (BG. Charles Fordyce) 2nd Royal Canadian Rifles, 22nd Battalion “Oxford Rifles”, 26th “Middlesex” Battalion Volunteer Rifles,

    2nd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Edward Newdigate), 23rd “Essex” Battalion of Infantry, 24th “Kent Battalion of Infantry, 25th “Elgin” Battalion

    3rd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Henry R. Brown), 31st “Grey” Battalion of Infantry, 32nd Battalion of Infantry, 33rd Battalion of Infantry

    Support Troops: London Garrison, Col. James Shanley, 56th Battalion of Infantry, London company of Foot Artillery

    Despite being a relatively flat piece of country, the cavalry for the division was lacking. Most of the battalions had only been raised relatively recently in December and January, and had drilled sporadically with the Royal Canadian Rifles. Their artillery, under the newly organized “2nd Canadian Field Brigade” had been formed from the London Field Battery, and the companies of foot artillery from Goderich and London. Though the London field battery had received a battery of modern Armstrong 12pdr field guns, the two other batteries were armed with cast off militia 9pdr field guns and 12pdr howitzers.

    The second brigade, under Newdigate, was comprised mainly of men whose homes were in the direct path of the American invasion. As such they were the first to draw blood when Palmer crossed the border. They withdrew, and delayed this force as long as they could. Palmer worked to re-establish communications with his 1st Brigade under Slack, but his own deficiency in cavalry meant he was mostly out of contact with his second brigade. His force though, advanced along Egremont Road, until they arrived just outside the village of Komoka where Napier’s 3rd Brigade under Brown was established. He would wait for three days before he received word from Slack, but when he did the battle was joined on June 2nd…” – For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

    -----

    1] This is a completely original unit created by the British to mould the Volunteer cavalry into a more cohesive and effective fighting unit. I created it by combining the various volunteer cavalry companies in Canada West to create roughly regiment sized cavalry squadrons to attach to each Volunteer division.

    2] Like other period sources some of this is word for word from Mr. Denison himself, and others bits of my own creation for the narrative.

    3] Sharp eyed readers might remember him from last time.

    4] Again bits of this are Wolseley’s writings and bits are entirely fictional.

    5] Yeah it's the map from 1866, but sue me!
     
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    Chapter 20: The Invasion of Canada: Part 2
  • Chapter 20: The Invasion of Canada: Part 2

    "The day was hot, I was thirsty, and we knew the Yankee's were coming." - Veteran of the Queens Own Rifles describing the Battle of Lime Ridge[6]

    “The mettle of the Canadians was first tested when the enemy crossed the Detroit frontier. Col. Newdigate did admirable work in slowing their advance to the interior, but a single brigade, no matter how well led cannot hold such a flat country against an invader. Especially a force such as ours, which was woefully deficient in cavalry for reconnaissance purposes, meaning we had to often rely on local guides or citizens for information which was simple hearsay or rumour more often than not.

    The enemy had a force of approximately 8,000 men at his disposal, nearly equal in numbers to our own. I was able to observe the fighting from my position with Napier’s headquarters in Coombs Mound, and thus can relate much of the battle. The enemy first advanced upon our position at the Delaware Cross Roads where he engaged the defenders under, Newdigate who held firm despite hot fire and a skillfully employed cannonade. The enemy, thus with our southern flank emplaced, turned his attention to those forces in that unenviable position on Komoka.

    It was there that the fire was hottest, and I later learned that amongst the forces of the enemy was a unit of Yankee sharpshooters. Having read about the mischief they caused for us in their Revolution and in the 1812 war, I saw that they did their legacy proud that day. In the space of one hour, the battalion commanders for each militia battalion were killed or wounded, which greatly demoralized the Canadian defenders. General Napier was slow to react to this threat to the northern flank, and despite having a strong reserve of 2,000 men he hesitated in the face of determined attack. It was this hesitation which would cost us the battle.

    The sharpshooters having done their terrible work, our force was met with a well handled bayonet charge. The lack of remaining officers, and the demoralized state of those forces caused the militia of the 3rd Brigade to break in the wildest confusion. Even though we possessed the strength to plug such a gap, Napier dawdled in sending in the reserve, and when the militia at Delaware Cross Roads saw the rout of their fellows, the bugle call for withdrawal was mistakenly sent up. Though order might have been restored, it was too late. The withdrawal had become general, and Napier seemed to lose what little nerve he possessed with it. It was then left to our reserve under Brigadier General Fordyce to stall the Yankee pursuit, and in conjunction with our guns atop Coombs Mound, they could not mount a hasty attack and thankfully many men would live to eat their dinner at the bivouac that night.

    Speaking with my own significant experience of the Canadian Militia, who I have every reason to think highly of, I should believe that had they been well led that day we should never have been forced to withdraw. Instead they were led to a panic by their own officers, who at that time were not well drilled in the ways of war. Instead they had been mishandled by our commanding officer and taught the childish barrack maneuvers which were perfectly useless in the field. And so we were compelled to withdraw up the highway, protecting the immense train carriage which withdrew our heavy equipment.

    Though many of my colleagues have attempted to use this battle at London to disparage the fighting prowess of the Canadian militia, I would simply direct them to the events of Lime Ridge or Doran Creek to assuage them of that opinion…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903

    canadian-riflemen.jpg

    The Royal Canadian Rifles skirmishing with Palmer's Division

    “My troop was assigned to the headquarters of Colonel Mauleverer alongside that of Captain Teeter’s and it was there we learned the enemy had crossed the frontier. Much to my consternation our first week of the war was spend as messengers, delivering news to the front and in return as the Yankee’s cut the telegraph wires. Though they had landed on the 17th, their position was widely spread out and the enemies formations spent much time connecting with one another from the 17th to the 20th as their forward elements moved inland.

    My first contact came with the enemy at St. David’s on May 22nd 1862. We had ridden in support of the 12th Volunteers under Lt. Col. Worthington, as he withdrew from Niagara against the enemies formations there. The day was damp, and the mud would have made the enemies advance precipitous at best, but on he came. When my troop arrived the 12th was engaged in withdrawing up the Queenston Road, but their flank was engaged by a party of the enemy concealed in the woods. Unable to ride them down I led my men around the wooded copse of trees, where I left a dozen good men to watch the horses, while the remaining forty of us advanced upon the enemy. We came upon him in the woods, and we opened fire with our old Victoria Carbines, weapons far better for scaring horses than killing men, and exchanged shot with him for over an hour driving him from the wood. However, our victory was short lived, as the enemy had the numbers and we were forced to withdraw in the direction of St. Catherines with the infantry.

    It is here that I should relate the bravery of one of our newest members of the troop, a young trooper named John James. He proved himself most formidable in the skirmish, and with a whooping war cry like some Indian brave he had spent much of the skirmish popping in and out from behind various logs, making it appear like our company was more like a battalion. Cool under fire he had crawled forward to where a downed enemy lay and taken his pistol for himself, thereby making off with a second Colt revolver like the remainder of our corps used.

    Though we would bivouac for two days at St. Catherines, our stay there was cut short by the Yankee’s landing at Port Colbourne on May 25th. An audacious landing of 2,000 men under the protection of the enemy fleet was undertaken and thus upended our forward defence. It had been our hope that we could prevent the enemy from advancing further inland, but with the enemy supreme in Lake Erie and contesting the waters of Lake Ontario, it was a forlorn hope. Our unhappy task was then to cover the engineers as they sabotaged the Welland canal to deny its use to the enemy and then withdraw towards Hamilton to rendezvous with the remainder of the division under Major General Rumley.

    Our retreat was joined by throngs of citizens fleeing the depravations of the Yankees. Young and old alike had strapped their belongings to carts, drove their flocks ahead of them, rode with heavy saddlebags, or walked with their worldly belongings in hand. It brings at once to mind the flight of the Loyalists from the savagery of the so-called Patriots in the American Revolutionary War. For many they would be running for some time against the onslaught of Yankee raiders.

    Amongst the desperation though, were true stories of bravery and stout heartedness of the local populace. On the frontier itself many men were former soldiers of the Queen’s forces settling themselves into a simpler life. One man, former Captain Lewis Palmer who had served in the 1812 war and the Rebellions of 1837-38, saw the approaching Yankee’s and despite being much advanced in age, mounted his horse and galloped about the countryside to give warning to his neighbors, before disappearing himself to cause mischief for the invader. Another veteran of those conflicts, Henry F. Angur, who though crippled by gout and at the age of 69, encouraged his family to leave without him as “he had survived two wars, and would risk a third” in this fashion he would harangue a column of Yankee cavalry so crossly that their officer would apologize for the destruction of his and his neighbors picket fences and even pay compensation for the damaged properties! It was thanks to the quick wit of one engineer of the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railroad which would save two railcars from American capture. 21 year old Robert Larmour was roused by the sounds of ruckus from the harbor as the Yankee’s landed and managed to steam up two engines of that rail line in and slip them away from the invaders in a wild chase, but for his actions all three engines would have fallen into American hands and eased their passage inland.[7]

    Despite this heroism we were forced to steadily give ground as the number of American troops grew daily. By the start of June there were some 15,000 advancing inland towards Toronto. Our troops steadily withdrew, not easing the passage of the enemy one mile, but slowly we were pushed back to our defensive positions on the outskirts of Hamilton. General Dundas had, in accordance with our engineers, chosen an excellent defensive site near the old Stoney Creek battlefield.

    Lime Ridge is a limestone ridge which joins the local highlands above the city of Hamilton and overlooking Burlington Bay. It extends at a rough 90 degree angle along the coast, overlooking both the Queen’s Highway, the Great Western Railway on the lake shore, and observing the Thorold Road leading to the interior. At 90 feet in height a frontal assault is an impossibility, allowing guns to cover the roadways, and the infantry a relative position of safety from the enemy. Each flank has a weakness however, on the lake shore it may be assaulted in conjunction with gunboats, while the position at Albion Mills might be attacked by a force coming up the Thorold Road. However, each point had been strengthened by earthworks and covered with many guns, which General Rumley had spent many weeks inspecting by this point. By June 3rd our whole force had been collected, and numbered some 9,000 Volunteers and British troops.

    The enemy had made good time in his pursuit in spite of our efforts, and he endeavored to break us here. I learned later that their commanding officer, Major General Charles Smith, had served in their war in Mexico, and so felt we would be in for a rough fight. He was skillful in his attack, directing a feint against the lakeside entrenchments up Barton Road along Albion Creek and probing our works there. Knowing his ships were driven to distraction by the daring do of Captain Bythesea, he gambled his assault on our more vulnerable landward position at Albion Mills.

    Our positions were outlined as follows. On the Highway leading to Hamilton manning the earthworks was the 2nd Brigade under Col. Thomas Ross, comprised of the13th, 19th, and 20th Battalions of Volunteer Infantry. Col. Mauleverer’s 1st Brigade was atop the ridge, constituting a reserve. The 3rd Brigade under Col. Baron, John De Courcy comprising the 27th, 28th, and 30th Battalions of Volunteer Infantry, stiffened by the 45th which had withdrawn from Port Colbourne.

    Our rear was protected by the Hamilton Garrison under Col. Booker who held the 38th Battalion in the city, while the 39th was guarding our lines of communication with Toronto.

    Lt. Col. Boulton had the Dragoons protecting the flanks, skirmishing with the Yankee riders when the battle started, and I was present at Albion Mills when the attacks first came…” – Soldiering In Canada, Recollections and Experiences of Brigadier General George T. Denison III, Toronto Press 1900

    Action%2Bat%2BEccles%2BHIll%2BNDM-2.jpg

    Canadian militia skirmishing with Smith's scouts.

    “As Smith moved inland, his engineers repaired bridges and railroads, establishing supply depots at Fort Erie and Port Colbourne fueling the American advance inland. He pursued Rumley’s retreating forces to the Welland Canal, where after the daring landing of Sweeney’s brigade he bypassed the British lines compelling their withdrawal.

    Upon reaching the defences erected by Rumley he paused awaiting word from Palmer on his advance, upon which so much of his campaign was dependent. When he received word of London’s fall he was ecstatic and ordered the attack for the next day on June 6th. McArthur’s brigade was assigned to test the British defences on the lake shore, while Prentiss’s brigade would assault the British positions at Albion Mills in the hope of unhinging their lines and sweeping the British force into Hamilton.

    The two divisions were organized as such:

    1st Division (BG John McArthur)

    1st Brigade: (Col. Isaac C. Pugh) 9th, Illinois, 12th Illinois, 41st Illinois, 7th Illinois
    2nd Brigade: (Col. Thomas W. Sweeney) 50th Illinois, 52nd Illinois, 12th Iowa, 52nd Indiana, 13th Missouri
    3rd Brigade: (Col. Jacob G. Lauman) 2nd Iowa, 7th Iowa, 14th Iowa, Birge's Western Sharpshooters

    3rd Division (BG Benjamin M. Prentiss)

    1st Brigade (Col. Everett Peabody) 21st Missouri, 25th Missouri, 16th Wisconsin, 12th Michigan
    2nd Brigade (Col. Madison Miller) 18th Missouri, 61st Illinois, 16th Iowa
    3rd Brigade (Col. John Turchin) 19th Illinois, 15th Iowa, 23rd Missouri, 18th Wisconsin

    The attack began at 10am June 6th with McArthur’s leading brigade, Pugh’s, attacking against the British works on Albion Creek as a diversion. His guns kept up a steady cannonade on the British positions there and on the heights in order to try and tie the defenders down. His remaining two brigades demonstrated against the base of the ridge for effect, and moved as if to support Pugh, but in reality they were simply covering for Prentiss attack.

    Prentiss attack began well with his leading division under Peabody coming on the Canadians as they were having breakfast, but the quick wits of their officers allowed them to recover, and repulse Peabody’s attack. The nature of the terrain chosen by the British allowed them to attack their attackers in a small ravine which lead to the low ground, breaking up the main thrust of Peabody’s brigade and diverting the second wave under Miller to the flank where it was hoped the Canadians would be less prepared, instead they found the vicious fighting of Stone Church.

    Properly known as Barton Stone Church, it had been constructed in 1847 on the site of a former Lutheran Church it was eventually bought up by American Presbyterians who took charge of the property in 1850. In 1862 Reverend Anthony Gill was managing the congregation and would be well regarded in the aftermath of the battle for his ministrations to the wounded.

    However, it had been absorbed by the militia for very un-Christian purposes. The Church now formed a strong point in a series of entrenchments dotting the high ground behind both Stone Church Road and the Thorold Road which ended at Rosseau Creek securing the positions flanks. Here the militia of the 30th Battalion made their stand against the men of Peabody’s attack, and then Miller’s as the action became general. This point was considered crucial to the defence and so they hung on tenaciously, egged on by their battalion’s commanding officer John Fitzroy De Courcy.

    A nobleman of Anglo-Irish descent he was a career soldier in the British army, joining the 47th Regiment of Foot at the age of 17 in 1838. He was also a decorated veteran of the Crimea. He had also faced the Americans before in the stand-off over the San Juan Islands, the abortive “Pig War” which had made his series of decisions leading up to May of 1862 very confusing to follow. De Courcy was a fighter, not much else. So when the prospect of war beckoned to the south he decided that rather than moldering away from the fighting he would volunteer to lead a regiment of Union forces against the South, appointed command of the 16th Ohio Volunteer Infantry in 1861. However, as the rumours of war between the Union and Britain had deepened. He had felt it his duty to resign his commission and travel north to offer his services in Canada, where he was soon appointed a brevet Colonel and drilling a brigade of militia. The Canadian militiamen soon shared the opinion of the Union men he had commanded in that he was “cruel, but fair.” It was this disciplinarian attitude which allowed them to hold firm against two attacks, before finally facing their most pressing challenge yet.

    John%2BFitzroy%2BDe%2BCourcy-2-3.jpg

    John Fitzroy De Courcy
    The 3rd Brigade of Prentiss’s Division was John Basil Turchin, or as he had previously been known, Ivan Vasilyevich Turchaninov. Turchin was a combat veteran from the Imperial Russian Army. He had fought in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, as well as in the Crimean War against the British seeing action at Balaclava. After the war he would marry the daughter of his commanding officer, Nadezhda (or Nadine) Lovow and would immigrate to the United States in 1856. While there he grew to love his new country writing “I have to thank America for one thing. This country helped me destroy my nobleman’s ideals and put me on the level of an ordinary person. I am not afraid of any kind of work, no matter what situation I am in. It does not matter to me… I have been reborn.” Upon the outbreak of war he naturally sided with the North. He quickly rose through the ranks, soon commanding a brigade of Midwesterners who, much like their commander, felt a great deal of disdain for their foreign aristocratic opponents. They had in their minds, a score to settle.

    turchin.png

    John Basil Turchin

    That two noblemen, one reformed and the other a symbol of foreign aristocracy could end up at the head of brigades of more democratically minded soldiers is perhaps emblematic of this conflict. However, few had time for high ideals or romantic notions of war on that hot June day, and it soon turned to a contest of bullets and bayonets.

    Turchin’s brigade led the renewed charge, led by his former regiment, the 19th Illinois. The fighting at the church was bloody, with men sniping one another amongst the gravestones of the church yard. De Courcy was in the middle of the fray, urging his men on, and eventually taking the graveyard back pushing out a determined assault by the 19th, he would be wounded twice that day, but despite the exhortations of his men, he refused to withdraw. Soon the vigor of Miller’s assault began to push and the militia were forced slowly but surely back.

    However, this was when Rumley chose to commit his reserve, and Col. Mauleverer’s 1st Brigade rejoined the fray. The committal of perhaps the most veteran troops in Canadian ranks turned the tide and Prentiss was forced to withdraw. Smith, seeing his gamble failed, judged it would be prudent to end the day’s fighting and ordered his men to withdraw in the direction of St. Catherine’s at 2pm. The Canadians were left holding the ridge, and victorious. Over the course of battle the Canadians had suffered 1,100 killed, wounded and captured, while the Americans lost 2,600 to all causes.

    The victory would be short lived though, as news of Napier’s defeat at London, and Smith’s ambitious turning movement through the countryside at Brantford unhinged the British defensive line around Hamilton, compelling Rumley to withdraw to Toronto, which would begin the long retreat. This might have demoralized the Canadians had it not been for their taste of victory and the infamous burning of Brantford…”– For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

    -----

    6] Based on a quote spoken by a veteran of Ridgeway in 1930. Funny how there’s more than once Lime Ridge in Canada!

    7] It goes without saying these are all real people. I’ve based their actions primarily off what they did in the historic Fenian raids in 1866.

    As an aside, I had to edit chapter 19 as I made an error in geography, Fort Malden is rather far from Sarnia!
     
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    Chapter 21: Blood and Water
  • Chapter 21: Blood and Water

    Fort Wellington, Canada West, May 17th 1862

    The sun shone fitfully behind a bank of white clouds, and the cool spring air bellied the heat which was surely approaching come summer. George Fulford, well Ensign George Fulford now he supposed, glanced across the river at the Yankee flag billowing proudly in the wind. The Union Jack of course flapped resolutely on the flag pole hanging above Fort Wellington, but the war wouldn’t be won with flags alone.

    That was all the more apparent by both the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle he carried, and the large number of guns poking out from the parapets of the earthworks in front of the fort.

    We’re not all here to love our neighbors. George thought ruefully of Christ’s most sacred commandment and what sacrilege it was to break it. Though I wonder how He would feel if His neighbor was trying to shoot him?

    That was a question for a preacher on Sunday, today he had to worry about ensuring every man in his company was ready to move on the orders of Captain Burke. Burke stood nearby bawling orders to the men of the company of the 41st Battalion of Volunteer Infantry. They were readying to march; the Yankees had landed up river and were preparing to march on Prescott from the north so the news said. The camp was a flurry of activity as men gathered knapsacks and rifles, shakos and boots. The last four months had been nothing but constant drill and marching, the regular officers trying to get the men into shape come the spring when the real fighting would start. George hoped the feeling in the pit of his stomach was just his breakfast disagreeing with him.

    “I don’t understand it.” William Fulford said sliding into place behind him in their section of the column.

    “Understand what?” George asked his son, shifting his pack on.

    “Why did the Yanks cross the river so far away? They can’t ride the train, they’ve cut it in a dozen places between here and Cornwall, why land so far away from us?”

    “Our trenches and artillery are here, and we might bombard Ogdensburg in the fighting, they want to spare their own property as much as we want to spare ours I suspect. Besides, it would be foolish to attack where we’re strongest. Crossing up the river lets ‘em slip barges and boats across where we can’t shoot them full of holes either.”

    “And why not?”

    “Border’s too long and there’s not enough of us.” George said simply as the bugle sounded to move out.

    The infantry moved in column, scouts from their cavalry companies in the lead, and the guns pulled by sturdy draft horses drafted into the army followed behind. Sunshine glinted fitfully off fixed bayonets, the muffled shouts and curses of men and drivers mingled with the whinnies of horses and the braying of mules. Officers rode mounted at the head of their units, and staff officers swarmed in and out of the head of the column like bees in a hive. The column, 3,000 strong was on the move.

    They were off to see the elephant.

    -x-x-x-x-

    “…the decision to attack Prescott was an obvious one. It connected the only secure railroad from Ottawa with Kingston and was the first step to encircling that British possession, and it could be used to threaten the Rideau canal and so cut off Kingston completely, ensuring the forces there were unable to communicate with Montreal and Quebec. This was however, difficult from the American perspective.

    Little more than basic infrastructure existed on the southern shore of the St. Lawrence, and the railroad along the northern bank was in Canadian hands, with the American railroads ending at Ogdensburgh. As the Chief Engineer of the United States Army Joseph Totten had observed back in December: “On that portion of the northern frontier that the Saint Lawrence abounds we have never had any defenses except a small weak redoubt at the mouth of the harbor of Ogdensburg. Every town and habitation upon either shore of this river may be said to lie at all times at the mercy of the shore opposite.” And the British ability to reinforce and supply their side of the frontier in the winter and spring of 1861-62 outstripped that of the Americans.

    Small detachments of Volunteer militia under British officers had seized the important islands in the St. Lawrence and used the large quantity of guns in their possession to fortify these against approach. Though most of these guns were admittedly of small calibre, they were enough to deter anything but a determined assault on these island holdings.

    Fort Wellington threatened the town of Ogdensburg across the river, and the Canadians had placed further guns, meaning that any assault would cost the town dearly. The American forces could not hope to cross at that point, and so were relegated to camps further inland. A crossing though, was a necessity, not just to be able to threaten Fort Wellington from a position of strength, but to cut the river route to Lake Ontario.

    To do this 2nd Division of the Army of the Niagara had been assigned to that section of the front. The 2nd Division, under the command of Jacob Ammen, 56, was composed mainly of men transferred from the Army of Ohio, and as such consisted of men from William Nelson’s division. Ammen was a Virginian born loyalist who had joined the army in 1831 serving in the artillery and was stationed at Charleston Harbor during the Nullification Crisis. Though he had retired in 1837 for a career as a civil engineer when Fort Sumter was fired upon he rejoined the colors, seeing action at Cheat Mountain. Through both skill and determination he rapidly worked his way up the ranks from merely commanding a regiment, to commanding the whole of the Division by May.

    His forces were organized as such:

    2nd Division, I Corps, Department of the Lakes: (BG Jacob Ammen)

    1st Brigade (Col. William Grose) 6th Ohio, 24th, Ohio, 36th Indiana
    2nd Brigade (Col. William B. Hazen) 6th Kentucky, 9th Indiana, 41st Ohio
    3rd Brigade (Col. Sanders D. Bruce) 1st Kentucky, 2nd Kentucky, 20th Kentucky

    Cavalry: (Lt. Col. Edward M. McCook) 3rd Kentucky Cavalry

    Artillery: (Capt. John. Mendenhall) Batteries I, H, and M, 4th US Artillery

    On the morning of May 17th they crossed the St. Lawrence near Morrisburg and began marching inland towards Prescott.

    At Prescott there was a force of approximately 3,000 militia under the command of George Jarvis. The 65 year old colonel had a respectable war record, serving in 1812 at most major battles including Queenston Heights and Lundy’s Lane, commanding a company at age 17. He had retired from the army in 1817, instead serving as a local judge and political figure but retaining an active role in the militia of Stormont County commanding a body of cavalry during the events of 1837-38. This had made him the obvious choice based on his service, career, and social standing to command.

    This force was quartered at Fort Wellington, in a fortified camp well back from the river to protect the surrounding area.

    His force was laid out as such:

    Commander Col. George Jarvis

    18th Battalion “Prescott” Infantry (Lt. Col John Hamilton),
    41st “Brockville” Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col James Crawford), 42nd Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col Jacob D. Buell)

    Prescott Volunteer Cavalry Company (Captain William D. Wood)1cos

    Kingston Field Battery (Captain Thomas Drummond)

    However, he also had 200 men of the 63rd Foot under Major Falkland Paterson. This caused some confusion in the chain of command, as although in the Volunteers Jarvis outranked Paterson, by the law he could not command a unit of regulars. On the morning of the invasion though, this was simplified by the dispatch of the remainder of the 63rd Foot from Kingston under Lt. Col. William F. Carter who carried the rank to command the engagement. He arrived with the 15th and 16th Battalions of Volunteers to stiffen the ranks. Carter had commanded the 63rd in the Russian War and had seen service in all the major battles, including the expedition against Kertch, and so was deferred to by Jarvis.

    Marching east Carter, under advice from Jarvis, deployed his forces on the banks of Doran Creek just to the west of the village of Iroquois. Anchoring his right flank on the St. Lawrence and his left on Black Creek, he entrenched his militia on to the front of the American advance, taking advantage of a rise in the ground before the creek.

    The two forces met the afternoon of the 20th. Ammen’s force was advancing up river, with McCook’s cavalry scouting ahead. They skirmished with the Canadian piquets before advancing towards the Anglo-Canadian positions. After two hours of skirmishing the 2nd Brigade under Col. Hazen who took to skirmishing with the Canadians. The slow progress of the remainder of Ammen’s division up the highway ensured that the first day’s fighting ended in stalemate as dark fell. Ammen arrived and established his headquarters at Parlow’s Farm, and reorganized his troops for the morning assault.

    Carter realized that his forces would be outnumbered come the dawn, and with an unpleasant memory of Inkerman; decided to even the odds of the Canadians on the defence. He maneuvered the 63rd and the 15th Volunteers to a wooded lot in the north, setting up what many today would recognize as an L shaped ambush pattern along the American line of advance up the Queens Highway. From there he expected to engage the Americans on very uneven terms.

    The two sides rested for the night, but shortly after 9am on May 21st 1862, the battle was joined again. As before Hazen’s men advanced up the highway, this time under the cover of Mendenhall’s artillery. As his men came closer to the Canadian positions though, the trap was sprung and a vicious fusillade of deadly accurate rifle fire poured into the unprepared flanks of the American column. The sudden rifle fire from in front and beside spooked the American column, which after ten minutes of fighting, broke and fled. In response, the 1st Brigade under Col. William Grose advanced into the heat of battle.

    Grose, 49, had been born in 1812 and his father had fought in that war under William Henry Harrison, and his grandfather had been killed in the Revolution fighting against the British. His blood was up that day, and he led his brigade while mounted. Advancing methodically he moved his men hard, and despite having his horse shot out from under him he simply picked himself up and waved his sword hollering to his regiment: “Come on lads! Let us see how you deal with these militiamen!” Apocryphally he is said to be the only one to have made it over the Canadian entrenchments before being shot dead, but it is far more likely he, like the rest of his men, never made it past 100 yards. With Grose’s death the spirit of the 1st Brigade broke, and they too fled the field. Ammen, seeing further battle pointless, withdrew that evening. On his way south he sabotaged as much of the rail line as he could, and ordered his men to roll boulders into the Morrisburg Canal to impede any British traffic. Other than harassing him as he retreated, Carter did not have the strength to do more.

    As the sun set on May 21st, the battle of Doran Creek had ended in a Canadian victory…”– For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

    -x-x-x-x-

    May 21st 1862, Doran Creek, Canada West

    Gun smoke hung in the air thick as fog. It stung George Fulford’s eyes and clung to his hands. Men stood in grim silence, faces stained black and blue like a troop of Christy Minstrels on tour. There was no music now though, just the grim shouting of the officers and the piteous cries of the wounded. He peered over the edge of the trench at the backs of the retreating Yankees. The occasional cannon shot still ploughed into the earth announcing they were not quite done yet, but they were leaving, that was clear.

    Most of the gunfire had died out, though he still saw flashes and heard the occasional crack of a rifle in the distance, and thought he could make out flashes in the tree line. He tried very hard not to turn his eyes to the scene directly across the creek, but soon his eyes wandered.

    Blue clad corpses lay in all manner of death pose. Men tumbled over in heaps, others laying down looking almost asleep. Others had gruesome wounds, missing arms, legs, and heads. Worse than that though was the moans that wafted in from the water with the gentle breeze. Horrific cries, some that seemed inhuman, others simply for water, and all too often, men weeping for their mothers.

    Beside him, George knew there was another dead man. His face a perfect picture of perplexity, save for the hole in the top of his head. Flies were beginning to gather in numbers, and already he heard crows calling to one another.

    He roused himself from his kneeling position and stood looking for his son. In the dim light under the smoke it was hard to distinguish one black faced red tuniced man from another, but soon someone pointed him in the right direction.

    He found William sitting, mouthing prayers he hoped, staring wild eyed ahead of him. His rifle was gripped white knuckled in hands that shook too hard to give him much ease of aim. George took his canteen out from around his neck and proffered it to his son. Suddenly startled from his prayers William looked up with uncomprehending eyes. George poured a small dribble on his face and some of the powder residue began oozing off. Not seeming to notice William took the canteen and sucked greedily at it. George waited a moment before quietly pulling it back and taking a seat next to him.

    They sat in silence for a time before William mumbled something. George looked over.

    “What was that boy?”

    “I’ve seen the elephant father.” William said grimly “And he’s an ugly beast.”

    “Aye, that he is boy.” George said sitting back. He went to take a swig of his canteen and found it empty. He sighed. “An ugly beast indeed.”
     
    Appendix: Orders of Battle for the Upper Canada Campaign May - June 1862
  • Appendix: Orders of Battle for the Upper Canada Campaign May - June 1862

    Union Forces:


    Army of the Niagara (I Corps, Department of the Lakes)

    MG Charles F. Smith
    Chief of the Staff: Col. John P. Cook
    Asst. Adjutant General: Capt. Hiram Scofield


    1st Division (BG John McArthur)
    1st Brigade: (Col. Isaac C. Pugh) 9th, Illinois, 12th Illinois, 41st Illinois, 7th Illinois
    2nd Brigade: (Col. Thomas W. Sweeney) 50th Illinois, 52nd Illinois, 12th Iowa, 52nd Indiana, 13th Missouri
    3rd Brigade: (Col. Jacob G. Lauman) 2nd Iowa, 7th Iowa, 14th Iowa, Birge's Western Sharpshooters


    2nd Division (BG Jacob Ammen)
    1st Brigade (Col. William Grose) 6th Ohio, 24th, Ohio, 36th Indiana
    2nd Brigade (Col. William B. Hazen) 6th Kentucky, 9th Indiana, 41st Ohio
    3rd Brigade (Col. Sanders D. Bruce) 1st Kentucky, 2nd Kentucky, 20th Kentucky


    3rd Division (BG Benjamin M. Prentiss)
    1st Brigade (Col. Everett Peabody) 21st Missouri, 25th Missouri, 16th Wisconsin, 12th Michigan
    2nd Brigade (Col. Madison Miller) 18th Missouri, 61st Illinois, 16th Iowa
    3rd Brigade (Col. Ivan Turchin) 19th Illinois, 15th Iowa, 23rd Missouri, 18th Wisconsin


    4th Division (BG John M. Palmer)
    1st Brigade (Col. James R. Slack) 34th Indiana, 47th Indiana, 43rd Indiana
    2nd Brigade (Col. Graham N. Fitch) 46th Indiana, 22nd Missouri, 64th Illinois “Yates Sharpshooters”

    Cavalry Brigade (Col. John A. Bridgeland): 7th Illinois Cavalry, 2nd Indiana Cavalry, 11th Illinois Cavalry,

    Anglo-Canadian Forces:

    Upper Canada Field Force[1]: Lt. Gen. Sir, Henry Dundas

    Staff:
    Chief of the Staff: Col. Patrick MacDougall
    ADC: Capt. John Weyland, RCR
    ADC: Capt. Nathaniel Massey, 30th Foot
    Asst. Quartermaster General: Lt. Col Garnet Wolseley
    Asst. Adjutant General: Maj. Wimburn Laurie
    Commanding Artillery: Lt. Col. Richard F. Mountain
    Commanding Cavalry: Bvt. Lt. Col. Taylor Lambard Mayne

    1st Division MG Randall Rumley[2]
    1st Brigade (Col. James T. Mauleverer) 30th Regiment of Foot, 2nd Battalion of Volunteer Infantry “The Queens Own Rifles of Toronto”, 10th Battalion Volunteer Infantry, 12th Battalion Volunteer Infantry
    2nd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Thomas Ross), 13th Battalion Volunteer Infantry, 19th “Lincoln and Welland” Battalion, 20th “Milton” Battalion Volunteer Infantry
    3rd Brigade (Col. John De Courcy) 27th “Halton” Battalion of Infantry, 28th “Stratford” Battalion of Infantry, 30th “Wellington” Battalion of Infantry

    1st Canadian Field Brigade (Lt. Col William Notman)

    Support Troops: (Hamilton Garrison)(Col. Alfred Booker) 38th Battalion of Rifles, 39th Battalion of Rifles, 45th Battalion of Rifles

    2nd Division MG George T. C. Napier
    1st Brigade, (BG. Charles Fordyce) 2nd Royal Canadian Rifles, 22nd Battalion “Oxford Rifles”, 26th “Middlesex” Battalion Volunteer Rifles,
    2nd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Edward Newdigate), 23rd “Essex” Battalion of Infantry, 24th “Kent Battalion of Infantry, 25th “Elgin” Battalion
    3rd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Henry R. Brown), 31st “Grey” Battalion of Infantry, 32nd Battalion of Infantry, 33rd Battalion of Infantry

    2nd Canadian Field Brigade (Maj. John Peters)

    Support Troops: (London Garrison)(Col. James Shanley) 56th Battalion of Infantry

    Cavalry Brigade: (Brevet Colonel Taylor L. Mayne)
    1st Canadian Volunteer Dragoons (Lt. Col. D’Arcy E Boulton) 10cos, 3rd Canadian Volunteer Dragoons (Maj. Norman T. Macleod, transfers from 2nd York Troop) 5cos,


    Garrison Troops:

    Toronto Garrison: Col. George Denison
    Upper Canada Colored Corps (5cos 474 men)(Maj. Charles C. Grange)
    5th and 10th District militia cos.

    Kingston Garrison: Col. Hugh Bouchier
    63rd Regiment of Foot (right and center wings)
    14th Battalion Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Col David Shaw)
    15th Battalion Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Col Archibald Ponton)
    16th Battalion Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Col Walter Ross)
    Kingston Volunteer Cavalry (Major James Wood)3cos

    Prescott (Fort Wellington Garrison): Col. George Jarvis
    18th Battalion “Prescott” Infantry (Lt. Col John Hamilton)
    41st “Brockville” Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col James Crawford)
    42nd Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col Jacob D. Buell)
    Prescott Volunteer Cavalry Company (Captain William D. Wood)
    Kingston Field Battery (Captain Thomas Drummond)

    -----

    1] All troops are existing militia formations or those created in the mobilization of 1861-62 unless specified otherwise.

    2] Seems I made a mistake in the narrative where I referred to Rumley as Russell. Going to go back and fix this.

    Well there you have it. For ease of reading a complete order of battle for the forces involved in the Upper Canada Campaign thus far! I'll probably do another like this for Canada East once I power my way through that chapter. Hope it helps!
     
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    Chapter 22: The Lion and the Bull
  • Chapter 22: The Lion and the Bull

    "Comme le dit un vieil adage:
    Rien n'est si beau que son pays;
    Et de le chanter, c'est l'usage;
    Le mien je chante à mes amis
    L'étranger voit avec un oeil d'envie
    Du Saint-Laurent le majestueux cours;
    À son aspect le Canadien s'écrie:
    Ô Canada! mon pays! mes amours!

    (English:
    As the old proverb says:
    Nothing is more beautiful than one's country;
    And to sing it is the tradition;
    And mine I sing to my friends
    The stranger looks with an envious eye
    Of the St. Lawrence the majestic course;
    At its aspect the Canadian sings:
    O Canada! my country! my love!)

    O Canada! Mon pays mes amours – originally written by George-Étienne Cartier, unofficial regimental song of the Les Voltiguers du Quebec, 9th Battalion Volunteer Rifles


    “The Anglo-American frontier had not been idle in the time since the British had first crossed it in February on the Maine border and the time when Sumner’s army crossed into Canada come May 17th. In the period since the declaration of war the state of New York had been a frenzy of activity as men and material were shipped north from the warzones on the Potomac, and the arsenals in the lower state. Halleck had also taken up his command post at Albany where he would direct operations against the Province of Canada. Here was connected by rail, river, telegraph and canal with all his forces at the front, and to the industries of New England.

    The Army of the Hudson, which had been forming since March, was four divisions strong and with its attached infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, counted over 50,000 men and 84 guns.

    Commanding the army was major general Edwin V. Sumner. At 65 Sumner had spent over 40 years in the military after enlisting in 1819. He had served in the Black Hawk war in 1832, then fought in Mexico earning two brevets, as well as his nickname “Bull Head” after being struck in the head by a spent round at the Battle of Cerro Gordo. Otherwise he was known as “The Bull of the Woods” for his ability to loudly address his troops and bellow orders. In the period before the Civil War he campaigned against the Cheyenne and attempted to quell the violence during “Bleeding Kansas”, and had been selected to escort Lincoln to his inauguration after his electoral victory in 1860.

    When the Civil War broke out he was commanding the Department of the Pacific, but was rapidly transported east to take command of a formation in spring 1861. When trouble with the British threatened he had been assigned command of a formation of three divisions, then been transferred north to Albany where he took Burnside’s “Coastal Division” under his command. There he had formed the “Army of the Hudson” or the I Corps, Department of the Lakes, into shape.

    200px-Edwin_Vose_Sumner_-_Brady-Handy.jpg

    Edwin V. Sumner

    The army was not green. Each of the division commanders had seen action, whether it was in Mexico or Germany, and most of their men had been blooded in the early fighting in the summer and fall of 1861. In May of 1862 it was organized as such:

    Army of the Hudson: MG Edwin V. Sumner commanding

    Chief of Staff: Col. Alfred Sully
    Commanding Artillery: Col. Francis N. Clarke
    Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Joseph H. Taylor
    ADCs:
    Cpt Louis Philippe d'Orleans
    Cpt Robert d'Orleans
    Cpt Martin T. McMahon

    1st Division BG Israel Richardson
    1st Brigade (BG Oliver O. Howard): 5th New Hampshire, 81st Pennsylvania, 61st New York, 64th New York
    2nd Brigade (BG Thomas F. Meagher): 63rd New York, 68th New York, 88th New York, 28th Massachusetts
    3rd Brigade (BG William H. French): 52nd New York, 57th New York, 66th New York, 53rd Pennsylvania

    2nd Division BG John Sedgwick
    1st Brigade (BG Willis A. Gorman): 82nd New York, 15th Massachusetts, 1st Minnesota
    2nd Brigade (BG William Wallace Burns): 69th, 71st, 72nd and 101st Pennsylvania Infantry
    3rd Brigade (BG Napoleon T. J. Dana): 19th Massachusetts, 20th Massachusetts, 7th Michigan, 47th New York

    3rd Division BG Louis Blenker
    1st Brigade (BG Julius Stahel): 8th New York, 39th New York, 41st New York, 45th New York, 27th Pennsylvania
    2nd Brigade (BG Adolph von Steinwehr): 29th New York Infantry, 68th New York Infantry, 73rd Pennsylvania
    3rd Brigade (BG Henry Bohlen): 54th New York, 58th New York, 74th Pennsylvania, 75th Pennsylvania

    4th Division BG Ambrose Burnside
    1st Brigade (BG John G. Foster): 10th Connecticut, 23rd Massachusetts, 24th Massachusetts, 25th Massachusetts, 27th Massachusetts
    2nd Brigade (BG Jesse L. Reno): 21st Massachusetts, 9th New Jersey, 51st New York, 51st Pennsylvania, 99th New York
    3rd Brigade (John G. Parke): 8th Connecticut, 11th Connecticut, 9th New York, 4th Rhode Island, 5th Rhode Island

    Cavalry Brigade: (Col. George A.H. Blake) 4th New York, 6th New York, 8th Illinois, 5th U.S. Cavalry

    Burnside’s division had been transferred north in early February after Lyons departure as a holding measure. When war was officially declared at the end of February Sumner was dispatched to Plattsburgh to organize his headquarters. Richardson and Sedgwick’s divisions had followed over the thaw and Blenker’s had been entrained north from the West after the victory at Pea Ridge in March. They had drilled over the winter, and in accordance with the plans in Washington, had organized themselves for a march north.

    The 99th New York had been detached to Plattsburgh where they had been put to work converting gunboats for service on Lake Champlain (their original purpose had been to man such vessels for the expedition to the Carolinas) in cooperation with the Navy in order to support a movement north up the Richelieu to attack Montreal.

    The plan as laid down by Halleck was simple as plans went. The Army of the Hudson would march north and take the British fort on Île aux Noix, march up the river and seize the bridge and railroad crossing at St. Jean, then wheel about to besiege Montreal, which lay a mere 40 miles distant from their base at Rouse Point. This they were expecting to accomplish in accompaniment with a general uprising on the part of the French speaking peoples of the Province. This belief had been bolstered over the winter months, both from optimistic reports in the papers of the British needing to garrison the Province in case of rebellion, and from the reports of former members of the Province who had fled in the aftermath of the 1837 rebellions like Edmund O'Callaghan (who would join the Union army as a surgeon). As such when the army marched north in May 1862 most believed they would be greeted as liberators.

    They were soon disabused of this notion…” – To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

    BNA-USA-border-2.png

    The Anglo-American Border 1862

    “The British forces in Montreal had not been idle since the outbreak of war. Williams, after returning from his whirlwind tour of the Province in January, set to work setting out the defences of Montreal and organizing the field force which would protect the city. Through December, Williams had just turned 62, and though the "Lion of Kars" was getting long in the tooth, he was not at all short of energy.

    Williams first task though, was in seeing to the defence of Montreal itself, described as “the commercial capital of the Province, the centre of all great communications, and the principal strategic point in the Province.” To that end he established or re-established fortifications on the island itself and in the river. The fortifications on Saint Helen’s Island had been allowed to decay after a fire in 1848, but in the winter of 1861-62 the Royal Engineers had worked to re-establish some of the fortifications, laying out a series of entrenchments surrounding them. It was also made safe for ships in the river to dock, establishing a station for naval stores there. A heavy battery of guns was established there, along with temporary works on Nun’s Island, Bout de I’lse, and Lachine as well as a redoubt at Vaudreil.

    To man these works, and free up the regulars for work in the field, a strong brigade of volunteer infantry and artillery had been established on the Island of Montreal under Col. John Dyde, a long time militia officer who had been organizing troops since 1855 and had served in the Volunteers during the Rebellions of 1837-38. He had three battalions of Infantry manning the works, and a brigade of garrison artillery under Lt. Col. Robert Tylee. They were supported by the Volunteer Engineer companies of Montreal, as well as two batteries of garrison artillery from the regulars.

    The main field army was being gathered at St. Jean, in order to contest the advance of any force marching up the Richelieu, or to threaten the flank of any force which would attempt to march along the Chateuguay River, and by May had over 25,000 men and 54 guns. This force had been assembling since February, first with the Guards Brigade under Major General Lord Frederick Paulet. Paulet, 52, had enrolled in the Coldstream Guards in 1828 as an ensign, and had advanced in the peacetime army to the rank of Colonel before serving in the Russian War in the Crimea with the Guards Brigade in the battles at Alma, Inkerman, and Balacava. He had been dispatched to North America in the winter of 1861 and taken command of the Guards Brigade, which was stationed at St. Jean, before being elevated to command the First Division, Army of Canada, with the arrival of a second brigade of regulars in January. His division was understrength, thus being the equivalent of a light division. This was due to the refusal of the Guards officers to serve alongside the Colonial militia in brigade, and so to avoid ruffled feathers Williams placed Paulet’s division in reserve.

    By May, two further divisions had been formed from the reinforcement tranches which had arrived both overland during the winter of 1861-62, and come mid-April, directly by ship from the Maritimes to Quebec and Montreal.

    The Second Division was under the command of Major General Sir Patrick Grant. At 58 Grant had served with the army for over 40 years on various services in India as a staff officer and field commander in conflicts from the Gwalior Campaign, to the Mutiny where he acted as Commander in Chief. He had commanded the efforts against the Mutineers until the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell. His appointment to North America, with the rank of Major General, was as much practical as it was political. There were serious doubts about William’s abilities, and it was felt that a good officer should be waiting in the wings. The two men knew this was the reason for such an experienced officer’s presence, and although their relationship was polite, it was incredibly tense as Grant’s presence reminded Williams very distinctly of the price of failure.

    Grant’s division also included the “Canadian Brigade” under Col. Augustus Lane Fox, a guards officer who specialized in rifle instruction and had won his colonelcy in the Crimea, a brigade of Canadian Volunteers enrolled into British service. Though each brigade save those of Paulet’s was bolstered by the presence of a militia battalion, Pitt-Rivers’s Brigade was the only one to incorporate only Canadian troops. The decision to fold militia into the brigades was both political and practical, the militia, though certainly not up to the standards of the regulars, were still able to pad out the numbers of Williams’s army, and accepting them into the ranks made it appear as though the Canadians shared the burden alongside the regular troops. To fill out this Canadian brigade they had selected three battalions who had volunteered themselves for service.

    The first was the 1st “Prince of Wales” Battalion of Volunteer Rifles, first formed in 1859, it had earned its distinction in 1860 during the Prince’s tour of North America. It was commanded by Bernard Devlin, an Irish born lawyer who had immigrated with his father to Canada in 1844 and had practiced the bar since 1848. He had undertaken the prosecution of the Confederate raiders om behalf of the government in Washington in November 1861, but when war called he had joined his militia unit faithfully, replacing Lt. Col. Thomas Wiley who was promoted to the staff in January.

    Second were the men of the 9th Battalion of Volunteer Rifles, the “Voltiguers de Quebec”. They had been assembled in Quebec City under the command of Charles de Salaberry. Son of the great French hero of 1812 of the same name who had led the militia to victory at Chateauguay, his inclusion had been almost as political as it had been practical. His brother Melchior-Alphonse was a very influential politician and the assistant adjutant-general of the Lower Canada militia serving in Montreal. Taché and MacDonald both speaking in support of him. With the recommendation of so many powerful people and Charles good record inside the militia he had been a natural to be chosen.

    Lastly there was the 11th Battalion of Volunteer Infantry, or the “Argenteuil Rangers”. This unit had been organized John Abbott, a local member of parliament, and his brother Harry at considerable expense to himself. He was a successful businessman and politician, who was deeply involved in the economy of Lower Canada, and so had ties with many influential men. Despite many suspecting him of disloyalty after having signed the 1849 “Annexation Manifesto” Abbott, who would hold considerable grudges for the remainder of his life about the subject, would always maintain his service throughout the war, and that he had been granted command of the battalion, was firm proof his “youthful error” had been forgiven.

    Augustus-Pitt-Rivers.jpg
    Lt.%2BColonel%2BJoseph%2BAbbot%2B11th%2BBattalion%2BArgenteuil%2BRangers%2B1862.jpg
    Charles-Ren%25C3%25A9-L%25C3%25A9onidas_d%2527Irumberry_de_Salaberry.jpg
    220px-BernardDevlin23.jpg

    From left to right: Lane Fox, Abbott, de Salaberry, Devlin
    Finally, the Third Division was under the command of Major General David Russell, 53, another Guards officer assigned to North America with the local rank of Major General. He had originally entered the army as a cornet in the 7th Dragoons in 1828, then exchanged to the 84th Foot in 1835, gaining a brevet colonelcy in 1854. He had seen action in the Mutiny, commanding the 5th Brigade, a mixed force of regulars and local troops, in the relief of Lucknow. There he greatly distinguished himself in the actions and was severely wounded and mentioned in the dispatches. He would return to Britain and spend time recruiting before taking command of a brigade at Aldershot.

    The attached cavalry brigade was composed of the two newly raised Volunteer Dragoon regiments, as well as a solid core around the 13th Hussars who had been dispatched in response to the border raids in November under the command of Lt. Col, Soame Jenyns. They were led by Colonel Alexander Low who had entered the army in 1835. He had fought in the Russian War, serving in the battles of Alma, Inkerman, Balaclava, Tchernaya, and the siege of Sevastopol. He had even taken part in Cardigan’s ill-fated scouting expedition in Eupatoria. Sent to chivy the local cavalry into something resembling a field force, he had taken command of the cavalry brigade to provide a semblance of a mounted force and drill the Volunteer squadrons.

    All told, Williams Army of Canada was organized as such come May 15th 1862:

    Army of Canada: Lt. Gen. Sir William Fenwick Williams commanding

    Military Secretary: Col. Hon. Robert Rollo (Unattached)
    Aides de camp:
    Captain Grant (Royal Engineers)
    Captain W. H. Earle (17th Foot)
    Chief of the Staff: Col. Edward Wetherall (Unattached)
    Commanding Royal Artillery: Col. F. M. Eardley Wilmont, RA
    Headquarters: 2/Royal Canadian Rifles (Bvt. Lt. Col Fitzwilliam Walker), 13th Hussars (Captain Thomas P. Gratrex)(1 company)

    1st (Light) Division (MG Frederick Paulet)

    1st (Guards) Brigade (BG Henry Ponsonby): 1st Battalion Grenadier, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards , 2nd Battalion Scots Fusilier Guards
    2nd Brigade (Col. Lord Alexander G. Russell) 1/Rifle Brigade, 1/16th Regiment of Foot, 1/17th Regiment of Foot

    Divisional Artillery (Lt. Col. Edward W. Crofton)

    2nd Division (MG Sir Patrick Grant)
    1st Brigade (BG John Garvock) 4/60th Kings Rifles, 55th Regiment of Foot, 6th Battalion Volunteer Militia Rifles
    2nd Brigade (MG William Norcott) 47th Regiment of Foot, 1/3rd Regiment of Foot, 3rd Battalion “Victoria” Volunteer Rifles
    3rd (Canadian) Brigade (Col Augustus Lane Fox) 1st “Prince of Wales” Volunteer Rifles, 9th Volunteer Rifles, 11th Volunteer Rifles

    Divisional Artillery (Lt. Col. Thomas Elwyn)

    3rd Division (MG David Russell)

    1st Brigade (Col. Henry Smyth) 86th Regiment of Foot, 76th Regiment of Foot 17th Battalion “Levis” Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Colonel J. G. Blanchet)
    2nd Brigade (BG William Sutton) 1/10th Regiment of Foot, 2/25th Regiment of Foot, 12th Battalion Volunteer Militia Rifles
    3rd Brigade (Col. Edward Scovell) 64th Regiment of Foot, 96th Regiment of Foot, 4th Battalion Volunteer Rifles

    Divisional Artillery (Lt. Col. Murray O. Nixon)

    Cavalry Brigade (Col. Alexander Low): 13th Hussars, 4th Canadian Dragoons(4cos), 2nd Canadian Dragoons(6cos)

    It was this force which would be expected to hold the border against the coming storm…

    …Williams, keeping in line with Burgoyne’s view that: “some favourable battlefields could be selected…these, previously thoroughly well studied, could no doubt be rapidly entrenched, and made very formidable.” sought out a defensive line close to the border, where he could keep both the river and his line of retreat open, and fall back upon his defences if necessary. It was this which led him to entrench his force at the Lacolle River.

    The Lacolle River was a small, swift, feeder of the Richelieu, running from the interior of the district to connect with the Richelieu as it rushed north to meet the Saint Lawrence. To the west it was fed by the shallow Beaver Creek, beginning in the broken country at Henrysburg. At the main crossing, a small village had grown up around a mill that sat at the site of previous fighting, unoriginally named, Lacolle Mills.

    This position augered well for Williams, being the site of victories in 1812, 1814, and 1838 against other invaders, and it also covered the main road leading north to St. Jean, and the Richelieu River. Williams dug in his forces following the river. The Second Division under Patrick dug in at the Stone Mill, utilizing the high ground at the mill and the crossing to create a series of redoubts which overlooked the soft ground to the south of the river. The Third Division under Russell dug beside this position, covering a long line up to the rough ground at Beaver Creek which secured the flank, while Paulet’s First Division remained in reserve at Fort Lennox, several miles distant…” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

    la_colle_mil_lg.jpg

    Lacolle Mills, 1869

    -x-x-x-x-
    More to come tomorrow ;)
     
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    Chapter 22: Faugh A Ballagh
  • Chapter 22: Faugh A Ballagh

    “It is not only our duty to America, but also to Ireland. We could not hope to succeed in our effort to make Ireland a Republic without the moral and material support of the liberty-loving citizens of these United States.”- Thomas Francis Meagher, On deciding to fight for the Union, September 1861


    Sumner_vs_Williams.png

    Sumner vs. Williams

    “Sumner’s forces were preceded by Blake’s cavalry who began skirmishing with Low’s cavalrymen shortly after they crossed the border. This caused Sumner to advance cautiously, not knowing his enemies exact dispositions. With his slow, methodical advance Sumner’s advance guard, Foster’s brigade, came into contact with the British piquets on the Lacolle River just past 1pm on the afternoon of May 17th. The remainder of the day would be spent shaking out his force along the British line, probing for weaknesses. By the end of the day he felt certain that he had found the weak point in the line near Beaver Creek, the ground was firm, and his flank was secure from British counter attack. He shifted Sedgwick’s Division to be the left hook of his attack, while Burnside’s Division, who knew the area better, would demonstrate against the stone mill. Richardson’s and Blenker’s Divisions would be held in reserve waiting to support the anticipated break through.

    The battle began in earnest at 7am on May 18th. The American guns opened up on their British counterparts, with special emphasis being placed on the strong point at the Stone Mill. However, it became rapidly apparent that the artillery duel was an unequal contest.

    The American artillery was a mix of Napoleon 12pd guns and 10inch Parrott Rifles. Most crews were not new, but they were not well experienced with their guns. Though in theory their guns could reach a maximum range of 1,400 meters, in practice they reached less than half that, and most American gunners were firing from a range of 600 meters at best. In sharp contrast, the British Armstrong 12pd cannon, could reach a maximum range of 3,400 meters, and at Lacolle Mills they were firing on average, over 1,000 meters.

    The artillery duel bogged down from the start as batteries were thrown up, only to first fall under devastatingly accurate artillery fire, and then, disciplined British rifle fire. Despite a clear superiority in guns, Sumner possessing 84 to the British 54, the men of the Royal Artillery had the range to a nicety, and were firing from well prepared positions, and outranging their opponents by a significant margin. As one artilleryman would later recall “The day was fine, and the range was good.”

    It was in this manner the first disaster would strike near Beaver Creek. While directing his men in the assault on Russell’s Division, Sedgwick was personally directing the emplacement of his batteries to support the attack. It was here he first came under fire from British riflemen along the shore, many of his gunners ducked for cover, but Sedgwick strode about unconcerned calling "What? Men dodging this way for single bullets? What will you do when they open fire along the whole line?" His artillerymen, suitably motivated by their commanders example, returned to their pieces and opened fire with aplomb. An hour later though, the counter batter fire was becoming distressingly accurate and Sedgwick had to again stroll into the fray and shout "Why are you dodging like this? They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance."

    It was moments later that a 20 pound shell landed nearby and burst, mortally wounding him. He was removed from the field at 11 o’clock.

    His division’s assault across the river was continuing just as well as the artillery barrage. Though the Lacolle River is shallow, it is not easy to ford, much less under constant disciplined rifle fire. Sedgwick had placed Gorman’s brigade in the lead assault, but they soon faltered under British fire. Successive attacks produced similar results, and with Sedgwick’s death his entire division was soon in disarray. Sumner though, was not perturbed, he simply ordered Richardson’s division forward with orders to cross the river.

    Brigadier General Israel B. Richardson, nicknamed “Fighting Dick”, had served in the United States Army near since 1841 when he graduated West Point. Serving against the Seminole and in Mexico, where he was brevetted twice, before resigning in 1855 to take up farming in Michigan. When war had broken out in 1861, he was quick to offer his services, commanding a brigade at Bull Run. When he led his men forward at Lacolle Mills he knew there would be no shirking, as he had drilled them hard over the winter, and by his example they would ford the river.

    Twice his men attacked, and twice they were driven back, but on the third time the charge was led by men who had every reason to take the fight to the British, no matter what the cost.

    The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, Army of the Hudson, was under the command of Brigadier General Thomas Meagher. At 38, Meagher was young for a Brigadier General, though perhaps not so much in the Volunteers. He had been born in Munster in 1823 and grew to have a flair for oratory quickly as he aged. This skill would serve him well in the “Young Ireland” movement, which he became prominent in in the early 1840s. He participated in the Young Ireland Rebellion of 1848 and was exiled to Tasmania where he married in 1851. He soon escaped to the United States, making his home in New York and becoming an American citizen. When the Civil War had broken out he used his considerable oratory to recruit a full company of Irishmen for the 69th New York Volunteers, and after Bull Run he would use his talents to recruit an entire brigade of Irishmen…” – To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

    meagher.jpg

    Thomas Meagher

    “By the time of the First Battle of Lacolle Mills, the Irish Brigade had shaken out and was well in hand. When their chance came to fight where their peers had failed in assaulting the British, they would surely succeed. For them, this was not just a fight for their homes, but a fight against their most ancient enemy in battle. Indeed, as one captain would later recall “At the sight of the English redcoats our fellows got mad to get at them.”

    Meagher led his men mounted, until his horse was shot from under him, and then he led them afoot. The advanced signing in Gaelic, unhindered by the shot and shell. Despite taking fire as hot as any that the British had thrown out that day, they advanced steadily, making it to the river, and then stepping across with a great yell of “Faugh A Ballagh” or “clear the way” in old Gaelic.

    They thundered home in a furious charge, unleashing a devastating volley of buck and ball shot at 100 yards, then drove on with the bayonet. Meagher himself was in the British works, laying about with his saber and urging the men on. Slowly but surely the British were pushed back. Here it was that old Sedgwick’s division, though leaderless, rallied, and joined the fray with their fellows, themselves reaching the British lines. Russell’s Division soon found itself hard pressed, and being driven slowly from their entrenchments.

    It was there that the day was decided, that great crush of men in a wild melee, and then the British reinforcements arrived…

    …when Meagher’s men saw the banners, one sharp eyed observer sent up a cry of “It’s the Guards!” but Meagher, wounded but with blood in his eyes brandished his sword like a hero of old and cried “Then come on boys! Let’s give them a taste of Fontenoy!”The Bloody Green Banner: The Irish Brigade, Seamus Meagher, New York Publishing, 1961

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    Meagher at Lacolle

    “Paulet’s Division had been informed the night of the 17th that the American forces had been spotted, and so on the dawn of the 18th they had formed up and marched to the sound of guns. Their march had been a quickstep across good corduroyed roads established by the Royal Engineers, and they made excellent time to the site of the fighting. The division was the only reserve available to Williams, and he intended to make good use of it.

    The melee on the flank at Beaver Creek was quickly getting out of hand. Despite having stalled the American advance all day, by 1pm the numbers and the ferocity of the Irish Brigade was pushing Russell’s 9,000 men back as the renewed assault pressed on. By 1:30 over 10,000 Union troops had pushed through the lines and were threatening to unhinge the British position, and here was where success or failure in the battle would hinge.

    The Guards Brigade led the way, under the command of Brigadier General Henry Ponsonby, marching as though on the parade ground in red coated splendor with the regimental flags held proudly aloft. They came upon the battle, which was rapidly reaching a crescendo and filled in the flank where Sutton’s brigade was being steadily forced back. With a loud cheer of “Hurrah” they announced their arrival with a wave of gun fire. The Union men, despite their numbers, were now mixed in a disorganized mass. Brigades from two different divisions intermingled with each other, making controlling the whole group exceedingly difficult, and so the Union assault stalled.

    For the next hour disciplined volley fire on the advance would drive the Union soldiers back. Ponsonby led his brigade steadily ahead, pushing even the Irish Brigade back with the steely discipline of the guards, even briefly engaging in a bayonet fight so that “when we engaged the enemy, our volleys were exchanged muzzle to muzzle.” Even the blood thirsty cry of the Irish Brigade was forced to give way before the Guards as they advanced. The action was hot, but by 3pm there could be little doubt as to the outcome. Meagher’s men, despite their tenacity, had been driven back across the river, and Paulet’s Division occupied Russell’s field works as Russell regrouped his own division.

    Richardson’s Division was back across the Lacolle, and Sedgwick’s Division, now commanded by Brigadier General William W. Burns, was badly bloodied and needed to regroup. Sumner’s left hook had failed.

    His diversionary attack on the Mill, had not gone much better.

    Burnside’s Division, taking the lead, had discovered similar problems with their artillery. The British gunners, on an elevated portion of the field and with superior range, had effectively silenced his divisional artillery by 10am. Burnside proceeded with the assault regardless, feeding his brigades into British fire piece meal, dispatching another when one was pinned down. This resulted in what later men would term a “meat grinder” as Burnside’s Division simply went forward, one brigade after the other.

    According to legend, Blenker sat on his horse with his division in reserve watching the action, when Edwin Sumner Jr. (the son of the elder Sumner commanding the army) rode up to him to ask how the battle went.

    “I believe that Burnside means to cross the river.” Blenker said. Confused, the junior Sumner asked how this was to be accomplished since the Stone Mill was still in British hands. Blenker shrugged and replied “Oh he means to build a new one, with the corpses of his own men.”

    The fighting at Stone Mill ended near 2pm, and as soon as Sumner was made aware of the situation near Beaver Creek he ordered the withdrawal. Blenker’s men covered the retreat of Burnside’s bloodied division as Burns and Richardson withdrew towards Rouse Point. Come the morning of May 19th, the entire American army would be back where it had started, with the only American soldiers to reach Montreal being prisoners of war.

    The battle had been costly. All told Sumner’s forces had suffered some 7,600 men dead, wounded, and captured. The costliest fighting coming at Beaver Creek where the Irish Brigade had fought hard, only to be repulsed by the Guards. Burnside’s disastrous attacks on the Stone Mill had fared poorly and left his Division a wreck, while Sedgwick’s death had thrust Burns to the command of the 2nd Division, which was in dire need of rest and refit. It was a dispirited army which encamped at Rouse Point the next few weeks.

    In sharp contrast the British army was jubilant. News of William’s victory against a force, often exaggerated as being three times his size rather than double, was broadcast throughout Canada and Britain, and soon flashed across the continent. Williams’s army had only suffered 2,300 casualties in the battle, inflicting three times the losses on their foes. This victory though would be offset by American victories across the summer…” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV
     
    Chapter 23: To Change Her Masters
  • Chapter 23: To Change Her Masters

    “Listen, my children, and you shall hear
    Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere,
    On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-Five:
    Hardly a man is now alive
    Who remembers that famous day and year.

    He said to his friend, “If the British march
    By land or sea from the town to-night,
    Hang a lantern aloft in the belfry-arch
    Of the North-Church-tower, as a signal-light,--
    One if by land, and two if by sea;
    And I on the opposite shore will be,
    Ready to ride and spread the alarm
    Through every Middlesex village and farm,
    For the country-folk to be up and to arm.”

    Then he said “Good night!” and with muffled oar
    Silently rowed to the Charlestown shore,
    Just as the moon rose over the bay,
    Where swinging wide at her moorings lay
    The Somerset, British man-of-war:
    A phantom ship, with each mast and spar
    Across the moon, like a prison-bar,
    And a huge black hulk, that was magnified
    By its own reflection in the tide.

    Meanwhile, his friend, through alley and street
    Wanders and watches with eager ears,
    Till in the silence around him he hears
    The muster of men at the barrack door,
    The sound of arms, and the tramp of feet,
    And the measured tread of the grenadiers
    Marching down to their boats on the shore.” – The Ride of Paul Revere, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, 1861

    “The chief strategy for the spring campaign of 1862 agreed upon by Whitehall and the Horse Guards centered on both the desire to secure the overland communications with the Province of Canada and that to draw off as many American troops as possible from an inevitable invasion of the Province. To that end, plans for a campaign against the Atlantic terminus of the Grand Trunk Railway at Portland were drawn up as early as December. De Grey’s early draft involved as few as 8,000 men, while another plan suggested by MacDougall, called for 50,000 men to ensure its speedy success.

    In the end, a compromise was agreed upon. A force of two divisions would be assembled in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and shipped to Maine in order to seize Portland, and if necessary, operate further in the state. This being done swiftly, and the overland route to Canada reasonably secure, the British expected that the American government would quickly come to terms and sit down at the negotiating table, regardless of the events in Canada.

    The Admiralty was far from enthusiastic about the planned campaign against Portland, Milne because it detracted ships from his preferred strategy of blockade, and the Admiralty because of the great frustration they had felt over the Eastern campaign in the Russian War. Captain Washington (serving as an ad hoc staff officer with the Admiralty), in his preliminary plan drawn up in December wrote: “If it were desirable to take possession of the place (which seems doubtful), it should be done before the inner fort could be finished or other works thrown up. But it would require a strong force, say, several line of battle ships or two armor plated ships and some heavy frigates.”

    However, the Army would get its way, as in the belief of MacDougall: “The interests of Maine & Canada are identical. A strong party is believed to exist in Maine in favor of annexation to Canada; and no sympathy is there felt for the war which now desolates the U. States. It is more than probable that a conciliatory policy adopted towards Maine would, if it failed to secure its absolute co-operation, indispose it to use any vigorous efforts against us. The patriotism of the Americans dwells peculiarly in their pockets; & the pockets of the good citizens of Maine would benefit largely by the expenditure and trade we should create in making Portland our base & their territory our line of communication with Canada,”

    This of course brought to mind long ago reflections on New England’s dissatisfaction with the previous war half a century earlier. Such overly optimistic projections drove the plan forward. Milne wrote in a final objection, hoping to strengthen his argument with that position, that he “would rather feel my way at Portland, rather than at once adopting active operations against that Town and State. An active blockade would offer evidence that we might wait and see whether the State was inclined to change its masters.”

    There were some reservations, Burgoyne writing: “…it will require great caution to attempt to make an impression ourselves from the sea on the Federal territory itself; for though, with a good force, we might gain momentary possession, there would be nearly the certainty of being overwhelmed at last by the masses that would be brought against us.” But regardless of such dissenting opinions, the plan pressed forward from its planning stages in December and January, to the implementation stage in February as troops were dispatched.

    Much to the disappointment of both Williams and Dundas in Canada, troops and supplies were concentrated at Halifax and St. Johns for the expedition against Portland, and such material received top priority on shipping come the spring.

    By May the force collected throughout the Maritimes, The Army of the Maritimes, was under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Lysaught Pennefather[1]. At 63 Pennefather had been serving in the Army for over 40 years. He had entered the forces in 1818 as a cornet with the 7th Dragoon Guards, and earned his way up the ranks to Lt. General. None of these ranks were purchased by commission, each had been earned by merit. He had commanded a brigade in India at Meanee, and most famously in the Crimea where through chance he ended up in command of the 2nd Division at Inkerman as the Russians launched their ill-fated attack on the siege lines. He commanded the garrison at Malta from 1855-1860 when he was placed in charge of the camp at Aldershot, from which he drew much of the strength of the Army of the Maritimes. With his varied command experience, and unquestionable skill in the field, he was noted as a natural to command this force.

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    Lt. General Sir John Pennefather

    The army was composed of two divisions of infantry come the spring, one division of cavalry, and a full complement of field and siege artillery, numbering 26,000 men and 66 guns. The men had been assembled largely from the garrison in Ireland and the troops at Aldershot, all soldiers who had been drilling strenuously in the previous year, with the numbers bolstered by the original garrison troops from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It was organized accordingly:

    Army of the Maritimes: Lt. Gen. John Pennefather

    Staff:
    Chief of the Staff: Col. Charles Tyrwhitt (From Headquarters)
    ADC:
    Capt. Ellison (47th Foot)
    Maj. Paget Bayly (Unattached)
    Assistant Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Sir Henry M. Havelock
    Assistant Quarter Master General: Lt. Col. H. H. Clifford
    Commanding Royal Artillery: BG Henry S. Rowan
    Commanding Royal Engineers: Col. J. A. Simmons

    1st Division (MG Brooke Taylor)

    1st Brigade (BG W. G. Brown) 1/2nd, 29th and 61st
    2nd Brigade (BG John Alexander Ewart) 1/8th, 53rd and 78th
    3rd Brigade (Col. Charles North) 2/20th, 1/60th Rifles and 84th

    Divisional Artillery (Lt. Col. Thomas Knox)

    2nd Division (MG Charles Trollope)
    1st Brigade (BG John A. Cole) 1/15th, 2/16th and 2/17th
    2nd Brigade (Col. Charles Hood) 2/19th, 58th and 2/60th Rifles,
    3rd Brigade (BG Alexander Gordon) 1/11th, 2/21st and 45th

    Divisional Artillery (Lt. Col. Henry A. Turner)

    Cavalry Division: (MG George Paget)
    1st Brigade (BG. John Foster) 9th Lancers, 12th Lancers, 16th Lancers, Royal Horse Artillery
    2nd Brigade (BG G.W. Key) 5th Dragoons, 5th Hussars, 11th Hussars, Royal Horse Artillery

    All told it was a force as large as that which had landed in the Crimean in 1854 some eight years previous. It remained to be seen whether it would be capable of accomplish its task of storming Portland…”– Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

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    Portland Maine 1860

    “The city of Portland was seen as an obvious target by American strategists. Maine had of course been a warzone in the 1775-83 and the 1812-1815 conflicts against Britain. Whether it was the disaster on the Penobscot, or the sacking of Bangor and Hampden, the fact that Maine itself had been a battleground was long remembered in that state. It was thought though, that when the British withdrew in 1815, this would be the end of two centuries of conflict for control over the waters in the Gulf of Maine.

    That idea proved to be in error.

    In 1862 Maine was well involved in the War for the Union, having mustered some 16,000 men for the war effort by winter 1862, and the call for further volunteers leading to the muster of the state militia to garrison the vital points along the coasts.

    Portland, the city which the British strategy aimed at thanks to its connection to Canada via the Grand Trunk Railway, was already defended by a brigade of Maine militiamen under Maj. Gen. William W. Virgin of the Maine State Militia who garrisoned Forts Preble and Scammel, and the earthworks on Hog Island which would compromise the later Fort Gorges. Here he was supported by a division from Benjamin Butler’s Army of New England under Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Williams, which brought the strength of the garrison to 15,000 men come May 1862.

    However, the American strategy, could not assume Portland as the only target. There were still the cities of Boston and Portsmouth, and the naval yard there to consider. And so the Army of New England, 40,000 strong, was spread out across the whole of the department in order to cover the defenses of the coast.

    William’s division was stationed in Portland, while Erasmus D. Keye’s division was headquartered at Boston, William F. Smith’s division was stationed at Portsmouth. The 4th Division under Silas Casey was in reserve, waiting to spring into action to support against any landing of the British troops. They were supported by mixed divisions of state militia and volunteers who padded out the fortifications and field works to free up each division to take the field against the expected British landings.

    The defences of Portland itself though were weak when war had broken out. As the new year had dawned Fort Preble had all of 12 24 pounders and a single 8 inch gun in the battery, while Forts Scammel and Gorges were completely unarmed[2]. Taking advantage of the delay in the British offensive the cities fortifications had taken shape under Major Thomas Casey of the engineers. He had, with the support of the Board of National Defense and Chief Engineer Joseph Totten, rallied to have each fortification armed as far as possible by spring when it could be expected that the British would be able to mount a landing. With his tireless efforts Fort Preble mounted 34 guns, Fort Scammel mounted 50 pieces and Fort Gorges had two batteries of 8inch guns for a total of 12 guns facing out to sea and covering Diamond Island Roads and the passage between Catfish Point and Maiden Cove. The landward defences, occupied by William’s men, consisted of redoubts placed along a series of entrenchment stretching along the Stroudwater and Fore rivers which protected the landward side of the harbor to the south, and entrenchments along the Presumpscot River to the north, centered on the Village of Westbrook where the two rivers drew close to one another.

    There was little naval support to be had for the city. Flag Officer Charles Wilkes[3], the man many would blame for the widening of the war, had been assigned to the new “North Atlantic Squadron” was assigned to Boston to assemble this new force. His duty was to keep Boston and Portsmouth secure, and to contest the waters from Massachusetts Bay to the Gulf of Maine. As the new year dawned he found he had little enough strength to protect his own base of operations. The steam sloops San Jacinto(12) and Wachusett(10) with six of the new five gun screw gunboats, Sagamore, Aroostook, Chocura, Huron, Marblehead, and Penobscot were based out of Boston. In addition, after the success of the Monitor, two new “90 Day ironclads” were under construction at Charlestown and Kittery, the Nantucket and Nahant which would be tasked with defending the harbors. These all would soon be joined by the steam sloops Ossipee and Housatonic. Finally, the old unfinished screw frigate, USS Franklin, was being converted as an experimental ironclad alongside her sister USS Roanoke.[4]

    This was all the naval force which could be mustered in the early months of 1862 though, many of the ironclads would not be in service for months, and in Portland itself only the old sailing frigate Macedonian stood anchored in Portland harbour as a blockship. Effectively, the sea lanes had been conceded to the British early on in the war, a fact which they would take full advantage of…”– To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

    jacinto.jpg

    The ship that started it all, the USS San Jacinto

    “The invasion fleet, gathered with speed and efficiency at the end of April, departed for Portland on May 2nd 1862. It was an immense fleet carrying out the expedition. It contained 5 ships of the line, 3 frigates, 4 sloops and corvettes, 5 gunboats and 2 mortar frigates. Alongside this came the “Inshore Squadron” consisting of the one ironclad frigate, one ironclad sloop, and 4 floating batteries for inshore work to disable the fortifications in Portland Harbor. Aside from the assemblage of warships there were 87 vessels chartered to transport Pennefather’s soldiers, supplies, guns, and draft animals to the front. These ranged from the enormous Admiralty steam transport Himalaya, to the small Nova Scotian built barque McDuff.

    Overall command was given to Vice Admiral Sir William Hope-Johnstone, second son of Admiral Sir William Johnstone. At 63, Johnstone had been in service with the Royal Navy since 1811. Serving in various capacities across the world in South America, the Mediterranean and the East Indies his duties had seen him primarily in command of sail vessels. In his years of service though, he had seen numerous assaults on fortified ports, most notably an expedition up the Brune River in 1846 against the Sultan of Borneo. He had been reassigned from the Nore command aboard the recently worked up Goliath(78) as his flag. His former flag, the steam frigate Formidable, had been assigned to convoy duties in the North Atlantic.

    Serving under him was Rear Admiral Sydney C. Dacres in Edgar(89). Son of Vice-admiral Sir Richard Dacres, and brother of General Sir Richard James Dacres, he entered the navy in 1817. He had earned significant experience with steam vessels and operations against ports while in the Black Sea and operating against Sevastopol. In 1859 he had been transferred to the Mediterranean, where he would become second in command there. Initially slated to be Milne’s second in command he had been moved to the Portland expedition, merely one more move the Admiralty was unhappy with in the allocation of resources for the initial war effort.

    Finally, commanding the inshore forces was acting Commodore Arthur Cochrane. At 37 he was the youngest of the bevy of officers assigned to the expedition, and was commanding the most modern ironclad yet in commission in the Royal Navy, the Warrior. He had joined the navy in 1839, and so had significantly less experience under his belt than his superiors, but most of it gained from hard fighting. He had been at Acre during the Oriental Crisis in 1840, where he was wounded, and then in the Baltic during the Russian War where he had blockaded the Russian ports, and finally in the Second Opium War where he had helped destroy the Chinese fleet in 1857, and participated in the bombardment of Canton.

    The Naval Force was organized thusly:

    First Division (Johnstone): Goliath(74)[F], Trafalgar(86), Meeanee(80), Queen(86), Emerald(51), Tribune(31),

    Second Division (Darcres):
    Edgar(89)[F], Arethusa(51), Raccoon(21), Malacca(17), Rapid(11), Swallow(9), Speedwell(5), Pandora(5), Dart(5), Surprise(4), Wanderer(4),

    Inshore Squadron(Cochrane): Warrior(40)[F], Defence(22), Terror(16), Aetna(14), Glatton(16), Erebus(14), Horatio(12), Eurotas(12)

    In addition to these vessels, the blockading squadron which had been in place since early March consisted of the vessels: Algiers(86), Rattlesnake(21), Rattler(17), Rifleman(5), Sparrow(5).

    The First Division lead the charge, while the Inshore Squadron came up behind. The Second Division was engaged in escorting the vessels which carried the troops and supplies. The fleet first stopped at Eastport, where after a short bombardment they occupied Fort Sullivan with a mixed battalion of Royal Marines and sailors. From there they proceeded to Castine where after another bombardment, it too would be occupied by the Royal Marines, and they would sweep up considerable traffic which was attempting to run to Augusta, including the steamer Chesapeake. The gunboats Surprise and Wanderer were deposited to patrol the mouth of the Penobscot River and support the Marine garrison detached there.

    After these short diversions, the fleet moved with haste towards Cape Elizabeth. Dacres squadron continued onwards towards the landing site, while the First Division and the Inshore Squadron continued towards Casco Bay, taking up positions at Maiden Cove where it was expected they would meet the infantry on the advance inland. The plan was that Pennefather’s forces would land on the soft sands of Cape Elizabeth at Seal Cove and from there they would march inland and take Fort Preble from the landward side in conjunction with the navy and unhinge the entire defensive position at Portland, compelling the cities surrender. On the morning of May 11th Pennefather’s 1st Division worked their way ashore in cutters, launches, and sweeps from the fleet of transports, under the safety of Darcres guns.

    The landings proceeded smoothly, and other than some initial skirmishing with local Home Guards, they were unopposed, and sat within 7 miles of Fort Preble, the target of the overland assault. However, the invasion message flashed out and by the evening the Army of New England was in motion.

    The first to move was Casey’s division, working its way north, but even with the best marching speed, they were still six days from Portland. Smith’s division was closer, but they were five days march at the best time from Portsmouth. Units were embarked by train to speed them north to the cities defence, but for crucial days the city would be on its own.

    Despite this, Williams Division, 10,000 strong, was determined to do its best to stymy the British advance. Thomas Williams, aged 47, had been a career soldier since 1832 when he served as a bugler in the Black Hawk War, then earning a commission by graduating from West Point in 1837. He then fought against the Seminole in Florida, and served in Mexico, brevetted for “meritorious service” in the fighting. On the outbreak of the Civil War he had been a major, but was soon promoted to Brigadier General in February 1862, for a projected campaign against New Orleans. As tensions with the British grew however, he had been reassigned to Portland with his division in order to stiffen the ranks of local militia. Four months of drill and preparation had prepared him for this however, and when the British did land, he reacted with admirable swiftness.

    General_Thomas_Williams.tif

    Thomas Williams

    Leaving the defence of the forts and outlying defences to Virgin’s militia, he brought his First Brigade to stall the British advance at Alewife Brook. Emptying from Great Pond to the west, Alewife Brook lay directly across the British line of advance, and so Williams set out to hold it. He dug in his brigade across the road, supported by his divisional artillery, while his second brigade moved west to cover the crossings up Bowery Road…

    …By the afternoon of the 12th, Pennefather’s 1st Division was ready to advance inland. Supported by the 1st Brigade of cavalry from Paget’s division, they moved up Kettle Cove Road, advancing until the cavalry came into contact with Williams men. In the resulting firefight the cavalry was pushed back, and Brooke Taylor’s Division advanced to deal with the entrenched Americans.

    A sharp firefight erupted between the two sides as Knox’s artillery arrived, but when it did, the range and strength of the British guns, like it would on many other fields, decided the battle. William’s men were practically blasted from their trenches. William’s himself led a futile defence of their positions until felled by a bullet from a British marksman. Though mortally wounded, he lived long enough to order his men’s retreat to the trenches below Portland. He would be captured by the men of Brown’s brigade, but would die of his wounds two days later.

    Taylor, though unperturbed by the delay caused by the battle, was worried that his timetable would be thrown off by the stalling thanks to William’s defence. He arrived at Maiden Cove and signaled the ships of Cochrane’s squadron, but as he feared, night was closing fast and his men would need to assault the forts in conjunction with the ships. So he marched his division to the edge of the American entrenchments, just beyond the range of the American guns, and began digging his own men in. Cochrane’s ships made a few ranging shots at the American fortifications in preparation for the assault come the dawn, and the British slept on their arms. The Union men hunkered down in their trenches, dreading the storm to come in the morning.

    Then everything went wrong.

    On the dawn of May 13th Cochrane’s ships lead the way. Cochrane commanding from the deck of Warrior, with the mortar frigates anchoring off Cushing’s Island and began bombarding the American forts and the ironclads leading the way up through Danforth Cove to Forts Scammel and Preble. As they came ahead of Scammel Point, they ran in to the first layer of torpedoes laid by the American defenders.

    Torpedoes were not a new innovation. Indeed the use of underwater explosives dated all the way back to the Revolutionary War where simple kegs filled with gunpowder were used to attempt to deter British ships. The Russians had used them in conjunction with landward defences in the Black Sea and the Baltic to stymy the efforts of the Royal Navy. Those all had been inefficient and not particularly threatening to warships. Even though the British were aware of their existence, it was assumed that the ironclads could simply sail over them. In this they were both right and wrong.

    At 10:23am, Warrior’s unarmoured bow struck a torpedo with a violent explosion tearing through her front compartments. Though she was compartmentalized to protect against such damage, the ship was shoved violently off course, nearly sending her into a collision with Defence. The smaller ironclads all veered to avoid their big sisters, and the firing line was disrupted. Cochrane, unsure of the damage, ordered a withdrawal. He signaled to the infantry on shore, but from here accounts are hazy and contradictory. Though the naval captains all agree that the signal was sent to Taylor, the soldiers on shore do not seem to have seen the signal, or, as Taylor would later state, he heard the gunfire and assumed that the seaborne assault was ongoing.

    Whatever the case, Taylor would continue with his assault. His 1st Brigade under Brown, freshly rested after the fighting at Alewife Brook the previous day, led the way from their camp. They marched towards the outer entrenchments of Fort Preble, and with the thunder of guns they began their attack on the earthworks. However, as they advanced, skirmishers in the lead and the engineering parties pushing onwards, it was discovered that in the haste of the advance the scaling ladders meant to overcome American redoubts had been left on the beach[5]. Predictably, the assault stalled, and a crucial half an hour was spent milling about in confusion as Brown’s brigade halted before the earthworks. During that time the American defenders rained musket fire and grapeshot down upon them, inflicting great casualties. The arrival of the 3rd Brigade merely added to the troubles and soon Taylor was forced to order a retreat.

    Pennefather would spend the remainder of the day attempting to sort out what had gone wrong between the navy and the army, while moving his second division under Trollope forward to contain any moves by the American garrison. Even once the whole fiasco had been established; there were two crucial days of arguments between Pennefather’s staff, and the naval officers. Warrior needed repair and so would be required to retire, and Johnstone was determined not to send his ships in to an unknown situation, and requested that the American defences be scouted thoroughly lest his ships discover any further unpleasant surprises.

    In the end it seemed William’s sacrifice at Alewife Brook paid off. Even by the end of the day on the 13th reinforcements were arriving by train, and by the dawn of the 16th Smith’s division had marched to the American defences on the Stroudwater River, and a day later Casey’s division arrived and began harassing Pennefather’s flank.

    Pennefather moved swiftly though, turning Trollope’s division to engage the Americans…

    …the end result though proved that Pennefather, despite his speed and audacity, had been unable to remove the defenders from Fort Preble. Johnstone remained adamant that the torpedoes would need to be cleared, and overall the British effort bogged down and would become a siege. The short, sharp, maneuver warfare in May had seen the British unable to completely cut the rail lines, but the Union unable to dislodge the British positions around Portland.

    The British gamble had failed…” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

    -----


    1] You might remember him from last time.

    2] The Union’s coastal defences were pretty awful in this period. Though the war was ongoing and historically they had no need to man the defences since the Confederate navy was incapable of threatening Union ports. Here though they obviously do, and with access to the records of the time we can see that both the state of Maine, and the Engineers considered Portland a strategic necessity to defend. I have no doubt the need to defend the terminus of the Grand Trunk would be readily apparent and so receive lots in the way of guns as quickly as they could. That doesn’t mean they will get all the guns however, there’s still many other places of strategic import to consider.

    3] Thought you’d heard the last of him did you?

    4] With the exception of Franklin, these are all ships under construction in the period in question OTL. The smaller ironclads though are more of a stopgap measure and have less in common with OTL's Passiac Class and more with the original Monitor for the sake of expedience, so their construction and design is almost stroke for stroke that of the Monitor, including being armed with the 11inch Dahlgren's rather then the 15inch.

    5] Now this is set in historic precedent. The lack of ladders became a problem both at New Orleans in 1815, and the Great Redoubt in 1856, and the assaults on the Great Redoubt failed multiple times. If this all went perfectly things would be going rather too well for the British at this juncture.
     
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    Chapter 24: Celerity
  • Chapter 24: Celerity

    “Without a decisive Naval force we can do nothing definitive - and with it, everything honorable and glorious.” - George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, 15 November 1781

    “When the war had opened in February 1862, the United States Navy was in the midst of one of the most audacious attempts at blockade undertaken in that century. Taking up the blockade of some 3,500 miles of Southern coastline and concentrating on 12 major ports, and numerous smaller points of entry along shores impassable to large warships. To do this they had, by January 1862, assembled a fleet of roughly 264 warships. However, many of these were converted merchantmen or sail vessels, and so not suited to the rigors of modern naval warfare, and found themselves rapidly decommissioned or sunk when war with Britain commenced.

    In response, the Union had fallen back on what was seen as the traditional strategy, a robust defense of the primary ports and rivers, while engaging the British where they were most vulnerable, their commercial interests at sea. In this they had something of an advantage with the numerous converted merchantmen at hand. Those deemed suitable for duty were stocked and armed and sent cruising days after the initial declaration of war. Many of these were old paddle steamers or even sailing ships, which although completely defenceless against a modern screw warship, could more than easily handle the burning of Britain’s merchant ships. Most of these “first wave” commerce raiders were rapidly run to ground, and their effectiveness wad dulled by the Admiralty’s orders for all ships travelling to North America and the West Indies to move in convoy. However, when the “second wave” of steamers, modern screw vessels, sortied in early March and April, they were able to sweep out to all corners of Britain’s commercial empire.

    However, this was not a war winning strategy. It had not been one in 1775-83 nor in 1812-15. Even half a century or a century later, in a world of oil burning ships and submarines, it would have at best mixed results when attempted by the Entente or Pact navies. The American planners in 1862 were just as aware of this deficiency, and so they would attempt to correct it by weakening the British as much as possible in asymmetric warfare in the littorals.

    In this the Americans differed from the Russian Navy in 1853-56. Whereas the Russians had largely fled to port to preserve their ships, the Union sought to match their ships against those of the Royal Navy. Though purely ship to ship action was, rightly, seen as tantamount to suicide, the United States Navy was more than willing to take a school of hard knocks in littoral warfare.

    In spite of the destruction wrought in the Gulf of Mexico in February from New Orleans to the Florida Keys, the USN had managed to escape the opening blows of the Royal Navy largely intact, and had proved it would not sit idly by in a series of sharp individual actions throughout March and the spring. Whether it was the destruction of the sloop Rosario, or the pouncing on of the gunship Trinculo, a series of short sharp actions buoyed the public, spirit, and made the British fume…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.


    blockade%2Brunner.jpg

    Blockade running would become essential to the Union war effort

    “When planning for war in December, the British had considered blockade their most effective weapon of war against the Union. The way to carry out this plan though, was a matter of considerable debate amongst those in Whitehall and the Admiralty. Somerset, in contrast to many of his peers, felt blockade was the only viable strategy, and had only reluctantly endorsed the campaign in Maine. The blockade was though, the first thought on British minds when it came to shaping their overall strategy. This was informed not the least by the casual contempt amongst the British politicians and officer class for American morale and economy, but by half a centuries’ understanding of being the dominant naval power, and the success of the navy in the late Russian War.

    They faced a considerable challenge though. In carrying out the chosen strategy they were faced with the daunting prospect of enforcing a blockade along 1,260 miles of coastline against seven principal ports, two major inlets, and numerous smaller ports and river inlets. As early as December 15th however, a rough strategy had been laid out under the advice of Captain John Washington, the Chief Hydrographer, who in the absence of a proper naval staff, served in the ad-hoc capacity of a staff officer for the Admiralty. He had devised a plan in his report “List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast of the United States” giving within an approximate number of ships estimated necessary in the blockade.

    He concluded that in order to maintain a successful blockade, there would need to be squadrons placed off of the major ports and shipyards at Portland, Portsmouth, Boston Bay, New York (both the upper and lower bays), the Delaware, and the Chesapeake. In addition he recommended smaller squadrons for the Penobscot Bay, Kennebec River, Cape Ann and environs, and finally Narragansett Bay and environs. To do this, Washington estimated a force of roughly 40 ships for the principal ports, and a further twenty for the lesser ports and inlets. Thus when war was looming in late December and Milne had 45 ships on hand Somerset wrote to Milne and declared he had more than enough vessels on hand to carry out the blockade.

    Milne however, disagreed. In response to Somerset he declared that Washington’s numbers were “utterly inadequate” for the operations at hand. He suggested that for the blockade of the major ports alone he would require 65 ships, much less the operations against minor ports and inlets. His own calculations estimated a force of at least 90 vessels[1] for a secure blockade, or almost a third of the Royal Navy’s ships currently on active duty. The realities of war however, ensured that he would end up carrying out his mission with far fewer than he would need.

    Though the number of ships available and necessary was discussed and debated right up to the declaration of war, Milne had on hand, in the opinion of Whitehall, enough ships come February to carry out operations against the American coast. The true number of ships employed in North America, would eventually top 100 as the Admiralty became further committed to the blockade strategy.

    On the outbreak of war though, the 60 odd vessels under Milne’s command proved enough to smash the remaining blockading squadrons on duty, and deliver a victory at the Battle of the Keyes. From there Milne began moving his ships to their various blockade stations. By the start of March he had 50 vessels employed on the blockade. While others were available, many vessels had been scooped up to take part in the campaign against Maine, and the contests on the rivers and lakes of North America, as well as convoy vessels across the Atlantic and hunt American commerce raiders, which had sortied as early as February despite Milne’s best efforts.

    This first state of the blockade proved less than effective. Milne’s vessels were simply not numerous enough to patrol the whole coast line, and carry out the other duties necessary to protect British commerce and war materials. The case thus became one of attrition, numerous gunboats were lost in small inconsequential actions in the spring as the USN pounced on unwary vessels, and commerce raiders took advantage of local knowledge to slip past the blockade, either escorting runners, or simply breaking loose to wreak havoc.

    The first wave of raiders managed, in less than a month, to destroy or capture, over 50 British flagged vessels leading to pointed questions in London. This lead to the unpopular, but effective, Convoy Order of April 5th 1862, wherein all ships going to and from North America and the West Indies were to travel in convoy under escort from a warship. Though unpopular, it cut British losses immensely in the summer months. But as targets became more difficult in the North Atlantic, many raiders moved on to richer pastures…

    …the blockade in the early months, was undeniably leaky, and even Milne himself wrote that it was at best only partially effective. He also bemoaned that the Admiralty assigned to his squadrons many battleships, which although fine to act as flagships in the myriad of squadrons, were perfectly useless in the commerce war Britain found herself engaged in. Milne wrote to Somerset: “In this war there is a great want of Frigates and Corvettes. In the large service I have before me the Line of Battleships are of no great consequence, and I can scarce see on what service I can employ them. They do not stand the gales and sea off the American coast. As to attacking Forts it must never be done by anchoring ships but by passing and repassing in rotation so as not to allow a steady object to the enemy. Ships with larger draft of water are unfit for this task and you need not build any more.”[2]

    However, he proved excellent at establishing a system of logistics for his vessels, and one of his first acts in early March was to seize the island of Martha’s Vineyard to act as a coaling station for his vessels. He established coaling depots at the Confederate base at Norfolk, and the port at Port Royal, with factory ships established in the Chesapeake and at Martha’s Vineyard. Though the work of keeping American ports shut did not proceed smoothly at first, his job in keeping his ships supplied and stocked, did. His strategy needed time however…”– Troubled Waters: The Anglo-American War at Sea, Michael Tielhard, Aurora Publishing, 2002


    HMS_Grinder_%25281855%2529-2.jpg

    The rigors of blockade

    “Commanding what had become the Home (or Atlantic) Squadron of the United States Navy based in New York was Flag Officer David Glasgow Farragut. The 60 year old Tennessee born naval officer had grown up in the South, first in Tennessee then Louisiana, but despite suspicions about his loyalties, he had moved his family from Virginia to New York, making it clear to all who knew him he regarded secession as treason. Thanks to the actions of his adoptive father, Captain David Porter, Farragut had been commissioned into the navy in 1810. He took part in the 1812-15 war, serving in the capture of HMS Alert in 1812 and the Battle of Valparaíso in 1813 where he was wounded and captured commanding a prize ship. Following his service against the British he had commanded in the West Indies against pirates aboard the USS Ferret, and then taken command of the USS Saratoga in the Mexican War blockading Tuxpan. During that war he established the United States naval station on Mare Island. Though originally selected to command the Gulf Squadron, he had been held back in New York as the crisis with Britain deepened after the departure of Lord Lyons at the end of January.

    Upon the outbreak of war he had been placed in command of all those ships available in New York. He worked tirelessly with the commander of the Department, Major General John E. Wool, in order to make America’s largest port secure from attack. The fortifications in the Upper and Lower Bays were, as much as possible, armed and brought to readiness. The main channels were obstructed with booms and torpedoes where possible. However, Farragut was determined to do more than simply sit behind his defences and as he said to Fox shortly after his appointment; “Everything that can be done must be done immediately. I believe in celerity.

    To that end he organized the ships he had on hand. The three large screw sloops Hartford(28)[Flag], Pensacola(25), and Richmond(22), and the two smaller sloops Oneida(10), and Dacotah(8) which had been at the center of the action with Terror in November. They were supported by a dozen new build gunboats, Chippewa, Istaca, Cayuga, Katahdin, Pinola, Kineo, Kennebec, Wissahickon, Sciota, Owasco, and Winona, as well as the sidewheel gunboats, Octorora(8) and Port Royal(8). Alongside the regular warships were the converted steamer Varuna(10) and the converted gunboats Clifton(7), Jackson(6), and Westfield(6). Just as important were the ironclad vessels in the squadron, the USS Monitor(2), which had made her debut in March, and her sisters USS Montauk(2) and USS Catskill(2). There was also the new broadside ironclad the USS Galena(6) which rounded out the Home Squadron.

    Despite the presence of the British squadrons off both Upper and Lower Bay, Farragut believed in getting his crews drilled, even with the prospect of a skirmish, which he felt would only be advisable as “The more you hurt the enemy the less he will hurt you.” To that effect he would drill his squadrons in the waters of Upper Bay and pounce on unwary British blockaders, managing to sink two gunboats in early April in such a fashion, forcing the British, in conjunction with the menacing of the ironclads, to move further out to sea.

    Farragut attempted to keep the British off balance. Making repeated feints to wear the British down, or pounce on unwary single blockaders. He would feint against the British squadrons in the Lower Bay to clear the way for a raider or runner to escape, and harass the British warships. It prevented an easy routine…” – The First Admiral: The Life and Battles of David Glasgow Farragut


    farragut.jpg

    Flag Officer David Farragut

    “The British blockade of New York was divided into two squadrons, each operating independent of one another due to the constraints of distance. By June they had been reinforced by two British ironclads to counter the American ironclads in service, HMS Trusty(14) and HMS Thunder(14).

    The overall command of the blockade was under Rear-Admiral John Kingcome. He had joined the Royal Navy in 1808 and had served in the Anglo-Burmese War from 1824-26. Promoted to Captain in 1838 he commanded the Belleisle in 1841 during the First Opium War and then commanding the Royal William in the Baltic Sea during the Crimean War. He was selected to command the blockade off of New York, a difficult task. He had two squadrons under his command in the region:

    Long Island Sound: Conqueror(101)(Flag), Phaeton(51), Challenger(21), Greenock(12), Charger(4), Hasty(5), Julia(4), Fervent(4), Insolent(4), Thunder(14)

    New York: St. George(Flag)(89), Ariande(26), Jason(21), Chanticleer(17), Peterel(11), Mullet(5), Hyena(4), Osprey(4), Trusty(14)

    Split between Long Island Sound and Lower Bay to cover both entrances to New York, a task which proved more complex than the Admiralty had anticipated due to geography, the advantages of steamships versus sail, and the audacity of Farragut. Kingcome broke his flag in St. George and remained responsible for the Lower Bay, covering the broader channel and moving as far north as Sandy Hook in his patrols, attempting a regular route to catch ships attempting to sortie. After the appearance of Monitor in March, he had his gunboats travel in pairs, shepherded by one of his corvettes, while Trusty would remain close inshore waiting for the signal an American ironclad had arrived. He established this system to keep his smaller boats safe from the unpredictable feints by Farragut, and to attempt to preserve as much coal as possible.

    Commanding the blockade of Long Island Sound was Commodore Edward Sotheby. The 49 year old had only recently been promoted to commodore for his string of victories over the American squadrons in the Gulf, and with that promotion had come greater responsibilities. This was seen as reasonable however as his naval career had been, by all accounts, competent. He had entered the navy in 1828, serving in the Mediterranean and fighting in the Syrian Crisis of 1840 where he received his promotion to commander. From there he commanded the sloop Racehorse in New Zealand and China before taking on the command of the corvette Pearl in the East Indies. With the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny he commanded the Naval Brigade in the Oudh, and was mentioned in the dispatches 13 times and received the thanks of both houses of Parliament, the governor general of India, and the Admiralty.

    He was faced with the difficult prospect of keeping all the smaller ports and inlets in Long Island Sound closed. He formed an “Inshore Squadron” around Thunder and the gunboats who patrolled the littoral harbors, while his frigates operated as far west as Huntington Bay fearing a sudden sortie by Farragut. Sotheby was in constant contact with Milne asking for more gunships, as he could not possibly operate with fewer with such a large American squadron nearby. More vessels were available, but were either operating in Canada and Maine, or fitting out and building come the summer of 1862.

    So it was they went to battle with the fleet they had…”– Troubled Waters: The Anglo-American War at Sea, Michael Tielhard, Aurora Publishing, 2002


    littlegulloriginal.jpg

    Little Gull Island

    “…Farragut had been long trying to use his local knowledge to his advantage. He had studied the British patrol patterns with interest, and of particular note had been their laying of buoys to warn off ships from entering channels where the shoals or reefs were too thick for them. After a number of weeks of observation he was determined to use this to his advantage.

    He would discover though that attempts to remove the buoys brought about a strong response by the British fleet on both channels. He found this unsatisfactory for an assault, and though such attempts produced limited skirmishing, it did not interfere with British navigation. So instead, Farragut simply decided to move the buoys. On the night of June 3rd he ordered his gunboats out to move the buoys over unsafe waters, and instructed the blockade runners to attempt to draw British ships near there.

    This would pay off on June 22nd when the blockade runner Quaker City, pursued by the British frigate Phaeton, in league with the gunboat Hasty, came steaming in to The Race, the entrance to Long Island Sound that warm summer evening. Quaker City, a paddle wheel steamer which had originally been launched in 1854 for the soon defunct Collins Line had been sold to appease her creditors. She had been taken on lease by the government and commissioned into the navy in early 1861 under the command of James M. Frailey who had commanded her as a blockader just days after the declaration of the blockade of the South in 1861, where he had scooped up 9 vessels. Originally he had an armament of 9 guns (one 20pnd Parrott Rifle and 8 32pnd guns), but her sidewheel paddle and her commendable speed of 13 knots meant she would be put to use as an armed blockade runner. Shedding all but three of her guns she had run the blockade in early March, making her way to Brest where she took on a cargo of French rifles purchased by American merchants, and making a run home to New York. She sortied again in April, capturing and burning the brig Jessie in the Bay of Fundy before making a trip through the Baltic to pick up a supply of Prussian powder and again running through the British blockade. Her third sortie at the end of the month had been south to St. Thomas to acquire a supply of Prussian muskets circuitously bought through Danish merchants. From there she raced back to New York, when she was finally spotted by Phaeton.


    USS_Quaker_City.jpg

    USS Quaker City

    Running at full steam Frailey came into sight of Phaeton just as he was coming around Montauk Point. With his steam up he streamed past the frigate as the British attempted to get their own engines up to speed, and soon the big ship was sending up signals and giving chase. Steering close to the shallow water where the big frigate could not follow, Frailey remained in water deep enough for him to maneuver, but much more hazardous for the frigate, he maneuvered towards Gull Island. This would pay off as at 6:33pm Phaeton, twice the size and tonnage of Frailey’s 1400 ton vessel, hit the shoals off Little Gull Island with a resounding crash, and beached herself. Hasty immediately broke off her pursuit in an attempt to aid her larger consort. Phaeton’s commander, Captain Edward Tatham was no fool, with experience in the blockade from the Russian War and years of coastal experience with the coast guard, he had been running his ship carefully. However, Farragut’s simple moving of the buoys had paid dividends and he ended up resolutely stuck and calling for aid.

    Frailey ran into New York harbor and was quick to relate the news of the frigates beaching to Farragut, while Hasty was just as quick to send word to Sotheby.

    Farragut, wasted no time in bringing his forces together. Desiring to face one only foe at a time he sent the ironclads Monitor and Catskill, with the steamers Richmond and Oneida, and half his gunboats, to sortie against Kingcome’s squadron to prevent them from interfering while he took the remainder of his vessels to capture or destroy the British frigate.

    By the afternoon of June 23rd Sotheby aboard Conqueror had arrived, with the protection of the Inshore Squadron with Thunder, Hasty, Julia, and Fervent, as well as the Challenger. All were angling to take Phaeton off of her unfortunate perch. However, their efforts had been unsuccessful thus far, and when Farragut’s vessels appeared they were in the process of attempting to haul Phaeton off the rocks.

    Farragut led from the deck of Hartford, leading the charge with the big sloop alongside Pensacola, Dacotah, and Varuna. The ironclads came up behind, while his gunboats, shepherded by Octorora and Port Royal, brought up the rear. The sight of the big battleship however, caught Farragut off guard. He had been expecting that the British would not risk the large ship in potentially shallow waters, and expected to be able to catch the smaller British vessels and sink them in detail. Despite his numeric superiority, Farragut brought only 111 guns to the battle, all told the British had 149. This is when his famous phrase was first uttered.

    Contrary to William Abernathy’s cutlass flailing shouting portrayal in 1962’s The First Admiral, the phrase was most likely uttered in response to a comment made by Captain Drayton.

    According to witnesses Drayton, upon seeing the big ship said: “I don’t like those odds sir.”

    In response Farragut replied “Damn the odds. Go ahead, four bells Captain Drayton.”

    Much milder than the wildand more dramatic version most Americans remember, but history can sometimes be tamer than we imagine. The resulting battle was not.

    Upon sighting Farragut’s ships Sotheby immediately signaled for his ships to form up for engagement. The gunboats split off from the ironclad to consort with Challenger, while Conqueror attempted to place herself in waters which would allow her room to maneuver. Thunder, broke off to engage the American ironclads.

    Thus began the first battle between ironclad warships in history.

    Though Thunder was outnumbered, she far outweighed her opponents in armament. Monitor carried only two 11inch Dahlgren guns in her turrets, while Galena carried four 9inch smoothbore Dahlgren guns and two Parrott rifles. Thunder carried fourteen 68pnd cannon. Monitor held an advantage with her turret, but her slow rate of fire negated that effect, and Galena held no advantage whatsoever.

    Galena was sunk after two salvoes from Thunder’s broadside, shredding her 3inch armor as though it did not exist. Monitor, with her thicker armor, fared better. Her armament was insufficient to pierce Thunder’s shell, but Thunder in turn did not possess the type of ammunition it was later reckoned would pierce ironclad armor. Their gunnery duel lasted an hour, until both Monitor’s turrets were battered shut, and Thunder took serious damage to her smokestack, but Monitor would withdraw first, towards the safety of the torpedoes and forts of New York Harbor.

    The remainder of the action though, did not play out in the Royal Navy’s favor.

    Despite her advantage in firepower, Conqueror was severely limited in her maneuverability by her deep draft in the shallow waters, and as such spent more of the fight maneuvering that contributing to the battle itself. The gunboats of the Inshore Squadron, shorn of the ironclad protection, entered a swirling melee with their American counterparts. Julia was sunk after veering too far from her consorts for support, and Hasty fell when overpowered by the sheer weight of American guns. Only the timely intervention of Thunder saved Fervent from meeting her sisters’ fates.

    Challenger tried in vain to protect Phaeton, but with the big American sloops concentrating their energy on her, she fell to numbers. Phaeton would end up burned by her crew as they withdrew under the cover of Thunder and Conqueror’s guns, but it was an inglorious day for the Royal Navy.

    The battle of Little Gull Island ended with a heavy toll for the British. Two gunboats, a frigate, and a sloop sunk, in exchange for three American gunboats, the converted warship Varuna, and an American ironclad sunk. Farragut, though he had failed in his goal of capturing the British ship, returned to port to great acclaim, and the blockade of Long Island Sound was severely weakened for crucial months as the British moved ships from convoy duty and coastal patrol to stop up the gaps. Farragut was on his way to earning his just fame alongside the likes of Tegetthoff, Brown and Grau in 19th Century naval warfare.

    All in all it would provide a valuable lesson to both sides in the nature of modern war at sea…”– The First Admiral: The Life and Battles of David Glasgow Farragut

    -----


    1] This comes from a reading of Milne’s own comments, and the various prospective plans drawn up by Washington and Milne on the issue of the blockade. What is clear though is that no major consensus of what was truly necessary was reached in the time between the seizure of the Trent and when Lincoln decided to release the commissioners. My own assumptions stem from thoughts by modern scholars, and those put to paper by people at the time. Some fascinating reads on the matter from modern scholars can be found in Kenneth Bourne’s article British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862, Howard Fuller’s Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power, and No Need of Glory: British Navy in American Waters, 1860-64 by Regis Courtenmanche.

    2] Letter from Milne to Somerset quoted in Fuller’s Clad in Iron, but slightly edited to suit my purposes. Amusingly the original goes on to say “Their days are numbered except against France…if she ever gets up a Navy.”
     
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    Chapter 25: Thunder on the Rivers
  • Chapter 25: Thunder on the Rivers
    "Your dispatch of the 24th received. Will take Island 10 within a week. Trust me." - John Pope to Don Carlos Buell, April 1862

    Johnston’s plan in the opening stages of the campaign was simple. He would oppose any Union thrust out of either Nashville, or up the Mississippi against Memphis, and then march north to turn the flank of any Union force and drive it back to Nashville and then invest the city. That he was allowed to build up his forces with so little opposition was thanks to a number of factors, largely though was the necessary pause as Union forces were reorganized and shifted north towards the border with the Province of Canada.

    It remained to be seen whether the reorganized Union forces could match the vigor with which they had driven south in late January and early February. The declaration of war with Britain had forced a pause in offensive operations as the Union was forced to peel off forces to undertake an offensive against Canada, while also reorganizing their command structure to continue the offensive in the West against Johnston’s forces.

    With Halleck’s transfer to the Department of the Lakes, Don Carlos Buell stepped up to take command in the Western theater. Buell, 44, had graduated West Point in 1841 and served in Mexico, brevetted three times for bravery and had served under both Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor. At the start of the Civil War he had served in the nascent Army of the Potomac before being transferred west to assume command of the Army of Ohio, promoted to Major General after his capture of Nashville.

    He assumed command of the theater under Lincoln’s guidance, and was informed of the due haste required to move south and deliver victory against Johnston’s army and the total capture of Tennessee from the rebellion. Washington had settled on a grand strategy in three parts: Pope would move against Memphis with the support of Grant who would lead his forces south against Corinth and capture the vital rail junction there. Thomas meanwhile would move southwards towards Chattanooga and Eastern Tennessee, keeping Johnston’s army fixed in the eastern portion of Tennessee and driving it southwards while Beauregard would be unable to support him. Buell was reminded of the need for unified action of his forces, but somewhat sluggishly he moved in half measures against the Confederates facing him.

    He had three armies under his command. The Army of Ohio, operating out of Nashville, the Army of the Mississippi on the west bank of that river, and the Army of Western Tennessee operating on the right bank. Both armies were to demonstrate against Memphis, and capture the city for the Union, but the nature of the two commanders proved prickly.

    The Army of the Mississippi was under the command of John Pope. Pope like his contemporaries had served in Mexico, and had been chosen as one of the four officers to escort Lincoln to his inauguration, and gained an appointment to Brigadier General early in the war. His stormy relationship with his superiors would dog him, first with Fremont (who believed Pope was out to replace him) then with Halleck, and then Buell whom he accused of not promoting him to command a “unified army of the Mississippi” which intimated he believed he should be in command over the whole of the force marching on Memphis. This put him in competition with his erstwhile ally, Ulysses S. Grant.

    Grant, 40, had graduated from West Point a year after Pope in 1843, and had also served in Mexico, earning distinction in his actions, such as leading an ad-hoc cavalry charge at Resaca, and assembling a howitzer in a church steeple to bombard the enemy, and he was brevetted to the rank of captain. However, in peace time he proved a melancholy soldier. Assigned to the remote outpost of Fort Humboltd, he reportedly fell to drink and allowed his duties to lag, and was eventually offered the honor of resigning without a potential court martial because of his war record, he accepted and returned to civilian life. There he pursued numerous failed civilian ventures, before war broke out again in 1861. In spite of some reservations about his abilities he rose through the ranks and his lightning campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson made him popular in the political circles in Washington.

    Pope, who angled for a higher command, could not accept this. In spite of his orders to move in conjunction with Grant to keep Beauregard’s forces pinned in place, Pope desired victory for himself. He wrote to Grant saying: Make your preparations for carrying out the campaign proposed in your communication on the 18th. I will direct Comm Foote to begin movements against Island No. 10.” Instead of waiting for Grant to move simultaneously with him, Pope moved first.

    May 1st he launched a spectacularly ill-advised campaign against Island No. 10. The fortress was an excellent site to impede Union efforts to invade the South by the river, as ships had to approach the island bows on and then slow to make the turns. However, it had an appalling weakness in that it was only accessible by land over one easily cut road. Since February though, the Confederates, under Brigadier General John P. McCown, 3rd Brigade Confederate, Army of the Mississippi, had fortified the position with over 60 heavy guns, and he had the support of the Confederate Navy on the river under Commodore George N. Hollins. Pope meanwhile had only the tepid support of the Union Navy under Commodore Foote, who after the pounding his vessels had received at Fort Donelson, was leery of a direct assault against the Confederate position.

    Pope though, thought this immaterial, and decided to split his force to attack the Confederate garrison from both sides of the river. Though he outnumbered the Confederates two to one, this was a risky move, and had he been following his directions from headquarters he would have moved in conjunction with Grant’s army and overwhelming superiority. Though initially successful in driving the Confederates from their entrenchments into the fort, the appearance of Hollins gunboats would cause his forces to withdraw from range, until the gunboats then withdrew in turn. Despite prodding by Pope, Foote would not run the guns to engage the Confederate gunboats.

    Despite this, by May 12th reinforcements had arrived. Beauregard had advanced from Memphis in order to help the beleaguered garrison, and after stiff skirmishing with the Union men at Donaldson’s Farm, Pope’s men on the east bank of the Mississppi withdrew up the river to the safety of Foote’s guns, which compelled Pope’s withdrawal towards Columbus.

    The news infuriated Buell who ordered Grant to stall his movement towards Corinth in order to prevent Pope from being overrun...

    …Thomas led his forces south from Nashville on May 3rd. By May 1862, with his forces reorganized from the declaration of war against Britain Thomas led some 50,000 men in four divisions, inclusive of cavalry and engineers:

    Army of the Ohio

    MG George H. Thomas
    Chief of the Staff: Maj. Alvan C. Gillem
    Chief Engineer: Capt. James St. Clair Morton
    Commanding Cavalry: Col. William H. Taylor

    1st Division BG Robert Latimer McCook

    2nd Division BG Alexander McCook

    3rd Division BG Thomas L. Crittenden

    4th Division BG Thomas J. Wood (garrisoning Nashville)

    With Wood’s division garrisoning Nashville and covering his rear areas, Thomas advanced south towards Murfreesboro, where the troops of Alexander McCook’s 2nd Division ran headlong into the troops of Leonidas Polk’s 2nd Corps at Stewarts Creek.

    Johnston, since his retreat to Tullahoma in early March, had been working to fortify his front as a check on a Federal advance, and create a supply depot to support his own intended advance against Nashville. Polk’s Corps had been assigned to Murfreesboro, partially to lessen the strain on the local population and partially to serve as the first line of defence in case of Federal assault. When McCook’s men began skirmishing with Polk’s corps at Stewart’s Creek, both armies were advancing, turning the fight into one where both foes were on the offensive.

    Polk’s fieldworks held off McCook’s advance until the arrival of Bragg’s Corps, which extended the Confederate lines towards Stewartsburg, easing the pressure on Polk’s front and forcing Thomas to redeploy his forces to counter the new threat. The fruitless skirmishing would continue until May 15th when Breckinridge’s Corps would move around Thomas’s flank compelling Thomas’s withdrawal towards Nashville.

    Johnston would regroup his forces before advancing against Thomas’s entrenchments south of Nashville. The two sides clashed again on May 19th when Bragg’s Corps launched a full scale assault across Brown’s Creek into the teeth of Thomas’s defences. This preliminary skirmishing allowed Breckinridge and Polk to move to the west to strike at the city itself, but such assaults proved fruitless. The fighting only ceased on May 21st after Johnston determined that such assaults would cause only unnecessary bloodshed.

    The two armies found themselves at an impasse. Johnston was not strong enough to either break into the city nor surround it, and Thomas was not strong enough to break out and end the siege. So each side looked for a way to end the stalemate. Thomas communicated with Buell for the use of Grant’s army, which was then engaged in the assault on Island No. 10, which limited the immediately available options for the Union Army. Thomas determined that Johnston would be unable to force the city’s defences, and not cut off he could hold out indefinitely, so did not urge haste to the actions on the Mississippi. Johnston and his commanders determined they likewise would be unable to force the defences of the city absent substantial reinforcement, and a significant investment by artillery (which at that time the Confederacy did not possess) limiting their options.

    Johnston and his subordinates were split. Polk advocated movements to cut off the city, while Bragg and Breckinridge were more offensive minded. The major Union armies were tied up in either the defensive of the city of Nashville, or against Beauregard’s defenses at Memphis, should they not then go on the offensive? In their minds, Kentucky looked ripe for the taking. It was a border state they argued, and one with closer ties to the South than the North. The Confederate governor, George W. Johnson, served in the ranks as a sergeant and had fought in all the battles thus far. Breckinridge was a popular man in the state, and many soldiers in his division were of Kentucky extraction. The assault would draw Union forces out of Nashville and take pressure off the army at Memphis. Johnston, seeing few direct options, acquiesced to the pleas of his commanders and began shifting his forces westwards.

    A series of cavalry raids across the Cumberland, designed to draw Thomas’s and Buell’s attention to the west of the city paid off as Johnston transported Bragg and Breckinridge’s corps north at the beginning of June. His plans were to move north in the direction of Louisville in conjunction with Kirby Smith’s forces from East Tennessee through the Cumberland Gap, before merging the two forces at the state capital in Frankfort.

    The Confederate effort at Misdirection paid off, and Thomas shifted his forces west to look for attempted crossings of the Cumberland. Breckinridge’s Corps captured Munfordville on June 17th, while Kirby Smith moved through Glasgow on the 15th. The Confederate invasion of Kentucky had begun…” - On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis MacDougal, University of Boston, 1996

    -x-x-x-x-

    “Despite the defeat at Lacolle, Sumner was not deterred from attempting to continue his advance. After the losses incurred he regrouped his troops at Rouse Point, safe under the forts guns, and determined to find another way past Williams’s entrenched army. He had spent two weeks reorganizing his battered forces south of the border, sending raids and patrols northwards to sound out the British positions on the border. For his part, Williams merely responded with patrols, doing little to ascertain the strength of the Americans.

    So far as the British were concerned, they had won a great victory, and Montreal and Quebec were safe for the time being. This was especially true with the arrival of the 4th Division Army of Canada in the middle of June. In order to strengthen their position on the border the garrisons of the Mediterranean stations were being brought up to strength and dispatched to the North American theater. Williams had advocated for reinforcements directly from the British Isles, but the Horse Guards were sending those troops to Maine, and thus Williams had to wait.

    For the Union army there were no such reinforcements immediately available. The available state troops were tied up in garrisons along the coast and frontiers, and more soldiers were being drawn out West for the great contest taking place there, and the new volunteers in training were not yet ready for the field. Sumner pressed onwards though, looking to strike a blow at the British flank.

    He found a possible route right through the heart of the country south of Montreal. Though the British had spent much of the winter destroying the Caughanawa Railroad which led south, making that route north a poor option, they had little presence on the roadways which led to Napierville, and Williams’s flank. Other than militia piquets, the British presence immediately west of the Richelieu was limited, and with their cavalry largely tied up in screening the immediate flank of the army their ability to reconnoitre the surrounding countryside was negligible.

    Sumner though, also lacked for cavalry, but used Blake’s brigade as best he could, scouting the British lines. Though they routinely skirmished with the militia, they found that there were no British troops in strength to the west of William’s line. Through late May and early June he began shifting the men of Blenker’s division west, to Mooers, where the rail line was still intact to a lesser degree in the north on the border. With Burn’s much savaged division as a reserve Sumner planned to move his troops north to upset William’s flank, and hopefully compel his withdrawal into Montreal.

    Williams, despite concerns from his cavalry officers, showed little interest in the American skirmishing to his west. He maintained the destruction of the rail line and the absence of a navigable river would limit the Americans to attacking his front, or attempting to shift him by moving forces on the east side of the Richelieu. So when on June 14th Blenker’s forces crossed the border and drove the militia north at the village of Chateuguay, he was caught by surprise.

    In conjunction with the crossing Burnside’s division (much to their dismay) was again tasked with launching an assault at Lacolle. This diversion would serve to pin the British in place, and leave their flank open for Blenker’s men to harass.

    Or so they thought.

    What Sumner’s intelligence had failed to divine was that in early June elements of William’s 4th Division, under Major General John Inglis, was arriving. Composed of troops freed up from the Mediterranean garrisons by militia, they were shipped directly to Montreal by steamer, and on July 10th, the first brigade was already disembarking.

    These were battalions from Malta under the command of Col. Alexander Dunn VC. Dunn, 28, was a Toronto born Canadian who had been educated at Upper Canada College, but after the passing of his mother his father moved the family to England where he attended Harrow School. Tiring of an academic life he purchased a commission in the 11th Hussars in 1852, and two years later was deployed with the army to the Crimea. He took part in the battle at the Alma, and most famously at the Battle of Balaklava. It was there he won the Victoria Cross during the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade, cutting down four Russian lancers and saving the lives of two of his fellows. After the war in 1856 he returned to Canada to manage his family’s properties north of Toronto. In 1857 the Indian Mutiny broke out however, and Dunn rushed to raise a Canadian regiment to take part in the fighting. Thus was the 100th Regiment of Foot “The Royal Canadians” created. Dunn rose quickly in the ranks, becoming a major, and then Lt. Colonel by 1861. Given the local rank of Colonel he commanded the brigade that stepped off the boat at Montreal.

    Almost as Dunn’s brigade was stepping off the boat Blenker’s troops were pushing north, driving the militia before them. Williams responded by repositioning the “Canadian” Brigade under Pitt-Rivers, and they took up hasty positions on the Acadia River, as Dunn’s men marched swiftly south to confront the advancing Yankee horde.

    Blenker’s men sought to cross the water into Napierville proper on July 14th. The Canadians skirmished with Blenker’s first brigade under Stahel, while Steinwehr’s brigade attempted to cross the creek south of the village, with only the 11th Battalion of Volunteers to stand in their way with companies of militiamen from the 51st Battalion of Volunteer Infantry caught up in the fray.

    The fresh arrival of Dunn’s troops the afternoon of the 14th stabilized the situation, if only barely. William’s sought to shift Grant’s division north, but the assault’s by Burnside at Lacolle, and skirmishing up and down the line tied all of his troops except Paulet’s in place. Thus it would again fall on the Guards to march to the aide of their beleaguered comrades. Marching up Cyr Road they arrived at Napierville late in the evening, taking up positions alongside the battered Canadians.

    At dawn on the 15th Steinwehr’s brigade made a second attempt, which fell apart in the face of determined volley fire from the Guards Brigade. The arrival of Burn’s division altered the course of the battle little, as the brigades that marched forward promptly threw themselves flat to return fire rather than prosecuting the assaults with vigour. This situation continued until late in the evening, with a disheartened Burns counseling Blenker to call off the attack. Reluctantly the German agreed, and the two divisions began withdrawing in the direction of Mooers late in the evening...” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV
     
    Chapter 26: Masterly Inactivity
  • Chapter 26: Masterly Inactivity

    “And even things without life giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped? For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?” – 1st Corinthians 14, 7-8

    “The slow build up of armies in the winter months had not stopped all campaigns in the Eastern theater. The outbreak of war with Britain had come like a thunderbolt in Virginia, and every soldier in the ranks sang the praises of the Queen and Union Jack. British tars docking in Norfolk found themselves drinking well, and any man who was British in the ranks suddenly found himself well regarded by his fellows.

    The most immediate effect of the British entry into the war had been the allowance of the removal of troops on coastal duty to reinforce the ranks of the army at Centreville, and the slow withdrawal of troops from the Carolina’s following the surrender of Col. Nathaniel Brown’s 3rd Rhode Island Heavy Artillery at Port Royal in early March. This had allowed troops from the points further south to be shifted north to Centreville and the army there. The most active portion of the Confederate army however, was in the Shenandoah Valley.

    The division under the command of Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson had been in the Valley since late 1861, and had withdrawn under pressure from the Union VII Corps under Nathaniel Banks late in December 1861. Jackson, 38, was an 1846 West Point graduate who had served in Mexico earning two brevets, and then brief service in Florida before returning to Virginia to teach at the Virginia Military Institute. With the secession of Virginia he enrolled in the Confederate Army, rapidly rising through the ranks to earn the rank of brigadier general. Most famously he stood off numerous Union assaults on Henry House Hill at Bull Run, earning his nick name of “Stonewall” Jackson.

    In early 1862, he was seeking to move back up the Valley and draw Union troops away from the anticipated offensive at Centreville. However, acting on bad intelligence, he moved his 4,000 men against Kernstown in March expecting only a single weak Union brigade, and instead he ran into 9,000 well entrenched Union troops and withdrew with a bloody nose. However, with reinforcements coming from the Carolinas, he was given more men and soon designated commander of the “Left Flank” of the Army of North Virginia, with three divisions, Garnett’s, Ewells, and D. H. Hills.

    Meanwhile, up the valley VII Corps was sluggishly moving forward after an easy winter. With the easy repulse of Jackson in March, Banks felt his position was secure. He had no inkling of Jackson’s reinforcement, and so had his troops spread out in winter quarters garrisoning the Valley. The first indication he received of Jackson’s movement up the Valley was when the 1,000 man garrison of Front Royal on May 23rd was captured by Garnett’s Division. Reacting swiftly, he concentrated much of VII Corps strength at Winchester, hoping to block ant attempted thrust by what he believed to be an inferior force.

    In this he played in excellently to Jackson’s expectations.

    In a rapid march, which he only informed his commanders of the night before he implemented it, Jackson took Ewell’s and Hll’s divisions over 30 miles in two days, looping around Winchester. Meanwhile, Garnett’s division moved slowly up the Valley Pike, lulling Banks into a sense of safety as he dug in at Winchester anticipating an attack on his front. He deployed Bayard’s Brigade from Shield’s Division on his flank covering the Berryville Pike for safety, while pulling Brigadier Adolphus William’s Division on his front watching the approaches from the Valley Pike and the Front Royal – Winchester Pike. The slow skirmishing with Garnett’s men allowed him to push back, and even, so it seemed, stall Garnett’s men.

    Then on the morning of the 26th of May, Jackson’s two other divisions crashed into his unprotected rear. The resulting battle was an unmitigated disaster. Only portions of Bank’s command managed to escape the resulting envelopment, Bayard’s troops fled at first contact with Jackson’s force, and the 1st Michigan Cavalry managed to fight its way northwards, but Banks, and the whole of William’s Division, was not so lucky. In the confused fighting his 14,000 men had been overwhelmed by the 32,000 Jackson brought to bear. Banks and his entire command were captured, putting 12,000 prisoners at Jackson’s disposal[1].

    The resultant panic in Washington led to the diversion of Sigzel’s Corps from the coming offensive aimed at Centreville, to bottling up Jackson’s troops in the Valley…” - A Prophet of War: The Life of Stonewall Jackson, Timothy Henderson, Richmond University, 1988

    Jackson_%25282%2529.jpg

    Jackson at Winchester

    “Since his removal as General in Chief, McClellan had committed himself to organizing the Army of the Potomac throughout the winter months. The declaration of war by Britain had led him to be increasingly critical of the cabinet, but only in his private correspondence and to trusted subordinates. He instead maintained an increasingly strained communication with Lincoln and Stanton in Washington, where he felt strategy was unwisely dictated by committee rather than by strategic necessity. The naming of John A. Dix as General in Chief in late May had further strained the relationship between Commander in Chief and his principal general in the Virginia theater.

    McClellan for his part remained in Alexandria, largely leaving only to inspect the new Corps established in the spring, and to correspond with his preferred commanders. Despite Johnston’s army entrenching itself at Centreville a mere 20 miles distant, there was no urgency to McClellan’s actions. Increasing calls from Washington for movement fell on deaf ears, and McClellan himself seemed to have no strategy in place for dealing with the growing Confederate force which threatened the city. Jackson’s stunning victory in the Valley had led to increased grumbling in Washington. The perception that McClellan had done nothing since February grew as June began, and ominous rumblings began to be heard in the capital that someone else had better be found to command the Army of the Potomac. The press began to compliment his "masterly inactivity" on the front, and it seems McClellan felt action was necessary.

    Finally McClellan had written to Lincoln explaining, in vague terms, how he intended to force Johnston south, and hopefully capture a part of it like Jackson had done in the Valley. Lincoln, relieved to see some action from McClellan, wrote his enthusiastic approval of the vague plan, despite misgivings by Dix and Stanton. McClellan ended his letter with a promise of action by the 4th of July…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

    Masterly%2BInactivity%2Bcartoon.jpg

    “…Johston’s Army of Northern Virginia had grown by leaps and bounds over the winter. With troops from the Carolinas, and men freed from defending the coasts, he soon had 65,000 men direction supporting him at Centreville, and 97,000 under his overall command. His position at Centreville had become progressively more secure, and he soon had the equivalent of two corps occupying it. The Confederate army had not yet adopted the Corps distinction however, and thus far Johnston had divided his forces into “wings” with the army organized as such in July of 1862:

    Army of Northern Virginia

    Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

    Chief of the Staff: Maj Thomas G. Rhett
    ADC: Lt James B. Washington
    Assistant Adjutant: Maj A. Pendleton Mason
    Quartermaster: Maj Archibald H. Cole
    Chief Engineer: Lt. Col. Walter H. Stevens

    Left Wing (Jackson)
    - Garnett’s, Ewell’s, D.H. Hill’s divisions

    Center (Longstreet)
    - Anderson’s, Early’s, Pickett’s Divisions

    Right Wing (Magruder)
    - McLaw’s, Jones’, Griffith’s Divisions

    Reserve (G.W. Smith)
    - Whitings, and Holmes, Ransom’s Divisions

    Calvary Division (J.E.B Stuart)

    Artillery (William N. Pendleton)

    The Left Wing was in the Valley, having won a smashing victory in late May which buoyed Confederate confidence. The largest wing was in the Centreville defenses under Longstreet, some 34,000 men. The Right was emplaced at Manassas Station, supplying Johnston’s army, while the Reserve was organizing at Groveton, and aimed to provide support to the two formations in the defenses to the east.

    Johnston had not been idle, and had been progressively fortifying his position over the winter. Centreville itself controlled the high ground and the Warrenton Turn Pike along with the major roadways in the region, while covering the main crossings on Bull Run. Secondary redoubts had been established at McClean’s Ford supporting Magruder’s fortifications at Manassas Station. However, for all their strength the flanks of the position were weak, and so Stuart’s cavalry screened the army as far north as Chantilly. Despite the strength of the fortifications though, they lacked for heavy guns, many of which, despite Johnston’s pleading, Richmond had refused to move from defences further south, and so though strong, his position was not as great as it could have been.

    McClellan had been reconnoitring this position since March, and he had told Washington it would take five corps to storm the works, even after an immense artillery bombardment. Despite these points, his much needed fifth corps under Sigzel had been detached at the start of June to shield the Valley and bottle up Jackson, in order to protect Washington, and despite asking for more men from the Washington defenses, Stanton had refused this request citing the need to defend the capital, and in this he was backed by Lincoln, and McClellan was left with only 108,000 men under his command, a force he deemed unfit to carry out his operations.

    Fuming McClellan had delayed his assault on Centreville for over a week, before finally settling on a new plan of attack. To carry it out he had his army organized as such:

    Army of the Potomac

    MG George B. McClellan Commanding
    Chief of Staff: Col. Randall B. Marcy
    Adjutant: BG Seth Williams
    Quartermaster: Maj. Stewart Van Vilet
    Engineers: BG John G. Barnard


    I Corps: MG Joseph K. Mansfield
    1st Division BG Isaac L. Stevens
    2nd Division BG Thomas W. Sherman

    III Corps BG Samuel P. Heintzelman
    1st Division BG Fitz John Porter
    2nd Division BG Joseph Hooker
    3rd Division BG Charles Smith Hamilton


    IV Corps BG Irvin McDowell
    1st Division BG William Franklin
    2nd Division BG George A. McCall
    3rd Division BG Rufus King


    V Corps MG William Rosencrans
    1st Division BG Edward O. Ord
    2nd Division BG Amiel W. Whipple
    3rd Division BG Jesse L. Reno

    The XII Corps was detached for service in the Valley, much to McClellan’s displeasure. McClellan moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court House on June 22nd, and drove the Confederate piquets from Dangerfield on the 25th. His cavalry began engaging Stuart’s troops in the vicinity of Chantilly on July 9th but the main offensive, the full weight of I Corps under Mansfield, didn’t begin until July 12th. There was a great show of McClellan directing his artillery, and beginning a great bombardment of the Confederate positions. Johnston, reasoning this was where McClellan meant to throw his main assault, and with news of Union troops moving to McCleans Ford, ordered Smith’s wing up from Groveton to support him.

    Smith however, was delayed in getting the message by a courier’s fall from a horse, and when he did receive it, was slow in getting his troops moving. It wasn’t until the morning of the 13th that Whiting’s division was trooping up the pike towards Centreville.

    However, the great showy attack had all been a ruse. Over the preceding days McClellan had moved the greater portion of his strength south, pursuing the withdrawing piquets from Dangerfield. The III and IV Corps had proceeded to Blackburn’s Ford and Union Mills, where Magruder’s men had not established adequate fortifications. At 7am on the 13th Heintzelman directed his 2nd Division under BG Joseph Hooker in a skillful crossing at Blackburn’s Ford which overran the men of David Jones division, most notably scattering the brigade commanded by former Confederate presidential contender Robert Toombs, who withdrew in confusion. McDowell crossed at Union Mills, pushing towards Manassas Station from the south while Heintzelman’s troops swung north to take the position at the ford from the flank.

    Magruder reacted swiftly however. He pushed forward McLaw’s Division to act as a stop gap while he reorganized Jones troops, and sending couriers galloping north to request support from Johnston. Johnston, who had his attention focused squarely on his front and north, where he assumed a flanking maneuver would take place, was caught entirely off guard by McClellan’s maneuver. If Manassas Station fell it unhinged his flank and current supply line. He ordered Whiting’s division, just trudging into Centreville at 1pm, to move south and support Magruder, and sent urgent couriers back to Smith to redeploy his forces to support the position at Manassas Junction.

    However, Smith failed to maneuver quickly enough, and only Whiting’s men would arrive in any position to accomplish something resembling a meaningful holding action. Communication between the large wings began breaking down as the day wore on, which influenced events as much as the surprise of McClellan’s attack.

    Meanwhile, Hooker’s troops had dashed forward, taking the stunned Confederates of Kershaw’s brigade at McCleans Ford in the flank and sending them reeling towards Manassas. Magruder quickly realized he was outmaneuvered and began withdrawing towards Gainesville, but could not get a message to Johnston, or Smith who remained unsure of his own forces dispositions. Johnston, realizing his flank was crumbling, began to move himself back along the turnpike, abandoning many guns in his flight. His own divisions withdrew slowly from their defences, and McClellan was unable to capitalize on this potential advantage due to his own communications difficulties.

    McClellan proved unable to determine exactly where McDowell and Heintzelman were in relation to Johnston troops, he would waste two precious hours attempting to coordinate his Corps, and failing to commit Rosencrans men who spent the whole battle waiting in reserve. Despite this poor coordination however, McDowell and Heintzelman were able to press the attack on, but experienced their own difficulties. Hooker’s division charged ahead, pressing recklessly forward, supported by Hamilton’s, but became bogged down in vicious fighting at Lewis’s Farm. McDowell’s 3rd Division under Rufus King actually managed to pursue Magruder’s fleeing troops, putting them in some disorder.

    The Confederate army was saved though by the skillful stand of Whiting’s division first at Bethlehem Church on the 14th, and then by Stuart’s audacious attack on McClellan’s baggage train on the 15th, which allowed Johnston to extract his troops to Gainesville where Magruders corps dug in across North Fork.

    Johnston wrote to Richmond, informing President Davis he would be unable to hold his present line, and requested permission to withdraw to the Rappahannock. Davis at first refused, but Johnston soon ignored his commander in chief and moved his headquarters south to Culpeper Courthouse on the 20th, ordering Jackson’s troops to withdraw to support his flank. These orders would have significant consequences in Richmond…” – The Virginia Front 1862, Katherine Zellers, 2012, Random House

    -----


    1] Think of this battle as 1st Winchester, but instead Jackson has 32,000 men to move against Banks. Banks being Banks, and Jackson being Jackson, there’s not many ways this can go.
     
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    Chapter 27: War Means Fighting Pt. 1
  • Chapter 27: War Means Fighting Pt. 1

    The White House, Washington, the District of Columbia, July 1862

    The infernal heat of a Washington summer seemed to infuse the capital with a gloomy haze that had little to do with the war raging across the width of the continent and across the seas. The president sat with his shirt sleeves rolled up, near neck deep in correspondence and communications. He was in a fair mood, the victory over the rebels at Centreville had pushed the Union lines as far south as the Rappahannock, and the British seemed content to remain stalled around Portland. The gloomy news of the stalemate in Canada and the contest raging on the Mississippi did not seem to perturb him despite the murmur it aroused in the city itself. The sounds of whooping and shouting could be heard from the halls as his two boys raised ruckus with their antics. Lincoln had given them near free reign in the halls of the Executive Mansion and seemed content to let them do as they pleased. Seward hoped earnestly that they might soon be sent on to the Soldier’s Home with Mrs. Keckley, but Lincoln had no desire to be parted from his children.

    Seward, with his own son serving in the defenses at Baltimore, envied the president with his family close at hand. The president’s eldest son remained at his studies, despite earnest entreaties to be permitted to join the colors. With the blow the family had suffered that winter Seward was not surprised that the president was thus far averse to putting another one of his children in harms way.

    The strains of the war had aged the president Seward noted. Worry lines creased his face, and his hair had gray streaks that had not been there last July. He only seemed to truly smile when he spent time with his children, or when he served some function of state and put on his immense confidence in the prowess of the nations’ soldiers. The recent meetings with the Russian and French ambassadors had been productive he seemed to think but Seward was never sure.

    “I still can’t understand why you let those two cross the lines.” Seward said scowling bringing up a thread worn conversation. Lincoln looked up from his desk raising an eyebrow.

    “It seems to be of little worry whether two foreign diplomats have the run of Richmond, what will they see that harms us? If anything I should like to hear the news they bear upon their return.” Lincoln replied.

    “Stoeckl will no doubt be forthcoming with information, but I sincerely doubt Mercier will. The Frenchman has been more mercurial with his responses regarding everything since March. He won’t give me a firm answer on the Mexican question, and all he can do is send his ‘deepest condolences’ regarding lost trading opportunities over the blockade.” Seward grumbled.

    Lincoln set down his pen.

    “They seem rather upset about Mexico ever since the news about Puebla came back. Some great blow to French pride they seem to think.” Seward grinned in response.

    “That may be one reason for the Emperor’s lack of firm commitment to anything. This Mexican adventure was supposed to be a parade, what they got was a farce. The Emperor may be having second thoughts about North American adventuring.”

    “We can only hope he can think to invite Scott back to Paris.” Lincoln said.

    “The polite reception Scott received seems the best we could hope for. His reception in Berlin was formal and polite, but the Prussians seem more concerned with European affairs than our own. They have no qualms about accepting contracts however, unlike the French.” Seward said scowling.

    “The French seem more concerned with Britain’s opinion than our own. Though so long as they remain neutral in this conflict I cannot be too discomforted.” Lincoln said.

    “That Stoeckl is with him is something of a relief I shall admit. St. Petersburg is enthusiastic in its support for us. I doubt the powers of Europe will follow London’s lead on any matter regarding the South without a general consensus of the great powers. So far we may rest assured that they see our war as an interesting diversion from European affairs from what Adams tells me. Should it drag on, we may be able to discomfort the British in Europe.” Seward replied. Lincoln frowned.

    “Let us hope it does not drag on too long. I desire an honorable peace abroad and a conclusion to the war at home. One war was bad enough, but two wars is stretching the nation.” Lincoln sighed picking up a report. “The greenbacks are worth perhaps half their estimated value according to Chase, 150 greenbacks will buy 100 dollars in gold, and it remains steady for now, but he predicts that bond sales may drop off should we suffer any grievous reverses. I shudder to think what is happening on Wall Street as the merchants feel the pinch.”

    “Or in Tamanny Hall. Fernando Wood and his ilk are making noises with Tweed in the city, and they’ve got friends from Buffalo to Albany who want Morgan out of office. The economy is making them anxious, and our own supporters feel it too.” Seward said cautiously.

    “One would think the war economy would help with that, what with the facilities at Albany and the money made from soldiers. Troy is booming with the money we’ve sent so I’m told.”

    “A few ironclads for the lakes does not make up for mills closing across New England and sailors and ships stuck in port.” Seward cautioned. Lincoln looked weary suddenly.

    “As my conscience reminds me all too often. Sometimes I lay awake at night imagining the cost of this war in blood and treasure, in sons and crops, and it is almost too much to bear. But I console myself with the knowledge it must be done if we are to save not only our nation, but our principles.”

    “Hence why you were so adamant in signing the Militia Act?” Seward asked.

    “I know you do not approve of such a measure so soon Seward, but how can I justify not arming men of color who wish to fight when they already serve as porters, drivers, and pioneers in many of our armies and face fire no less hot than that of white men? Ms. Keckley’s own son gave his life for our country August last. Can I deny any man the right to take up arms for what is right?”

    “Little matter who is right if it drives Kentucky into the arms of the Confederacy! Missouri and Delaware would soon follow! You heard the governors, they will not even consider compensated emancipation!” Seward exclaimed. In a rare moment of temper Lincoln slammed a palm on the desk making his papers shake.

    “I will go as far as I must Seward, but we both abhor that so called peculiar institution, I will save this Union whether I free only some of the slaves now, or all of them, but I will not deny a man his right to fight based on the color of his skin! Would you have me fight this war with rose water and light blows?”

    There was a silence between them for a moment. Lincoln sighed heavily. “I am sorry friend Seward. I should not be short with you, you who has stood by me all this way. The war ages me, and I feel it in my bones. But I know we are fighting for things in this war that transcend our party politics.”

    “In that we are agreed sir. But like you have said, timing is everything in this matter.” Seward said softly. “With Kentucky in flames and our soldiers in Canada making no progress on Montreal we need victories to sooth the people’s worried hearts.”

    “There is much merit in that Seward,” Lincoln said turning his gaze out the window, as though straining to see the armies in the field “much merit indeed.”

    Rusholme Villa, Canada West, July 1862

    The colonial mansion a few miles outside of the city of Toronto was normally an oasis of calm for its residents, but it currently housed a considerable degree of tension. Built in an early colonial style in 1839 the spacious manor had served as the home for the Denison family for nearly 30 years as the current scion of the Loyalist descended landholders worked his way up in the society of Canada West. The home had 19 rooms housing a large family and serving as the center of a dynamic social life; having catered to distinguished colonial, military, and royal personages in their tours of the country. The manor was protected from the view of the common man passing by on the roadway through the strategic placement of forests and fields. Those fields and orchards worked by tenant farmers who made the Denison family a considerable sum of money in crops through the families dabbling in scientific farming. This all allowed the Denison’s to live like landed gentry in a distinctly Old World fashion.

    Henry Dundas, the Third Viscount Melville enjoyed that style. He was quite at home amongst the spacious rooms and lands of the Denison family. It was a quaint colonial villa, and though he didn’t think it held a candle to his own families’ Melville Castle outside of Dalkeith, he had appreciated the use of its spacious facilities for planning and retreat from the dusty streets of Toronto too often to feel a contempt for it. He had enjoyed many an afternoon on the front verandas discussing hunting, politics, and war stories with his officers there. However, now he was in a far more stressful position.

    The home’s owner, George Denison II, sat in the spacious sitting room alongside the other officers. Creeping gray was steadily eroding the last brown strands from his hair, and he had a very tired expression. The Denison family’s contributions to help the war effort were immense in both personal and monetary terms. George II had personally donated thousands of dollars in his efforts to arm and equip the militia battalions which had formed up around Toronto. His eldest son led their cavalry escort, another was a major in a volunteer battalion, and his youngest son served as a messenger on his staff. Then his younger brother commanded a battery of artillery in the field force. The family had been of great help in whipping up support for the volunteer battalions, and Dundas had no reason to complain about their conduct at Lime Ridge or during the withdrawal.

    The other Canadian officers present had been just as helpful in their own way. Colonel James Shanley had commanded the active militia forces in the London District and done a credible job of leading his men during the withdrawal. Colonel Alfred Booker, previously commander of the Hamilton garrison and many of the surrounding units had performed admirably in organizing the defences at Hamilton and extracted his men from the city, his steady and workman like manner keeping spirits high as he led them north. They sat with him and the rest of his staff, MacDougall, Wolseley, and Laurie.

    The meeting was a tense one, the cloud of defeat that had hung over the ramshackle army since the withdrawal from Hamilton lay heavily in the room. The fact that they were there to discuss only one item and its probable implications was another thing to be added to the depressing list of military problems in Canada West.

    “Gentlemen, I am afraid that we will be unable to hold our position here at Toronto.” He declared solemnly. There was a collective look of pain across the faces of the Canadians, and the British officers merely nodded grimly. Denison in particular looked anguished.

    “My Lord,” the Canadian colonel began “that is the abandonment of all Her Majesty’s loyal subjects in Canada West to the enemy.”

    “I’m afraid I’m well aware of the consequences Colonel Denison.” Dundas said.

    “This is the most populous and industrious portion of the province next to Montreal. Toronto is the largest English city in the region! Surely her factories, ports, and people can’t be given up without a fight?” He asked, the pain in his voice almost palatable.

    “The position of the city is unenviable with no natural defences and little good ground to offer battle. Our squadron on the waters is ill disposed to prevent a sudden descent upon the port and its defences are not well suited to drive off an amphibious assault. I will not risk this army in a vain attempt to hold the city, nor will I subject it to the potential pillage of the enemy.”

    “It may be pillaged anyways, after the barbarism the Yankee’s displayed unleashing that mad Russian on Brantford!” Booker thundered in sudden anger. The Canadians all bristled at the mention of the town.

    The small town of Brantford was little more than a station on the railway, with no strategic value other than the railroad running through it. Some of his forces had retreated up that way, sabotaging the railroad behind them, and he had only left a picket there to warn him of the American advance. The Americans had come and then, according to refugees, after driving off the picket they had proceeded to completely sack the town; burning it to the ground under the orders of their Colonel Turchin. They had engaged in wanton looting and burned empty homes declaring that their inhabitants were militiamen or some of the men roving behind the lines. The fires had spread out of control, and three men who had tried to extinguish the flames had been shot dead.

    The town was almost totally deserted now he heard, but it had put fire into the flagging morale of the militia under his command. Though desertion had been something of a problem after the steady retreat, he suddenly found new volunteers coming to fill the ranks, and spirits had soared as the Canadians swore vengeance on the American invaders. Defeatism amongst their officers had been replaced with a sudden steely resolve to keep fighting.

    “The Americans have stopped their advance.” Denison said “Surely we might have time to fortify the city now that their General Buell seems to be cooling his heels?”

    “I am afraid Colonel that would take more time than we would like.” MacDougall answered. “The ground here might be quite suitable for entrenching, but even if we had a month to dig in and fortify the city, our defences would still be unsuitable to withstand a protracted siege.”

    “If we have the city elders surrender to the Americans, I’m sure cooler heads will prevail. Compared to that Russian madman, or the ruffians who burnt it in 1813 the American commander Buell seems rather reasonable.” Dundas replied.

    “Perhaps he is correct.” Colonel Shanly said. “London has not burned, and thus far the occupation has been fair from all we have heard.”

    There was a stark silence as the elderly colonel sat in his home and bowed his head. He looked up around his house as though he were seeing it for the last time and let out a heavy sigh. He finally returned the stares of the others and nodded wearily.

    “There are still points to offer battle to the Americans gentlemen. I don’t mean to let them come so far without testing this Smith again.” Dundas said. He then gestured to a map laid out before him. “In the meantime our wounded must be evacuated, the stores shipped east, and the men must begin moving out. Port Hope is the first terminus for the railroad from Peterborough, and where I mean to join with the remaining militia from the region, it is also where Bythesea’s ships may safely put to anchor. From there I intend to move on to another position…”
     
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    Chapter 27: War Means Fighting Pt. 2
  • Chapter 27: War Means Fighting Pt. 2

    The White House, Richmond, Virginia, Confederate States of America, July 1862

    The three story grey stuccoed neoclassical mansion serving as the executive mansion of the Confederate States of America stood on the corner of East Clay Street, and housed the President, his wife Varnia, and their staff. President Davis’s office was tucked away on the second floor, close enough to greet important visitors, but far enough away to avoid disturbing the family. It was where the executive decisions were so often made, and to most of those decisions, the Confederate Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin, was privy. He currently wished he wasn’t quite so privy to his chief’s mood.

    Though he appreciated the trust of his chief, and the faith both men held in their new nation, he understood Davis could be prickly where points of honor were concerned. His health, ever poor, also made him prone to seeming irritable, stiff, and distant. Bad news could also bring that about. However, he had been walking on sunshine since early February with news of the British declaration of war, positively elated at news of Yankee setbacks throughout the spring, and utterly overjoyed at news of Johnston’s advance on Nashville.

    Unfortunately, good things never lasted.

    Joseph E. Johnston had, against the Presidents wishes, withdrawn to the Rappahannock River in the face of the Union advance. He was fuming currently, teeth grinding as he glared at the letter that had been delivered, and the map on his wall showing the disposition of the armies of his nation.

    “The Rappahannock, the Rappahannock? Does he intend to withdraw to the interior then when McCllelan next attacks? Where would be left to withdraw, the Carolinas?” Davis thundered. He crumpled and uncrumpled the letter in his hand as he painstakingly moved the pins representing the best known dispositions of the armies. Johnston currently sat at Culpeper Court House along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, with his troops spread out along the Rappahannock from the foot of Piney Mountain to the city of Fredericksburg, waiting on a Union attack they all knew would come.

    “And still he sees fit to quarrel about seniority, or the disposition of Richmond’s defenses! Ha! If he were bold enough he would see we have no need to defend Richmond so long as the Royal Navy keeps the Yankee fleet bottled up in port. Johnston delivers us victories in Tennessee and Kentucky! He stands at the gates of Louisville and we have to fear for the safety of Richmond!” Davis paused to take a breath, and Judah butted in.

    “On a different note sir, when should we meet those gentlemen from Washington?” He said. Davis face softened slightly and he turned contemplative, putting the much crumpled letter aside. Benjamin continued “They have spent much time touring the army headquarters at Culpeper, and the yards at Nortfolk, but I fear we shouldn’t put them off any longer.”

    “I had hoped to meet with them on better terms.” Davis grunted. “With our armies advancing on all fronts, rather than with our men falling back through the state towards the capital. However, we must establish our foreign contacts.”

    “I agree sir. The French may be the most receptive to our discussions, especially with trade resuming all along the coasts. The nations of Europe are starving for cotton, and now we can give it to them. Our leverage has returned in negotiations.” Benjamin said brightly.

    “My confidence would be multiplied by victories in the field.” Davis replied.

    “Think of it sir, ships from France, England, Holland, and Spain are docking in our harbors to take on cotton and tobacco, in return they bring gunpowder, rifles, timber, iron, and wines which will sustain our population. The currency is at an all time high, Memminger believes we may be able to keep it stable via a bond of some sort.”

    “I thought the war tariff would provide us nicely?” Davis asked.

    “We are spending yet more money on the army, and the navy needs funds if it is to expand. The call everywhere is for more money.” Judah said spreading his hands. Davis, with an age old Southern mentality against such economic interference grunted.

    “That whole business was a bitter pill before Congress in April. I doubt I will gain political capital if we must fight them again on economics.” Davis rubbed his temples as he felt a familiar ache behind his eyes.

    “An unfortunate necessity of our times, I daresay it is that or raise taxes.”

    “Possibly,” Davis said musing “it could be done, I think that would help, but we can table that discussion for another time. Now about these foreigners?”

    “The French minister, a Mister Mercier, has been very hopeful of seeing us. Delay because of the withdrawal may deter him from making a favorable report.”

    “Very well,” Davis sighed as the headache subsided slightly “sent for him tomorrow at his earliest convenience.”

    “There is also sir,” Judah broke in “a request from Captain Morgan to be transferred West again.”

    “Where is he now?”

    “It seems as though paperwork has delayed he and his men from rejoining the campaign in Kentucky and he is very, ah, eager one might say to return to his home state.” Davis broke a rare smile.

    “Then send him on. I have no wish to see him languish here in the capital when he could be liberating my own home from the Yankees. I wish I could join him” Davis scowled “Instead I am here in a nest of vipers in an office I did not desire – did not request – when I could be doing my service in the field. Meanwhile we have men who care more about seniority skeedadling from a fight out in Virginia!” He said becoming vehement again. Benjamin broke in timely:

    “But we now have allies, and the eyes of the world are upon us and our struggle.”

    “Yes, yes Judah this is true.” Davis said looking out his window briefly. “Soon all the world will see our cause is just, and that we, like our forefathers nearly a century ago, are willing to stand against tyranny.”

    “But tyranny cannot be withstood without paperwork.” Judah said as his secretary entered with a pile of correspondence. Davis felt another headache coming as he turned back to his thankless task.
     
    Chapter 28: War Means Killing Pt. 1
  • Chapter 28: War Means Killing Pt. 1

    "War means fighting, and fighting means killing." - Nathan Bedford Forrest

    “The invasion of Kentucky was not a part of a broader coordinated strategy in 1862 unlike those that would emerge the following year. Davis had endorsed the plan, but Johnston had been led to it, rather than decisively agreeing to carry it out himself. Though his subordinates had enthusiastically pushed for the scheme, it did not take long for the limited goals Johnston had envisioned to be exceeded.

    Kirby Smith, with his 6,000 men had captured Lexington, moving well ahead of Johnston’s troops, who were delayed by the repulse of Thomas’s pursuing army at Elizabethtown. Soon though, the two forces met at Frankfort on July 12th, bringing the total number of men in Kentucky to 37,000. More soldiers were drawn from Eastern Tennessee to control the supply lines leading overland to Frankfort, leaving a small number of men to police the restive eastern counties of the state.

    The greatest effect of this was in Breckinridge’s stand at Elizabethtown where Thomas was stymied through a truly epic defense by Breckinridge. It was here where the Orphan Brigade stood off the attack of Crittenden’s entire division in a bloody stand up fight that earned them a just fame in and outside of Kentucky. Though merely a skirmish, Thomas was convinced that his efforts would be better served in the long march around to Louisville. Fooling Breckinridge into believing his army was sitting on his doorstep he executed a skilled, but slow withdrawal north, where he would meet with Buell and the forces hurriedly transferred up the Ohio from Grant’s army. Grant himself was moving away from Island No. 10 with all speed to the relief of Louisville, or so he believed.

    The Confederate army, for all its effort, had marched well beyond its supply lines even moving to Frankfort. Johnston ordered the army be given a chance to rest, and with no adequate intelligence on Thomas’s position decided to stand firm on the defensive, much to the lamentations of Smith and Bragg who all but pleaded for an offensive maneuver to take Louisville, which they (rightly) believed was only lightly defended by local militiamen. However, Johnston would not hear it. Breckinridge’s corps was spread thin, and his own men were tired and worn, in need of resupply after a month’s skirmishing and marching to reach their current goal. The army was stretched from Franktown to Elizabethtown with tenuous control of the roadways in between, forcing the dispatch of 4,000 men from Smith’s former department. Instead he ordered two weeks to rest and refit his forces, and threw himself into the organizing of the Confederate government of Kentucky at Davis’s insistence.

    Buell meanwhile, fumed in Louisville, convinced of an impending Confederate attack. Grant was perturbed to see a state of near inaction upon his arrival in the city. Buell was ponderously entrenching himself while messages of near panic inundated him from Washington, Thomas had yet to arrive, and Buell, other than being well supplied and finding a stronger position every day, seemed at a loss. Matters had not been helped by the flight of Governor Beriah Magoffin, who had taken the states gold reserves and fled across the Ohio, which had led to Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton to declare himself provisional governor of Kentucky in Magoffin’s absence, leading to political turmoil as he declared martial law on Buell's behalf.

    Though Buell knew where his enemy was, until Thomas arrived he had few options…” On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis MacDougal, University of Boston, 1996

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    The flight of Governor Magoffin greatly increased the Union's difficulties

    “Grant had only brought three divisions (McClernand, Wallace, and Hurlbut), as Sherman held the supply lines in western Kentucky, but all told this was only 19,000 men from VIII Corps, leaving the city in potential peril from the larger Confederate army. Thomas’s arrival on the 17th of July was well timed. He too only had three of his divisions from the stronger IX Corps, but with the casualties he had suffered throughout the spring and summer campaigns even his force had dwindled to 27,000 men. However, combined the two corps mustered some 46,000 men between them.

    This was larger than Johnston’s force could hope to be, especially with its needs to garrison Kentucky, maintain the stalemate outside of Nashville, and trap Pope’s army in place on the Mississippi. However, Buell remained cautious, much too cautious for the liking of those in Washington. He dithered until the beginning of August until Lincoln finally prompted the cautious general to march with a firm order to do so. Buell acquiesced, but took his time in planning his attack.

    The roads south of Louisville teamed with Confederate riders, but the Federal position was secure north of the Salt River. Cautiously Buell dispatched Thomas to establish a secure advance position at Shepherdsville just north of the river on the Bardstown line, insuring a secure supply line to the south. Scouting by the Union cavalry, despite intense skirmishes, revealed that the two Confederate forces were still separate, with the majority of the Confederate army still at Franktown, and only Breckinridge’s Corps nearby still entrenched at Elizabethtown.

    Buell now, in an uncharacteristic fit of optimism, determined to strike effectively. He brought Grant’s corps south, leaving the security of Louisville to local militia and the “100 day men” called up in response to the emergency by the governors of Indiana and Ohio, and brought his full force to bear on what he assumed to be Breckinridge’s unsupported corps. In crushing or capturing Breckinridge, he opened the way to Nashville again, and would leave Johnston with no choice but to withdraw south, and abandon his efforts in the Bluegrass state…

    …though the name of the informant who brought the information through the Bluegrass Corridor to Johnston in Frankfort where he had finished installing Confederate governor George W. Johnson, and begun building Fort Johnston on the hills over town, the effect is well known. In a hurried departure he moved swiftly, bringing with him Bragg’s Corps, and Smith’s attached division. His aim was to unite with Breckinridge’s troops and bring Buell to battle, and hopefully to fight the deciding battle for Kentucky.

    The Federal army made good time but halted at the little crossroads of Bardstown. It was here Buell sought to establish his main supply depot to march on Breckinridge’s isolated position. The little town of 1,500 residents was the major crossroads in the region, well known for the picturesque locale of Federal Hill which had inspired Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The town itself served as crossroads for Louisville bringing goods up the Bardstown road. It was here the two forces would meet.

    Buell had proceeded south down Bardstown Road, while Breckinridge advanced along the Elizabeth Pike, Johnston had taken the most circuitous route through Shelbyville. However, other than ordering Breckinridge to reconnoitre Bardstown, Johnston was little aware of the presence of the Federals south of Shepherdsville. For all this though, Buell again displayed signs of slowing down as he gathered his forces at Bardstown, allowing the Confederates to become aware of the Federal Army’s dispositions.

    Thomas’s IX Corps (Robert McCook, Alexander McCook, Crittenden’s Divisions) was positioned south of the town along the steep banks of Town Creek overlooking Beech Fork, anchoring the line against any advance from Breckinridge’s Corps. Robert McCook had the ground where the two bodies of water cordially met, while Alexander McCook held a U shaped bend in the terrain which anchored the line with Grant’s, Crittenden’s battered division was the reserve.

    Grant’s VIII Corps held the small gulley through which Town Creek burbled. They overlooked the picturesque Federal Hill home, and were charged with scouting out the roads leading west. McClerland’s division held the extreme left of the Federal position, anchored on rocky gully north of the town, while Wallace’s division formed the center, and Hurlbut’s men held the line connecting with Alexander McCook’s division. There was a laxity in the Federal dispositions.

    They were assured they knew Breckinridge’s location, and reports from scouts that he was advancing simply put Thomas’s men on alert, while Grant’s commanders, tired from marching, allowed their men to sit, and no entrenchments were made. News that Breckinridge’s force was approaching from the west did not concern Grant, he happily told Buell "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." Even Thomas seemed uncharacteristically blasé to the possibility of Breckinridge launching an assault.

    And so on the night of August 9th, neither side was prepared for the bloodbath which would follow the next day.

    Johnston had brought 35,000 men together to assault the Federal position, however, he only had Bragg’s 2nd Corps and Smith’s “Division”, totalling some 22,000 men, while Breckinridge had only 12,000 men in his corps. They were separated by terrain, and Johnston’s plan had been improvised in a midnight meeting with Bragg and Smith. Smith advised an audacious morning assault, which Bragg approved of. Breckinridge was given vague instructions to pin Thomas in place while Johnston’s force hit the Federal left, with the instruction to listen for the sound of guns in order to begin his attack. The plan was for the attack to begin at 6am.

    It was an audacious plan, but it came apart almost immediately.

    Smith, eager as ever, attack half an hour early the morning of the 10th. His men had stolen a march on McClernand’s men who were camped across the creek, and while they were cooking their breakfasts the eerie wailing noise of the rebel yell caught them. The Confederates surged forward, across the creek and up the slope into the midst of the Union camp. Such was the shock that the leading elements were already across the creek and charging up the slope when the Federal pickets rallied to fight back. The two elements, under the command of Thomas J. Churchill and Patrick Cleburne, completely overran McClernand’s position in an hour, taking over 3,000 prisoners, including the shocked general himself who was captured trying to rally his command. Cleburne would distinguish himself with his command running over the federal camp.

    With Smith’s overeager attack Bragg was forced to commit himself early, and his men roared across the creek into the better prepared Wallace’s position. In spite of being more prepared, they too were caught up in the ferocity of the rebel charge, and soon were breaking. By 6:45am the Federal right was completely unanchored, and Buell himself was caught up in what was rapidly becoming a route. Grant was meanwhile attempting to rally his men, but with McClernand captured, and Wallace caught up in the route he was casting about wildly for some semblance of order.

    Thomas on the other hand, had been expecting an attack, and the terrain on his side of the battlefield offered an advantage. The steep slopes meant that it was suicide for Breckinridge to assault him, and so he had simply started an artillery duel to keep Thomas pinned in place, demonstrating with his former brigade. Thomas, quickly became wise to what was happening, and moved Crittenden to support Hurlbut, who was now fighting for his life on the outskirts of town. Crittenden arrived, and shored up the line, which was stalemating around what would be called “bloody gully” by the troops, a short gully which lead the town. Smith had his force harassing the retreating Federals, while attempting to support Bragg who was hoping to force Hurlbut’s line.

    Crittenden’s arrival prevented this, and the attacks soon stalemated. By 11:25 Johnston himself appeared and rallied the men for another attack. He committed the whole of Bragg’s corps to the assault, and in a great wave they surged forward, but broke themselves on the teeth of federal firepower. The whole time Breckinridge continued his desultory artillery duel with Thomas’s gunners, doing nothing to support the battle itself. Johnston would remain with the men until 1pm when he belatedly realized that he had had no contact with Breckinridge since the night before, and attempted to reassert control over the army.

    Thomas meanwhile understood the predicament he was in. The left flank was completely upended, and while his frontage was secure, he could not stay in his position forever. The appearance of a bloody Grant, who had had his horse shot from under him, convinced him the left was in total peril. Though he knew Breckinridge offered him no real danger, he could not risk the army by leaving his front uncovered, and with no reserve to call on he had few options Buell and the remainder of McClernand’s, and the majority of Wallace’s divisions were fleeing far to the north, and there was little to be done except withdraw.

    By 1pm he ordered the withdrawal of Hurlbut’s division from the line, while Crittenden took up that position. Johnston had bloodied himself on the line, and neither Bragg or Smith’s men were up for another assault. Belatedly he contacted Breckinridge’s men ordering a general assault on the flank, but the terrain made it a massacre. The greatest tragedy was the heroic Orphan Brigade advancing, only to be repulsed with heavy losses. Breckinridge was heard to cry “My poor orphans!” upon seeing the wounded stream to the rear in the aftermath of this costly assault. Thomas would skillfully extract IX Corps from the fighting, moving quickly north towards Shepherdsville.

    The Battle of Bardstown was costly. Buell had brought two corps south with 45,000 men, but the Federals having suffered 13,000 casualties, with over 3,000 captured and 2,000 dead. The Confederates were little better, as of the 35,000 who had marched to battle, 10,000 were casualties. It was the bloodiest battle in the West so far, and it would send shockwaves through Washington and Richmond.

    While the press would proclaim it a great Confederate victory, it was a pyrrhic one, and also inconclusive. Though Johnston had inflicted more casualties than he sustained, Buell’s army remained in the field to threaten his, and he could not afford the same losses, and would slowly chase the Federals only two days later, stopping just south of Shepherdsville on the banks of Salt River. The immense casualties taken would lead to pointed questions in Richmond and Washington, which would have ramifications further down the line…

    …The biggest winner of the battle would be General Thomas. He was hailed as the savior of the army, and the press dubbed him “The Rock of Bardstown” for having extracted his command from such a precarious position. The Confederate press quickly dubbed him “The Bastard of Virginia” for both betraying his state, and for his performance and the fact his family had cut all ties with him when he elected to remain loyal to the Union. Though Thomas would accept the former name, he firmly clamped down on the bastard nickname as he felt it unsuitable for publication, though his troops would use it affectionately for the remainder of the war. Even after the war a veteran could proudly proclaim “I served with the Bastard!” to his fellows and be applauded; save in Kentucky and Virginia where it excited a ferocity to provoke bar brawls until well after the turn of the century…” The Fight for Kentucky, George Gates, University of California 1979

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    Speaking of bastards...

    “…the events at Fort Donelson where Forrest had managed to withdraw to Nashville with his cavalry command and a few odds and ends had ensured that he entered the public view. His attitude in the evacuation of Nashville had earned him a hard reputation in Tennessee, but his daring raids drawing away Thomas’s attention from Johnston’s advance into Kentucky had ensured he would remain in Tennessee with Hardee’s corps to bedevil the Yankees…

    …The stalemate around Nashville which had lasted from late in May well into August. While our fellows twisted Buell’s tail and gave the Yankee’s a licking they would not soon forget we sat in front of Nashville daring Wood to attack us. Forrest was much in evidence in this period. General Hardee made use of his talents drawing Yankee attention away from the fortifications near the city, raiding and burning, driving Wood to distraction.

    Perhaps our greatest feint came with our great ride around the flank, which would make even the Knight of the Golden Spurs proud. Though Breckinridge sat on the rail line leading to Nashville, rolling stock still picked up what goods could come in through the river and down to the city. Hardee desired such shipments should cease, and so ordered Forrest to raise a hue and a cry throughout the region and burn whatever we couldn’t carry. Forrest obliged.

    We crossed the Tennessee on the 9th, and rode north to Springfield. Aided all the while by patriotic citizens who desired to see our Confederacy of States stand victorious. Forrest was well aware of Federal blockhouses and patrols and we crossed the country with relative ease, shooing away Yankee patrols or capturing them and releasing them with all sorts of contradictory information. Such was their terror that we reached Franklin Kentucky with little trouble. We had torn up ten miles of track at Springfield, and now we proceeded to spend two days tearing up twenty miles of track to discomfort the Yankee occupiers in Nashville…

    2c5cf70bef736b24cc35c4de63e7df9b.jpg

    Forrest's depredations made the Union position in Nashville untenable

    …so when Wood departed Nashville on the 18th of August and Hardee could liberate the city, I felt we had played no small role in driving the Yankees from her soil. I could only hope that great ass Pope was next to be dealt a blow.” I Rode With Forrest, Ephraim S. Dodd, Houston, 1899
     
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    Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 2
  • Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 2

    “I have taken sides with the King my father, and I will suffer my bones to bleach upon this shore before I will recross that stream to join in any council of neutrality.” – Tecumseh in response to an emissary from General Hull, 1812

    “The invasions of May under Charles F. Smith’s Army of the Niagara had driven the Anglo-Canadian forces under Dundas from their prepared positions on the frontier, delivered sharp blows to the Canadians on the frontiers at London and Fort Erie. Despite this the advance across the St. Lawrence had been checked at Doran Creek, and the advance had been briefly checked at Lime Ridge before Smith had boldly maneuvered them out of their positions. This had led to the gradual fall of London, Hamilton and Toronto, depriving the Canadians of major centers of industry and bountiful resources which could have been used in the war effort.

    For all these successes though, the Union army had largely been eating the dust of the Anglo-Canadians as the British retreated northwards towards more defendable positions. Dundas had, to the great dismay of his Canadian officers, abandoned the positions at Toronto, and headed east across the shores of the Lake Ontario in search of a more secure position further north. The first act was a long march from Toronto to Port Hope, keeping pace with Bythesea’s squadron which helped escort the supplies needed to sustain the forces under his command, while scooping up the militia garrisons to pad out his own forces…” For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

    Kingston-Harbor-1860.jpg

    Kingston Harbor, 1860
    ““Like in the war of 1812-1815 the conflict on Lake Ontario would prove pivotal to the ultimate outcome of the war. The state of the two squadrons on the Lake is an interesting study in contrast. Unlike on Lake Erie there could be no entertainment of immediate success, and the needs and resources were far different from those facing the squadron there. In fact it bore more than passing resemblance to the previous war in many ways, but one must note a significant number of differences.

    Since the 1812-1815 war neither side had maintained a serious presence on the northern lakes. However there had been great changes in the nature of shipbuilding and industry. The Rideau, Welland, Genesee, and Erie canals made the problems of transporting ships and materials across the landward and riverine barriers far less difficult than they had half a century ago, and even helped connect the lakes with the Atlantic…

    …American industry along the shores of Ontario was not what it had been in 1812. In the forty years since our settlement along those shores had grown from small isolated trade villages, to bustling and industrious towns and cities with canals and railroads that connected them to the industrial heartlands of New England. The rail head at Syracuse was well placed to provide for the upkeep of the existing yards on Lake Ontario, and the surrounding cities such as Buffalo, Rochester, and Oswego where supplies could be readily furnished for the construction of a fleet.

    On the Canadian shores the population had grown, but nowhere near as exponentially as that of the neighboring states. There were still bustling cities of industry and trade where new facilities could be expanded upon. The city of Kingston, much larger than her 1812 population with 13,000 inhabitants remained the center of Canadian shipbuilding on Lake Ontario, but the town of Hamilton with its 23,000 inhabitants, good harbor, and excellent industrial output was fast catching up to the old citadel of the west. Able to draw on the burgeoning industry of cities like Toronto, London, and Guelph it was well supplied to lay down new hulls and produce new ships and even engines at need.

    Unlike in 1812 the where the Canadian shores had been longer settled and its inhabitants more accustomed to riverine and lakeside navigation, in 1862 our shores were teeming with men and industry. While the population of Canada West was 1,300,000 souls all told; the population of neighboring New York State by itself was some 3,800,000 souls. This outnumbered the combined population of the Province of Canada (2,500,000) by a considerable margin. The sum total of the frontline states in the northern theatre on Lake Ontario and the Canadian Border (New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine) numbered 5,100,000 versus 3,100,000 in all of the British North American possessions on their borders. This total increases to several million souls if one counts Michigan and Wisconsin
    1, this ought to put in perspective the imbalance of forces which existed in the early days of the conflict, between the Anglo-Canadian efforts and those of our own on those waters in 1862.

    This imbalance seems even more in evidence when one considers the tonnage of shipping on the Lakes when compared side by side as it existed in 1861:

    Summary Tonnage of United States Shipping on the Lakes: 223,953

    Summary Tonnage of Canadian Shipping on the Lakes: 75,658

    Now one must keep in mind that even so the vast majority of shipping on the Lakes was tied up in sail vessels such as barques, brigs, and schooners which plied the majority of the trade, especially that between the lakes along the Erie or Welland Canals, and these vessels were wholly unsuited for warlike purposes. A contrast of the summary tonnage of steam vessels on the Lakes paints just as stark a picture however:

    United States Steamship Summary Tonnage:

    Screw: 50,018

    Paddle: 42,683

    Canadian Steamship Summary Tonnage:

    Screw: 4,562

    Paddle: 21,017

    As awesome an image this does paint, it is also slightly misleading.

    The preponderance of Canadian shipping existed on Lake Ontario in 1861[1], and the previously listed tonnage was found largely plying its waters. These lists also bafflingly exclude Canadian ships which plied their trade from Montreal to Kingston along the St. Lawrence which though not granting any superiority in tonnage to the Canadians, make the numbers far less unenviable than they would first appear. The truth was that while we had the greater number of steamers the Canadians possessed a larger number of steamers which numbered over 400 tons. The other reality that pure numbers are unable to tell is that of the predicament of our Navy on Lake Ontario in the months between the outbreak of war with Britain.

    At the start of the rebellion in the South the Navy had been well aware of the need to rapidly expand its resources in order to enforce a close blockade of the rebel coastline to interdict his trade and coastal commerce. The Navy in April of 1861 simply did not possess enough ships to carry out this task and as such began to draw upon all the resources available to it and more. Chartering or purchasing steamers on both Lake Erie and Lake Ontario for riverine and coastal warfare five of the six United States Revenue Cutters on the lakes were sailed to New York where they were discovered to be too small for their intended purpose. They then turned to lake steamers as a source of hulls in the coming conflict. A number of American steamers were chartered from Oswego, Rochester, and Ogdensburgh, as well as some from Kingston, Toronto, and Hamilton.

    The problems with purchasing British vessels can be explained well with the story of the steamer Peerless. About the beginning of May, 1861, she was purchased by J. T. Wright, of New York, from the Bank of Upper Canada, for $36,000. On May 10 she left Toronto, under command of Capt. Robert Kerr. On May 27 she reached Quebec, where it was ascertained that under British laws she could not sail for a foreign port without an Imperial charter, which the officer at Quebec could not give, as she was owned by an American. Mr. Wright thereupon made application to the American consul at Quebec for a sailing letter; but this was declined on the ground that the vessel might be destined for service in the navy of the Confederate States. Mr. Wright was finally enabled to get this vessel out of port by giving heavy bonds that the Peerless should not be used for war-like purposes, and she was allowed onwards on condition that Captain McCarthy, a native of Nova Scotia, but a naturalized citizen of the United States, should command her. It was in her service to our Navy that she would be recaptured by the British in July of 1862 and returned to Canadian waters as a prize.

    Such a story helps explain why it was readily preferred to charter or purchase American hulls rather than those belonging to a foreign power. This however, had the effect of diluting the potential strength of any emergency squadron which could be thrown together on Lake Ontario by the Navy in 1862. In this respect it is fair to maintain that the United States did not carry a substantial advantage in terms of ships immediately available to them when war struck in February of that year.

    This was made worse by the stipulations placed upon them by the Rush-Bagot Treaty. The Treaty had been signed as a show of good will between the two nations in order to ease post war tensions, and as a much needed cost saving measure for both sides. Proposed by Acting Secretary of State, Richard Rush and British Minister to Washington, Sir Charles Bagot it stipulated that the two nations would not furnish more than a single vessel not to exceed 100 tons burden, and armed with only a single gun not exceeding eighteen pounds on either Lake Ontario or Lake Champlain. It was, with some naivety, hoped that this could lead to the demilitarization of the frontier between the two nations, and prevent an arms race on the lakes.

    In keeping with the spirit of the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1818 there was no official presence by either the Royal Navy or the United States Navy on Lake Ontario in 1862. However, much like on Lake Eerie, the treaty would not bind the two sides as greatly as they might have wished. The British had been the first to push the limits of the treaty in 1837 in response to the patriotic uprisings in Canada West (then Upper Canada). Civilian ships were hurriedly purchased and armed and used against the Patriot raiders and rebel crossings on the lake and lower Saint Lawrence. The British swiftly converted a number of steam merchantmen to gunboats, but afterwards began the construction and arming vessels of war such as Minos and Cherokee which the United States saw as a violation of the treaty prompting the construction of the Michigan. These vessels though were scrapped in 1853 when the British decided to decommission them in order to cut costs associated with the garrison in Canada. The British however had decided not to leave events to chance on the lakes and had begun in the late 1840s with the construction of three 400 ton iron steamers; Kingston, Passport, and Magnet which could in an emergency be armed and manned by the Provincial Government. These formed an important nucleus around which an emergency squadron could be furnished in times of need.

    On our own shores no such measures existed. No plans had been made for a sudden outbreak of hostilities with Britain upon the Lakes despite tensions in 1838, 1842, and 1844. The Navy Department had not seriously considered any measures in their defence, nor had it consistently kept up adequate supplies for any sort of emergency which might break out. Nor had any effort been expended in an effort to provide for a secure yard in which to shelter a squadron which might be created. Unlike the works at Kingston which had been expanded upon and modified throughout the half century leading up to the renewed conflict, the defences in Sacketts Harbor had been allowed to decay into a state of ruin, while the fort which would protect Oswego was incomplete and unarmed at the outbreak of war. Rochester and the Genesee River had nothing to protect them from a sudden descent out of the harbor at Kingston or Hamilton. It is fair to declare then that we suffered from a disadvantage at the start of the conflict on the Lake.

    However, in the immediate outbreak of war neither side could do the other any great damage. The lake was resolutely frozen until the arrival of the thaw, and even then navigation would be hazardous until the full thaw of summer drove the lingering ice away. In that time each side prepared itself as best it could…

    1[ Considering the distance and sparse material value provided by these states to the conflict on Lake Ontario I do not.]
    ” The Naval War of 1862, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., New York University Press, 1890

    “…the time between the declaration of war was spent in a state of frantic activity from Montreal to Hamilton by both the Imperial Government and the Provincial authorities inside Canada. They were faced with a situation much like that which existed in 1812 and 1837 with the threat of looming invasion hanging over all.

    The Provincial government had been the first to act in December with the chartering of the tug St. Andrew and the steamer Huron (armed with 2 and 4 guns respectively from Quebec) to patrol the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Lake St. Francis. The Admiralty in London had been next with the dispatch some junior officers, a number of shipwrights and clerks, and a company of Royal Marines at the end of the month who took the arduous overland journey to Kingston tasked with reopening the dockyard there.

    The reaction of the local population on the lake shore was supportive of the effort to rearm with volunteer naval companies forming at Garden Island, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, Dunville, and Port Stanley in January of 1862. Men offered up their ships, and in return the government offered commissions and charters to those who would serve. An ad-hoc naval school was established at Kingston in February where men of the merchant marine went to learn something of naval warfare from the men of the Royal Navy. There were however, precious few men of that pedigree to go around, but a number of officers would present themselves at Kingston and Montreal to form the nucleus of the riverine squadrons that would endeavor to protect Canada from invasion.

    In February the officer the Royal Navy had appointed to take command of the emerging squadron on Lake Ontario arrived, Captain John Bythesea.

    Bythesea had entered the navy in 1841 serving as a lieutenant aboard HMS Arrogant in 1850 and aboard her in the Russian War. It was there he earned the Victoria Cross for his actions on Vårdö capturing Russian couriers carrying important despatches to the fortress of Bomarsund. He was then given independent command of the paddle gunvessel HMS Locust in the Baltic where he would pursue Russian merchantmen and help strangle their coastal trade. In the aftermath of the war he was promoted to commander and took command of the 11 gun sloop HMS Cruizer in March of 1858 in station off China where he participated in the Second Anglo-Chinese War in action off the Taku Forts in May and surveying the Gulf of Pechili to pave the way for the allied landings on the road to Peking. Returning to Britain in 1861 he had been scooped up for particular service as the crisis deepened. Dispatched in late March he had been expected to make something of the men and material available to him, in this he would not disappoint…” Defending the Seaways, Canadians on the Lakes and Rivers in the War of 1862, Donald Glover, Royal Military College, 1972

    John-bythesea.jpg

    Captain Bythesea

    “…despite a severe degree of pessimism prevalent in the Navy Department regarding the ability to seize control of the lake on the outbreak of war Welles acting quickly began to make preparations for the formation of a squadron[Footnote: This more due to the suddenness of the blows inflicted by the Royal Navy and the perception of lacking preparation versus any inability on the part of the Navy itself]. This formation’s duty would be to contest any squadron assembled by the British at Kingston and to support the Army as it moved into Canada West. However, the realities of our own unprepared state prevented any coordinated plans between Army and Navy from being attempted on Lake Ontario unlike those on Lake Erie. The War Department, not placing any great faith in the naval establishment on Lake Ontario come spring, decided to place its trust in the superior numbers of our army to win the day and avoid any interference which might be forthcoming from the British squadron on the lake. It was however known, and expected, that the two forces would be required to work together come the fall of Toronto, as the army then could no longer avoid marching along the shore, and the navy would need to secure the west end of the lake.

    Selecting a commander for this new force was found to be of some difficulty. Many men with previous experience were already enrolled in the navy on the Atlantic at the outbreak of war, and thousands of seamen had been killed or captured by the British in the opening stages of the war. Then the results of the Battle of Key West gave birth to an officer who was fired with a desire to bring the fire of war to the British on land and sea, and in Commodore David D. Porter was a suitable commander found.

    Porter was the son of Commodore David Porter, who had also fought against the British in the 1812 war, gaining acclaim for his actions in the Pacific. Porter had followed in his father’s footsteps, serving briefly in the Mexican Navy before fighting against in the Mexican War with distinction at Vera Cruz and Tabasco. In his service he had earned a reputation for arrogance and insubordination, but his conduct was buoyed by his fertility in resources and great energy. However, he was impressed with and boastful of his own powers and given to exaggeration in relation to himself, a infirmity of the Porter family. However, it had served him well in his command of Powhatan. He had been selected to take part in that expedition to relieve Fort Sumter, and his own zealous nature had impressed Lincoln. His relation to the daring Farragut, who had recommended him, earned him the position.

    Porter’s headquarters were established, not in Sackett’s Harbor as Secretary Welles would have preferred, but at Oswego at the mouth of the Oswego River. With its population of 16,000 and good rail and river connections with the rest of the state it was a superb choice for the nucleus of a new naval yard. He would work with Halleck to build up Fort Ontario to protect his yard and the city from any sudden descent by the British. He was made secure by the men of the 24th New York Militia Brigade under Brigadier General Elson T. Wright.

    However men and material would be needed to supply this squadron. Men could furnished in abundance to man the emergency auxiliary gunboats the Navy could prepare, but material was another matter. Just as the search for hulls had stripped the lakes of many larger vessels so too had the need for guns to arm them with and the shell and shot to sustain them deprived the already meagre arsenals on the lake shore of substantial armament come the outbreak of war. That which remained was either in poor shape or of inferior quality, and new weapons were in demand all along the coasts and inland rivers. What could be spared was diverted though, and new guns were cast in the arsenals of New England as winter gave way to spring.

    The nature of this new squadron though, was contentious. It has been generally accepted that only heavier steamers were suitable for handing larger guns and that the equipping of steamers less than 300 tons would result in serious damage if provided with a heavier modern armament.

    The greatest concentration of American owned steamers lay at anchor in Ogdensburgh where there were several steamers suitable for the purpose of conversion into gunboats, but come February they were completely trapped in the ice on the St. Lawrence, and potentially at the mercy of the British and Canadian soldiery on the other shore at Prescott safely ensconced behind the works at Fort Wellington. However, in the lead up to war, the owners of these vessels had feared for their safety, and in a great risk broke them through the encroaching ice to sail them to Oswego where they could be more safely stored. It was these vessels that porter worked to refit into vessels which could take the fight to the British alongside those at Rochester under the command of his chief lieutenant, Lieutenant William “Bull” Nelson.

    Fully assembled at Oswego Porter now had ten ships totalling 4,855 tons available to him with 30 guns, he broke his flag on the hastily reassembled 832 ton Ontario carrying 6 guns. The remainder of the squadron was organized thusly:

    Bay State(4), Buckeye(2), Cataract(4), Cleveland(2), Empire(2), Genesee(2)
    2, Northerner(2), Prairie State(2)

    On the slips at Oswego were building two tinclad vessels, the Oswego, and Scourge. At Rochester was building the Sylph. These three ships had been laid down at the end of March as facilities became available, and unlike the current squadron these would be purpose designed warships which would enhance our squadron and give it an edge over the British vessels which were assembling at Kingston.

    At Kingston the British under Captain Bythesea were also arming. The sheltered port in Navy Bay and the superb harbor at Kingston itself, as well as good anchorages all along the north shore and at Garden Island gave them ample ground to retrofit their merchant ships, and the arsenal at the Stone Frigate contained many good weapons, and further were shipped inland from Quebec and Halifax as the spring wore on and navigation along the St. Lawrence opened up. They however faced the same difficulty in creating a scratch fleet as did we. They also had the majority of their vessels scattered across the breadth of the lake, but with a majority at Kingston and some at Toronto and Halifax.

    Bythesea had the full cooperation of the garrison at Fort Henry in this undertaking, the town major and brevet Colonel Hugh P. Bourchier was fully committed to the fight on the lake. Bourchier had originally come to Canada with the 93rd Regiment of Foot in 1837 and had seen firsthand the necessity of organizing even a scratch naval force on the lakes thanks to the events of 1838. Coal, guns, and ammunition were Bythesea’s if he needed it, and the cooperation between the two was superb, greatly aided by Bythesea’s service in China and his ability to cooperate with the Army. That the Stone Frigate was under the authority of the Provincial Marine (and by extension the Royal Navy) and not the Army or the militia made a competition for its resources unlikely, and the relationship between the two men would be pivotal in the opening months of the conflict…

    With his squadron in place at Kingston, Bythesea broke his flag on the 432 ton Kingston(6) and had at his command a squadron of eleven ships totalling some 5,214 tons with 43 guns organized thusly:

    Algoma(3), Banshee(3), Champion(3), Empress(4), Europa(4), Hercules(2), Kingston(6), Magnet(6), Passport(6), St. Andrew(2), Zimmerman(4)

    As such in the opening stages of the war one can see that the British held quite the advantage over us in tonnage, guns, and ships. This was made even worse by the arrival of the Russian War era gunboats HMS Raven(4), Leveret(4), Thrasher(4), and Decoy(2), on May 21st bringing the total tonnage on the British side up to 6,121 tons and 57 guns…

    …Bythesea’s audacious assault on Porter’s flotilla at Hamilton had caught the navy by surprise, but it did not significantly hamper the fall of Toronto. While the action had been bloody, for the loss of Empire and Genesee on our own side and Europa and St. Andrew on the side of the British, it had done little to change the equation on the waters of Lake Ontario. The fall of Toronto had disheartened the Canadians, but Dundas would allow no shirking in his army and punished deserters accordingly. He was concerned though that Smith could once again turn his flank by an amphibious landing. Moving in concert with Bythesea’s squadron he sought to prevent that by finding a piece of terrain which would allow him to anchor his flank as well as protect the fleet…

    2[Formerly the SS Ontario, but rechristened to avoid confusion with Porter’s flag]
    ” The Naval War of 1862, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., New York University Press, 1890

    David%20Dixon%20Porter.jpg

    David Dixon Porter

    “The journey northward had seen little beyond minor skirmishing and isolated rearguard actions. Smith had been perennially delayed by the need to garrison the territory behind him, which proved more difficult than anticipated. His own forces had been depleted by battle and the exertion of campaign, and the promised militia brigades had failed to appear to garrison his rear, the expectation that the populace would be quiet had proved in error, and the lack of naval supremacy dictated a cautious overland approach by X Corps towards their ultimate goal at Kingston. The Army of the Niagara found itself stretched thin as it pursued Dundas’s men, and while at the outset of the campaign it had numbered 34,000 men it now numbered only 28,000, minus Ammen’s division which still sat astride the St. Lawrence tying down the Canadian militia there.

    Dundas, had actually strengthened his forces, but suffered desertions as the retreat saw men return to their homes to care for their families in the face of an invading army. Dundas dealt harshly with this, branding or lashing any who were caught trying to escape. As his discipline grew harsher his forces scooped up the men protecting the rear areas, growing in size to over 18,000 men. This had created a very top heavy force, as he had absorbed the militia officers and staff into his own organization, and he was required to find some use for them. Many staff members were attached to the cavalry units, while others were assigned to supplies, others simply expanded Dundas’s staff, but as one British officer would complain “we have an influx of useless mouths which never tire of opinion.”

    Even upon arriving at Cobourg he was fearful of some assault upon his rear and withdrew to behind the Trent River, emplacing himself at Port Trent. Here he had withdrawn behind the Prince Edward Peninsula, placing his flank squarely on the Bay of Quinte, and preventing a landing from taking him in the rear. The Bay of Quinte could easily be controlled by the gunboats, which would either have to be bypassed or engaged to prevent them from falling on any American naval convoy going towards Kingston, and offered safe harbor. Dundas began to dig in here, establishing a fortified position on the grandiosely named Mount Pelion which rose 191 feet above the surrounding area allowing for artillery support, and protected the bridge crossings into Port Trent itself. Behind this position his engineers established a tete-du-pont supported by a pontoon bridge which could evacuate his men if necessary, and hold off any attempt at an American crossing.

    His supply lines were secure thanks to the Grand Trunk Railroad and the Rideau Canal stretching back to Kingston and Ottawa. However, other than supplies of food and water which could be drawn from the local population, everything else had to be shipped to the depots at Montreal, and from there up the Ottawa River, and down the Rideau Canal to Kingston and from there across the railroad to Port Trent. Ammen’s brigade, which raided up and down the length of the St. Lawrence with near impunity, had effectively cut the rail link directly to Montreal.

    Smith faced a logistical challenge just as severe. He was now deep in unfriendly territory, and though the populace was largely quiet in the summer months with the needs of the farms, bands of guerrillas preyed on his supply trains, and he was responsible for garrisoning the region now as well. His supplies all had to come from factories and depots in the United States, and travel either by rail or by barge (which was safer) to reach his army over 200 miles from Buffalo, or travel nearly 100 miles across Lake Ontario to Port Cobourg, which he occupied August 9th. Here he rested his men, made his supply lines secure as he could, and took stock of his situation.

    As he feared he could expect no naval support from Porter in this attack, and the position on Mount Pelion was formidable. With the memory of the assaults at Lime Ridge in mind he balked at a frontal assault on Dundas’s position, realizing he could not risk the casualties. Instead, he sent his cavalry under Col. Bridgeland scouting the river banks. Though at first anticipating being able to feint around Dundas’s position as he had at Lime Ridge, he soon discovered the river (which grew wider as it led north) led only north to the fastness of the Madawaska Highlands, and even a flanking march there would leave him open to attack with little hope of successfully re-establishing his supply lines. However, Bridgeland informed him that only 7 miles distant the bridge at the town of Frankford stood, and seemed guarded only by a small number of militiamen. Smith sensed an opportunity…” For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

    ----

    1] This comes from reading the British recommendations for the defence of Canada, which includes a summary tonnage of all the vessels under Canadian and American registry on Lake Ontario. Similarly my conclusion that on Lake Ontario most of the Canadian steamers are in a greater tonnage from their American counterparts comes from reading the insurance registry of shipping from 1864. That one surprised me as it showed a rough parity in vessels with suitable tonnage for warlike purposes, with a slight Canadian advantage.
     
    Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 2.2
  • Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 2.2

    “The Six Nations had contributed some 300 warriors to the British cause on the outbreak of war. Most of those who volunteered had fathers and grandfathers who had fought for the British in 1812, and a few had even fought Mackenzie’s rebels in 1837-38, however most were young men excited for their first fight, or because they had heard rumours that the invaders intended to confiscate their land.

    They were led by their chief William Simcoe Kerr who spoke for their interests and had inherited a political savvy and amateur military spirit from his father. William was the son of William Johnson Kerr, the Indian Agent and officer who had led the Six Nations warriors at Queenston Heights and Beaver Dams against invaders in 1812 alongside such notables as John Brant and John Norton in that war. He had also been an ardent anti-reformer, leading a company of volunteer warriors against the rebels in 1837-38, infamously he had been prosecuted for assault against Mackenzie himself in 1833. This anti-reform (and by extension anti-American) attitude had been inherited by his son, who had used his influence to lobby for arms and equipment for the men sent to serve alongside the Crown forces…

    …Kerr’s warriors had largely served as scouts and piquets alongside the British during the opening stages of the invasion. Kerr had seem some action at Lime Ridge, skirmishing with the American scouts, but largely they had served as Auxiliaries, and Dundas had been glad to use them. By the time of Mount Pelion they had earned their reputation as warriors…” The Six Nations in the War of 1862, Aaron Brant, University of Toronto, 1963

    41ca7dbe-20b9-4db4-b6f0-911988594c22.jpg

    Six Nations veterans from the War of 1812

    “Dundas had reorganized his command upon digging in at Port Trent. Napier’s 3rd Brigade had been reorganized on the march, Col. Brown had been killed at London, and the militia troops who had formed that brigade had largely disintegrated. The new brigade was formed from the former London garrison (56th Volunteer Rifles), with a new battalion (59th Volunteer Rifles) formed from the remaining militia companies from Toronto, while the 40th from Port Coborg was attached, and the 33rd Battalion, the only militia battalion which had remained in a semblance of readiness, was attached to these battalions. Col. Denison of Toronto was placed in command on the recommendation of the Imperial and Canadian officers, as he was judged fit to command the battalion. Though Dundas would have liked to replace Napier, political and seniority reasons prevented him from doing so, and so he would remain commanding the 2nd Division. He did choose to fix Dundas’s men in a “safe” position holding the bridge at Frankford.

    He held the former Hamilton garrison brigade under Col. Booker as his overall reserve, alongside Macleod’s 3rd Dragoons for a quick reaction force. Booker’s men were relatively fresh, having seen little heavy action save for some skirmishing at Lime Ridge, and in the various rear guard actions on the retreat from Toronto, and so could be expected to act in support of any American breakthrough.

    The 1st Division under Rumley was strengthened by the addition of new battalions into the brigades including the 46th from Port Hope under the “Boy Colonel” the 25 year old Arthur T. H. Williams, which were already strong. The 1st Brigade (now known as the York Brigade) under Maulverer, would act as the division reserve, while the 2nd and 3rd Brigades under Ross and De Courcy would hold the line.

    De Courcy was placed on the fortified position on Mount Pelion itself. Gun positions were erected, and rough breastworks were thrown up near the summit. Ross’s brigade held the flanks which stretched back to the Trent River. In total 3 miles of crude field fortifications held the line Dundas had established resting their flank on Dead Creek…

    Mount%2BPelion.jpg

    Mount Pelion after the turn of the century, with the modern battlefield marker.

    …Smith intended not to allow Dundas to become too comfortable. Bridgeland’s scouts informed him of the relatively lightly defended crossings northwards at Frankford, and so, on the night of August 14th, Smith began to move Prentiss’s 3rd Division northwards, using the Quinte Hills to screen the advance. However, in unfriendly country, it was impossible to hide the movement. Locals, and Kerr’s Indian scouts, spotted it and reported it to Dundas. Dundas, fearing that this was a prelude to a crossing near Frankford, moved Booker’s brigade north, pulling Maulverer’s York Brigade behind the river in case they needed to march north in a hurry.

    Skirmishing began on the afternoon of August 15th and it was reported to Dundas, who held back, as he also received skirmishing to his front. Remembering how he had been outmaneuvered at Lime Ridge he decided to wait. His choice was fortuitous.

    Though Smith had moved most of Prentiss’s division north, he had kept Turchin’s men back, adding them as a 3rd Brigade to Palmer’s division. He had realized that even if he forced a crossing to the north, Dundas could counter him by moving the bulk of his men to assault a lodgement on the far side. He needed to punch through where Dundas might not be prepared. The construction of the British pontoon bridge had sealed his choice. Risking his slim numeric superiority he had concentrated 16,000 men against Rumley’s 8,000 in the hopes of forcing the British across the banks. He gambled on being able to seize the bridges and drive back the British lodgement, while pulling Dundas’s reserves north to deal with the non-existent threat from Prentiss.

    The heavy guns of X Corps opened up at 11:37 in the morning on August 15th. A half hour artillery duel erupted, which caused disarray in the British lines as the heavy guns hit the forward positions, save the batteries emplaced on Mount Pelion. Then, Palmer’s Division advanced, his 1st Brigade towards the center, and his 2nd towards the left flank while McArthur’s men moved on to the right flank.

    The key to the field was Mount Pelion as Smith said “That hill is the key position and must be taken. From there we control the field and the crossings and I must have it.”, and the British had spent many days clearing trees and creating good fields of fire at the summit for the artillery. The base of the hill was still well forested, which meant that when Palmer’s 1st Brigade under Slack arrived at the base at 12:44, they were well protected from artillery. Too late did the Canadian gunners discover that in their efforts to dig in the guns that they had emplaced them so they could not be depressed far enough to fire downhill, so when Slack’s Indianans, who had helped break the militia at London, charged upwards, they were unmolested by cannon fire. Only a single battalion held the summit, the 30th Volunteer Rifles, and they panicked at the sight of three regiments charging for the summit. They were soon running, their courage failing them.

    However, they ran past the Upper Canada Colored Corps under Major Charles C. Grange. Grange had entered the military in 1843, originally serving as a militia officer from Canada West, he had commanded men in 1837-38 and had been present at the Siege of Navy Island. He had enrolled in the British forces in 1843 as an ensign, serving in in the Gambia, and commanding detachments from the West Indies Regiments in 1849. Like most Canadians he was an abolitionist, and his service with the colored men of the West Indies Regiments had made him a natural choice to lead the 400 men of the Colored Corps. Formed by men who had settled in Canada, the grandsons and sons of former slaves from the United States, and even former slaves themselves, they were eager to serve the Crown which had offered them safety. They had largely been detailed to pioneer work, and had been working to clear trees and construct roads on the march, and even here had largely been carrying ammunition to the summit, but when the call came men threw down crates of ammunition and grabbed their rifles.

    As the 30th ran down, the colored troops ran up to aid the few brave gunners who had stood with their guns. When the Indianans reached the summit they were met by a cheering mob of red coated black men who met them head on as they attempted to scale the breastworks. After a few ragged volleys a furious melee erupted as men fought with bayonets, knives, swords, and clubbed rifles. It seemed that numbers would tell, until De Courcy arrived with the remnants of the 30th and men pulled from the line on the flank. Slack’s brigade was soon retreating down the slope to cheers from the Canadians, black and white.

    The brief respite was used to rearrange guns, and reform the breastworks as best they could. Slack’s brigade was soon reinforced by his new 3rd Brigade under Turchin at 1:40. Turchin’s men were ready to repay the Canadians for the repulse at Stone Church, and they joined Slack’s men as they headed back up the hill. Trees and rocks impeded the Canadian fire, and like before the Americans made it to the breastworks at a run. The fresh men gave an extra weight to the charge, and they cleared the breastworks, intending to capture the guns. Despite the bravery of Granger’s men, and the rallied men of De Courcy’s brigade, the Canadians were driven back, and the Canadian guns were captured. However, De Courcy rallied his troops for a counter attack, and they managed to push Turchin’s men away from the guns in a running fight. The unexpected ferocity of the counter charge again pushed the Americans to the base of the hill.

    Both sides would regroup and reorganize for a precious hour as the exhausted men sat and waited.

    On Ross’s flank, McArthur’s men under the one armed Irish Col. William Sweeney in engaged the Canadians of Col. Ross’s brigade. Though the defenders were entrenched, they were stretched thin, and Sweeney’s men made significant headway against the defenders, reaching the earthworks on their first rush. Hand to hand combat ensued, but near point blank fire from the guns drove the first assault back, with significant losses on both sides. However, a second attack, with the uncommitted men of Pugh’s brigade gains traction. Ross’s men were steadily pushed back as the numbers begin to tell.

    Dundas was forced to commit the reserve his line beginning to buckle under the strain, and he ordered the York Brigade forward. The York militiamen, who had fought so hard at Lime Ridge and supported by the only battalion of regulars on the field, take the line. They quick march to the flank where Ross’s men are being driven to the river, and here the professionalism of the British once again shows its colors. With a series of quick orders the 30th Foot leads the way, flanked by the 2nd Battalion of Volunteer Infantry who maneuvered so well one officer would say “You could not tell where the 30th ended and the Volunteers began”. Hard fighting erupted as Sweeney’s men attempted to drive the regulars back with musket fire, but Maulverer directed his men skillfully. Rapid volley fire from the 30th clears the way to the field works, and soon the Americans are again driven over the line.

    By 5pm the two sides had been fighting for hours, and Mount Pelion has switched hands three times. The Americans still snipe at the Canadians from the base, and a firefight raged on each flank; however closest to the water the attack is not pressed as support from Bythesea’s gunboats prevent a general assault. The only force remaining to Smith was McArthur’s uncommitted reserve, Brigadier General Jacob Lauman’s 3rd Brigade. Lauman had been fighting since early 1861, distinguishing himself at the Battle of Belmont, and his men being some of the first over the entrenchments at Fort Donelson in February. Riding to Lauman’s brigade he indicated the summit of Mount Pelion where the colors of the Canadian Volunteers fly.

    “General, I want you to plant your flags on that summit and send the message that we control the field.” Smith ordered.
    “By God sir I’ll have the Stars and Stripes flying from the heights before sundown and we’ll show those Canucks what we did to the secesh at Fort Donelson!” Lauman replied.

    Smith welded the three disparate groups together under Palmer, in effect he organized Slack’s Turchin’s and Lauman’s regiments into an ad hoc division for a final assault on the mountain. At 6pm the attack began. Preceded by another artillery bombardment that “threw such fire one can scarce believe a tree survived” before Palmer, at the head of his men, led the way as 5,000 men advanced up the slope. Fire erupted along the summit as the Canadians threw a volley at the advancing column, before the staccato of picked fire erupted all along the line. De Courcy in command, with the 30th, the Upper Canada Colored, odd companies from the 28th, and the 46th all holding the line, barely 2,000 men, and all knew they must hold the hill to the last.

    However, the 46th was relatively fresh, and Arthur, the Boy Colonel, eager for action. While the exact sequence of events varies, he is attributed to have been standing with revolver and sword speaking excitedly to his men seeing the enemy advance. His hat is shot off, at which point he crests the breastworks (perhaps in nervous excitement) and shouts “Come on men! You volunteered to die for Queen and country! Here’s your chance!” and without a backwards glance he charges down the slope. On reflex the 46th follows, soon the 30th is joining in and the Colored Corps is right behind them.

    ArthurTHWilliams23.jpg

    Arthur T. H. Williams before the war.

    The unexpected bayonet charge smashed into Palmer’s lines with “all the ferocity of hell hounds” as one private from the 23rd Missouri would say. The momentum of the downhill charge breaks the coordinated attack, and the exhaustion of the American Volunteers shows. They break, and only the freshness of Lauman’s brigade prevents the charge from becoming a route.

    A messenger from Maulverer’s men incredulously reported to Dundas “De Courcy is attacking!”


    “Then in the name of God and Saint George go and help him!” Dundas snapped.


    The stalemate ends as Maulverer’s men counter attack in support of De Courcy’s unexpected charge. Smith rode up and down the line with his staff attempting repeatedly to stem the rout, threatening to shoot men who don’t stop running. He manages to gather enough men to form a rearguard, just as the 1st Dragoons under Boulton enter the fray, with help from Kerr’s scouts turned warriors and they harass the American flanks. With the sun setting, Smith had no choice but to fall back to Port Colborne with his forces intact. Dundas has little choice but to let them withdraw as his own men are too exhausted to even consider pursuit, and the American cavalry form a screen which Dundas could not hope to pierce causing Boulton’s cavalry to reluctantly break off, but they would shadow the withdrawal to Port Coborg. By sundown Booker’s men have arrived, having countermarched from Frankford and take the line, bolstering Dundas’s numbers. The Battle of Mount Pelion was over.

    The battle is not without cost however. Palmer is killed at the head of his ad-hoc division as the Canadians charged down slope while Turchin receives a wound for which will see him convalescent in Toronto. De Courcy and Grange were both wounded in the counter attack, and the Boy Colonel of the 46th fell mortally wounded as he led the charge. Apocryphally his last words are said to be “At least I have died for my country” Which of course should be regarded as nothing but a modern invention, but Canada gains its next war hero on the slopes of that hill.

    Of the 16,000 men Smith brought to battle, 4,600 are dead, wounded or captured. The Canadians suffer heavily as well with 3,100 dead and wounded. However, the sacrifice of the Canadian Volunteers ensures that the American campaign in Canada is over for now. Hundreds of miles away the resources needed to continue it are being eaten up from fronts as diverse as Michigan, Kentucky, and Virginia…” For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966
     
    Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 3
  • Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 3

    "Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible." - Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson

    “McClellan had spent much of July moving his forces forward towards the Rappahannock, and establishing his headquarters and main supply dump at Warrenton. He had cautiously pursued Johnston’s retreating army southwards, as though expecting Johnston to turn on him at any moment. However, Johnston proved to be just as cautious as his opponent, which caused consternation in Richmond, and ominous mutterings about his ability to command.

    McClellan, despite his slow maneuvering, was on the other hand, praised by the papers across the nation. The Battle of Centreville had been one of the few unqualified victories that year, and there was every expectation he could drive Johnston’s army further south, and resources that might have been better used elsewhere were being lavished upon him. McClellan himself spent a great deal of time overseeing the movements, gathering his forces at Warrenton, and then maneuvering along the Rappahannock to stretch out the Army of Northern Virginia under Johnston.

    However, in this period he found himself feuding with a number of his subordinates. He earned the ire of Mansfield, when despite Mansfield’s requests he awarded the division of Syke’s regulars to the newly appointed XIV Corps under his favorite Major General Fitz John Porter. Mansfield, too much of an old soldier to complain, kept his opinions to himself, but there were mutterings from his subordinates. William Rosecrans, commander of V Corps, felt snubbed by McClellan’s refusal to commit him during the actions at Centreville, and McClellan himself was ambivalent towards his former subordinate in West Virginia, and some would say fearful that the other hoped to replace him at the head of the army. Rosecrans would write “I spent much of that summer unhappy as second fiddle to a military peacock…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

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    Rosecrans, the developing rival.

    “This skirmishing and maneuvering would pay off, Johnston was forced to spread Smith’s Reserves across the Rappahannock from Barnett’s Ford(Holmes) to Fredericksburg(Ransom), using Whiting’s division as a mobile reserve to block any attempted crossing south of his headquarters at Culpeper. Stuart’s cavalry was also stretched thin as a screen for the army, with only Fitizhugh Lee’s brigade concentrated at headquarters. He remembered well his outflanking at Centreville and so was prepared to react whichever way McClellan moved.

    To his north he had placed Longstreet’s men on the crossings on the banks of the Rappahannock, and Longstreet had done his best to cover the approaches to Culpeper. Anderson’s Division was placed on a hillock overlooking Beverly Ford(Battery Glassell) covering the Beverly Ford Road, with his brigades (Armistead, Wilcox, Featherston) prepared to fall back to Yew Ridge if overwhelmed. Across from them stood Pickett’s division, with his brigades (Kemper, Hunton, Pryor) covering Kelly’s Ford and Norman’s Ford. Kemper’s brigade overlooked Norman’s Ford from Payne’s Hill, while Pryor’s brigade covered Kelly’s Ford, dug in at Kelly’s Mill. Early’s division stood in reserve.

    Magruder’s Corps was holding the northern flank near Muddy Run covering the way down Rixeyville Road. Johnston remained at headquarters in Culpeper, overseeing the supply of his forces…

    …McClellan had, in the subsequent weeks, brought his heavy guns forward from Centreville. This had given him much needed time to establish batteries and observe the growing Confederate defences on the south bank of the river. However his “timidity” (Hooker) had allowed the Confederate positions to grow strong. McClellan was unperturbed by this however, believing that should he manage to turn Johnston’s flank again he would be compelled to withdraw further south as he had in July.

    Jackson meanwhile, despite serious skirmishing in the Valley, did not seem ready to come to the aid of Johnston, leaving the flank of the army secure. The fighting at Charles Town and Summit point seemed to indicate he had no intention of moving to the south.

    In order to fix Johnston’s attention he drove Smith’s Corps to distraction, making movements in the direction of Fredericksburg and Barnett’s Ford, while maneuvering in front of the Rappahannock. However, from his headquarters at Warrenton he was looking for a more direct approach. McClellan believed that Jackson was pinned in place by Sigzel in the Valley, while with Smith’s Corps was now too far spread out to maneuver in any meaningful way against the numeric superiority he could bring to bear.

    To that end he dispatched I Corps to keep Smith looking the wrong way by demonstrating against Barnett’s Ford. V Corps under Rosecrans would demonstrate against the fords on the Rappahannock, supported by Heintzelman’s III Corps, while his hammer blow would come from the north.

    On August 12th he dispatched the newly created XIV Corps under Porter (the divisions of Skyes, Morrell, and Cox) south from Warrenton, supported by McDowell’s IV Corps. They were to be the hammer blow which would fall on Magruders Corps, pinning him in place, so Rosecrans and Heintzelman could roll up the Confederate army and seize Culpeper forcing Johnston to retreat ever further south. The hopes were high that he would succeed, and give the Lincoln administration a much needed victory.

    Unbeknownst to McClellan, Jackson had already been recalled from the Valley. Leaving Garnett’s division to vex Sigzel, who only covered McClellan’s flank as far south as Mannassas Gap, with lookout posts on Sugarloaf Mountain and Buck Mountain overlooking Chester’s Gap which would allow warning to reach McClellan of any flanking attempt, Jackson withdrew south. He took Ewell’s and D.H. Hills divisions south, transiting through Thorton’s Gap. It was here, on August 13th, that his scouts would observe a Federal column moving along Rixeyville Road. Jackson would communicate this to Johnston, who then ordered Jackson to stand in place and await further developments.

    On the 14th the assaults on the Rappahannock started…” - The Rappahannock Campaign, Simon Lewis, Aurora Publishing, 2010

    “McCllelan had aimed for the assaults on the Rappahannock to only be diversionary in order to pin down any other reserves Johnston might commit, and hopefully force Magruder’s Corps out of position. McClellan himself was headquartered at Bealton Station, with a steady stream of messengers reporting on the events occurring…

    Though the fighting on the Rappahannock was meant to be diversionary it soon escalated into an unexpectedly decisive action…”- I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

    the-battle-of-antietam-war-is-hell-store.jpg

    The men of III Corps cross the Rappahannock

    “The assaults began at 1pm, with a half hour artillery barrage opening up along the line. Though McClellan had merely intended for these to be a nuisance, and perhaps soften the Confederate positions enough to prevent needless casualties in the diversionary attacks, they proved overwhelmingly effective. The heavy guns bombarded the earthworks held by Pickett’s division, and in the opening salvos overwhelmed Pryor’s brigade and it fell back in disorder towards the ridge adjacent to Mt. Dumpling. Into the sudden gap left by Pryor’s brigade the Union V Corps, streamed across the ford in good order. Leading the way was the 1st Division under Edward Ord, which crossed the stream, and made for Brandy Station, hoping to drive a wedge between Longstreet’s divisions. Pickett tried to rally his men, but their flank was well turned and they withdrew in wild disorder.

    The only force which stood between them was that of Brigadier General Jubal Early. Early, a Virginian who had served against the Seminole in Florida and in Mexico, was a former Whig who had roused to the cause of Secession after the events at Fort Sumter. He had distinguished himself at Bull Run, and been promoted to brigadier general, and his brigade had been attached to Longstreet’s Corps where it had performed with distinction earning him a divisional command

    As Pryor’s brigade broke Early was ordered up by Longstreet to plug the emerging gap. Outnumbered, Early’s men fell back slowly in the face of superior numbers towards Flat Run, stymieing Ord’s advance until Reno’s 3rd Division was committed. Early however, held fast, planting himself on Flat Run and declaring “The Federals will move me when my banners lay trampled in the mud.” Despite repeated attacks, both Reno and Ord failed to dislodge him, and soon Pickett’s reorganized division was stepping into the line…

    JubalEarly.jpeg

    Jubal Early

    Heintzelman’s III Corps did not begin their attack so well. Anderson’s men had established excellent earthworks, and despite the pounding gave good account of themselves. Armistead’s brigade, dug in at Battery Glassel, stood off three assaults by Daniel Butterfield’s 1st Division in Heintzelman’s III Corps, until his 2nd Division under Hooker was thrown forward. Hooker’s 1st Division under Naglee would carry Beverly’s Ford under the cover of artillery. Anderson’s men soon fell back to prepared positions on Yew Ridge, holding off a determined assault by Hooker’s 2nd Brigade under the notorious Daniel Sickles, if only barely.

    The position though, was tenuous. The line was disorganized in the center, and Early’s flank was snarled between Flat Run, and the Old Carolina Road, with only a thin screen provided by his outermost brigade. Hooker, realizing this, saw the chance to turn Anderson’s flank by cracking the line at St. James Church. Butterfield’s division was rotated out, and Hooker’s men moved forward, skirmishing with the Confederates on Yew Ridge. Winfield Featherston’s Mississippians were the only force tentatively holding the flank at the church, and Hooker determined they were ripe for the picking.

    Samuel Starr’s “New Jersey Brigade” was fed into the fray at 5pm, the New Jerseyans and Mississippians clashed for over an hour with the church itself being severely damaged before Anderson pulled his line back towards Fleetwood Hill, but the success of the attack was short lived as the Pickett’s Division was stepping into the line, and the Confederates held firm despite the best efforts of Heintzelman, and Rosecrans.

    As the sun set the Confederates held a rough line stretching from Fleetwood Hill to Paoli’s Mill. Longstreet seemed firmly dug in, and the Union had suffered numerous casualties (especially amongst the men of III Corps) in forcing the fords. However, it seemed McClellan’s plan would succeed, and come the morning the hammer of Porter and McDowell would crash home on the unsuspecting northern flank of the Confederate army…” - The Rappahannock Campaign, Simon Lewis, Aurora Publishing, 2010
     
    Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 3.2
  • Chapter 28 War Means Killing Pt. 3.2

    “The fighting had largely petered out by nightfall as the Federal forces consolidated their hold on the west bank of the Rappahannock, Rosecrans and Heintzelman were bringing up their artillery in the expectation of a dawn assault in conjunction with Porter’s Corps which would strike the out of position Corps of Magruder, and in doing so drive the Confederates back to Culpeper Court House, and further south, making Jackson’s position in the Valley untenable.

    The proceeding day’s attacks had gone better than McClellan had expected, and so he anticipated little trouble with the follow up assault on the 15th. Messengers come in the night had informed him that Porter and McDowell were in position, and despite some skirmishing with Confederate cavalry, it seemed that Johnston was focused on his flank on the Rappahannock. McClellan, understanding that now a swift assault would be necessary for success, ordered that Porter begin his attack at sunrise, and retired for the night.

    The news was passed back along the line to McDowell’s command, which forwarded it up the road to Porter’s headquarters at Springfield. Porter, had the men sleep on their arms so all would be in readiness for the assault in the morning.

    Johnston, apprehensive of an assault on his front, was now convinced that he would face a dawn attack. Filled with a restless energy, he remained awake all night awaiting messages along the line. Was Jackson in position? He was. Was Magruder prepared? He was. Johnston’s nervous energy would see him described as “pacing like a caged lion and stamping like a ready horse” as he waited for the events at dawn. His orders to Jackson were clear, he was to await the sound of guns, and attack.

    Magruder, who had been ordered not to alert the Federals with his preparations, had his three divisions (McLaw’s, Jones, and Griffith’s) dug in along the Hazel River, stretching to Ruffin’s Run, where it had tenuous contact with Longstreet’s division at Fleet Hill. His main concern was protecting Hill’s Mill, Burnt Bridge Ford, and Stark’s Ford. Jones division, badly battered at Centreville, was held in reserve, while McLaw’s held the fords in conjunction with Griffith’s men. Hills Old Mill had been fortified by Kershaw’s brigade and acted as the hinge which held the line along the Hazel River, while entrenchments had been dug to cover Burnt Bridge Ford…

    Porter’s men had used Big Indian Run to mask their advance, and hauled their artillery up during the night. The 3rd Division, under Jacob D. Cox, was to open the attack in conjunction with George Morell’s 1st Division, while Syke’s regulars were to exploit the breakthrough of the Confederate lines. McDowell was the reserve, who would cross to where there was trouble.

    The plan was for Cox’s men to assault Hill’s Mill and unhinge the line, allowing Morell’s men to bring their guns to bear on Burnt Bridge Ford, and move down to Rixeyville. Stark Ford was to be ignored, and hopefully drive the forces their into the arms of the waiting Hooker and Rosecrans. With his superiority in artillery McClellan rationalized that he could drive the Confederates from their entrenchments, and move on Culpeper. So long as surprise was maintained, he anticipated little difficulty in the assault.

    At 6:35am the guns sounded.

    In order to maintain surprise the guns had been moved in the dead of night, and unfortunately Cox’s division had the furthest to go, and did not actually begin their attack until 6:50, but with the guns in place they bombarded the fortified position at the mill. Morrell’s men, who had both the shorter movement and an advantage in ground, began on time. With their advantage, they swept Semme’s brigade away, and rushed the ford in under half an hour. Semme’s men withdrew in the direction of Rixeyville, leaving Kershaw’s brigade at Hill’s Mill dangerously exposed. Kershaw, completely unaware of Semme’s withdrawal, clung doggedly to his position as Cox’s men attacked repeatedly. At 7:40, Skye’s regulars were ordered forward to support Morell…

    Jackson had slept soundly that night. He knew where the Union was, and had a rough intuition of when they would begin their attacks. In the morning he had mounted up, and brought Ewell’s Division forward down Stone Run Road.

    Ewell’s men (Trimble, Taylor, and Elzey’s brigades) caught Cox’s Division as it began its second major assault on Hill’s Mill. Cox’s men, tired from over an hours fighting, were caught off guard, and Cox ordered their withdrawal towards Big Indian Run, sending urgent messages of a force on his flank. Ewell’s men pursued Cox closely, moving to position themselves between the fords and Porter’s men. However, Skye’s regulars had not completed crossing the river, and upon hearing the whooping rebel yell, turned to position themselves in the face of the oncoming onslaught. The regulars, with a steely determination, faced off with Ewell’s men at Doyle’s Farm, and across Stone Run. In a series of hard fought stands in woodlots and orchards they sought to prevent Ewell from cutting them off. In this the regulars did admirably, at one point closing to hand to hand combat with the men of Trimble’s brigade as they attempted to force their way through the orchard.

    Hill’s division was attempting to move around their flank and position themselves between Little Indian Run, and any hope of McDowell’s reinforcement…” The Rappahannock Campaign, Simon Lewis, Aurora Publishing, 2010

    Jackson16.jpg

    Jackson feeds his men into the battle.

    “McDowell’s headquarters at Jeffersonton were a scene of confusion. The wild reports from the front line told him that Magruder’s Corps had flanked Cox, and was even now positioning itself at Big Indian Run, others said Jackson’s Corps had flown in from the Valley and was preparing to encircle their position and cut off retreat. McDowell was at first unsure of what to believe, and a crucial hour passed before he was reasonably sure of Porter’s predicament to send a message to McClellan. In the meantime he had ordered McCall’s Pennsylvanians forward to Big Indian Run…

    …McClellan did not receive the news of Jackson’s attack until 10am. So far along the Rappahannock there had been little more than heavy skirmishing as the McClellan waited for the response from Porter’s attack. However, despite three hours of fighting he had seen no change in the Confederate dispositions along their line. This concerned him, as the news he had received from Porter had confirmed a successful crossing of the Hazel River, while his position on the Rappahannock was stronger than it had been yesterday. Surely there would be some response from Porter?

    The hour delay in the dispatch of McDowell’s message meant that events were already coming to a head at Big Indian Run when McClellan received the news of Jackson’s attack. McDowell made clear he believed it to be Jackson, and that he was moving in support of porter. The news sent McClellan into a sudden silence. “He looked for a moment like how Napoleon must have looked upon news of the Prussian arrival at Waterloo” chief of staff Randall Marcy would write. Seeing in his mind the situation that his two Corps must be in, either cut off by the Hazel River and flanked by a fresh enemy force or withdrawing, he ordered a diversionary attack on the Confederate line, and sent orders for McDowell to protect Porter and begin withdrawing to Warrenton.” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

    “McDowell seems to have misunderstood his orders from McClellan, believing he needed to withdraw immediately to Warrenton he ordered Franklin’s division to begin moving their supplies at 12:09pm. Meanwhile King’s Division would be held as the reserve to support McDowell. This misunderstanding meant he would not have the strength to counterattack and drive Jackson off should the need arise.

    Porter meanwhile was fighting for his life and attempting to extract himself from the trap Johnston had created. Magruder had counterattacked, sending Jone’s Division forward to Rixeyville. Morell’s men were caught fast between Ewell’s approaching division, and Hill attempting to cut off their retreat. Cox division had scrambled as far as Big Indian Ford, just in time to join McCall’s men as Hill’s division attacked. The presence of McCall’s fresh troops prevented disaster as Cox men fell into line. The fighting would stretch all along the riverfront, until Hill attempted to turn the flank by sending Rodes brigade around Parr’s farm.

    Morell’s men were now moving across the Hazel River, John Martidale’s brigade forming a desperate rearguard, under the cover from the divisional artillery on the high ground, while Syke’s regulars held the flank against Ewell’s men. Morell now received the incorrect information that the roads back north were blocked, and so requested permission to order a withdrawal towards White Sulfer Springs.

    Porter, listening to the sounds of battle to the north, and assuming it was the unfortunate destruction of Cox’s division, reluctantly gave his assent. He assumed McDowell had not advanced to save him and was heard to curse “God damn McDowell, he’s never where he’s supposed to be!” as the Corps withdrew…

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    The rear guard holds the line.

    Porter’s withdrawal, opened the way for Magruder and Jackson to both attempt to cut off McDowell. Jone’s and McLaw’s pursued Porter, hoping to drive him into Jeffersonton and cut him off as Jackson had done to Banks at Winchester. However, Rodes attempt to cut the flank had been halted at Parr’s farm by Seymour’s 3rd Brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves. Slowly but surely they were able to withdraw towards Jeffersonton, where King’s division waited to act as rearguard…

    The rearguard action at Jeffersonton saved Porter and McDowell, allowing them to withdraw back in safety across the Rappahannock. McClellan’s assaults to pin Longstreet in place, though costly, had ensured he too could withdraw across the river towards Warrenton…” The Rappahannock Campaign, Simon Lewis, Aurora Publishing, 2010

    “The end result of the Rappahannock campaign saw McClellan return to the fortifications at Centreville and dig in across the Bull Run. McClellan informed Washington he was now outnumbered on his front, saying that 150,000 Confederates would converge on Centreville, at any moment. “I have lost this campaign because my force is too small. Had I but 10,000 more men I could be secure in the knowledge that we could defend the capital. This campaign has seen too many dead, wounded, and broken men for me to do anything but hold my position here.” In effect McClellan was requesting more men to mount a defensive campaign. Not only that, but a significant portion of his artillery had been lost in the retreat, especially by Porter’s Corps who had suffered the brunt of the fighting at Hazel River. He now demanded more resources to simply keep his army in place.

    Matters had been made worse when Johnston had unleashed Stuart’s cavalry on his great ride on the 20th of August. In eight days Stuart had ridden rings around his opposite numbers, wrecking the supply depots that Manfield’s I Corps had worked to establish, and discomforting McClellan’s retreat towards Centreville by burning wagons and harassing the withdrawing columns. They had returned to Confederate lines to great acclaim in the Richmond papers, and Stuart’s reputation would climb ever higher.

    This came at a time when commanders on all fronts were calling for more resources. McClellan’s campaign to push the Confederate army south had failed, but he was no further north than he had been last year which soothed some fears in Washington. That they had no more resources to spare him at the moment, would be a source of considerable anxiety…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.
     
    Chapter 28: War Means Killing Pt. 4
  • Chapter 28: War Means Killing Pt. 4

    “I have never seen a more lovely day. The very few clouds that hung on the horizon only served to throw into relief the bright blue of the heavens – a blue such as we dream of when we speak of Italian skies, but never seen in England. In the distance lay our fleet mirrored in the still deeper azure of the Black Sea, and the same color as pure and deep in the harbor of Sebastopol contrasted well with the brilliant white of the handsome buildings that surrounded it. Light puffs of smoke rose above different parts of the lines, and every now and then what seemed to be a little fleecy cloud would suddenly appear in the heavens. This was the bursting of a shell.” – Phillip Rathbone observing the siege lines at Sebastopol, April 1855

    “Since the arrival of William Paulet’s 3rd Division in mid-June, Pennefather had been able to stretch his siege lines around Portland further west, and definitively cut the rail lines, ensuring that the city was cut off except by road and the Oxford canal to the rest of the United States. With three divisions, and some 32,000 men now under his command, he had set to the task of attempting to besiege the city completely.

    However, it was a siege that neither Pennefather nor London desired. In the minds of the mission’s planners it was meant to be a quick sweep down on a poorly defended port which would connect Maine to Canada via rail and ease the supply problems faced by the British in the winter. Now it tied down three divisions and necessitated a significant investment by the Royal Navy.

    Since June there had been significant pressure from London for Pennefather to push the enemy from the city, a mission which Pennefather faced considerable difficulty in carrying out. Even with the arrival of Paulet’s troops, including the first Maritime Volunteers enrolled into Imperial service, he had at best numerical parity with the Army of New England which lay inside the defences. Keye, for all intents and purposes, led the troops in the field. The technical theater and army commander, Benjamin Butler, rarely bestirred himself to the siege lines outside of Portland, preferring to stay at his headquarters in Boston and organize the defences of the principle ports.

    However, he had considerable problems with his subordinates. Keye enjoyed the command, but felt increasing frustration as his requests for more men and material were increasingly ignored by Butler in Boston. This caused considerable friction as Butler, a darling of the Radical Republican faction for his contraband policy and the Democratic Party for his pre-war politics, was impossible to remove from his position and he commanded considerable sway within New England itself. Though he made some effort to manage the siege, so far as he was concerned, the British were simply stuck in place, which on a basic level was in accordance with his directives from Washington. The commander of the North Atlantic Fleet, was a more difficult problem.

    Flag Officer Charles Wilkes was, in his own way, as much of a darling to the nation as Butler was to the Radicals. Wilkes, 62 at the time of the Portland siege, had had a colorful and checkered career in the navy. Formerly known for his epic South Seas expedition, in which he had sailed around South America and up along the west coast, to the Pacific Islands, and finally to Washington state. However, he had lost one of his ships (for which he was court martialed) and brutally punished his crew and officers. This black mark on his career saw him shunted to the Coast Survey until the outbreak of war. There he had undertaken his boarding of the RMS Trent, which served as the catalyst for the British intervention. Upon his assignment, Secretary Seward had been warned “He will give us trouble. He has a superabundance of self-esteem and a deficiency of judgment. When he commanded his great exploring mission he court-martialed nearly all his officers; he alone was right, everybody else was wrong.” With a reputation of being overzealous, impulsive, and sometimes insubordinate, his assignment to squadron command had been contentious. In stepping into the role of a national hero, he was impossible to ignore however.

    Here he feuded with Butler almost endlessly. Butler’s brother Andrew ran a runner cartel from Boston, and hoped to cooperate with the navy on obtaining important (and for Andrew, lucrative) supplies for the war effort. Wilkes refused to disclose naval activities to the Butler’s, and in return Butler made a litany of complaints against Wilkes for his “insubordinate” behavior to a superior officer. The recriminations amongst the army, navy, militia, and volunteer officers, and the problems this caused in the overall defence of New England, were legion. However, though there was tension, Wilkes often unpredictable actions kept the Royal Navy blockading squadron on its toes.

    In the British camp, after the setback in early May, recriminations between army and navy were just as great. Pennefather, blamed the navy for the problems in the initial assault, while Admiral Johnstone made it clear his captains had acted properly. This had delayed army and navy cooperation in clearing the obstacles near Portland Harbor, and the siege had taken on a pretense of a race to see who could blast through the fortifications of Portland first. This resulted in the naval bombardments of Portland on May 28th, June 4th, and June 17th in 1862. While Pennefather worked to emplace his guns to greatest effect, and near nightly and daily bombardment followed as the guns sought to reduce the fortifications.

    It took until July for the problems to be smoothed over between the commanding officers, with the help of direct pressure from London. By that point, conversations between the army and navy heads had brought forward a good plan for the seizure of the city. His greatest frustration was in preventing Keye’s field army from interfering with the city’s capture. He did not desire to be trapped in the city himself once he had taken it, nor did he want to pursue Keye across Maine in order to end the threat it represented. “It would not do for our army to enter the city in triumph only for the American Army to withdraw to Canada and make our whole effort pointless. We do not need another Sebastopol.” He would write this to Lewis who in turn would only echo the Cabinet’s stated policy to seize the city.

    One of the principle lines of supply and communication still open to the city (despite near constant shelling) was the Oxford canal. Through this vital line of communication supplies could still flow which allowed for sustenance of the army. To ensure it had remained open Keye had fortified that portion of the line considerably. In this he was aided by geography as the hills on the north bank of the Stroudwater River allowed the defenders to shoot down on any attackers, meaning that considerable casualties would be taken if any force tried to assault it. This had been made painfully obvious during a probing attack near Stroudwater Village on June 17th which had been repulsed with heavy casualties amongst the attackers.

    To that end Pennefather had probed the lines looking for weaknesses throughout June, and had found depressingly few. However, where the geography of the defences worked against him, it also worked in his favor. The trenches along the Fore River, by necessity, had their backs to the water. While they in theory could be easily resupplied and controlled by armed tugs in the river and boats which ferried men and supplies across, if the lines were overrun the men there were trapped and the city open to artillery barrage. The trenches at Fort Preble were strong, and supported by the guns of Fort Scammel and batteries along the shore, but those on the river were much more vulnerable to Pennefather’s siege artillery.

    There were two key points in the defences Pennefather intended to reduce in July. The first were the twin earthworks supporting the trenches on Long Creek, Fort Long and Fort Casey which kept the trench lines even, the other was an earthwork named Fort Hamlin which sat astride Spring Road protecting the bridge there. In order to make this work easier Pennefather coordinated his future attacks with the navy, especially to reduce the guns protecting the harbor. His siege guns would reduce the strong points in the way of his impending attack, while the city was made progressively defenceless by the naval forces.

    After the June 17th attack, Pennefather concentrated largely on slowly reducing the trench lines along the Fore River and moving his artillery closer to the city. In conjunction the forts were to be reduced by the navy. This was made more difficult as when guns were silenced the American defenders threw earthen batteries up, which while less powerful, remained an annoyance.

    Despite the best efforts of the defenders, by the end of July Fort Preble was a ruin, and Fort Scammel had been silenced. Only the batteries on Hog Island presented any real opposition to the British ships, but Corchane’s ironclads proved more than capable of withstanding the guns in order to remove the torpedoes laid so desperately by the defenders.

    It would be in these actions that Benjamin Jackson, a Nova Scotian serving aboard Warrior would be awarded the Victoria Cross. While undertaking to clear torpedoes in a launch alongside his fellows at night, a flare was sent up and he became exposed to enemy fire. Despite the fire, and the wounding of most other members of his crew, he would work diligently to clear torpedoes from the waters of the Fore River before rowing his comrades back to safety…

    Pennefather set the main attack to commence along all fronts for July 25th. It would begin, on the night of the 24th however with specially chosen storming parties selected from volunteers from the regiments. “Parties of 100 or 150 (sometimes 200 or 300) were selected and formed up closest to the points to be assailed. At a sign from the officers who are going to lead the men creep over the top on all fours. Not a word is spoken, but at a sign from the officers – in they go. In less time than it takes to write this it is all over, the bayonet has done its work and the defenders are all destroyed or taken prisoner.”

    Keye had been expecting a large attack for some time however, and so had concentrated Casey’s division at Westbrook as his reserve. The ever weakening state of the defences of the Fore River had prepared him to evacuate the garrison should the south bank be taken. Pennefather’s assault was designed to prevent just this occurrence. Just before dawn on the 25th however, a great bombardment began. “Thunder split the sky, unnaturally loud, and the whole shore lit up like the midnight sunrise.” One awestruck Maine militiamen would write afterwards, upon witnessing the beginning of the bombardment.

    The siege guns under Rowan, and the mortar frigates and ironclads under Corchane began their own attack as well. In the early dawn light shell and shot fell on the defences, many streaking high and into the docks and suburbs of Portland itself, which further distracted the defenders as they sought to extinguish the resulting flames.

    On the banks of Long Creek, the two earthworks were assaulted simultaneously, the storming parties having done their brutal work the night before. Taylor’s Division lead the charge. Fort Casey on the north bank was assaulted by the 29th, and 61st Regiment of Foot lead by Brigadier Brown, Fort Long was assaulted by the 53rd, and 78th under Brigadier Ewart. The two forts, though well made, had been weakened by the bombardment and cut off by the storming parties. Fort Casey, manned only by Home Guard, fell quickly. However, Fort Long had just had the 75th New York rotated into the line. Commanded by Colonel John A. Dodge, they had been slated to form part of the planned assault on New Orleans in February, but instead had been transported north to Portland with Williams Division. Having already seen some hard fighting at Alewife Brook, they were prepared for the assault.

    They poured fire onto Ewart’s men as they two regiments sallied forth. Despite being cut off and outnumbered they fought tenaciously. Ewart was required to commit his full brigade to the action until finally Captain Alexander Mackenzie of the 78th raised the regimental colors above the fort. By that time over half of the 75th had been killed or wounded, including Col. Dodge…

    Pennefather’s main attack would be carried out by Trollope’s Division. Trollope’s troops had been in the siege lines skirmishing with the American troops since May, and had held off Keye’s attempts to shift the British lines shortly after landing. The result was Trollope was well familiar with the ground he was going to assault. Trollope himself was experienced in siege warfare, as he had commanded brigades in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions in the Crimea while serving in the trenches around Sevastopol, and he had previous experience in North America as Doyle’s predecessor in the Atlantic colonies, and had commanded the garrisons in the Ionian Islands where he had skirmished with insurgents there.

    Trollope’s three brigades were led by BG John Cole (1st Brigade), Col. Charles Hood (2nd Brigade) and BG Alexander Gordon (3rd Brigade). Cole’s 1st Brigade formed the reserve, while Hood and Gordon’s brigades would be the tip of the spear assaulting Fort Hamlin.

    The line along the Spring Road was held by William F. Smith’s division. His troops had been in good spirits despite the bombardment thanks to the repulse of the British on the 17th. His own brigades were led by Winfield S. Hancock (1st Brigade), William T.H. Brooks (2nd Brigade), and John W. Davidson (3rd Brigade). Hancock’s 1st Brigade had led the counterattack which repulsed the British with such heavy losses on the 17th of June, while Brooks brigade of Vermonters had performed admirably in their actions across the campaign and siege, taking the fight to the British wherever possible. Only Davidson’s 3rd Brigade had been relatively unbloodied in the fighting thus far. However, as the guns opened up on the 25th, Davidson’s men found themselves in the line of fire as Trollope’s brigade charged home at Fort Hamlin.

    Davidson’s brigade had some 3,600 men ready for action that morning. Facing him were 7,500 British regulars, supported by heavy guns. The men of Gordon’s brigade led the way, the men of the 45th Regiment of Foot leading the charge. The heavy bombardment had reduced the number of guns available to Davidson’s men, but those that could fired back with admirably swiftness and the first assault bogged down. Gordon’s brigade was thrown in in its full strength and soon the fighting was raging in the trenches as men shot and bayonetted one another in close confines. The ferocity of the fighting was such that Davidson’s men were pushed back, save for one regiment. The 7th Maine.

    Under the command of Lt. Col. Selden Connor, the 7th had originally mustered for service in Virginia, but when war with Britain had threatened they had been dispatched home with Smith’s division. Selden had been born in Fairfield Maine, and along with the men of his state he fought with a ferocity that can only come from men defending home and hearth. Despite lacking any combat experience, the men held firm and fired as fast as they were able into the attacking regiments. Even when the other men of Davidson’s brigade had withdrawn, they formed into a rough line and were driven to the base of the earthwork fortifications of Fort Hamlin itself, only surrendering when they came under fire from British fire in front of their position and above it. When a soldier raised a white shirt to indicate surrender, Gordon himself came forward to accept it. They had held up the British assault, on their own, for over an hour.

    With Fort Hamlin fallen though, a gaping hole now existed in the Union lines west of Portland, which was made worse by the fall of the positions on the south bank of Fore River, now Pennefather began to move his heavy guns forward. Keye was suddenly threatened with the city being completely cut off. He began to move Casey’s division forward, but Pennefather unleashed another surprise.

    While his cavalry had largely been restricted to harassing the Union flanks and protecting supplies moving from Cape Elizabeth to the siege lines, Pennefather had gambled on the American positions in their rear being unfortified, and so prepared to mount an audacious cavalry movement to completely break up the American rear. His 1st Cavalry Brigade, under BG John Foster of the 16th Lancers, was thrown through the gap. Comprised of the 9th, 12th, and 16th Lancers, along with a battery of Royal Horse Artillery, it contained perhaps the most singular oddity of the campaign in Maine, breaking through the trench lines they charged as though on the fields of Flanders or India against Davidson’s retreating soldiers. The true shock of a lance attack was enough to route Davidson’s men, even though the terrain was not even remotely suited to such a display. However, a successful cavalry charge nearly took place.

    The counterattack under Hancock showed that infantry who did not break would do to cavalry what Wellington had done at Waterloo to the French cavalry. Hancock, upon hearing the reports of cavalry, marched his men to Capisic Pond, where he ordered the men to form square. Foster’s troops attempted to break them with shock action before they could form, but Hancock kept his men well in hand, and the attack was repulsed with the predictable result of cavalry facing prepared infantry. However, when the fresh troops of Cole’s brigade arrived, supported by the Royal Horse Artillery, Hancock was forced to withdraw, lest he be blown away by superior British firepower. Foster’s bloody cavalry began to move, in conjunction with Gordon’s infantry, towards Black Cove…

    …despite Casey’s valiant counterattack, the British stood firm in their gained ground by the night of the 25th…

    At dawn on the 26th the siege guns of Pennefather’s army sounded again. This time they were bombarding the burning hulk of the old Macedonian, which was soon wrecked at the mouth of the Fore River. Corchane’s ironclads were at the mouth of the harbor, and the city was well and truly cut off. The only troops inside were the battered remnants of William’s division, and the remaining 3,000 militiamen under Virgin’s command. Pennefather began negotiations for the surrender of the city.

    Keye attempted to attack the fresh British positions, but the movement of men and artillery made any attempt to break the British lines near impossible as British guns hammered any forward movement. For two days this would continue, until Keye, recognizing the inevitable, withdrew his men to the fortified position at Westbrook. On the evening of the 29th Pennefather wrote to Virgin, who was by now de-facto commander of the garrison in Portland:

    “To the Commander of the American garrison, I request that an armistice be undertaken to discuss the surrender of this city to avoid any further effusion of blood. I propose the following terms: the men remaining under arms inside should lay down their arms, and surrender themselves to the custody of my command. Their stores, and supplies shall be surrendered to this army. In exchange we shall parole those who offer to it, and transport to a place of imprisonment, those who refuse this offer. The personal property of the men, and the citizens of this city shall not be interfered with, and the city itself shall not suffer an further damage. If these terms are refused, I am prepared to use every heavy gun ashore and afloat in order to reduce the remaining defences and take the city by storm. I will require your reply come the dawn of the 31st”

    This short, yet terrifyingly to the point, correspondence left Virgin with few options. Consultations with the mayor, and the Volunteer officers remaining to him left them with but one option.

    At dawn on the 31st Virgin, accompanied by his aide, and Mayor William Thomas, emerged under a flag of truce to meet Pennefather and his staff. They met at the home of Warren Brown on the shores of Black Cove. With pleasantries dispensed early on, Virgin and Thomas agreed to Pennefather’s terms, and would surrender the remaining 6,000 soldiers inside the city. This was communicated to Keye via messenger from Virgin’s staff. The news was from there transmitted by telegraph to Washington…”– Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

    -x-x-x-x-

    “To the last, I grapple with thee; From Hell's heart, I stab at thee;” – Captain Ahab, Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, 1851

    “The fall of Portland would free up considerable naval power that the British were hoping to send elsewhere, especially with the setbacks at New York worrying with Admiralty. This was presupposed in Washington where the fall of Portland caused alarm, and Welle’s, in concurrence with Lincoln, was determined that the navy should make some effort to discomfort the blockaders before they could properly reposition their forces along the Union coast.

    Orders were sent out mid-August for the commanders of the various squadrons to harass the British ships, and attempt to inflict as much damage as possible. This would lead to the two major naval events of August, the Battles of Cape Henlopen and the Battle of Massachusetts Bay…

    …the Delaware Bay Squadron under Commodore Samuel F. Dupont had gained acclaim in March for Dupont’s burning of the British sloop Rosario, which had been seen as a success in light of the devastating Battle of the Keyes. Added to that had been Farragut’s success at Little Gull Island, which had seen a sharp rise in morale amongst American seamen.

    In August 1862 Dupont’s squadron consisted of his flagship the USS Wabash(42), the USS Monongahela(10), the converted steamers Pocahontas(6) and Isaac Smith(6), and the gunboats Ottawa(5), Seneca(5), Pembina(5), and Penguin(5). They had carried out a few skirmishes with the British blockaders since March, but in light of the disadvantage in guns Dupont had declined to mount a serious challenge to the British blockaders. That had not stopped him from sortieing to protect runners and raiders from breaking out.

    The Royal Navy, by and large, had been content to attempt to enforce the blockade rather than go after Dupont’s squadron. The Delaware Squadron was under the command of Rear Admiral Robert Smart from Donegal(101) he had the aid of the vessels Immortalité(51), Niagara(12), Vesuvius(6), Clinker(3) and Steady(5). With an overwhelming advantage in guns, Smart felt he had little to fear from the American squadron, save for an attempted sortie by Wabash, which saw him keep Immortalité on near constant alert, which tended to exhaust her crew. Smart, had largely seen combat against pirates and raiders in the Mediterranean, while serving on vessels which worked to apprehend the African slave trade. He was in that capacity, well-adjusted to running down blockade runners and raiders, but as seen by his lackluster attitude towards the American squadron, not well adapted to combat.

    So when Dupont did sortie on August 9th, he was almost caught unawares.

    Dupont came south through the bay, with Wabash leading the converted steamers, the two gunboays Ottawa and Penguin lagging behind. They were spotted almost immediately by Clinker, who sent up a flare alerting Immortalité, who in turn sent warning to Smart in Donegal.

    The two squadrons met just west of Cape Henlopen. Dupont had hoped to take the gunboats unawares in a repeat of his action in March, but with the frigate waiting for him, and the battleship coming in, Dupont resolved to simply hit the blockaders and run. He turned his ships in an impressive line, raking the British vessels (and seriously damaging Clinker in the process) while turning to move to the safety of the upper reaches of Delaware Bay. The British frigate, soon supported by Donegal and Niagara, moved to pursue, but the chase action was called off as Dupont’s ships passed Nantuxent Cove, as Smart feared being lead into a trap involving torpedoes.

    Dupont’s less than aggressive performance led to demands he be cashiered, or hauled before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. However, the damage inflicted on Clinker forced the gunboat to retire to Bermuda for repairs, and the negligible damage suffered by Dupont’s own fleet was seen as decent compensation, especially in light of the damage incurred at Massachusetts Bay…

    …Wilkes, unlike his fellow commanders, had received his orders with aplomb. He was determined, it seemed, to cement his place in history as an American hero. He even felt he had a force powerful enough to eclipse Farragut’s victory at Little Gull Island. He could argue his squadron was just as strong as that which had bested Sotheby at Little Gull Island.

    Come the 11th of August 1862 his squadron was most likely one of the strongest in the Union Navy. With his flag in the San Jacinto(12), Wilkes had a strong squadron of five steam warships, six gunboats, and two ironclads including; Housatonic(14), Wachusett(10), Powhatan(14), Canandaigua(6) Sagamore(5), Aroostook(5), Chocura(5), Huron(5), Marblehead(5), and Penobscot(5), Nantucket(2), Nahant(2) for a grand total of 90 guns.

    The British squadron under Commodore Arthur Forbes, was smaller in its overall number of ships, but had a massive advantage in the number of guns it could deploy. Forbes squadron included the liners Hero(91)[F], Caledonia(40), the screw frigate Severn(51), the corvette Chanticleer(17), and the gunboats Goshawk(4), Vigilant(4), and Alacrity(4) with eight ships and 211 guns. However, like Milne had predicted, Hero was better served as a flagship and deterrent, and could do little to police the waterways, with that duty falling on the smaller vessels. His newest vessel though, Caledonia, was a reaction to the events in Lower Bay.

    Caledonia was originally one of ten Bulwark Class battleships ordered and laid down at the end of the Russian War, and was among the five ordered to be converted to ironclad battleships in June 1861. These had been ordered rushed to completion upon the discovery of the American ironclad program. Though Milne would have preferred smaller ironclad vessels versus more “impractical liners” the needs of the River Class ironclads, and the conversion of other vessels meant these were the only ones available to be rushed to completion. Fitting out and launching in July, Caledonia was among the first of her sisters to arrive in North America, and she represented an advantage to the blockaders both in terms of firepower, and in terms of armor for challenging the two American ironclad vessels…

    Wilkes hoped to emulate Farragut’s successes from earlier in the year, and so leaving only the gunboats Aroostook, Chocura, and Marblehead behind, he led the charge out Hypocrite Channel early on the morning of the 11th of August. The blockade that day was undertaken by Severn, and the gun vessels Goshawk and Vigilant off of Massachusetts Bay, with Chanticleer in squadron with Alarcity and Caledonia patrolling the North Channel. Hero had returned to Martha’s Vineyard for supplies, so Forbes had transferred his flag to Caledonia.

    The initial sortie caught the blockaders by surprise, and they churned north towards The Graves, and Forbes ironclad. Wilkes, inexplicably confident now that the British had seemingly turned tail, gave chase.

    The two squadrons would collide just north of Maffit Ledge, where Caledonia, Severn, and Chanticleer had formed in squadron, with the gunboats acting as a secondary squadron behind them. Wilkes, with San Jacinto, Housatonic, Wachusett, Powhatan, and Canandaigua, led his vessels straight into the teeth of the British formation, while the gunboats shepherded the much slower ironclads up from behind coming in, they hoped, on the rear of the engagement.

    The steamships engaged in a ragged line, with the British ships working to shield the gunboats while battering their American counterparts. Wilkes vessels, for their part, sought to engage the British vessels in a melee. Wilkes took San Jacinto and Housatonic into the fray against Caledonia, while Wachusett, Powhatan, and Canandaigua sought to cut off the frigate and corvette…

    …the armor on Caledonia frustrated the best of Wilkes fire, and Caledonia’s broadsides soon had shredded San Jacinto’s rigging, while Housatonic floundered with multiple holes appearing near the waterline. The brutal fire from the, for all intents impenetrable, ironclad soon had Wilkes shearing off, while his other consorts sought to do the same. However, they soon ran across the hapless gunboats which were now seeking to disengage from their short contest with their British counterparts.

    The ironclad Nantucket was being towed to safety by Canandaigua, but her sister Nahant proved to be slower than her sister, and the rougher waters of Massachusetts Bay slowed her progress. She was soon descended on by the pursuing British vessels, and like her sister Monitor, had her gun ports blasted shut by the intensity of her fire. However, her armor prevented her from suffering crippling damage, but soon her smokestack was punctured repeatedly and her crew was soon blinded by smoke and burned by steam, and she drifted to ground on Green Island. Housatonic, her pumps working diligently, suffered a similar fate as her steering was soon disabled by shot from her pursuers, and ground herself on Devil’s Back Rock.

    The remainder of Wilkes’s squadron would retreat down the Boston South Channel to safety, the British content to scoop up their prizes grounded on the rocks. Housatonic would be burned by her crew to prevent capture, but Nahant, damaged as she was, would fall into British hands and be towed back to Halifax for examination…

    …the results of August, with the fall of Portland, the bloody battles in Kentucky and Virginia, and the disappointing actions on the seas would prove to become legendary in American military history. They would be aptly surmised by Secretary Welles with a section from his diary on August 30th recording: The national mood is depressed, and we have had no victories. August it seems, has been a black month for American arms…” – Troubled Waters: The Anglo-American War at Sea, Michael Tielhard, Aurora Publishing, 2002
     
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    Chapter 29: The Bottom is out of the Tub
  • Chapter 29: The Bottom is out of the Tub

    "The plans of the diligent lead surely to plenty, But those of everyone who is hasty, surely to poverty. Getting treasures by a lying tongue Is the fleeting fantasy of those who seek death. The violence of the wicked will destroy them, Because they refuse to do justice." Proverbs 21: 5-7

    “From Kentucky to Maine, the Union armies would be on the retreat. The gloom over August would continue into early September, first with Beauregard’s Tennessee Campaign, moving Van Dorn’s Corps along the Tennessee River and into Nashville to allow Hardee to move north to reinforce Johnston’s army further consolidating the Confederate hold on Tennessee. Then with the actions in the Indian Territory where troops who had not received supply or pay for two months mutinied ending the Weer Expedition after its late start, and leading to the withdrawal of Federal troops in disgrace.

    In Maine, Augusta would fall to the British after a short sharp campaign against the remaining units of Home Guards which left the state totally in British hands[1], causing shock in New England. Maine, as a salient into Canada, could be rationalized as falling, far as it was from the heartland of American industry, but what of the rest of New England? As the weather turned, many wondered whether a British fleet would show up off Boston or Baltimore, and disembark a British army straight into the Union’s industrial heartland.

    This month of perceived disaster, with its 45,000 dead, wounded, or captured, led to a lack of confidence in the administration. Bond sales slumped, and reports of new British attacks or Confederate invasions (exaggerated as many were leading up to Second Centreville) did little to encourage the populace. Lincoln would go on to face his greatest challenges in the end of the year, and the greatest military emergency in 1863…” The Black Month, Thomas Lawrence, Ohio University, 1999

    Civilians%20Retreat%20from%20Manassas%20Square.jpg

    “September 1862 began with bad news from all across the country. The fall of Portland presented a major loss and embarrassment to the administration. McClellan’s failed Rappahannock Campaign had left a sour taste in the mouth of both the War Department, and the administration for his perceived mishandling of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan’s continued intransience towards the administration itself proved a thornier problem, but his popularity with the troops kept Lincoln from moving to replace the general.

    The politicians, and the nation, desired scapegoats for these disasters and a clamor was put up for men like Keye and Wilkes, among others, to be sacked. There was even ominous talk on the floor of the House that such disasters could only be the result of treason in the ranks. Surely some southern leaning generals, or British immigrants could be blamed. Lincoln though, was quick to clamp down on any talk of a witch hunt. National Unity was the goal, and anything which might go against that, would be divisive and unwelcome. He made sure he extolled the praise of men born in the South like Farragut and Thomas, while reminding the nation of the interference of Great Britain.

    Military and political considerations aside, Lincoln and his advisors faced a great problem in the simple act of keeping the war going. The battles and offensives from the recent campaigns had seen millions of dollars’ worth of supplies vanish in the smoke of battle on sea and on land. Ships had been lost, and gunpowder was expended at an alarming rate. Previous estimates had placed the amount of powder exhausted in the campaigns of 1861 at 450,000 pounds of gunpowder expended a month. The estimates of how much powder would be used per month in an expanded war doubled that rate to 900,000 pounds a month, and in August over one million pounds of gunpowder had been expended in the ferocity of the fighting.

    Not only that, but despite the best efforts of the domestic industry, the economy was beginning to strain under the demands of the war as the country’s iron industry was inundated with demands for iron and steel, especially to repair the nations railways. Though orders of magnitude larger than its Southern counterpart, the Northern iron industry had still not met the national demand for iron and steel in peacetime, and had imported much to make up the difference. Now with six months of war, and the lack of access to foreign products, weapons manufacturers and railroad companies found themselves competing with the domestic industry for necessary supplies, causing bottlenecks in areas crucial to the war front.

    Still worse was that despite the constant trickle of gold making its way overland from the gold fields in the west, the finances of the government suffered. Chase’s bond schemes had been dependent on confidence in the government and total victory remaining high, giving value to the greenbacks. However, across the nation many were suddenly skeptical of the current administration’s ability to win the war. As a consequence the value of the greenbacks fell, and gold rose from 125$ to 100 in gold, to the near disastrous price of 189$ for 100 in gold. Inflation slowly seemed to be seeping into the national economy. This was added to a sudden discomfort given to the farmers of the nation as their foreign trade was cut off, and prices for even moving their goods around the country on the railroads skyrocketed, while food at the same time saw prices fall due to a glut in the market, which would haunt the Mid-West for the remainder of the war.

    This material news, coupled with seemingly disastrous economic news, caused the President to seemingly fall into despair at the beginning of the month. The Union Quartermaster Montgomery Meigs would later confide to a friend “In December, the President confided to me that the bottom was out of the tub. Though we have for a time patched up the leaks, I fear that the bath shall continue to drain. The President too seems to feel this, as whenever I encounter him he seems stooped, bent, and careworn.” Many would observe that the Cabinet itself seemed to be falling apart.

    Chase sought comfort in the company of Seward’s old rival Charles Sumner, and both men were being pushed increasingly in the direction of the Radical camp. Welles, though putting forward a brave face, confided both in his diary and in letters to his son, that he felt that any day the war might be lost. Seward was seen to spend more and more time in the company of the president, and consistently put on a brave front, while it was consistently remarked upon that he seemed to be a pale shadow of himself. Stanton would fly into unpredictable rages, becoming a terror of the War Department as stresses piled upon him. The stress was so great that the Secretary of the Interior, Caleb Smith, was forced to resign due to failing health, and was replaced by Assistant Secretary John P. Usher.

    Lincoln himself would turn more to religion, which explained his increased correspondence with ministers across the nation. Also, as many have speculated, due to his time with Ms. Keckley, and his correspondence with Henry McNeal Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, his mind became not focused on the purely religious, but the earthly and practical. That correspondence of course, influenced Lincoln’s thinking in more ways than one…

    …Chase, despite already beginning to politic behind the back of the president, proved successful in continuing to fund the war. The Revenue Act of 1862 had created the Internal Revenue Commission, and provided for the first income tax in United States history. With a lack of revenue being made from trade, tax revenue became paramount. These first tax hikes, though modest, also included provisions for taxes on stamps, taxes, and photographs. With a 3% tax on incomes over 600$ to 5,000$, 5% on incomes 5,000$ to 10,000%, and a 7.5% rate on incomes 10,000$ and above it was the first progressive income tax instituted in American history, and essentially spared the poorest Americans the worst of the financial burden.

    It also allowed Chase to create new revenue streams overnight, while running an increasingly precipitous balancing act with the nation’s gold reserves. While needing much of it to offset the nation’s creeping inflation, he used the banks of Wall Street, with their many connections abroad, to assure foreign merchants that American merchants could still pay in gold for wares collected by blockade runners. This allowed for the invaluable services of the blockade ship captains not to be denied by rumours of American insolvency abroad, and that Chase could deliver on those goods kept American credit afloat in the difficult months of 1862. It also ensured there would be no lack foreign supplies, so long as ships could reach them.

    Chase’s financial acumen would also allow one of the oft overlooked, but arguably one of the most far sighted and important government projects of the war to continue unhindered. The Military Nitre Bureau, established in March 1862, was an inter-service department which was tasked with the domestic production of nitre for the Union armies. Headed by Flag Officer John A. Dahlgren, it was a shining example of so-called “Yankee Ingenuity” put to practice. Dahlgren had created the Navy’s Ordinance Department, and had been one of the men to alert the government of the startling developments in regards to the lack of powder in American stocks. What started as a small office off the Washington Navy Yard, soon ballooned into one of the most sprawling departments in the Federal Government. Though initially lacking in manpower, Dahlgren snapped up at first 1,000 men not assigned to units from the Volunteers, and would eventually have 10,000 men who were charged with gathering as much “product” (in this instance a polite euphemism for manure and night soil) as they could across the country.

    Contracts were farmed out to the nation’s powder companies, but the Du Pont Company would (due to its size and manufacturing capability) earn the lion’s share of the contracts. In the end they would provide over half of the domestic powder used in the war. However, in early 1862 much of the Bureau’s efforts were concentrated on finding a suitable formula for creating stable powder from the manure beds. Even Dahlgren’s most optimistic projects did not put significant outputs from these beds until mid-1863…” Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003

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    Salmon P. Chase, the man who didn't bankrupt the Union

    “Though much is often made of spies running across the lines in Canada and the United States, many often forget one of the most important espionage epics of the war took place not on the battlefields of North America, but in the ports and courthouses of Europe.

    The blockade instituted by the Royal Navy in 1862 proved leaky in its first six months of existence as ships and sailors built up experience in their duties off North America. This was a golden age for runners who dashed across the Atlantic to make call in European ports, and perhaps catch an unwary British merchantman along the way. However, Britain soon began exerting its’ not inconsiderable influence on the continental nations. This had the effect of many suppliers turning a favorable eye towards Confederate agents on the continent, especially in the burgeoning Confederate hubs at Antwerp and Cherbourg.

    However, the diplomatic team assigned by Seward to the continent before the outbreak of war, under the lead now of the former minister to Britain, Charles Adams, would use its own resources to establish a network of agents across the continent. Using the already existing network of consuls and diplomats in place they would work to organize a network of suppliers and informants from Cadiz to St. Petersburg who could be counted on to sell (at a mostly reasonable price) to American blockade runners. The unofficial headquarters of this enterprise soon became Hamburg, where the diplomatic mission would set up shop. With infrequent correspondence from Washington, it fell largely on the shoulders of the men present to direct the necessary efforts in establishing this network.

    They were in turn opposed by the British consuls, diplomats and agents on the continent. This was run as smoothly as possible by the War Cabinet, largely through a combination of work by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, with Russell and the Duke of Newcastle, working admirably to create a continental system of warnings which would alert naval ships to American runners before they could even attempt to cross the seas to run the blockade off the Union coastline.

    This provided a “tripwire” for the British. Any obvious American ship caught settling into a continental port would be observed by a consul, or an agent employed by a consul, and a telegraph promptly sent to London, where the news would be relayed to the commanders of the fleet. A ship would then be dispatched to lurk in international waters, and when the runner went to leave port, she would be promptly pounced upon by the waiting naval vessel. This system was of course, not perfect, and ships would slip through in the night or outfox their pursuers.

    This led to the Americans attempting numerous ruses in order to fool the British consuls. Some as complicated as buying goods through foreign agents, and having them shipped to neutral ports in the Caribbean or off of Mexico, and thus less likely to be intercepted and detected by British agents. Flying false flags was difficult however, as in many cases nations like Belgium and Spain sent formal protests to American diplomats when such ruses were discovered. Only Russia would give tacit acceptance of this practice. In many cases foreign consuls would report false flags to British agents and ensure a runner was caught.

    It would be John Bigelow who would present the Union men with an unorthodox solution. He suggested that, since the Confederate States held belligerent status, but no de facto foreign recognition, it would not be impossible for American runners to post as Confederate ships by hoisting the flags of either individual states (which the Union still claimed as their own) or by registering their vessels at Southern ports, which were not under British blockade. In 1862, the lack of good Southern records for their shipping made this a plausible disguise for American merchants. This thin legal veneer would allow ships to enter European ports as de-facto American vessels giving them a slim shield. It also helped offset the “flight from the flag” that was slowly destroying the American merchant marine as surely as capture by British warships.

    Though it would cause something of a legal firestorm in the post war world, it would prove a useful measure of protection in the interim and help facilitate blockade running which was propping up the Union…” Diplomats and Spies, American Diplomacy in the Great American War, Alex Krycek, Random House Publishing, 1989

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    John Bigelow's ideas on states and their rights and properties would ignite a firestorm post war leading to a Constitutional Amendment

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    1] This is actually overstatement from this historical author. Some 4,000 Home Guard and militia remain in the state, primarily concentrated in the defences of Fort Knox and Bangor, but they are essentially pinned in place and can’t hope to maneuver against the British in any other part of the state.
     
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