Chapter 2: Who is intercepting whom?
Chapter 2: Who is intercepting whom?
The aftermath of the great naval victory saw both jubilation and apprehension. It was not lost upon the Germans that the British had known they were coming out to sea, but the source of the information was unknown. It could be a spy, signals intercept or a submarine. The Germans were determined for the next action to rule out any submarine interference, change the codes and expose any spies that would be relaying information to the British. In consequence, after a 30 day period of hasty repairs that could be focused on the battlecruisers, the Germans went to see again with new codes, spies around every corner and a thorough effort at submarine sweeps, which included waiting to see if submarines would surface in the wake of the departing high sea fleet.
With the losses suffered, the British scouting forces had been reorganized under Horace Hood to include the four battlecruisers HMS Australia, invincible, inflexible and indomitable in the third battlecruiser squadron whereas the 5th battlesquadron included the recently commissioned Malaya and Valiant under Arbuthnot. The Queen Elizabeth were still undergoing repairs, but Valiant was sufficiently patched up to be included in the sortie to intercept the German fleet.
Against them, they faced the intact German battlecruiser fleet, with their losses replaced and a virtually intact high seas fleet.
When the operation commenced on June 30th, originally as an anti-convey intercept plan, there were no submarine sightings, no use of uncoded signals and yet again, the battlecruisers and the grand fleet went to sea. This time, there had not been unscheduled delays and the departures were reported by submarines on station and on picket line defense. For the grand fleet, this cost the battleship HMS Ajax to a spread of three torpedoes fired at closed range, before the sinking of the offending U-43, but the grand fleet was obviously on its way to intercept. With both the battlecruiser squadrons and the grand fleet reported heading east, admiral Scheer saw an opportunity to change from a northerly to a westerly course and engage the reformed battlecruiser squad when it was isolated.
This required a radio communication to Hipper’s battlecruisers, following which both of the German fleets changed course west. The transmission was intercepted by the British, but with the new codebooks used it could not be decoded in time. Alas, this mattered little as the German battlecruiser fleet was spotted heading west shortly after by a British submarine at 11 am. Thus began a double attempt to perform a trap. The Germans of the strengthened third British battlecruiser squadron and the British of the entire High sea fleet.
The British knew the Germans were coming right at the battlecruisers and would seek to engage and hold the German fleet, while the grand fleet deployed to the rear of the high sea fleet to prevent its escape. The obvious problem in the British tactics were that the British battlecruisers had been badly mauled no less than a month earlier and needed to remain as a fighting force until the Grand fleet could engage the German fleets. The 3rd battlecruiser squadron slowed down in order to intercept the Germans further westwards whereas the Grand fleet turned to a south-easterly course at full speed.
The German forces with Hipper in command expected to engage the British battlecruiser squadron at 2 pm, but to its surprise would not receive reports of smoke until 3 pm. This was because the British had slowed down for the preceding four hours to allow the positioning of the grand fleet. The significance of the delay was not realized by the Germans at this time as Hipper’s battlecruiser approached the British fleet.
This engagement, with reasonable weather conditions was very unlike the engagement a month earlier. Hipper’s force approached the British BC’s on a southwesterly course, with the British under Hood engaging on a parallel northeasterly course. Hipper would at the time see this as an opportunity to trap the British Battlecruiser squadron between Hippers battlecruisers and Scheers battleships and he duly signaled Scheer using wireless suggesting to turn to a northwesterly course. Unbeknownst to the Germans, this would aid in the British deployment of the grand fleet to the east of the German battle line.
The aftermath of the great naval victory saw both jubilation and apprehension. It was not lost upon the Germans that the British had known they were coming out to sea, but the source of the information was unknown. It could be a spy, signals intercept or a submarine. The Germans were determined for the next action to rule out any submarine interference, change the codes and expose any spies that would be relaying information to the British. In consequence, after a 30 day period of hasty repairs that could be focused on the battlecruisers, the Germans went to see again with new codes, spies around every corner and a thorough effort at submarine sweeps, which included waiting to see if submarines would surface in the wake of the departing high sea fleet.
With the losses suffered, the British scouting forces had been reorganized under Horace Hood to include the four battlecruisers HMS Australia, invincible, inflexible and indomitable in the third battlecruiser squadron whereas the 5th battlesquadron included the recently commissioned Malaya and Valiant under Arbuthnot. The Queen Elizabeth were still undergoing repairs, but Valiant was sufficiently patched up to be included in the sortie to intercept the German fleet.
Against them, they faced the intact German battlecruiser fleet, with their losses replaced and a virtually intact high seas fleet.
When the operation commenced on June 30th, originally as an anti-convey intercept plan, there were no submarine sightings, no use of uncoded signals and yet again, the battlecruisers and the grand fleet went to sea. This time, there had not been unscheduled delays and the departures were reported by submarines on station and on picket line defense. For the grand fleet, this cost the battleship HMS Ajax to a spread of three torpedoes fired at closed range, before the sinking of the offending U-43, but the grand fleet was obviously on its way to intercept. With both the battlecruiser squadrons and the grand fleet reported heading east, admiral Scheer saw an opportunity to change from a northerly to a westerly course and engage the reformed battlecruiser squad when it was isolated.
This required a radio communication to Hipper’s battlecruisers, following which both of the German fleets changed course west. The transmission was intercepted by the British, but with the new codebooks used it could not be decoded in time. Alas, this mattered little as the German battlecruiser fleet was spotted heading west shortly after by a British submarine at 11 am. Thus began a double attempt to perform a trap. The Germans of the strengthened third British battlecruiser squadron and the British of the entire High sea fleet.
The British knew the Germans were coming right at the battlecruisers and would seek to engage and hold the German fleet, while the grand fleet deployed to the rear of the high sea fleet to prevent its escape. The obvious problem in the British tactics were that the British battlecruisers had been badly mauled no less than a month earlier and needed to remain as a fighting force until the Grand fleet could engage the German fleets. The 3rd battlecruiser squadron slowed down in order to intercept the Germans further westwards whereas the Grand fleet turned to a south-easterly course at full speed.
The German forces with Hipper in command expected to engage the British battlecruiser squadron at 2 pm, but to its surprise would not receive reports of smoke until 3 pm. This was because the British had slowed down for the preceding four hours to allow the positioning of the grand fleet. The significance of the delay was not realized by the Germans at this time as Hipper’s battlecruiser approached the British fleet.
This engagement, with reasonable weather conditions was very unlike the engagement a month earlier. Hipper’s force approached the British BC’s on a southwesterly course, with the British under Hood engaging on a parallel northeasterly course. Hipper would at the time see this as an opportunity to trap the British Battlecruiser squadron between Hippers battlecruisers and Scheers battleships and he duly signaled Scheer using wireless suggesting to turn to a northwesterly course. Unbeknownst to the Germans, this would aid in the British deployment of the grand fleet to the east of the German battle line.