Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[Saphroneth]

I agree Thunder can't easily sink her, but I really doubt she'd last anything like an hour before being compelled to withdraw.

As for wasted shot - not if Thunder fires at the turret. A slow target at 500 yards in calm? That's basically a practice target, and that means 30% hits easily.

 

[RodentRevolution]

I agree Thunder can't easily sink her, but I really doubt she'd last anything like an hour before being compelled to withdraw.

As for wasted shot - not if Thunder fires at the turret. A slow target at 500 yards in calm? That's basically a practice target, and that means 30% hits easily.

A calm is effectively going to mean a gunpowder fog a few broadsides in, these warships fired off pounds of powder with each shot and that is going to mean a lot of drifting smoke.

 

[Saphroneth]

A calm is effectively going to mean a gunpowder fog a few broadsides in, these warships fired off pounds of powder with each shot and that is going to mean a lot of drifting smoke.

Calm sea, not calm wind. Any Monitor fighting outside sheltered water is very quickly sunk, ergo this is sheltered water.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Calm sea, not calm wind. Any Monitor fighting outside sheltered water is very quickly sunk, ergo this is sheltered water.

You do know there is a relationship between sea state and the wind? In fact I know you do so I am sure you are aware that visibility conditions are not likely to be optimal once the battle gets going. The other thing we tend to notice about battles is that people rarely fire to the max theoretical mechanical rate. Another point about messing bout in boats is that they move relative to one another which even when the word slowly means walking speed or less will still result from time to time in ships being out of optimum firing positions, which especially in a broadside arrangement can mean masking one or more guns.

The question though is not is there one exact outcome to every incident but what are the range of probabilities for a given incident?

It seems to be me that Monitor did not get off spectacularly unscathed, indeed I would expect that while she might seem to the general public and even her colleagues to be gloriously battered but unbowed she would have been trailing a pink wake in such a scenario.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I agree Thunder can't easily sink her, but I really doubt she'd last anything like an hour before being compelled to withdraw.

As for wasted shot - not if Thunder fires at the turret. A slow target at 500 yards in calm? That's basically a practice target, and that means 30% hits easily.

As RodentRevolution says, there is a relationship between sea state and wind. And I can tell you, being shot at is nowhere near the same thing to target practice. The gunnery in any fight will rarely be as good as at target practice.

The Monitors historically were all capable of taking a tremendous beating, and here the ship did, and her crew didn't get away unscathed.

 

[Saphroneth]

You do know there is a relationship between sea state and the wind? In fact I know you do so I am sure you are aware that visibility conditions are not likely to be optimal once the battle gets going.

Of course - but, nevertheless, if the Monitor is fighting the waves are going to be calm; that is, in sheltered waters. While I'm aware the conditions are not going to be ideal, see below about target practice.

The other thing we tend to notice about battles is that people rarely fire to the max theoretical mechanical rate.

Yes; nevertheless the relative expected rates of fire per gun are roughly 12:1 and Thunder has more guns. It's not in doubt that Thunder would be putting dozens of shot into Monitor over the course of a single quarter hour, while Monitor can get maybe one non-penetrating hit in return. (Their expected disparity of shots is, roughly speaking, that Monitor fires two shots over the course of twelve minutes and Thunder fires 168 back.)

Another point about messing bout in boats is that they move relative to one another which even when the word slowly means walking speed or less will still result from time to time in ships being out of optimum firing positions, which especially in a broadside arrangement can mean masking one or more guns.

The RN didn't do target practice in glass calm, so it's relatively comparable. Thunder has enough gunports to give four guns firing ahead or astern, so it's not as though she has any particular aspect where Monitor can park herself with impunity.

And I can tell you, being shot at is nowhere near the same thing to target practice. The gunnery in any fight will rarely be as good as at target practice.

Yes, I'm aware - which is why I suggest 30% hit rates in calm water at 500 yards, not nearly 100%. 25% accuracy was attained in practice at 2,500 yards, 75% at 1,500 yards (all with smoothbores, all from a rolling ship against a target with half the size of Monitor's turret)
As for being under fire, Monitor can, at maximum rate, get off one shot per six minutes (one per 12 minutes per gun). This is enough time for several reloading cycles for Thunder between shots.

This is the thing - I'm already significantly discounting the ability of the Thunder compared to target practice, it's my general rule. Now, if I was using target practice rates neither Galena nor Monitor would get within a thousand yards of the Thunder, but I'm strictly sticking to a heavily discounted scheme.
Under this scheme, a single broadside at 500 yards should be doing noticeable damage to the Monitor (Seven shots, two hit, both of them shatter their way past a plate or two as the plate is so brittle). A few broadsides should do enough concussive damage to her spindle to have a significant probability of disabling her turret, and if she's been in the fight for over half an hour then Thunder has probably nearly emptied her magazines into Monitor and Monitor's turret is riddled, with her guns disabled long ago and her gun crew slaughtered by spall. Realistically she'd retreat well before that.

The Monitors historically were all capable of taking a tremendous beating, and here the ship did, and her crew didn't get away unscathed.

But I'm not aware of any Monitor taking the kind of close range pounding that this one did - Monitor took a heavy battering from Virginia, but Virginia was mostly firing shell rather than shot (having expended most of her shot the previous day) and later monitor-type designs were both significantly uparmoured and never engaged at close range with armour-piercing weapons.

Put simply, of the two it's Monitor which is vulnerable to a relatively small number of hits and not Galena. Galena has backing, a single hit can only disable 1/6 of her guns (rather than all of them) and there's plenty of her target profile which a shot can hit without doing something immediately very deletrious to her ability to fight.


Certainly Galena shouldn't be being sunk. If the Thunder can put broadsides into Galena's waterline she can do the same to Monitor - the waterline is, definitionally, at water level - and if the Monitor loses watertight integrity she's very promptly dead, while Galena has actual reserve bouyancy.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

This is the thing - I'm already significantly discounting the ability of the Thunder compared to target practice, it's my general rule. Now, if I was using target practice rates neither Galena nor Monitor would get within a thousand yards of the Thunder, but I'm strictly sticking to a heavily discounted scheme.
Under this scheme, a single broadside at 500 yards should be doing noticeable damage to the Monitor (Seven shots, two hit, both of them shatter their way past a plate or two as the plate is so brittle). A few broadsides should do enough concussive damage to her spindle to have a significant probability of disabling her turret, and if she's been in the fight for over half an hour then Thunder has probably nearly emptied her magazines into Monitor and Monitor's turret is riddled, with her guns disabled long ago and her gun crew slaughtered by spall. Realistically she'd retreat well before that.

This is debatable I would say, as we really can't apply this with any certainty. My contention is Monitor is a much smaller (and ergo more difficult to hit) target and a broadside is not going to be enough to completely rattle her, while Galena has poorer armor, is a larger target, and with her poor protection historically, would not last if she closed with Thunder.

The action here simply had Monitor withdraw after taking a beating like the Monitor's did historically in many cases. Thunder has more pressing issues and can't spend any time chasing her.

But I'm not aware of any Monitor taking the kind of close range pounding that this one did - Monitor took a heavy battering from Virginia, but Virginia was mostly firing shell rather than shot (having expended most of her shot the previous day) and later monitor-type designs were both significantly uparmoured and never engaged at close range with armour-piercing weapons.

Put simply, of the two it's Monitor which is vulnerable to a relatively small number of hits and not Galena. Galena has backing, a single hit can only disable 1/6 of her guns (rather than all of them) and there's plenty of her target profile which a shot can hit without doing something immediately very deletrious to her ability to fight.Certainly Galena shouldn't be being sunk. If the Thunder can put broadsides into Galena's waterline she can do the same to Monitor - the waterline is, definitionally, at water level - and if the Monitor loses watertight integrity she's very promptly dead, while Galena has actual reserve bouyancy.

Galena's armor is much worse than Monitor's and she's much easier to hit with a full broadside. Closing with Thunder at any range would be suicide for Galena (and in this case it was) and even with Monitor backing her up, she's the weaker of the two ships.

 

[RodentRevolution]

This is debatable I would say, as we really can't apply this with any certainty. My contention is Monitor is a much smaller (and ergo more difficult to hit) target and a broadside is not going to be enough to completely rattle her, while Galena has poorer armor, is a larger target, and with her poor protection historically, would not last if she closed with Thunder.

The action here simply had Monitor withdraw after taking a beating like the Monitor's did historically in many cases. Thunder has more pressing issues and can't spend any time chasing her.

I think an important thing to recall here is there can be absolute carnage in the turret but the crew stationed in the pilot house and engine being in separate compartment and boy was a pillar turret a separate compartment, would be relatively unscathed. Not only that but the historical record shows that Royal Navy shooting performance could vary quite broadly from the expected mean average. It does not seem to me that Monitor's performance fell outside the range of probabilities.

Galena's armor is much worse than Monitor's and she's much easier to hit with a full broadside. Closing with Thunder at any range would be suicide for Galena (and in this case it was) and even with Monitor backing her up, she's the weaker of the two ships.

I think Galena on the other hand definitely got unlucky. While her armour was poor the fact she had armour suggested that shot would probably be required. Ships in general proved highly resistant to shot damage. Even with shells the tendency was for ships to be disabled or mission killed in modern parlance rather than sunk. My best guess is thus some kind of internal explosion most probably something like an internal ricochet or very unlucky penetrating hit found a boiler. With the crew stunned and no one manning the pumps, the kind of flooding a vessel of Galena's size would normally have shrugged off could rapidly become serious. Thus inspired the survivors may have opted to swiftly abandon ship.

I don't know this to be the case of course but the causes of many such incidents in real life remain unknown. Basically th same bad luck genie that attended the Warrior in Portland also alighted upon the Galena in New York.

 

[Saphroneth]

The action here simply had Monitor withdraw after taking a beating like the Monitor's did historically in many cases. Thunder has more pressing issues and can't spend any time chasing her.

There's certainly no problem with that - the problem is really that she lasted as long as she did. I'd expect Monitor to be disabled after taking fire from a corvette for that long, let alone a ship armed with over a dozen of the most powerful armour-piercing cannons in ship service in the world.
(And yes, I know about the unreliable narrator thing. I just mean that it's on the order of ten times as long as I'd expect Monitor to have taken to decide that this is a mug's game and retreat. Maybe the Thunder forgot to bring solid shot today.)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I think an important thing to recall here is there can be absolute carnage in the turret but the crew stationed in the pilot house and engine being in separate compartment and boy was a pillar turret a separate compartment, would be relatively unscathed. Not only that but the historical record shows that Royal Navy shooting performance could vary quite broadly from the expected mean average. It does not seem to me that Monitor's performance fell outside the range of probabilities.

Having read about the close quarters of early ironclads, especially the Monitor, I would never want to set foot in one myself personally

But yes, in the chaos of battle great performance, especially against such an unusual target as Monitor would be hard. And the crew of Thunder have only been in her for about 3 months by this point as she was worked up and deployed.

II think Galena on the other hand definitely got unlucky. While her armour was poor the fact she had armour suggested that shot would probably be required. Ships in general proved highly resistant to shot damage. Even with shells the tendency was for ships to be disabled or mission killed in modern parlance rather than sunk. My best guess is thus some kind of internal explosion most probably something like an internal ricochet or very unlucky penetrating hit found a boiler. With the crew stunned and no one manning the pumps, the kind of flooding a vessel of Galena's size would normally have shrugged off could rapidly become serious. Thus inspired the survivors may have opted to swiftly abandon ship.

I don't know this to be the case of course but the causes of many such incidents in real life remain unknown. Basically th same bad luck genie that attended the Warrior in Portland also alighted upon the Galena in New York.

The bad luck genie will always strike where least expected...

 

[EnglishCanuck]

There's certainly no problem with that - the problem is really that she lasted as long as she did. I'd expect Monitor to be disabled after taking fire from a corvette for that long, let alone a ship armed with over a dozen of the most powerful armour-piercing cannons in ship service in the world.
(And yes, I know about the unreliable narrator thing. I just mean that it's on the order of ten times as long as I'd expect Monitor to have taken to decide that this is a mug's game and retreat. Maybe the Thunder forgot to bring solid shot today.)

Possibly. Though in total fairness to Monitor's crew they've been running her for a while and would probably have enough skill and pluck to use her few advantages to good effect. I don't think the Monitors will always stand up to such pounding, but in this case it seemed like a good enough start to the ironclad race in the Americas.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The next chapter should be out by the weekend, but I would heartily encourage people to re-read chapters 22 and 14 in order to refresh your memories!

 

[JonKenobi]

You alright English? It's been awhile. I understand real life takes precedence but; I'm really loving the timeline. Hope it's not abandoned.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

You alright English? It's been awhile. I understand real life takes precedence but; I'm really loving the timeline. Hope it's not abandoned.

The TL isn't dead, but alas real life has gotten in the way. The next chapter is almost finished, and I will hopefully be able to run the next one out quickly after that! I might get it done after Easter, but it might only be done at the start of May!

It is still kicking though!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 25: Thunder on the Rivers
​

"Your dispatch of the 24th received. Will take Island 10 within a week. Trust me." - John Pope to Don Carlos Buell, April 1862

Johnston’s plan in the opening stages of the campaign was simple. He would oppose any Union thrust out of either Nashville, or up the Mississippi against Memphis, and then march north to turn the flank of any Union force and drive it back to Nashville and then invest the city. That he was allowed to build up his forces with so little opposition was thanks to a number of factors, largely though was the necessary pause as Union forces were reorganized and shifted north towards the border with the Province of Canada.

It remained to be seen whether the reorganized Union forces could match the vigor with which they had driven south in late January and early February. The declaration of war with Britain had forced a pause in offensive operations as the Union was forced to peel off forces to undertake an offensive against Canada, while also reorganizing their command structure to continue the offensive in the West against Johnston’s forces.

With Halleck’s transfer to the Department of the Lakes, Don Carlos Buell stepped up to take command in the Western theater. Buell, 44, had graduated West Point in 1841 and served in Mexico, brevetted three times for bravery and had served under both Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor. At the start of the Civil War he had served in the nascent Army of the Potomac before being transferred west to assume command of the Army of Ohio, promoted to Major General after his capture of Nashville.

He assumed command of the theater under Lincoln’s guidance, and was informed of the due haste required to move south and deliver victory against Johnston’s army and the total capture of Tennessee from the rebellion. Washington had settled on a grand strategy in three parts: Pope would move against Memphis with the support of Grant who would lead his forces south against Corinth and capture the vital rail junction there. Thomas meanwhile would move southwards towards Chattanooga and Eastern Tennessee, keeping Johnston’s army fixed in the eastern portion of Tennessee and driving it southwards while Beauregard would be unable to support him. Buell was reminded of the need for unified action of his forces, but somewhat sluggishly he moved in half measures against the Confederates facing him.

He had three armies under his command. The Army of Ohio, operating out of Nashville, the Army of the Mississippi on the west bank of that river, and the Army of Western Tennessee operating on the right bank. Both armies were to demonstrate against Memphis, and capture the city for the Union, but the nature of the two commanders proved prickly.

The Army of the Mississippi was under the command of John Pope. Pope like his contemporaries had served in Mexico, and had been chosen as one of the four officers to escort Lincoln to his inauguration, and gained an appointment to Brigadier General early in the war. His stormy relationship with his superiors would dog him, first with Fremont (who believed Pope was out to replace him) then with Halleck, and then Buell whom he accused of not promoting him to command a “unified army of the Mississippi” which intimated he believed he should be in command over the whole of the force marching on Memphis. This put him in competition with his erstwhile ally, Ulysses S. Grant.

Grant, 40, had graduated from West Point a year after Pope in 1843, and had also served in Mexico, earning distinction in his actions, such as leading an ad-hoc cavalry charge at Resaca, and assembling a howitzer in a church steeple to bombard the enemy, and he was brevetted to the rank of captain. However, in peace time he proved a melancholy soldier. Assigned to the remote outpost of Fort Humboltd, he reportedly fell to drink and allowed his duties to lag, and was eventually offered the honor of resigning without a potential court martial because of his war record, he accepted and returned to civilian life. There he pursued numerous failed civilian ventures, before war broke out again in 1861. In spite of some reservations about his abilities he rose through the ranks and his lightning campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson made him popular in the political circles in Washington.

Pope, who angled for a higher command, could not accept this. In spite of his orders to move in conjunction with Grant to keep Beauregard’s forces pinned in place, Pope desired victory for himself. He wrote to Grant saying: Make your preparations for carrying out the campaign proposed in your communication on the 18th. I will direct Comm Foote to begin movements against Island No. 10.” Instead of waiting for Grant to move simultaneously with him, Pope moved first.

May 1st he launched a spectacularly ill-advised campaign against Island No. 10. The fortress was an excellent site to impede Union efforts to invade the South by the river, as ships had to approach the island bows on and then slow to make the turns. However, it had an appalling weakness in that it was only accessible by land over one easily cut road. Since February though, the Confederates, under Brigadier General John P. McCown, 3rd Brigade Confederate, Army of the Mississippi, had fortified the position with over 60 heavy guns, and he had the support of the Confederate Navy on the river under Commodore George N. Hollins. Pope meanwhile had only the tepid support of the Union Navy under Commodore Foote, who after the pounding his vessels had received at Fort Donelson, was leery of a direct assault against the Confederate position.

Pope though, thought this immaterial, and decided to split his force to attack the Confederate garrison from both sides of the river. Though he outnumbered the Confederates two to one, this was a risky move, and had he been following his directions from headquarters he would have moved in conjunction with Grant’s army and overwhelming superiority. Though initially successful in driving the Confederates from their entrenchments into the fort, the appearance of Hollins gunboats would cause his forces to withdraw from range, until the gunboats then withdrew in turn. Despite prodding by Pope, Foote would not run the guns to engage the Confederate gunboats.

Despite this, by May 12th reinforcements had arrived. Beauregard had advanced from Memphis in order to help the beleaguered garrison, and after stiff skirmishing with the Union men at Donaldson’s Farm, Pope’s men on the east bank of the Mississppi withdrew up the river to the safety of Foote’s guns, which compelled Pope’s withdrawal towards Columbus.

The news infuriated Buell who ordered Grant to stall his movement towards Corinth in order to prevent Pope from being overrun...

…Thomas led his forces south from Nashville on May 3rd. By May 1862, with his forces reorganized from the declaration of war against Britain Thomas led some 50,000 men in four divisions, inclusive of cavalry and engineers:

Army of the Ohio

MG George H. Thomas
Chief of the Staff: Maj. Alvan C. Gillem
Chief Engineer: Capt. James St. Clair Morton
Commanding Cavalry: Col. William H. Taylor

1st Division BG Robert Latimer McCook

2nd Division BG Alexander McCook

3rd Division BG Thomas L. Crittenden

4th Division BG Thomas J. Wood (garrisoning Nashville)

With Wood’s division garrisoning Nashville and covering his rear areas, Thomas advanced south towards Murfreesboro, where the troops of Alexander McCook’s 2nd Division ran headlong into the troops of Leonidas Polk’s 2nd Corps at Stewarts Creek.

Johnston, since his retreat to Tullahoma in early March, had been working to fortify his front as a check on a Federal advance, and create a supply depot to support his own intended advance against Nashville. Polk’s Corps had been assigned to Murfreesboro, partially to lessen the strain on the local population and partially to serve as the first line of defence in case of Federal assault. When McCook’s men began skirmishing with Polk’s corps at Stewart’s Creek, both armies were advancing, turning the fight into one where both foes were on the offensive.

Polk’s fieldworks held off McCook’s advance until the arrival of Bragg’s Corps, which extended the Confederate lines towards Stewartsburg, easing the pressure on Polk’s front and forcing Thomas to redeploy his forces to counter the new threat. The fruitless skirmishing would continue until May 15th when Breckinridge’s Corps would move around Thomas’s flank compelling Thomas’s withdrawal towards Nashville.

Johnston would regroup his forces before advancing against Thomas’s entrenchments south of Nashville. The two sides clashed again on May 19th when Bragg’s Corps launched a full scale assault across Brown’s Creek into the teeth of Thomas’s defences. This preliminary skirmishing allowed Breckinridge and Polk to move to the west to strike at the city itself, but such assaults proved fruitless. The fighting only ceased on May 21st after Johnston determined that such assaults would cause only unnecessary bloodshed.

The two armies found themselves at an impasse. Johnston was not strong enough to either break into the city nor surround it, and Thomas was not strong enough to break out and end the siege. So each side looked for a way to end the stalemate. Thomas communicated with Buell for the use of Grant’s army, which was then engaged in the assault on Island No. 10, which limited the immediately available options for the Union Army. Thomas determined that Johnston would be unable to force the city’s defences, and not cut off he could hold out indefinitely, so did not urge haste to the actions on the Mississippi. Johnston and his commanders determined they likewise would be unable to force the defences of the city absent substantial reinforcement, and a significant investment by artillery (which at that time the Confederacy did not possess) limiting their options.

Johnston and his subordinates were split. Polk advocated movements to cut off the city, while Bragg and Breckinridge were more offensive minded. The major Union armies were tied up in either the defensive of the city of Nashville, or against Beauregard’s defenses at Memphis, should they not then go on the offensive? In their minds, Kentucky looked ripe for the taking. It was a border state they argued, and one with closer ties to the South than the North. The Confederate governor, George W. Johnson, served in the ranks as a sergeant and had fought in all the battles thus far. Breckinridge was a popular man in the state, and many soldiers in his division were of Kentucky extraction. The assault would draw Union forces out of Nashville and take pressure off the army at Memphis. Johnston, seeing few direct options, acquiesced to the pleas of his commanders and began shifting his forces westwards.

A series of cavalry raids across the Cumberland, designed to draw Thomas’s and Buell’s attention to the west of the city paid off as Johnston transported Bragg and Breckinridge’s corps north at the beginning of June. His plans were to move north in the direction of Louisville in conjunction with Kirby Smith’s forces from East Tennessee through the Cumberland Gap, before merging the two forces at the state capital in Frankfort.

The Confederate effort at Misdirection paid off, and Thomas shifted his forces west to look for attempted crossings of the Cumberland. Breckinridge’s Corps captured Munfordville on June 17th, while Kirby Smith moved through Glasgow on the 15th. The Confederate invasion of Kentucky had begun…” - On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis MacDougal, University of Boston, 1996

-x-x-x-x-​

“Despite the defeat at Lacolle, Sumner was not deterred from attempting to continue his advance. After the losses incurred he regrouped his troops at Rouse Point, safe under the forts guns, and determined to find another way past Williams’s entrenched army. He had spent two weeks reorganizing his battered forces south of the border, sending raids and patrols northwards to sound out the British positions on the border. For his part, Williams merely responded with patrols, doing little to ascertain the strength of the Americans.

So far as the British were concerned, they had won a great victory, and Montreal and Quebec were safe for the time being. This was especially true with the arrival of the 4th Division Army of Canada in the middle of June. In order to strengthen their position on the border the garrisons of the Mediterranean stations were being brought up to strength and dispatched to the North American theater. Williams had advocated for reinforcements directly from the British Isles, but the Horse Guards were sending those troops to Maine, and thus Williams had to wait.

For the Union army there were no such reinforcements immediately available. The available state troops were tied up in garrisons along the coast and frontiers, and more soldiers were being drawn out West for the great contest taking place there, and the new volunteers in training were not yet ready for the field. Sumner pressed onwards though, looking to strike a blow at the British flank.

He found a possible route right through the heart of the country south of Montreal. Though the British had spent much of the winter destroying the Caughanawa Railroad which led south, making that route north a poor option, they had little presence on the roadways which led to Napierville, and Williams’s flank. Other than militia piquets, the British presence immediately west of the Richelieu was limited, and with their cavalry largely tied up in screening the immediate flank of the army their ability to reconnoitre the surrounding countryside was negligible.

Sumner though, also lacked for cavalry, but used Blake’s brigade as best he could, scouting the British lines. Though they routinely skirmished with the militia, they found that there were no British troops in strength to the west of William’s line. Through late May and early June he began shifting the men of Blenker’s division west, to Mooers, where the rail line was still intact to a lesser degree in the north on the border. With Burn’s much savaged division as a reserve Sumner planned to move his troops north to upset William’s flank, and hopefully compel his withdrawal into Montreal.

Williams, despite concerns from his cavalry officers, showed little interest in the American skirmishing to his west. He maintained the destruction of the rail line and the absence of a navigable river would limit the Americans to attacking his front, or attempting to shift him by moving forces on the east side of the Richelieu. So when on June 14th Blenker’s forces crossed the border and drove the militia north at the village of Chateuguay, he was caught by surprise.

In conjunction with the crossing Burnside’s division (much to their dismay) was again tasked with launching an assault at Lacolle. This diversion would serve to pin the British in place, and leave their flank open for Blenker’s men to harass.

Or so they thought.

What Sumner’s intelligence had failed to divine was that in early June elements of William’s 4th Division, under Major General John Inglis, was arriving. Composed of troops freed up from the Mediterranean garrisons by militia, they were shipped directly to Montreal by steamer, and on July 10th, the first brigade was already disembarking.

These were battalions from Malta under the command of Col. Alexander Dunn VC. Dunn, 28, was a Toronto born Canadian who had been educated at Upper Canada College, but after the passing of his mother his father moved the family to England where he attended Harrow School. Tiring of an academic life he purchased a commission in the 11th Hussars in 1852, and two years later was deployed with the army to the Crimea. He took part in the battle at the Alma, and most famously at the Battle of Balaklava. It was there he won the Victoria Cross during the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade, cutting down four Russian lancers and saving the lives of two of his fellows. After the war in 1856 he returned to Canada to manage his family’s properties north of Toronto. In 1857 the Indian Mutiny broke out however, and Dunn rushed to raise a Canadian regiment to take part in the fighting. Thus was the 100th Regiment of Foot “The Royal Canadians” created. Dunn rose quickly in the ranks, becoming a major, and then Lt. Colonel by 1861. Given the local rank of Colonel he commanded the brigade that stepped off the boat at Montreal.

Almost as Dunn’s brigade was stepping off the boat Blenker’s troops were pushing north, driving the militia before them. Williams responded by repositioning the “Canadian” Brigade under Pitt-Rivers, and they took up hasty positions on the Acadia River, as Dunn’s men marched swiftly south to confront the advancing Yankee horde.

Blenker’s men sought to cross the water into Napierville proper on July 14th. The Canadians skirmished with Blenker’s first brigade under Stahel, while Steinwehr’s brigade attempted to cross the creek south of the village, with only the 11th Battalion of Volunteers to stand in their way with companies of militiamen from the 51st Battalion of Volunteer Infantry caught up in the fray.

The fresh arrival of Dunn’s troops the afternoon of the 14th stabilized the situation, if only barely. William’s sought to shift Grant’s division north, but the assault’s by Burnside at Lacolle, and skirmishing up and down the line tied all of his troops except Paulet’s in place. Thus it would again fall on the Guards to march to the aide of their beleaguered comrades. Marching up Cyr Road they arrived at Napierville late in the evening, taking up positions alongside the battered Canadians.

At dawn on the 15th Steinwehr’s brigade made a second attempt, which fell apart in the face of determined volley fire from the Guards Brigade. The arrival of Burn’s division altered the course of the battle little, as the brigades that marched forward promptly threw themselves flat to return fire rather than prosecuting the assaults with vigour. This situation continued until late in the evening, with a disheartened Burns counseling Blenker to call off the attack. Reluctantly the German agreed, and the two divisions began withdrawing in the direction of Mooers late in the evening...” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Whew, that chapter took waaaaay to long to complete. On now to Chapter 26 and some good old fashioned Union vs Confederate action!

 

[RodentRevolution]

Whew, that chapter took waaaaay to long to complete. On now to Chapter 26 and some good old fashioned Union vs Confederate action!

But you do very well in capturing the tone and style of so many Civil War histories and including some really good summaries of the principal players.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

But you do very well in capturing the tone and style of so many Civil War histories and including some really good summaries of the principal players.

Thank you! I enjoy the narrative style in many history books, and I ape a few of them here. I hope I can keep getting that style right when we return to Virginia next chapter!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 26: Masterly Inactivity ​

“And even things without life giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped? For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?” – 1st Corinthians 14, 7-8

“The slow build up of armies in the winter months had not stopped all campaigns in the Eastern theater. The outbreak of war with Britain had come like a thunderbolt in Virginia, and every soldier in the ranks sang the praises of the Queen and Union Jack. British tars docking in Norfolk found themselves drinking well, and any man who was British in the ranks suddenly found himself well regarded by his fellows.

The most immediate effect of the British entry into the war had been the allowance of the removal of troops on coastal duty to reinforce the ranks of the army at Centreville, and the slow withdrawal of troops from the Carolina’s following the surrender of Col. Nathaniel Brown’s 3rd Rhode Island Heavy Artillery at Port Royal in early March. This had allowed troops from the points further south to be shifted north to Centreville and the army there. The most active portion of the Confederate army however, was in the Shenandoah Valley.

The division under the command of Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson had been in the Valley since late 1861, and had withdrawn under pressure from the Union VII Corps under Nathaniel Banks late in December 1861. Jackson, 38, was an 1846 West Point graduate who had served in Mexico earning two brevets, and then brief service in Florida before returning to Virginia to teach at the Virginia Military Institute. With the secession of Virginia he enrolled in the Confederate Army, rapidly rising through the ranks to earn the rank of brigadier general. Most famously he stood off numerous Union assaults on Henry House Hill at Bull Run, earning his nick name of “Stonewall” Jackson.

In early 1862, he was seeking to move back up the Valley and draw Union troops away from the anticipated offensive at Centreville. However, acting on bad intelligence, he moved his 4,000 men against Kernstown in March expecting only a single weak Union brigade, and instead he ran into 9,000 well entrenched Union troops and withdrew with a bloody nose. However, with reinforcements coming from the Carolinas, he was given more men and soon designated commander of the “Left Flank” of the Army of North Virginia, with three divisions, Garnett’s, Ewells, and D. H. Hills.

Meanwhile, up the valley VII Corps was sluggishly moving forward after an easy winter. With the easy repulse of Jackson in March, Banks felt his position was secure. He had no inkling of Jackson’s reinforcement, and so had his troops spread out in winter quarters garrisoning the Valley. The first indication he received of Jackson’s movement up the Valley was when the 1,000 man garrison of Front Royal on May 23rd was captured by Garnett’s Division. Reacting swiftly, he concentrated much of VII Corps strength at Winchester, hoping to block ant attempted thrust by what he believed to be an inferior force.

In this he played in excellently to Jackson’s expectations.

In a rapid march, which he only informed his commanders of the night before he implemented it, Jackson took Ewell’s and Hll’s divisions over 30 miles in two days, looping around Winchester. Meanwhile, Garnett’s division moved slowly up the Valley Pike, lulling Banks into a sense of safety as he dug in at Winchester anticipating an attack on his front. He deployed Bayard’s Brigade from Shield’s Division on his flank covering the Berryville Pike for safety, while pulling Brigadier Adolphus William’s Division on his front watching the approaches from the Valley Pike and the Front Royal – Winchester Pike. The slow skirmishing with Garnett’s men allowed him to push back, and even, so it seemed, stall Garnett’s men.

Then on the morning of the 26th of May, Jackson’s two other divisions crashed into his unprotected rear. The resulting battle was an unmitigated disaster. Only portions of Bank’s command managed to escape the resulting envelopment, Bayard’s troops fled at first contact with Jackson’s force, and the 1st Michigan Cavalry managed to fight its way northwards, but Banks, and the whole of William’s Division, was not so lucky. In the confused fighting his 14,000 men had been overwhelmed by the 32,000 Jackson brought to bear. Banks and his entire command were captured, putting 12,000 prisoners at Jackson’s disposal[1].

The resultant panic in Washington led to the diversion of Sigzel’s Corps from the coming offensive aimed at Centreville, to bottling up Jackson’s troops in the Valley…” - A Prophet of War: The Life of Stonewall Jackson, Timothy Henderson, Richmond University, 1988

Jackson at Winchester​

“Since his removal as General in Chief, McClellan had committed himself to organizing the Army of the Potomac throughout the winter months. The declaration of war by Britain had led him to be increasingly critical of the cabinet, but only in his private correspondence and to trusted subordinates. He instead maintained an increasingly strained communication with Lincoln and Stanton in Washington, where he felt strategy was unwisely dictated by committee rather than by strategic necessity. The naming of John A. Dix as General in Chief in late May had further strained the relationship between Commander in Chief and his principal general in the Virginia theater.

McClellan for his part remained in Alexandria, largely leaving only to inspect the new Corps established in the spring, and to correspond with his preferred commanders. Despite Johnston’s army entrenching itself at Centreville a mere 20 miles distant, there was no urgency to McClellan’s actions. Increasing calls from Washington for movement fell on deaf ears, and McClellan himself seemed to have no strategy in place for dealing with the growing Confederate force which threatened the city. Jackson’s stunning victory in the Valley had led to increased grumbling in Washington. The perception that McClellan had done nothing since February grew as June began, and ominous rumblings began to be heard in the capital that someone else had better be found to command the Army of the Potomac. The press began to compliment his "masterly inactivity" on the front, and it seems McClellan felt action was necessary.

Finally McClellan had written to Lincoln explaining, in vague terms, how he intended to force Johnston south, and hopefully capture a part of it like Jackson had done in the Valley. Lincoln, relieved to see some action from McClellan, wrote his enthusiastic approval of the vague plan, despite misgivings by Dix and Stanton. McClellan ended his letter with a promise of action by the 4th of July…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

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“…Johston’s Army of Northern Virginia had grown by leaps and bounds over the winter. With troops from the Carolinas, and men freed from defending the coasts, he soon had 65,000 men direction supporting him at Centreville, and 97,000 under his overall command. His position at Centreville had become progressively more secure, and he soon had the equivalent of two corps occupying it. The Confederate army had not yet adopted the Corps distinction however, and thus far Johnston had divided his forces into “wings” with the army organized as such in July of 1862:

Army of Northern Virginia

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

Chief of the Staff: Maj Thomas G. Rhett
ADC: Lt James B. Washington
Assistant Adjutant: Maj A. Pendleton Mason
Quartermaster: Maj Archibald H. Cole
Chief Engineer: Lt. Col. Walter H. Stevens

Left Wing (Jackson)
- Garnett’s, Ewell’s, D.H. Hill’s divisions

Center (Longstreet)
- Anderson’s, Early’s, Pickett’s Divisions

Right Wing (Magruder)
- McLaw’s, Jones’, Griffith’s Divisions

Reserve (G.W. Smith)
- Whitings, and Holmes, Ransom’s Divisions

Calvary Division (J.E.B Stuart)

Artillery (William N. Pendleton)

The Left Wing was in the Valley, having won a smashing victory in late May which buoyed Confederate confidence. The largest wing was in the Centreville defenses under Longstreet, some 34,000 men. The Right was emplaced at Manassas Station, supplying Johnston’s army, while the Reserve was organizing at Groveton, and aimed to provide support to the two formations in the defenses to the east.

Johnston had not been idle, and had been progressively fortifying his position over the winter. Centreville itself controlled the high ground and the Warrenton Turn Pike along with the major roadways in the region, while covering the main crossings on Bull Run. Secondary redoubts had been established at McClean’s Ford supporting Magruder’s fortifications at Manassas Station. However, for all their strength the flanks of the position were weak, and so Stuart’s cavalry screened the army as far north as Chantilly. Despite the strength of the fortifications though, they lacked for heavy guns, many of which, despite Johnston’s pleading, Richmond had refused to move from defences further south, and so though strong, his position was not as great as it could have been.

McClellan had been reconnoitring this position since March, and he had told Washington it would take five corps to storm the works, even after an immense artillery bombardment. Despite these points, his much needed fifth corps under Sigzel had been detached at the start of June to shield the Valley and bottle up Jackson, in order to protect Washington, and despite asking for more men from the Washington defenses, Stanton had refused this request citing the need to defend the capital, and in this he was backed by Lincoln, and McClellan was left with only 108,000 men under his command, a force he deemed unfit to carry out his operations.

Fuming McClellan had delayed his assault on Centreville for over a week, before finally settling on a new plan of attack. To carry it out he had his army organized as such:

Army of the Potomac

MG George B. McClellan Commanding
Chief of Staff: Col. Randall B. Marcy
Adjutant: BG Seth Williams
Quartermaster: Maj. Stewart Van Vilet
Engineers: BG John G. Barnard

I Corps: MG Joseph K. Mansfield
1st Division BG Isaac L. Stevens
2nd Division BG Thomas W. Sherman

III Corps BG Samuel P. Heintzelman
1st Division BG Fitz John Porter
2nd Division BG Joseph Hooker
3rd Division BG Charles Smith Hamilton

IV Corps BG Irvin McDowell
1st Division BG William Franklin
2nd Division BG George A. McCall
3rd Division BG Rufus King

V Corps MG William Rosencrans
1st Division BG Edward O. Ord
2nd Division BG Amiel W. Whipple
3rd Division BG Jesse L. Reno

The XII Corps was detached for service in the Valley, much to McClellan’s displeasure. McClellan moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court House on June 22nd, and drove the Confederate piquets from Dangerfield on the 25th. His cavalry began engaging Stuart’s troops in the vicinity of Chantilly on July 9th but the main offensive, the full weight of I Corps under Mansfield, didn’t begin until July 12th. There was a great show of McClellan directing his artillery, and beginning a great bombardment of the Confederate positions. Johnston, reasoning this was where McClellan meant to throw his main assault, and with news of Union troops moving to McCleans Ford, ordered Smith’s wing up from Groveton to support him.

Smith however, was delayed in getting the message by a courier’s fall from a horse, and when he did receive it, was slow in getting his troops moving. It wasn’t until the morning of the 13th that Whiting’s division was trooping up the pike towards Centreville.

However, the great showy attack had all been a ruse. Over the preceding days McClellan had moved the greater portion of his strength south, pursuing the withdrawing piquets from Dangerfield. The III and IV Corps had proceeded to Blackburn’s Ford and Union Mills, where Magruder’s men had not established adequate fortifications. At 7am on the 13th Heintzelman directed his 2nd Division under BG Joseph Hooker in a skillful crossing at Blackburn’s Ford which overran the men of David Jones division, most notably scattering the brigade commanded by former Confederate presidential contender Robert Toombs, who withdrew in confusion. McDowell crossed at Union Mills, pushing towards Manassas Station from the south while Heintzelman’s troops swung north to take the position at the ford from the flank.

Magruder reacted swiftly however. He pushed forward McLaw’s Division to act as a stop gap while he reorganized Jones troops, and sending couriers galloping north to request support from Johnston. Johnston, who had his attention focused squarely on his front and north, where he assumed a flanking maneuver would take place, was caught entirely off guard by McClellan’s maneuver. If Manassas Station fell it unhinged his flank and current supply line. He ordered Whiting’s division, just trudging into Centreville at 1pm, to move south and support Magruder, and sent urgent couriers back to Smith to redeploy his forces to support the position at Manassas Junction.

However, Smith failed to maneuver quickly enough, and only Whiting’s men would arrive in any position to accomplish something resembling a meaningful holding action. Communication between the large wings began breaking down as the day wore on, which influenced events as much as the surprise of McClellan’s attack.

Meanwhile, Hooker’s troops had dashed forward, taking the stunned Confederates of Kershaw’s brigade at McCleans Ford in the flank and sending them reeling towards Manassas. Magruder quickly realized he was outmaneuvered and began withdrawing towards Gainesville, but could not get a message to Johnston, or Smith who remained unsure of his own forces dispositions. Johnston, realizing his flank was crumbling, began to move himself back along the turnpike, abandoning many guns in his flight. His own divisions withdrew slowly from their defences, and McClellan was unable to capitalize on this potential advantage due to his own communications difficulties.

McClellan proved unable to determine exactly where McDowell and Heintzelman were in relation to Johnston troops, he would waste two precious hours attempting to coordinate his Corps, and failing to commit Rosencrans men who spent the whole battle waiting in reserve. Despite this poor coordination however, McDowell and Heintzelman were able to press the attack on, but experienced their own difficulties. Hooker’s division charged ahead, pressing recklessly forward, supported by Hamilton’s, but became bogged down in vicious fighting at Lewis’s Farm. McDowell’s 3rd Division under Rufus King actually managed to pursue Magruder’s fleeing troops, putting them in some disorder.

The Confederate army was saved though by the skillful stand of Whiting’s division first at Bethlehem Church on the 14th, and then by Stuart’s audacious attack on McClellan’s baggage train on the 15th, which allowed Johnston to extract his troops to Gainesville where Magruders corps dug in across North Fork.

Johnston wrote to Richmond, informing President Davis he would be unable to hold his present line, and requested permission to withdraw to the Rappahannock. Davis at first refused, but Johnston soon ignored his commander in chief and moved his headquarters south to Culpeper Courthouse on the 20th, ordering Jackson’s troops to withdraw to support his flank. These orders would have significant consequences in Richmond…” – The Virginia Front 1862, Katherine Zellers, 2012, Random House

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1] Think of this battle as 1st Winchester, but instead Jackson has 32,000 men to move against Banks. Banks being Banks, and Jackson being Jackson, there’s not many ways this can go.

 

[The Gunslinger]

Man, talk about a seesaw. Neither side can catch a break.