Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

Chapter 29: The Bottom is out of the Tub
Chapter 29: The Bottom is out of the Tub

"The plans of the diligent lead surely to plenty, But those of everyone who is hasty, surely to poverty. Getting treasures by a lying tongue Is the fleeting fantasy of those who seek death. The violence of the wicked will destroy them, Because they refuse to do justice." Proverbs 21: 5-7

“From Kentucky to Maine, the Union armies would be on the retreat. The gloom over August would continue into early September, first with Beauregard’s Tennessee Campaign, moving Van Dorn’s Corps along the Tennessee River and into Nashville to allow Hardee to move north to reinforce Johnston’s army further consolidating the Confederate hold on Tennessee. Then with the actions in the Indian Territory where troops who had not received supply or pay for two months mutinied ending the Weer Expedition after its late start, and leading to the withdrawal of Federal troops in disgrace.

In Maine, Augusta would fall to the British after a short sharp campaign against the remaining units of Home Guards which left the state totally in British hands[1], causing shock in New England. Maine, as a salient into Canada, could be rationalized as falling, far as it was from the heartland of American industry, but what of the rest of New England? As the weather turned, many wondered whether a British fleet would show up off Boston or Baltimore, and disembark a British army straight into the Union’s industrial heartland.

This month of perceived disaster, with its 45,000 dead, wounded, or captured, led to a lack of confidence in the administration. Bond sales slumped, and reports of new British attacks or Confederate invasions (exaggerated as many were leading up to Second Centreville) did little to encourage the populace. Lincoln would go on to face his greatest challenges in the end of the year, and the greatest military emergency in 1863…” The Black Month, Thomas Lawrence, Ohio University, 1999

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“September 1862 began with bad news from all across the country. The fall of Portland presented a major loss and embarrassment to the administration. McClellan’s failed Rappahannock Campaign had left a sour taste in the mouth of both the War Department, and the administration for his perceived mishandling of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan’s continued intransience towards the administration itself proved a thornier problem, but his popularity with the troops kept Lincoln from moving to replace the general.

The politicians, and the nation, desired scapegoats for these disasters and a clamor was put up for men like Keye and Wilkes, among others, to be sacked. There was even ominous talk on the floor of the House that such disasters could only be the result of treason in the ranks. Surely some southern leaning generals, or British immigrants could be blamed. Lincoln though, was quick to clamp down on any talk of a witch hunt. National Unity was the goal, and anything which might go against that, would be divisive and unwelcome. He made sure he extolled the praise of men born in the South like Farragut and Thomas, while reminding the nation of the interference of Great Britain.

Military and political considerations aside, Lincoln and his advisors faced a great problem in the simple act of keeping the war going. The battles and offensives from the recent campaigns had seen millions of dollars’ worth of supplies vanish in the smoke of battle on sea and on land. Ships had been lost, and gunpowder was expended at an alarming rate. Previous estimates had placed the amount of powder exhausted in the campaigns of 1861 at 450,000 pounds of gunpowder expended a month. The estimates of how much powder would be used per month in an expanded war doubled that rate to 900,000 pounds a month, and in August over one million pounds of gunpowder had been expended in the ferocity of the fighting.

Not only that, but despite the best efforts of the domestic industry, the economy was beginning to strain under the demands of the war as the country’s iron industry was inundated with demands for iron and steel, especially to repair the nations railways. Though orders of magnitude larger than its Southern counterpart, the Northern iron industry had still not met the national demand for iron and steel in peacetime, and had imported much to make up the difference. Now with six months of war, and the lack of access to foreign products, weapons manufacturers and railroad companies found themselves competing with the domestic industry for necessary supplies, causing bottlenecks in areas crucial to the war front.

Still worse was that despite the constant trickle of gold making its way overland from the gold fields in the west, the finances of the government suffered. Chase’s bond schemes had been dependent on confidence in the government and total victory remaining high, giving value to the greenbacks. However, across the nation many were suddenly skeptical of the current administration’s ability to win the war. As a consequence the value of the greenbacks fell, and gold rose from 125$ to 100 in gold, to the near disastrous price of 189$ for 100 in gold. Inflation slowly seemed to be seeping into the national economy. This was added to a sudden discomfort given to the farmers of the nation as their foreign trade was cut off, and prices for even moving their goods around the country on the railroads skyrocketed, while food at the same time saw prices fall due to a glut in the market, which would haunt the Mid-West for the remainder of the war.

This material news, coupled with seemingly disastrous economic news, caused the President to seemingly fall into despair at the beginning of the month. The Union Quartermaster Montgomery Meigs would later confide to a friend “In December, the President confided to me that the bottom was out of the tub. Though we have for a time patched up the leaks, I fear that the bath shall continue to drain. The President too seems to feel this, as whenever I encounter him he seems stooped, bent, and careworn.” Many would observe that the Cabinet itself seemed to be falling apart.

Chase sought comfort in the company of Seward’s old rival Charles Sumner, and both men were being pushed increasingly in the direction of the Radical camp. Welles, though putting forward a brave face, confided both in his diary and in letters to his son, that he felt that any day the war might be lost. Seward was seen to spend more and more time in the company of the president, and consistently put on a brave front, while it was consistently remarked upon that he seemed to be a pale shadow of himself. Stanton would fly into unpredictable rages, becoming a terror of the War Department as stresses piled upon him. The stress was so great that the Secretary of the Interior, Caleb Smith, was forced to resign due to failing health, and was replaced by Assistant Secretary John P. Usher.

Lincoln himself would turn more to religion, which explained his increased correspondence with ministers across the nation. Also, as many have speculated, due to his time with Ms. Keckley, and his correspondence with Henry McNeal Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, his mind became not focused on the purely religious, but the earthly and practical. That correspondence of course, influenced Lincoln’s thinking in more ways than one…

…Chase, despite already beginning to politic behind the back of the president, proved successful in continuing to fund the war. The Revenue Act of 1862 had created the Internal Revenue Commission, and provided for the first income tax in United States history. With a lack of revenue being made from trade, tax revenue became paramount. These first tax hikes, though modest, also included provisions for taxes on stamps, taxes, and photographs. With a 3% tax on incomes over 600$ to 5,000$, 5% on incomes 5,000$ to 10,000%, and a 7.5% rate on incomes 10,000$ and above it was the first progressive income tax instituted in American history, and essentially spared the poorest Americans the worst of the financial burden.

It also allowed Chase to create new revenue streams overnight, while running an increasingly precipitous balancing act with the nation’s gold reserves. While needing much of it to offset the nation’s creeping inflation, he used the banks of Wall Street, with their many connections abroad, to assure foreign merchants that American merchants could still pay in gold for wares collected by blockade runners. This allowed for the invaluable services of the blockade ship captains not to be denied by rumours of American insolvency abroad, and that Chase could deliver on those goods kept American credit afloat in the difficult months of 1862. It also ensured there would be no lack foreign supplies, so long as ships could reach them.

Chase’s financial acumen would also allow one of the oft overlooked, but arguably one of the most far sighted and important government projects of the war to continue unhindered. The Military Nitre Bureau, established in March 1862, was an inter-service department which was tasked with the domestic production of nitre for the Union armies. Headed by Flag Officer John A. Dahlgren, it was a shining example of so-called “Yankee Ingenuity” put to practice. Dahlgren had created the Navy’s Ordinance Department, and had been one of the men to alert the government of the startling developments in regards to the lack of powder in American stocks. What started as a small office off the Washington Navy Yard, soon ballooned into one of the most sprawling departments in the Federal Government. Though initially lacking in manpower, Dahlgren snapped up at first 1,000 men not assigned to units from the Volunteers, and would eventually have 10,000 men who were charged with gathering as much “product” (in this instance a polite euphemism for manure and night soil) as they could across the country.

Contracts were farmed out to the nation’s powder companies, but the Du Pont Company would (due to its size and manufacturing capability) earn the lion’s share of the contracts. In the end they would provide over half of the domestic powder used in the war. However, in early 1862 much of the Bureau’s efforts were concentrated on finding a suitable formula for creating stable powder from the manure beds. Even Dahlgren’s most optimistic projects did not put significant outputs from these beds until mid-1863…” Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003

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Salmon P. Chase, the man who didn't bankrupt the Union

“Though much is often made of spies running across the lines in Canada and the United States, many often forget one of the most important espionage epics of the war took place not on the battlefields of North America, but in the ports and courthouses of Europe.

The blockade instituted by the Royal Navy in 1862 proved leaky in its first six months of existence as ships and sailors built up experience in their duties off North America. This was a golden age for runners who dashed across the Atlantic to make call in European ports, and perhaps catch an unwary British merchantman along the way. However, Britain soon began exerting its’ not inconsiderable influence on the continental nations. This had the effect of many suppliers turning a favorable eye towards Confederate agents on the continent, especially in the burgeoning Confederate hubs at Antwerp and Cherbourg.

However, the diplomatic team assigned by Seward to the continent before the outbreak of war, under the lead now of the former minister to Britain, Charles Adams, would use its own resources to establish a network of agents across the continent. Using the already existing network of consuls and diplomats in place they would work to organize a network of suppliers and informants from Cadiz to St. Petersburg who could be counted on to sell (at a mostly reasonable price) to American blockade runners. The unofficial headquarters of this enterprise soon became Hamburg, where the diplomatic mission would set up shop. With infrequent correspondence from Washington, it fell largely on the shoulders of the men present to direct the necessary efforts in establishing this network.

They were in turn opposed by the British consuls, diplomats and agents on the continent. This was run as smoothly as possible by the War Cabinet, largely through a combination of work by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, with Russell and the Duke of Newcastle, working admirably to create a continental system of warnings which would alert naval ships to American runners before they could even attempt to cross the seas to run the blockade off the Union coastline.

This provided a “tripwire” for the British. Any obvious American ship caught settling into a continental port would be observed by a consul, or an agent employed by a consul, and a telegraph promptly sent to London, where the news would be relayed to the commanders of the fleet. A ship would then be dispatched to lurk in international waters, and when the runner went to leave port, she would be promptly pounced upon by the waiting naval vessel. This system was of course, not perfect, and ships would slip through in the night or outfox their pursuers.

This led to the Americans attempting numerous ruses in order to fool the British consuls. Some as complicated as buying goods through foreign agents, and having them shipped to neutral ports in the Caribbean or off of Mexico, and thus less likely to be intercepted and detected by British agents. Flying false flags was difficult however, as in many cases nations like Belgium and Spain sent formal protests to American diplomats when such ruses were discovered. Only Russia would give tacit acceptance of this practice. In many cases foreign consuls would report false flags to British agents and ensure a runner was caught.

It would be John Bigelow who would present the Union men with an unorthodox solution. He suggested that, since the Confederate States held belligerent status, but no de facto foreign recognition, it would not be impossible for American runners to post as Confederate ships by hoisting the flags of either individual states (which the Union still claimed as their own) or by registering their vessels at Southern ports, which were not under British blockade. In 1862, the lack of good Southern records for their shipping made this a plausible disguise for American merchants. This thin legal veneer would allow ships to enter European ports as de-facto American vessels giving them a slim shield. It also helped offset the “flight from the flag” that was slowly destroying the American merchant marine as surely as capture by British warships.

Though it would cause something of a legal firestorm in the post war world, it would prove a useful measure of protection in the interim and help facilitate blockade running which was propping up the Union…” Diplomats and Spies, American Diplomacy in the Great American War, Alex Krycek, Random House Publishing, 1989

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John Bigelow's ideas on states and their rights and properties would ignite a firestorm post war leading to a Constitutional Amendment

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1] This is actually overstatement from this historical author. Some 4,000 Home Guard and militia remain in the state, primarily concentrated in the defences of Fort Knox and Bangor, but they are essentially pinned in place and can’t hope to maneuver against the British in any other part of the state.
 
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A bad time for America.

There seems to be a hint that Lincoln is proceeding towards the idea of taking some action akin to the Emancipation Proclamation once he gets the opportunity. Certainly, if he manages to turn the Union cause into a crusade for freedom that might do a lot to increase public demand in the UK for, at the least, a quick victory and lenient terms....
 
A bad time for America.

It was a struggle not to use the book "The Black Month" for one of the sources, but in the end I figured that would give away just how bad the month of August would end up being for the Union so I decided against it. The good news is that they're still fighting.

There seems to be a hint that Lincoln is proceeding towards the idea of taking some action akin to the Emancipation Proclamation once he gets the opportunity. Certainly, if he manages to turn the Union cause into a crusade for freedom that might do a lot to increase public demand in the UK for, at the least, a quick victory and lenient terms....

Well Lincoln is certainly up to something! There's much to be discussed on the political side that's for sure...
 
Great update! It's good to see the Union hang in there even as it becomes more difficult for them to do so.

I think you've got your thread tags on the wrong post though.
 
Honestly, at this point either the Union gets knocked out by a bad election in 1864 (or maybe even a bad 1862 midterm) or the British Government falls over the fact that they are devoting the resources of Britain to defend a slave-holding nation against a liberating force (assuming Lincoln gets a victory to push the Emancipation Proclamation with). I honestly can't see either side staying in all the way until the end, the loss of trade on both sides, as well as the expenses involved in prosecuting the war against each other while dealing with their other commitments (for the Union: beating the Confederacy, for the British: defending the Empire and maintaining the balance of power in Europe, Bismarck becomes the Prussian Foreign Minister in November, and he'll have plenty of plans to take advantage of a distracted Britain.)
 
Great update! It's good to see the Union hang in there even as it becomes more difficult for them to do so.

I think you've got your thread tags on the wrong post though.

Thank you! And so it seems I do! Edited!

Honestly, at this point either the Union gets knocked out by a bad election in 1864 (or maybe even a bad 1862 midterm) or the British Government falls over the fact that they are devoting the resources of Britain to defend a slave-holding nation against a liberating force (assuming Lincoln gets a victory to push the Emancipation Proclamation with). I honestly can't see either side staying in all the way until the end, the loss of trade on both sides, as well as the expenses involved in prosecuting the war against each other while dealing with their other commitments (for the Union: beating the Confederacy, for the British: defending the Empire and maintaining the balance of power in Europe, Bismarck becomes the Prussian Foreign Minister in November, and he'll have plenty of plans to take advantage of a distracted Britain.)

The only thing I will say for certain is that the end is not quite in sight, but you've got some ideas there...
 
Honestly, at this point either the Union gets knocked out by a bad election in 1864 (or maybe even a bad 1862 midterm) or the British Government falls over the fact that they are devoting the resources of Britain to defend a slave-holding nation against a liberating force (assuming Lincoln gets a victory to push the Emancipation Proclamation with). I honestly can't see either side staying in all the way until the end, the loss of trade on both sides, as well as the expenses involved in prosecuting the war against each other while dealing with their other commitments (for the Union: beating the Confederacy, for the British: defending the Empire and maintaining the balance of power in Europe, Bismarck becomes the Prussian Foreign Minister in November, and he'll have plenty of plans to take advantage of a distracted Britain.)

One of the issues for the British is that already the point has been made, mess with one of our mail boats and we go a bit screaming Highland loony. Of course one of the problems with wars is that it is often easy to lose sight of the original objective.
 
At this point, why isn't Lincoln looking for separate peace with Britain?

Sure, he might be labelled defeatist and torpedo the rest of his own political career, but British claims even at their worst are unlikely to be absurd. Canada cannot absorb large population centres unless said population centres have really come to hate Washington. There might be border adjustments here and there, but nothing the Union can't survive without, whereas capitulating several entire states to the Confederacy would not be in the cards.

Even assuming almost the entire US-Canada border is shifted south:
Big Lake - West Grand Lake - Mattanawcook Pond - Penobscot - Moosehead Lake - Long Pond to add the bit of Maine that juts into Canada to New Brunswick.
moving the ugly line-on-a-map border south to Devil's lake, from there to Missouri (from Sakakawea) and its tributary Marias river or thereabouts...

In terms of square miles, this would be a lot of land. In terms of population lost or displaced, fairly little.
 
Merry Christmas all! Come next March I will have been working on this story for over two years! Feels a tad surreal but I'm glad I'm keeping it going! I hope to have one more chapter up for you before New Years to make an even number for 2017!
 
At this point, why isn't Lincoln looking for separate peace with Britain?

Essentially what Knightmare has said:

And lose it all? No way. Plus, you think the Senate would approve?

Politically seeking a separate peace some six months after the commencement of hostilities without firm gains at the negotiating table to bargain with would be tantamount to saying he has no chance of accomplishing any of either his stated war objectives or political objectives. It would also have a disastrous effect on bonds since news that the government was looking for peace might tank many major war investments.

The entire political balance might be upended with the Republicans splitting into war and peace factions, while the Democrats would pounce on the much weaker Lincoln, and potentially make major gains in the 1862 elections. Lincoln needs to be negotiating form a position of strength, or at least a position of showing the British that the Union is stronger than its Southern counterpart. That second one might be easier than the first.

The other problem is that Britain is looking to negotiate from a position of strength as well. They desire that the Union be in a very poor position, and Britain be the dominant power at negotiations. This becomes problematic because Palmerston is expecting the Union to open negotiations, which they presently do not desire to do. I'll be dealing with the British outlook soonish, so we will get an idea of what both sides think of things soon.

Sure, he might be labelled defeatist and torpedo the rest of his own political career, but British claims even at their worst are unlikely to be absurd. Canada cannot absorb large population centres unless said population centres have really come to hate Washington. There might be border adjustments here and there, but nothing the Union can't survive without, whereas capitulating several entire states to the Confederacy would not be in the cards.

Even assuming almost the entire US-Canada border is shifted south:
Big Lake - West Grand Lake - Mattanawcook Pond - Penobscot - Moosehead Lake - Long Pond to add the bit of Maine that juts into Canada to New Brunswick.
moving the ugly line-on-a-map border south to Devil's lake, from there to Missouri (from Sakakawea) and its tributary Marias river or thereabouts...

In terms of square miles, this would be a lot of land. In terms of population lost or displaced, fairly little.

You are correct, even some big border pushes south would change very little. Now border changes north on the other hand...
 
Politically seeking a separate peace some six months after the commencement of hostilities without firm gains at the negotiating table to bargain with would be tantamount to saying he has no chance of accomplishing any of either his stated war objectives or political objectives. It would also have a disastrous effect on bonds since news that the government was looking for peace might tank many major war investments.
Plus, it'd kill the party.
 
Plus, it'd kill the party.

I'd argue it wouldn't kill the party, just split it. The Republicans were establishing themselves as a larger issue party by 1862 (the Homestead Act, the Pacific Railroad, even the war time taxes lead to discussions of fiscal matters down the road) which means they can't be easily brushed under.

What a disadvantageous political situation could do is split the party and weaken in like the Democrats were from the 1860s on. They could split along Radical and Conservative lines, but that wouldn't kill the party outright or destroy the founding ideology.
 
I dunno, they did just get into two wars, one of which is with the resident superpower, soo......

They can very easily make the case that the Union was attacked in both cases...

Remember the Confederates opened hostilities by shooting first at Fort Sumter. The war, call for volunteers, further secession and massive response of volunteers (on both sides) all stems from the fact that South Carolina opened fire on a US Army post.

As to the British, it is an easy matter to claim that the British started the shooting. TTL, a raid by Confederate soldiers using Canada as a base into US territory while the Trent Affair is arguable (that argument basically starting the war after all) but the Terror / Dacotach affair is very easily spun as an uprovoked destruction of an American naval vessel attempting to operate within the standard rules. The high American death toll makes that very easy indeed.
 
Remember the Confederates opened hostilities by shooting first at Fort Sumter. The war, call for volunteers, further secession and massive response of volunteers (on both sides) all stems from the fact that South Carolina opened fire on a US Army post.
Fucking South Carolina, always ruining shit for everyone else.

Could work, in theory, if this had been a spur deal. Issue is, it's been building for some time.....
 
They can very easily make the case that the Union was attacked in both cases...

Most certainly. The Democrats are wheedling the Republicans in certain cases, and it is about the war, but hardly for peace. IIRC during the Trent Crisis in OTL many Democrats berated Lincoln for backing down, even Clement Valladingham that arch Copperhead. He and his fellows are still causing trouble, but I'll cover how its a touch different in an upcoming chapter.

Remember the Confederates opened hostilities by shooting first at Fort Sumter. The war, call for volunteers, further secession and massive response of volunteers (on both sides) all stems from the fact that South Carolina opened fire on a US Army post.

As to the British, it is an easy matter to claim that the British started the shooting. TTL, a raid by Confederate soldiers using Canada as a base into US territory while the Trent Affair is arguable (that argument basically starting the war after all) but the Terror / Dacotach affair is very easily spun as an uprovoked destruction of an American naval vessel attempting to operate within the standard rules. The high American death toll makes that very easy indeed.

The first two instances could be easily argued back and forth by both sides, and perhaps some sort of diplomatic recompense might have been reached had time been allowed for tempers to cool, but Dacotah-Terror made that impossible. Even the Canadians bear some responsibility for the spectacularly ill advised release of the raiders (even if that was just a local magistrate screwing up) which Macdonald acknowledged. However, the government in London bears just as much for the completely inflexible orders given to their diplomatic and military personnel. Then of course, when the ultimatum did expire they definitely shot first (just like Han Solo) by marching across the border in Maine and seizing Houlton and Fort Fairfield in February even before the Battle of the Keyes.

While the British certainly have reasons for being belligerent, they've acted remarkably poorly in their handling of the crisis. It will have very...negative effects down the line.

Fucking South Carolina, always ruining shit for everyone else.

Could work, in theory, if this had been a spur deal. Issue is, it's been building for some time.....

And I guarantee you they're gonna keep ruining things too. What's that old quote? Too small for a Republic, too big for a lunatic asylum?

The Anglo-American relations of TTL will not be quite so rosy after the 1860s here that is guaranteed, and both sides are either going to try to dictate peace at the point of a sword, or bow to reality from sheer exhaustion.
 
Chapter 30: Williams Goes South
Chapter 30: Williams Goes South

"Because I will cut off from you the righteous and the wicked, therefore My sword will go forth from its sheath against all flesh from south to north.” - Ezekiel 21:4

“The successes in Maine, and the perceived shabby state of the Union Army brought matters to a head in Canada. In London there had been a sense of complacency regarding Canada, so long as Kingston remained secure and William’s army was south of Montreal there seemed little chance of the British facing a serious reversal. With the campaign season of 1862 drawing to a close, it was seen as necessary for the British to preclude the chance of a fresh invasion come spring 1863. To avoid that, there was one post in American hands which had to be taken, Fort Montgomery in northern New York.

From here it was obvious an American army could shelter, build up supplies, and even collect gunboats for a march north. Though there had been discussions about seizing it at the outset of the war, the objections of Williams and the resources diverted to the campaign against Portland had seen such an idea shelved. The victories on the Lacolle River and the reverses of the American thrusts north at Napierville had merely added to the complacency of British planners.

Now though, London sought another victory, and intended to make their Canadian position utterly secure…” - Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.

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Fort Montgomery, 1869

“One of William’s objections early in the war had been a lack of gunboats to support his troops when marching south to the shores of Lake Champlain. In early 1862 only a few converted gunboats had been available to support him, but by August over a dozen Russian War and new build gunboats were in the waters of the St. Lawrence. However, Collinson, commanding the St. Lawrence Squadron, was concerned about the lack of ironclads to support his squadron.

Some basic intelligence had filtered to the Admiralty regarding the our ironclad program, but details were slim until information from a pro-British ship builder filtered across the Atlantic in the fall. Palmerston, in his characteristic nature, demanded ironclads for the St. Lawrence while berating Somerset about the need for their speedy construction.

Palmerston’s anger was somewhat misplaced. Designs had been discussed in the halls of the Admiralty since January. While at first as purely theoretical matters, but as February wore on into March and war broke out, the discussion changed to practical construction rather than theory. Captain Coles, at that point the foremost ironclad designer in the Royal Navy, championed a riverine design similar to the first Monitor, which he claimed would be superior to any broadside ship. This was hotly contested by Somerset and Watts[1]. Somerset, predictably opposed it on matters of cost, while Watts opposed it on matters of time.

Watts’s argued that experimentation and construction would take much longer than the time frame imposed by the government. Coles argued that previous tests done would allow him to create a prototype which could be quickly emulated and shipped to North America by the fall. When the War Cabinet inquired how many weapons such a vessel could mount, Coles estimated three heavy Armstrong guns would be the maximum. Palmerston balked at this “armored peashooter” and demanded some swifter design.

Watts, who had helped design the Warrior, pointed to the ironclad batteries designed for the Crimea as his example. He declared that a smaller vessel, perhaps one third the tonnage, would be most suited to riverine warfare in North America. When asked how he could expedite the process he suggested building them in Britain, but knocking them down and shipping them by sea to North America. He proposed an ambitious building schedule for these vessels, constructing them in only 90 days. Palmerston and Somerset approved, and so the River Class ironclad was born.

Based on the Aetna Class built for the Russian War, they weighed in at 700 tons with an armament of seven guns. Six in a broadside and a single bow gun, which Watt argued was useful in the confines of the St. Lawrence or on the Lakes themselves. The Navy contracted for six vessels at first and the Lawrence, Yamaska, Richelieu, Ottawa, Rideau, and Ontario were built. Beginning construction in April, they underwent trials in July before being knocked down and convoyed across the Atlantic in August.

They were relayed to the yards in Montreal where they were rebuilt and launched officially with a mix of British and Canadian crews…

Lawrence, Yamaska, and Richelieu were dispatched to Fort Lennox, while Ontario, Ottawa, and Rideau ran the St. Lawrence to Kingston…

Welles and the Board of National Defense had realized since the outbreak of the war that some naval force would be needed on Lake Champlain, if not for offensive operations at least to prevent it from being used as a highway of invasion by the British. Joseph Smith had experience from Lake Champlain, and understood the necessity of an armed force of ships on the lake.

Fortunately, they had the example of the Western Gunboat Flotilla to draw upon, and numerous displaced naval officers and river boatmen to act as crews and gunners for the emerging squadron.

Command of the squadron itself would be gifted to Captain John A. Winslow. He had joined the navy in 1827 and was commended for gallantry during the Mexican War. Serving aboard vessels in the Pacific and Atlantic he had also served in the Boston Navy Yard. With the outbreak of the war in the South he had gone west and been present on the Mississippi. He had labored alongside Eads and Pook to outfit gunboats for service on the Mississippi River, eventually being given command of the gunboat Benton after serving with Foote’s squadron at Fort Henry. This service, and his friendship with Foote, earned him a recommendation to the Board, and when names were cast around for a commander for Lake Champlain, he was soon on his way north with Eads in April…

In the endeavor to equip and build new vessels would be supported by the engines of industry in New York. Two individuals in particular would throw all their industrial and political clout into the project. Those would be John Gregory Smith, and John Flack Winslow[2].

Winslow was the titan of the iron industry in New England, owning Rensselaer Iron Works and the Albany Iron Works with his partner Erastus Corning, having a corner on the iron market in the United States. With ties to railroads and rolling mills this considerable duo put their weight behind the war effort, and Winslow in particular put his influence into the ironclad program. He partnered with John Ericsson for the original Monitor, and would sponsor and supply those being built in New York. With this experience he turned towards supplying the new “Lake Champlain Squadron” with whatever they needed to construct vessels. Providing for facilities at Troy, Albany, and Shelburne he worked closely with the arriving officers to lay down vessels for the navy. He had a personal stake in the project as Vermont was his home state.

Smith, another Vermonter, was a railroad owner whose home town was St. Albans. His support was also based on a personal connection to the events of 1861. When the raiders had struck he had been away from home, but the raiders had attempted to burn his home with his wife Ann inside. She had confronted them with a pistol and they had fled, but this event left him with a burning desire to “give the British and South their due” and had thrown his not inconsiderable political weight behind the war effort[3]. He was the trustee of the Vermont and Canada Railroad, and using that position would effectively give ownership of the railroad to the military for the duration of the war. Lobbying local and national interests he ensured that all the resources of his state could be thrown behind both the Army of the Hudson, and Winslow as he attempted to build a naval squadron from scratch.

Already in March and April local steamers had been commandeered to serve as an ad hoc squadron, five ships had been assembled and armed. United States(4), Boston(2), Burlington(2), General Greene(2), and Shelburne(2) had all been strengthened with timber, and armed with guns shipped from across New England to make up for the lack of existing naval stores. Eads had set up slips at Troy and Albany to provide for the construction of three new “City Class” ironclads. However, they were slightly smaller than their Mississippi sisters, carrying only 10 guns, and with their hulls protected, but their sterns remained unprotected as with Eads original design.

Four vessels, all with eight guns, were launched between July and August, two named for their places of construction, Albany and Troy, and two, at Smith and Winslow’s insistence, after the places attacked by the rebels. The USS St. Albans was launched in July, but her sister was held up from commissioning until August as her proposed names, Franklin and Vermont, were both already in use by the navy. Finally a compromise was reached and the USS Plattsburgh joined her sisters on Lake Champlain…” The Naval War of 1862, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., New York University Press, 1890

“The Army of the Hudson had taken a series of hard knocks since May, and had lost over 10,000 men in the process, alongside numerous brigade and division commanders. As such, despite Sumner’s aggressive exhortations, the morale of the army was at an all time low. Men were despondent, and desertions were a common occurrence, with Sumner having to take extreme measures to counter the flight of nervous troops. From June on he repeatedly wrote Washington requesting more supplies and more men to hold his position. He firmly believed that it was only British inaction which kept Fort Montgomery secure.

With the fall of Portland, Stanton and Lincoln determined that something must be done to shore up their armies in Canada and New York. The Army of New England was deemed too weak to take the offensive into Maine (and with the Royal Navy supreme on the coast it was hazardous to make the attempt) and so they ordered two divisions from that army to the border.

Keye, the remnants of the militia and William’s division, would remain around Portland to pin the British in place with some 20,000 men. The 16,000 men of William F. Smith’s 3rd Division and Silas Casey’s 4th Division would be transported by rail from Maine to New York. The divisions movement would take near a month by rail, but come September 15th they had arrived at Albany and were being shipped up the Hudson.

Sumner now took the opportunity to reorganize his command. With Washington’s approval he divided his army into two Corps formations. Keeping the original designation for his army, II Corps, he placed the divisions of Howard, Burns, and Smith under the command of Israel B. Richardson. The newly created XVII Corps, with the Divisions of Foster, Casey, and Burns, under Ambrose Burnside.

With the 16,000 men from Maine, Sumner now had some 60,000 men under his command…” - The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York 1930

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Burnside and Richardson

“The Army of Canada, now four divisions strong, was deemed by Williams to be strong enough to take on a foe who he believed was demoralized, and at the very least numerically equal to his. Though his cavalry had been unable to completely penetrate the thin screen that Sumner had put forward, reconnaissance from the lake showed that Fort Montgomery remained incomplete, and the Americans seemed to have not thrown up few fieldworks of their own.

William’s determined that his men should cross the border marching toward Main Street along the rail line, with one column aiming for the village itself and another aiming for Fort Montgomery. From there they would seek to engage the Americans directly, with the support of Collinson’s squadron on the Lake. Scouting determined that a series of blockhouses had been thrown up along the roads, one set covering Main Street, while another sat at Waldon’s Farm covering the extreme left of the America position. In theory, these were covered by the forts guns and so the British determined to begin their attack with a bombardment of the fort using the army’s heavy guns. From there the infantry would advance and drive the Americans from the field.” - Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.


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1] Isaac Watts, Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy until 1863

2] Yes there are too many John’s in this picture, but try to remember their last names most prominently!

3] You can’t make this up! Though this is not what actually happened, his hometown was St. Albans and apparently his wife was threatened by the raiders. A fitting inclusion I think.
 
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