The betrayal of the Kaiserliche Marine and the resurrection of the Reichsmarine

[Gudestein]

Chapter 1: The sinking of Beatty's battlecruiser squadron

Hipper sighted Beatty’s battlecruisers at 15:22 and turned his battlecruisers south at 15:45 before initiating fire at 15:48. Optimal conditions with an overcast cloud obscured the silhouette of Hipper’s cruisers and several hits were made with a hit that wrecked the Q turret on Lion and killing dozens of crew members including the turret commander*. 2 minutes later Indefatiguable begun taking critical hits and blew up at 16:04.The action intensified with the second battlesquadron entering range between 16:06 and 16:15, but the reversal of the odds did not save queen HMS queen Mary which blew up after salvos from Seydlitz as well as the Derfflinger at 16:26. HMS queen Mary was followed to its watery grave by HMS Lion at 16:28 when flash fire from the Q turret ignited the underneath magazine.

The loss of HMS Lion did not prevent the remaining HMS Prince Royal, HMS Tiger and New Zealand from maintaining pursuit with HMS Barham, Valiant, Warspite and Malaya not far behind. With Lion out of the picture heavy and concerted fire was raining down on on HMS Prince Royal that was in close pursuit and the result of heavy damage on the bridge meant the signals from the 2nd light scouting cruisers were not relayed onwards. The fleets continued to run south at 16:40 when HMS Prince Royal received multiple hits and was slowed by a severe and worsening list to port. The pattern repeated itself and the German battlecruisers now concentrated on the lead HMS Tiger and New Zealand. HMS Tiger blew up at 16:52, while New Zealand sailed onwards despite receiving several hits from the German BC's. It was after the explosion on HMS Tiger that the high seas fleet opened fire on the New Zealand, ripping her apart over the next 7 minutes. We might ask ourselves why no orders came forth from New Zealand which became flagship after the loss of HMS Lion, as the battlecruisers were clearly being ripped apart, but it seems evident that damage to the bridge or communication systems were part of the earlier dame received on New Zealand.
With two exploding ships between them it might be understandable that Evan-Thomas took some time realizing that what was dead ahead of him and closing awfully fast was the entire seas fleet, and it was only as he passed the smouldering and sinking parts of New Zealand approximately 8 minutes later that Evan-Thomas realized that a substantial portion of the high seas fleet was heading towards him. Should he have known? Under these conditions and in poor visibility, whith the intelligence briefing stating that Scheer's battleline was still in Wilhelmshaven***, one can perhabs appreciate that he did not turn tail, before he had an understanding of the situation. By then it was too late. The 4 ships of the 2nd battle squadron signaled to turn and initiated their turn at 1705, but with a closing speed of approximately 40 knots the Queen Elizabeth battleships entered into a knife fight with the main body of the high seas fleet while trapping destroyers and scouting cruisers between them. In the ensuing melee, the 2 of the 4 British battleships was destroyed with serious damage to the remaining two ships over the next 30 minutes, but not without dealing crippling damage to SMS Westfalen. The Markgraf and Kronprinz also took serious damage with each losing a turret and Kronprinz taking in water after a penetrating hit close to the waterline. Ultimately, Scheer stopped the pursuit as scouting forces, which had advanced to cut off the british forces, sighted the Grand fleet steaming south-east.

When the Germans disengaged at 17:35 Beatty’s battlecruiser squadron had been annihilated and both the battleships Warspite and Barham had been sunk, and with them the commander of the fifth battlesquadron Evan-Thomas. The Germans in return had to leave SMS Westfalen behind with the British in pursuit, but there was no question that the Germans had reached their objectives on this day.



*The POD, IOTL he was mortally wounded, but ordered the flooding of the magazine which IOTL saved the ship at 16.28.

** In OTL Evan Thomas saw Beatty’s battlecruiser squadron heading north between the battlesquadron at 16.48 and at 16.55 initiated their turn. With a closing speed of approximately 40 knots the difference in distance to the order to turn is about 12 km.

***An OTL mistake from room 40
Edit: serious damage added to markgraf and Kronprinz
second edit: Elaborated section of the maiming of New Zealand, absence of signals from Packingham on New Zealand and the slowness by which Evan-Thomas reacted to the situation.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 2: Who is intercepting whom?

The aftermath of the great naval victory saw both jubilation and apprehension. It was not lost upon the Germans that the British had known they were coming out to sea, but the source of the information was unknown. It could be a spy, signals intercept or a submarine. The Germans were determined for the next action to rule out any submarine interference, change the codes and expose any spies that would be relaying information to the British. In consequence, after a 30 day period of hasty repairs that could be focused on the battlecruisers, the Germans went to see again with new codes, spies around every corner and a thorough effort at submarine sweeps, which included waiting to see if submarines would surface in the wake of the departing high sea fleet.

With the losses suffered, the British scouting forces had been reorganized under Horace Hood to include the four battlecruisers HMS Australia, invincible, inflexible and indomitable in the third battlecruiser squadron whereas the 5th battlesquadron included the recently commissioned Malaya and Valiant under Arbuthnot. The Queen Elizabeth were still undergoing repairs, but Valiant was sufficiently patched up to be included in the sortie to intercept the German fleet.

Against them, they faced the intact German battlecruiser fleet, with their losses replaced and a virtually intact high seas fleet.

When the operation commenced on June 30th, originally as an anti-convey intercept plan, there were no submarine sightings, no use of uncoded signals and yet again, the battlecruisers and the grand fleet went to sea. This time, there had not been unscheduled delays and the departures were reported by submarines on station and on picket line defense. For the grand fleet, this cost the battleship HMS Ajax to a spread of three torpedoes fired at closed range, before the sinking of the offending U-43, but the grand fleet was obviously on its way to intercept. With both the battlecruiser squadrons and the grand fleet reported heading east, admiral Scheer saw an opportunity to change from a northerly to a westerly course and engage the reformed battlecruiser squad when it was isolated.

This required a radio communication to Hipper’s battlecruisers, following which both of the German fleets changed course west. The transmission was intercepted by the British, but with the new codebooks used it could not be decoded in time. Alas, this mattered little as the German battlecruiser fleet was spotted heading west shortly after by a British submarine at 11 am. Thus began a double attempt to perform a trap. The Germans of the strengthened third British battlecruiser squadron and the British of the entire High sea fleet.

The British knew the Germans were coming right at the battlecruisers and would seek to engage and hold the German fleet, while the grand fleet deployed to the rear of the high sea fleet to prevent its escape. The obvious problem in the British tactics were that the British battlecruisers had been badly mauled no less than a month earlier and needed to remain as a fighting force until the Grand fleet could engage the German fleets. The 3rd battlecruiser squadron slowed down in order to intercept the Germans further westwards whereas the Grand fleet turned to a south-easterly course at full speed.

The German forces with Hipper in command expected to engage the British battlecruiser squadron at 2 pm, but to its surprise would not receive reports of smoke until 3 pm. This was because the British had slowed down for the preceding four hours to allow the positioning of the grand fleet. The significance of the delay was not realized by the Germans at this time as Hipper’s battlecruiser approached the British fleet.

This engagement, with reasonable weather conditions was very unlike the engagement a month earlier. Hipper’s force approached the British BC’s on a southwesterly course, with the British under Hood engaging on a parallel northeasterly course. Hipper would at the time see this as an opportunity to trap the British Battlecruiser squadron between Hippers battlecruisers and Scheers battleships and he duly signaled Scheer using wireless suggesting to turn to a northwesterly course. Unbeknownst to the Germans, this would aid in the British deployment of the grand fleet to the east of the German battle line.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 3: The end of the British Battlecruisers

The battle lines of Hipper’s Battlecruisers and the battlecruisers of Hood and the two Battleships of Arbuthnot opened fire at a range of 14 km at 3.45 pm and would gradually close to 10 km as the course plotted by the two groups were not entirely parallel. A neutral observer would come to two conclusions. Armor and shell weight reigned supreme. The battlecruisers that had been the fastest to deploy would take the lead for the british with the order of Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable, HMS Australia, Malaya and Valiant whereas the Germans engaged with Derfflinger in the lead followed by Lützow, Seydlits, Moltke and von der Tann. Until the deployment were completed this meant an initital weight of fire on Derfflinger/Lützow on the German side and Invincible and Inflexible on the British side, the outcome of which clearly ended unfavorable for the British. Invincible received several penetrating hits exploding the conning tower, in the superstructure, frontally bending the front turret knocking it out, in the forecastle at the waterline and amidships likewise near the waterline. Her starboard list quickly became so pronounced she could barely return fire and she had to abandon the battle line. In this process she received further penetrating hits through the thin deck armor resulting in further flooding. Invincible would sink an hour later but she would resume fire after having completed her turn and with the additional penetrating hits preventing her capsizing. Eye witness would later claim that waves were awash over the deck before the main turrets on invincible was evacuated. The fate of Inflexible was less glamorous and she blew up after having taken several hits from the Moltke.

The Germans were however not invincible on this day and Derfflinger/Lützow would soon find their hits providing little damage to Valiant and Malaya while turrets blew up on both Derfflinger and Lutzow was ablaze on the stern. Ultimately, as the battle lines passed each other at 4.30 pm, Lützow would receive further hits knocking out two further turrets and resulting in uncontrollable fires from stern to bow and its ultimate abandonment. The central path of the battle line were Seydlitz found itself engaging both Indomitable and HMS Australia were a give and take were Seydlitz lost two main caliber turrets while HMS Australia followed the fate of so many of the British battlecruisers and ended in a cordite inferno.

As the lines departed Hipper changed his course to the North, attempting to cut off the British to the West while the British continued on their North westerly course attempting to drag the Germans towards the approaching grand fleet. In this action the Malaya and Valiant formed the rearguard and while several hits landed on the two fleets from the 4 pursuing German battlecruisers, a turret hit on Derfflinger was the most significant result until admiral Arbuthnot spotted smoke on the horizon. Arbuthnot, expecting it to be the approaching grand fleet continued full speed ahead, and would engage the High Sea Fleet battleships from 5.15 pm. Possibly Arbuthnot could see the futility of this action, but his orders were to hold the German fleets and damn if he would fail them. His remaining ships formed a new battle line and was rapidly shot to pieces with the battlecruisers to the west and the high sea fleet battleships to the east. Hood, perhaps more considerate of the safety of his ships, briefly formed up against the battlecruisers, but decided to disengage as clearly the battlesquadron was doomed and reduced to wreckage. To evade the high sea fleet battleship he turned west and directly into the path of Hippers battle cruisers. Outnumbered 4 to two, but with superior ships, this would result in one of the most ferocious and desperate infights in naval history with only a battered Malaya escaping clear of the German BC’s at 6 pm, and with the Germans losing Moltke from straight up multiple penetrating hits from Valiant, several at or near the waterline. Ultimately, what saved the day for the German battlecruiser seemed clearly to be the better control of the explosives. At a range of few kilometers, no ships on either side escaped multiple penetrating hits, but the German hits set off secondary explosions, the British did not.

Alas, while the German battlecruisers clearly beat the British and the Queen Elizabeths beat the German battlecruisers, the sacrifice was not for naught. At 5 pm the Germans were alerted by Zeppelins of several large ships approaching from the north, but inexplicably failed to transmit the signal to Scheer, and smoke was observed by the fleet at 5.30. At 5.45 the Germans had almost eaten the bait, but the trap had been successful and the German High Seas fleet had the entire Grand Fleet between it and home waters.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 4: The HSF is caught

In the early summer there were still hours remaining when the British Grand Fleet started firing at the German at extreme ranges using their bow guns. With still some range to close before effective firing range, the Germans formed a battle line before the British and recalled their scouting cruisers that were looking for the Grand fleet to the north. The German BC’s were unable to participate as they were badly battered and more than 10 miles to the west.

Scheer decided to engage the approaching British fleet with a fully formed battle line as he knew the British would need to close the distance for effective firing and causing sufficient damage before sunset. In this phase, neither party could receive penetrating hits with the exception of the newly commissioned Bayern which focused its 8 15’ guns on the older RN battleships Orion and received a penetrating hit to the barbettes of Orion which set off secondary explosions. Alas, such a mismatch in firepower and protection was rarely found in this phase of the battle and a steadily increasing and roughly equal number of hits were landed on both sides as the ranges closed from 18-19 km down to 9-10 km and the british forces turned to form the battlelines at a highly effective firing range. At this range the British could now bring double the number of guns to bear and the exchange which followed landed more than 200 hits on the Germans for roughly 110 the other way. This finally led to German battleship losses and König, Markgraf and Helgoland were each hit more than a dozen times and on these ships, cumulative damage from fires, waterline penetrations and overwhelmed damage control crews caused the ships to abandon the battle line. Helgoland for the bottom of the sea with König and Markgraf being finished off later in the battle.

The German hits on their British foes were in general less critical, but again with Bayern as the exception. Bayern scored multiple hits on Colossus, including one straight turret penetration and colussus blew up in a massive explosion at 18:55.

The German battleships then fired their onboard torpedoes before the reemerged German torpedoboats initiated an attack to allow the German battle line to extradite itself from a losing battle. Jellicoe did not follow suit immediately, but send his destroyers into the foray. At 19:30, with the distance opened up to 18 km, the British initiated their pursuit, but this time with superiority in barrels to the Germans that could only operate their stern guns. The stern chase was not what the German ships were build for as at long range and not shooting over the sides, shells could impact directly on the armored decks at a reasonable angle for penetration. At 19:44 such a hit on Thüringen reached into the magazines below and blew her up in a spectacular series of explosions. Simulaneously with these actions, the main German battle line was receiving some respite as several British battleships were focusing on the crippled König and Markgraf . König and Markgraf would however soon be ablaze from bow to stern and the british fires returned to the fleeing parts of the High sea fleet. At 20:06, crippling hits were received on Oldenburg while again, the Bayern scored critical hits on Hercules. The German hits penetrated deep amidships and set of fires, secondary explosions from the secondary batteries and caused her to sink during a half our long agony.

Despite the soon legendary performance of the Bayern, the situation was clearly unsustainable and Scheer again signaled to form a battle line leading to another fierce engagement between the two lines between 20:30 and 21:10. During this period the German torpedo boats and destroyers would regroup for another melee. In this period, the Royal navy would close to within 9-10 km and deliver a new total of more than 200 hits, this time in return for only 90 recorded German hits. The Germans lost Nassau, Kaiserin and Prinzregent Luitpold in this action and while the Germans caused significant damage on the British ships, the British had no ship losses.

Again, Scheer needed to extradite his forces and did so with an all-out torpedo boat and destroyer attack. The British had to turn, but did not do so swiftly enough, and took a hit on Revenge which caused significant damage to her propulsion.

In this phase of the battle at around 21: 30 Scheer took a courageous decision by heading north-north-east to form a new battle line, a move mirrored by the British, but this time leading to the British gunners looking directly into the sunset. At this time the German battlecruisers re-emerged on the scene to cross-the-T of the leading British battleships to the North. This move caused severe distress for the leading Royal Oak which took more than 20 hits over the next 20 minutes and ultimately blew out her sides from a penetration of a 6’ gun magazine. The British would further lose Thunderer and Centurion at the German loss of Posen and König Albert before their lead ships were ordered to turn east thereby increasing the distance for the lead British ships that had been outnumbered by the emergence of the German battlecruisers. Further down the lines, the Germans sustained heavy losses to Kaiser with only one turret remaining. Kaiser would later be sunk by torpedo attack in the night action which followed.

As the sun set at 21:58 the Germans were to the North of the British lines and ultimately made their escape by seaking another brief engagement by turning east-south east, launching another torpedo attack and then run for home.

The night actions which followed was a fierce disorganized battle, but the British would not maintain an all ahead flank pursuit with their battle line as the Germans did on their retreat. The risk of torpedo attacks was just to great.

The German battle fleet which returned home was much smaller than what it had been before, and virtually all its ships had serious damage.


Edit: Loss of Audacious changed for loss of Thunderer

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 5: The aftermath of the Great North Sea battle

Following the second inexplicable interception of a high sea fleet sortie, despite the use of new code books and no sighted submarines, the internal conclusion was clearly that a well-placed spy was at work. A thorough internal investigation at the admiralty was conducted and at the signals intelligence department. Initially, none where found although suspicious behavior of a number of individuals, ranging from engineers to admirals were noted. One thing was certain, secrecy was now all important as the High Seas fleet was in no position to encounter the Grand fleet again. As it happened, the Germans had dealt out damage as good as they took, but the Royal Navy could better afford the losses. Nevertheless, the German press would emphasize that the British BC force had been annihilated and that the high sea fleet and Grand fleet had clashed and the Germans fought bravely. While it was not as devastating for morale as could have been feared, the British were now commissioning three more Revenge class battleships and the two battlelines could no longer fight each other. The only thing that was in their favor was that only the Germans now had fast capital ships. To plan the best use of this force, Scheer and Hipper formed a minimal task force with only their most trusted staff members.

On the English side, the battle was a major boom for the signals intercept and room 40. The British had not decoded messages in time, but they had analyzed the patterns of radio traffic. The patterns of radiotraffic initially with minesweepers and submarines providing short signals (presumed “all clear signals”) followed by an unusual level of silence led to the expectations that a fleet operations was happening. As was then British practice, the Grand fleet and the battlecruisers took to the seas and the High seas fleet were only later spotted by British submarines.

Edit: High seas fleet inserted in last sentence.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 6: The birth of the capital ship raider

As in the month before, the German yards quickly focused their attention on the heavily damaged battlecruisers and on the 15th of August 5 freightships fitted with cranes and loaded with coal, ammunition and plenty of fuel sailed north through the Danish belts. On the 16th the repaired Seydlitz took to sea without any radio signals and without the departure even being known beyond a selected few in the German command. On the evening between the 17th and during the morning of the 18th,she and her accompanying cruisers, Magdeburg, Stralsund and Strassburg fell on the armed merchant cruisers of the northern patrol and sank three of them before returning. Little did the Germans, nor the British know that the main purpose of the attack was to temporarily blind the eastern part of the northern patrol.

The 5 Merchant ships sailed through and took up pre-determined position near the north polar ice sheets and one took its position in a predesignated fjord on the eastern coast of Greenland.

For a few weeks, few activities happened in the north sea, but on September 3rd, the Seydlitz, this time accompanied by Derfflinger and Von der Tann, and again her screen of 3 long range cruisers took to the sea. Again, little warning had been provided in advance, even to the German crews, and no signals revealed their departure. On the 5th, as a few weeks earlier, the Germans struck on the northern patrol, sinking two British armed merchant cruisers. The difference was that this time, unbeknownst to the British, the German battlecruisers continued north

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 7: Flash-back to July 3rd 1916.

The second and devastating battle of the North Sea had resulted in a furious Kaiser Wilhelm brought to the brink of demanding a court martial for Scheer and Tirpitz. In his view, his orders that major warships were not to be risked recklessly had clearly not been followed and the Germans had suffered a strategic defeat as the direct consequence. At this critical time, Hipper, who was starting to look like the new commander of the High Seas Fleet, had come to the rescue of Scheer. In his explanation to the Kaiser, the German Fleet had been betrayed, but had nevertheless, in superb coordination between the battlecruisers and battleships accomplished its mission, the destruction of the British Battlecruisers. The Germans now were the only ones with fast and powerful ships. Now they had for the first time, the opportunity to take the fight to the British. Hipper was able to sway the mood, and over the next several hours, the new doctrine of the German battlecruisers were formed.

With regards repairs and building of new ships, repairs on the battleships were allowed to take longer than necessary and some battleships were even used as donors for secondary guns on the German battlecruisers. Suddenly, the Hindenburg could find all the hands it needed and the Salamis would temporarily be fitted out with 3 turrets from König class battleships giving it 6 12 inch guns. The bow would be rebuilt 9 meters longer and the added space from the X turret would be used for an even more powerful machinery. The hope was that Salamis in this way could be an intermediate between a battleship and a battlecruiser with a capacity for steaming at 26 knots.

Furthermore, work on the two Mackensen class ships under construction, Mackensen and Graf Spee was re-prioritized aiming for completion of Mackensen by the end of 1917 and Graf Spee by early 1918.

In this atmosphere of intense re-construction and design efforts, coupled with anti-espionage anxiety, a German engineer, Otto Krueger, was caught carrying information on the reconstruction of Salamis. While a devastating blow, it was realized that Krueger could not have been the spy providing the crucial tactical information to the Royal Navy, and he was executed soon afterwards

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 8. Sinking of the Mauretania

Following the breakout of Hipper’s battlecruisers on the 5th of September, the Germans had the fleet units sail well east of Iceland and resupply from one of the pre-positioned freighters in a Greenlandic fjord northwest of Iceland, before sailing south through the Denmark strait on the 17th. At this time the German were playing a dangerous cat-and-mouse with the British Northern Patrol and struck at it on the 8th and on the 15thwith the battlecruiser Hindenburg and the cruisers Graudenz and Regensburg, each time sinking two armed merchant cruisers. The heavy losses led to the recalling of the AMC’s, the stationing of two British battleships as a distant screen, as well as dedicated cruisers to patrol the waters between Norway and Scotland. This was feared by the British admiralty as the Royal Navy ships following a predictable pattern were vulnerable, but unbeknownst to the British, the German submarines had been stationed as scouts on the western approaches.

The Germans also suffered setbacks and the newly commissioned Hindenburg were struck by 2 torpedoes from a British submarine patrolling off the German coast. Hindenburg had to undergo repairs for 6 months and aid the price for inconsistent screening by the German forces in the face of operational radio silence.

Then, from the 18th the crisis of the northern patrol became the Atlantic crisis. First on the 18th, 2 merchant ships, a tanker and a grain transport failed to report in, and on the 19th another ships was lost and a distress signal was send from the cruiser Mauretania. Mauretania tried to outrun her opponents, the Seydlitz and the cruiser Magdeburg (the Germans had split up in three battlecruiser/light cruiser pairs), but in vain, and she received three deeply penetrating long-range hits during the ensuing stern. The two first had resulted in flowing and creaks in the riveted hull, while the last hit blew out her bottom and disabled the pumps. Mauretania would sink 30 mins later, only capable of sending off 1100 of her 3500 Canadian troops.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 9: Cat and mouse in a big sea

The sinking of the Mauretania and the knowledge that a German task force was lose in the Atlantic shook the British admiralty to the core. With resources diverted to the northern patrol and 3 strong capital ship task forces lose in the Atlantic, forces which the British could never catch in a chase, was an almost unsolvable problem. What was more, the German submarines were out in force, serving as scouts to multiply the efficacy of the raiders. The next three weeks would see the loss of over 25 ships before countermeasures would come into effect.

This period was not entirely without British successes as room 40 managed to break the codes used between the submarine scouts and the raiders, but it was hard to act on this intelligence in a direct manner without the Germans learning about the signals breach. The chosen British solution would be massive convoys guarded by multiple battleships, a strategy which caused logistical difficulties as damaging for the British merchant transport as the sinking were. That aside, the admiralty had initially a strong expectation that the crisis could only last a one-two weeks, before the Germans would need to return home to resupply. When the Germans entered the third week of raiding, the British realized that they must have resupplied at sea, and by the end of the third week they got the breakthrough they waited for. The correspondence between Seydlitz and a freightship which gave its position in a Fjord 150 km south of Isortoq on the east coast of Greenland.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 10: The Battle of Greenland

The end of September would provide an interim high point for the commercial war in the Atlantic. It saw two convoys attacked by submarines and sinking 7 merchant ships, but more dramatically, the British admiralty decided to act on the intercepted intelligence*. The British correctly deduced that a resupply set-up must have been established, and decided to try an intercept the German supply-ships and ideally also the BC’s.

The British detached Conqueror, Monarch and Neptune from convoy escort duty together with 8 cruisers. On the 30th of September their scouts spotted the German Ships of the Greenlandic coast in the channel separating the mainland from a larger island**. The British managed to make good their escape under gunfire. When the British returned with the battleships in the afternoon, the Germans were feverishly trying to build up steam starting from a cold iron cycle in some of their boilers. The stern chase engagement that followed was anything but fast, with the Germans initially moving north at 10 knots, making smoke and firing torpedoes from their light cruiser escorts. These efforts prolonged the closing of the gap, but as dusk approached the distance closed to 15 km and hits started to be gained on either side. The most significant of these were on the Derfflinger which had a shell penetrating the stern and exploding in close proximity to the center shaft. The hit knocked out the shaft and caused vibrations and flooding, and let to a distress signal from the Derfflinger. Upon receiving this signal, Von Der Tann and Seydlitz turned to fire broadsides while waiting for damage reports, while the British still maintained their stern chase – conscious of the need to close the gap before darkness would set in. At 21 knots the distance closed to less than 10 km’s in about 10 mins and during this period the Germans landed 9 hits on the british ships in return for 6 hits on the, 4 of these on the crippled Derfflinger. The later events have let Historians to debate the outcome of this battle, many believing the Germans could have won it, but what happened was that Derfflinger signaled that the damage was severe, and the captain intended to fight the British while allowing the remaining ships to escape. At this time the distance had closed sufficiently to allow lucky penetrating hits on the turrets (11 inch) and Barbettes (4-10 inch) of the British ships. Records would show that this happened tree times during the final 30 mins of the engagement with Von Der Tann scoring a penetrating hit on Conqueror which failed to ignite the magazine below and Derfflinger scoring two hits on Neptune, the last triggering a massive explosion. Alas, at this time Derfflinger had been hit more than 20 times, were engulfed in massive fires, and achieved it mortal blow on Neptune with its last remaining large caliber turret while the remaining battlecruisers and escorts made their escape to the North.

The tally of the engagement ended as a battleship for a battlecruiser and a collier.



*This is very different from what they would have done in WW2, but as I understand it, the room 40 intercepts were not considered as crucial as they should have been by the British admiralty. Many not too keen on wireless communication to begin with.

**sorry. Google maps doesn’t provide the island names. Search Greenland on google maps and zoom in until you find Isortoq, then 150 km to the south-west there is an approximately 50 km island hugging the coast. The Germans chose this location to load supplies in calm water while not become bottled up in a Fjord.

Edit: Thunderer for Conqueror, Lützow for Von der Tann

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 11: Convoy rampage and the end of Seydlitz

The battle of Greenland left Germany knowing with absolute certainty that their signals were being intercepted and read, a knowledge which would have profound strategic consequences. There were also more immediate consequences as the German ships now faced opportunities and challenges.

Seydlitz and the cruisers Stralsund and Strassburg had filled up their coal stores, but Van der Tann had not and without a safe mean of communication with the prepositioned and hiding Colliers, it was decided she would have to return home with the light cruiser Magdeburg and Admiral Hipper in overall command. Seydlitz with its captain Moritz von Egidy and the cruisers Stralsund and Strassburg would make a large circle outrunning their pursuants and go for a single week of convoy hunting. This proved astonishingly successful and Magdeburg scouting ahead located a large 45 ship convoy escorted by 5 destroyers on the 5th of October. Indeed, this convoy would have been escorted by Conqueror and 4 cruisers if not for the battle of Greenland. The Convoy would immediately start to scatter while the destroyers attacked, but with Seydlitz emerging on the scene, the destroyer’s options quickly diminished and three were crippled and sunk before the attack was aborted. Seydlitz and the two cruisers would now go on a 24 hour rampage sinking 24 merchant ships that had failed to distance themselves sufficiently. With that, Conqueror emrged over the horizon on the 6th of October and Moritz von Egidy decided to again outflank the British heading for the North before turning east. When out of sight, Seydlitz turned east for home.

The return voyage of Van der Tann and Seydlitz would not go easy however. Afraid to rely on wireless communication first Van der Tann fell on the Northern patrol, this sinking a British cruiser. However, this would spell the doom of Seydlitz as 8 battleships of the the Grand fleet including the fast remaining Queen Elizabeth class ships departed to protect the Northern patrol, inadvertently reinforcing it just before Seydlitz planned a similar run through the blockade.

After having been spotted by destroyer scouts, Seydlitz encountered Malaya and Valiant at a relatively close range. She delt damage to Malaya, but she quickly received multiple hits which degraded her fighting capability and slowed her down. Ultimately, after a 4 hour chase, she received penetrating hits in her boiler rooms, and could no longer hope to escape. She turned and faced the British with still working forward guns, and while she managed a further 3 hits, including one destroying the bridge on Valiant, she was plastered with dozens of 15 inch shells and slowly sank beneath the waves.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 12: The aftermath of the loss of the Iron Dog

The impact of the short period with surface raiders in the Atlantic had been dramatic and the need to maintain large convoys had alone meant a dramatic reduction in the quantity of British war material and resources that reached the isles. Added to this came the not insignificant actual sinkings and the impact the tales of the valiant naval battles had on the populace. Militarily, the conclusion was however not so clear. In many ways the tactic of using fast and powerfull raiders woth cruiser scouts had been working, but the breach of German radio security had cost the Iron Dog in the battle of Greenland and the inability to coordinate the return of Seydlitz and Van der Tann had been the likely cause of the sinking of Seydlitz. Now, only Van der Tann remained of the pre-war BC’s and with Hindenburg undergoing repairs there would be no large surface operations until March 1917.

In hindsight, the sinking of Derfflinger and Van der Tann due to radio intercepts might have caused Germany the war. Thus, unable to interdict British shipping effectively under the “cruiser rules”, the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, and action thet let to American involvement in the war. Had Seydlitz and Derfflinger been available, this decision might not have been taken.

The effects on the German admiralty was also profound. A feeling of being on the path to victory, but losing due to betrayal was a dominating emotion. That being said, this was emotion talking, and no-one really knew if betrayal was the cause or if the British were simply better at breaking codes than the Germans were at making them.

As it happened, the Germans made a subgroup within the Reichsmarine dedicated to develop entire new coding system for the surface raiders and separate systems for talking between U-boats and BC’s.

In the mean time it was also decided that the feeling of betrayal would be better for the morale and the fighting spirit of the German people, than the feeling of incompetence. With this in mind, provided that the next raid would be successful, a now believed to be deceased Jewish radio operator aboard the Seydlitz would be framed for the previous security breaches.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 13: The first happy time

In March 1917 2 parties of three German cruisers, the SMS Pillau, Frankfurt and Königsberg as well as Karlsruhe, Nürnberg and Emden once again fell upon the Northern patrol, in this case sinking two British cruisers before falling back against opposing battleships. Three German Colliers used the confusion to escape north, although one was apprehended and scuttled by the crew. Then once again on the 1st of April the raiders went North and this time they were undetected. Van der Tann and Hindenburg were the flagships and Königsberg, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg, Emden (all 8x15 cm guns), Magdeburg, Stralsund and Stralsburg (10x10.5 cm guns) as escorts and scouts. The ships passed through the Denmark Strait on the 10th of April and immediately created Havoc, even as the British were once again assembling their shipping into large convoys. The raiders split up in two task forces that were not far apart and they sunk 200000 tons of shipping for the reminder of April. In May, things become more dangerous because the convoys had formed and the US were contributing their sizeable fleet to the battles. On one occasion, the task forces left a convoy alone which were escorted by 3 British battleships, but directed U-boats to is position which sank 11 ships in the first factual if uncoordinated wolf-pack attack.

On another occasion, when an exceptionally large convoy was encountered sceened by 8 destroyers, 3 cruisers and the battleships Florida and Alabama (pre-dreadnought) it was decided to engage. The engagement would turn out to be a pivotal learning experience, if not bloody for both sides. The Germans dispatched the cruisers Magdeburg, Stralsund and Stralsburg (10x10.5 cm guns) to outflank the convoy and prevent the escape of scattering ships and then attacked in the late morning with the sun in their rear on a northern course with a North easterly angle to the American battleships. With optimal shooting conditions it was exploited that Hindenburg had been modified for increased range and could start shooting at 18 km’s of range and Van der Tann had been made capable of shooting at 20 km’s of range. Florida could in principle fire at the same range, and did so, but did not have equivalent range finding equipment. Consequently, a few salvo’s after the battle commenced, shells from first Van der Tann and then Hindenburg straddled US Florida. Not long after, a shell from Hindenburg, fired close to the maximum range penetrated the armored deck on Florida and entered the port side engine room. Splinter damage and vibration caused a flooding, a pronounced list and loss of electrical power for the starboard pumps. This penetrating hit and the ensuing list to starboard, was penetrating at the edge of what was possible even with the thin 45 mm armor, but it subsequently exposed the deck of Florida at an even more favorable angle for penetrating hits. Seven more hits were scored on Florida as the range closed to 14 km including 3 more deck penetrating hits hitting the boiler rooms, the steering equipment aft and close to the B turret jamming it. USS Florida was now clearly sinking and the Germans turned attention to Alabama. This might have been a minute too soon, as Florida next manage a hit on Van der Tann directly into the bridge, killing the captain and most officers on deck with splinter damage. That aside, the Germans wasted no time closing the range and sinking the Alabama, but took two large caliber hits in return, and they send in the cruisers to dispatch the smaller escorts.

After a whole day of fighting and hunting of fleeing merchants, the scale of the disaster could be estimated. The US had lost two battleships (one pre-dreadnought), 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and 36 merchant of a total of ~50000 tons of warships and 175000 tons of merchant shipping. The Germans had lost Karlsruhe to a torpedo hit, and Van der Tann had lost most of its officers. Two preserve the fighting capability of the squadron, the German task force returned for home waters and would not be able to sortie before June of 1917.

Adding in the submarine campaign, the British suffered a disasterous loss of 1060000 tons of Merchant shipping in April and 775000 tons in May of 2017. However, the outcome, even off massive successes, highlighted the German problems with sustaining a surface raider campaign.

Edit:1917 for 2017.
Heavy deleted in heavy cruiser.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 14: North Atlantic raids in the summer of 1917.

The spectacular raids of the battlecruisers in the spring of 1917 would have profound repercussions in the distant future as it effected German strategy and ship design, and it was an enormous embarrassment to the Royal Navy and the US Navy that their combined might could not handle two German ships and their escorts.

However, despite the embarrassment, the effects were small compared to the profoundly successful submarine campaign, and while whinning, SMS Van der Tann now needed repairs and new officers to familiarize with the ship. Consequently, she would not go on a sortie again before the 10th of June 1917. Working conditions for the Battlecruiser squadron had then deteriorated with the influx of many American battleships and the full implementation of large convoys. This does not mean the battlecruisers were not effective as the need to assemble very large convoys that had to be escorted by at least 2 dreadnoughts, by itself diminished anglo-american shipping capacity. The raid in June lasted a total of thirty days, in large part a consequence of the poor range of Van der Tann (she was left behind for a period of 10 days), and did not result in spectacular battles. 3 lonely merchant ships were sunk and for a period two convoys were shadowed by the battlecruisers while they could vector in submarines. The submarines managed to bag 150000 tons of merchant shipping which was something, but not a war winning effect. The pattern repeated itself in August, except at this time only with 90000 tons of shipping sunk by the submarines.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 14: North Atlantic raids in the Autumn of 1917.

The August raids were repeated in late September when the battle cruisers put to sea, but this time the context would become gloomier. Submarine losses were climbing and submarine inflicted losses were declining and absent a stronger contribution by the surface raiders, the war of the Atlantic were tilting towards an Entente victory. More risk-taking and more commerce sinking were required and the Reichsmarine would do its part. Tactics were rehearsed for how to proceed against heavily defended convoys and on the 3rd of October the battlecruiser group fell upon a large convoy defended by two British battleships (HMS Resolution, HMS Audacious), the composition of which had been wrongly relayed by submarine wireless as including only one battleship. The moment chosen were at a time of very poor visibility and with darkness setting in and the tactics were to move in aggressively with close guards around the battlecruisers to prevent torpedo attacks.

The results were dramatic, and they were bloody. Two destroyers and a British cruiser were quickly dispatched when the convoy perimeter was breached and the 6 German cruiser started to pick up on the merchant shipping. Without visibility across the length and width of the convoy counterattacks were poorly coordinated and information flow was hard. The Germans on the other hand used simple codes and communicated freely on wireless, believing their codes to be breakable anyway. Panic ensued among the merchant captains and the convoy started to scatter.

Confusion aside which played heavily into the German hands, there was no escaping the underlying disparity in firepower, and the first German loss was Königsberg, disintegrating and sinking from multiple 15’’ inch hits from Resolution. Karlsruhe did however manage to explain the situation and many believe that this should have been the time to call of the attack, but that did not happen. Instead, Van Der Tann, Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg moved directly in the direction of the Königsberg/Resolution shoot-out, soon leading to a knife fight between Van der Tann and resolution with Resolution being plastered with 6 and 4 inch shells in addition to the shells from Van der Tann. The fire control and situation awareness degraded aboard Resolution, but nothing the Germans could throw at it, except the heavy guns on Van der Tann had any effect on the main turrets. At this range of a few kilometers, both Van der Tann and Resolution saw their hits penetrating within their opponents armored shield, and on this instance, the British battleships did the most of the damage. While Resolution lost the B turret to a penetrating hit on the top of the Barbette, Van der Tann quickly lost it’s a turret and for the second consecutive sortie, had the bridge wiped out by a direct hit. Van der Tann accordingly did not maneuver after the initial mayhem due to the ensuing confusion and saw further hits to the bow, lost several casemate guns and soon the second forward main turret. Van der Tann’s moves directly on collision course with Resolution which had to break off shortly before Van der Tann’s officer in the aft conning tower assumed control.

Bereft of many secondary guns and under a heavy barrage from the German cruisers, and without destroyer screens as they had simply failed to locate the battle zone, Resolution was not powerless to prevent the torpedo attacks which ensued from Emden and Nürnberg. At a range off about 1000 m’s, all 4 fired torpedoes found their mark and inflicted catastrophic damage on resolution. Resolution would sink no more than 10 minutes later, but before additional 15’’ hits had taken out the aft conning tower on Van der Tann and one of the aft main gun turrets (1 remainng). Waterline hits were also causing a list on van der Tann and as she finally broke off the engagement, her speed had been reduced to 18 knots and she was a floating wreck with no fire-control systems in place except for local control of the few guns remaining.

The maiming of Van der Tann was not the end of it as Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg soon were infighting with destroyers of which the british lost one and received a torpedo hit on Nürnberg. Nürnberg got of lightly and suffered flooding at the stern which were ultimately controlled allowing it to limp away with 16 knots.

At the other end of the convoy, Hindenburg briefly engaged HMS Audacious, but the attack was broken off after torpedoes were fired from the German cruisers, and Audacious had to turn and then quickly follow in pursuit to chase the aggressors away from the convoy.

Tactically, the engagement was a German win and the British lost a battleship and 10 merchant ships were lost, but strategically it was a British win as Van der Tann was a goner. After the attack had been broken off, Van der Tann and Nürnberg were dispatched to try and make it home, but this was not to be. They were later discovered by British cruisers of the Northern patrol and sunk by HMS Valiant. Valiant had been dispatched to the Northern patrol, exactly for this eventuality.

After the first dramatic engagement, which was indeed a huge morale boost and prestige win for the Reichmarine, Hindenburg continued its mission with more cautious tactics.

A second convoy was located, but only shadowed to call in submarines with 50000 tons of merchant ships sunk as a result.

Again, the surface fleet had acted with valour, but failed to inflict a strategically important wound to the entente. The surface fleet would not venture out again before in January, this time with Mackensen replacing Van der Tann.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 15: The era of the fast battleship, January 1918.

When Mackensen and Hindenburg went to see together with escorts from Emden, Nürnberg, Stralsund and Strassburg it was the sortie of what was later considered the worlds first fast battleship, the Mackensen. Times were again desperate and an all out effort had been planned. Mackensen had also been crewed by veterans from the largely inactive battlefleet, and two colliers had been sent out, this time equipped with a carefully maintained position pattern known only to the Germans. The colliers were to be approached without radio signals.

Baden and Bayern sortied together with the BC’s to inflight losses on the Northern Patrol in a concerted effort while the battlecruisers again escaped north. Baden and Bayern managed to make their escape south guide by Zeppelin intelligence and once again, a raiding group was lose on the atlantic.

The group managed to attack a supply convoy only escorted by the two vintage battleships USS Missouri and USS Maine, and the two battle cruisers managed to fall upon them one by one, once again using the daring cutthroat tactics. The USS Maine was rapidly dispatched by multiple hits, whereas a prolonged confusion phase ensued were smoke screens and destroyers tried to hold off the Germans while the convoy scattered. Ultimately, the heavier armed Germans sunk another cruiser and two destroyers before battle ensued between USS Missouri and the two German BC’s. The fate of Missouri was similar and while she was well armored, it was 16 large caliber guns vs. 4 and it was veterans vs. Newbies. The German cruisers then spent the remainder of the day hunting merchantmen and succeeded in sinking 125000 tons worth of merchant shipment and 24 ships.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 16: The era of the fast battleship, February 1918.

The German task force containing two of the most modern battlecruisers was loose on the Atlantic, and this was at a time when a considerable strain had been put on the shipping capacity, necessitated by the transfer of American troops to Europe. On the 5th of February, the German task force sighted such a convoy and initially shadowed it. It was escorted by two American dreadnoughts, USS Texas and USS Nevada which were deemed as to strong foes for a direct long-range shooting contest.

For the American escorts, this surely spelt submarine battles, but he Germans would not be content with such an outcome. The Germans circled the convoy during the night and while it was still dark in the morning of the 6th, the Germans fell upon the convoy from the east. The battlecruisers and cruisers had a field smashing through the destroyer screen and started the maiming of hapless troop transports. Eventually Mackensen came into direct firing range of the USS Nevada at a little over 3 km’s of distance, but it was Nevada that was lit up by burning merchant ships. Initially, this fared well for the Germans aboard Mackensen, but when secondary guns struck the German ship and started fires, the American fire became more accurate. In a brief engagement, Nevada struck Mackensen two time, but only dismantled a secondary shell, while Mackensen had a shot which penetrated the A turret, this time without setting off secondary explosions before withdrawing under smoke cover. A similar engagement happened between USS Texas and Hindenburg, although with a more seriously battered Hindenburg that lost 37 crewmembers in a series of explosions on the superstructure. That aside, the attack had done its job and 10 merchantmen of 45000 tons and carrying 8000 American troops had been sunk. The convoy had also been scattered and and German submarines were homing in to inflict a further loss of 7 ships, 30000 tons and 6000 American troops.

For the Germans this was again a win, but an insufficient win. Fuel shortages meant that only limited raiding time was possible and the task force returned a week later without having discovered any more convoys.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 17: The spring effort.

After refits and the commissioning of Graf Spee, the Germans could send out 3 modern battlecruisers with 4 cruisers as escorts in an all-out effort to interrupt Atlantic shipments. The attempt was made on March 10th and this time the Germans came into infights with the northern patrol battleship Bellerophon. This did not go well for Bellephoron as the Germans were faster, better armed with 24 large caliber guns against 10 and as well armored despite being classified as Battlecruisers. Bellepheron was sunk, but managed to inflict damage to Hindenburg impeding its fire control. Consequently, the action meant that the Atlantic raid would take place without Hindenburg.

Once lose in the Atlantic, the cruisers were sent out as screens whereas the battlecruisers stayed together. On the 23rd of March, they encountered their first convoy and inflicted losses of 12 merchants and indirectly 7 more which were sunk by submarines, and on the 29th a lightly defended returning convoy was attacked with the loss of 17 merchant ships.

April 10th saw a further battle which included infighting between USS Pennsylvania and Graf Spee, and which left Graf Spee seriously damaged with penetrating hits on the bridge and with a turret knocked out of action. Again, troop ships were sunk with the loss of 9 ships and 10000 soldiers, but the German battlecruisers now had to withdraw, damaged and low on fuel.

As the Germans were in a desperate situation, Hindenburg was end out alone in late April while the Mackensen and Graf Spee returned, but she did not inflict serious damage except for the shadowing of a convoy which allowed it to be located by submarines that sank 11 ships.

The spring effort, possible saw a second high-point in the German Atlantic warfare and had an important knock-on effect in German mythology with the Germans seeing the Navy as supporting the efforts of the land forces. That aside, the land force offensive still petered out, primarily due to a lack of strategic focus and the exhaustion of supply lines.

The German battlecruisers would not sortie again until August as repairs needed to be made on Graf Spee.

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 18: The time of trouble

In August, things were looking dire on the land and only a win in the Atlantic could save the German effort. The Germans sortied in strength, but the fortitude that had been following previous raids were not with them this time.

A minefield was supposed to have a channel cleared for the exit, but due to engine troubles on a minesweeper, this work was not completed in time. The German emphasis on radio silence was explicit, but in the early morning haze, the flag signals telling the German task force that the work was incomplete was not received. Mackensen consequently struck a mine and so did the cruiser Stralsund. Mackensen suffered propulsion damage and Stralsund was sunk. The sortie was aborted and a new sortie was initiated two weeks later without Mackensen, at which time a radio signal was relayed to inform the Germans that the field had been cleared. Fate or bad luck now played its part and the German squadron sailed directly over a British submarine. The Submarine put 3 torpedoes into the side of Hindenburg which was heavily crippled and had to be towed back. The British submarine made its escape and its captain would be hailed as a war hero in Britain.

The German admiralty could not escape the feeling of disbelief at the stroke of bad luck they had suffered. Again, an emphasis was placed on the radio signal as the culprit, and again, without a real culprit to blame, a Jewish radio operator, this time in Wilhelmshaven who had relayed the signal that a channel was clear was accused of having leaked the German codes. The officers from the Preußische Geheimpolizei knew that the charges were fabricated, but it was felt that a scapegoat was preferable to internal German communication mishap. The picture painted in the popular media was that foreign Jewish spy’s had intervened, by leaks and sabotage (on the minesweeper), just as the heroic navy was ready to turn the tide of the war. This did not bode well for Jewish people employed in the armed forces or general public trust in Jewish people as fellow Germans, but the scam also had the effect of maintaining the prestige and popular support for the German regime and marine. With a few exceptions, even the German admiralty did not know any better and many were convinced that the navy could have contributed to victory, if not for the lack of signals intelligence and the actions of foreign spies.

This set of beliefs would have profound influence on the interwar years during which Germany would always prepare for round two and the eventual resurrection of the Reichsmarine in strength.

For the immediate practical considerations, the limited success of the previous solo raid by Hindenburg alone meant that no new sorties would be made until repairs had been made on Hindenburg and Mackensen. At this time, Germany was losing the war.

 

[Gudestein]

ATTENTION, COMPLETELY NEW CHAPTER: This chapter is entirely the work by NoMommsen and only edited for clarity and style. If any content errors occurred in this project I apologize in advance.
I did also insert the mentioning of the scuttling of battleships in Scapa Flow

Chapter 19 a : Last sortie of the Kaiserliche Marine (October)

When news of armistice negotiations reached the admirality and Scheer's objections about recalling the U-boats were ignored it did nothing to shatter the resolve of the Kaiserliche Marine. The next day he ordered Hipper to set up a 'last attack' plan for what was left of the HSF, still a considerable force [1]. Aside from the Graf Spee [2], (Mackensens were having replacement of screws and shafts) [3] there were the mainly iddle battleships :
the mighty Bayern and Baden, the still modern Großer Kürfürst, Friedrich der Große, Kronprinz, Oldenburg, Ostfriesland, Helgoland, Rheinland, Westfalen and Nassau together with 5 cruisers


As the rumors from the negotiations went : all this was to be surrendered by the brush of a feather ?

Scheer approved Hippers plan only a couple of days later, ordering the first submarines back into the North-Sea on reconnaisance duty [4]. Only the oldest of cruisers and the Braunschweig pre-Dreadnaughts were to be left behind for the most necessary guarding duties. Staff and bridge officers tried to clandestinly prepare the fleet for an 'exercise' [5]. But ... may it be by some inattentive young officers blustering of their future fame too loud or some veteran Deckoffizier (similar to Warrant Officer) just guestimated correctly, while the Fleet conveined on Schillig Roads rumors of a 'last attack for honor' spread within Wilhelmshaven crossing with rumors of the comming of the armistice - finally - and long awaited.
Generally a rather good 'mood' prevailed in the marine garrisons due to the former glorious successes - despite the last fail caused by infamous betrayel as propaganda went [6]. However, laying iddle didn't helped much to quell the raising envy of the battleship crews [7] against their battlecruiser counterparts; and the food situation of the sailors families did much to fuel the flames of discontent. This, coupled with the ever younger 'freshmen' officers lack of experience, if not to say incompetence in leading men, made insubordinations unavoidable.

Until then tension hadn't raised too much above 'normal', but on night of 29th October, the day before the Fleet should sail, all the above met with the general war weariness and the rumor of the 'honorable sacrifice' at the last moment. Unrest in Wilhelmshaven raised, quarrels with from home returning sailors, pub-brawls began and spread and to the dismay of the Marine, quite some effort of many civil police personnel was necessary to keep the lid on the cattle. Alas, Hipper had to cancel the sailing [10], originally only for the day, but events all over Germany took another direction all together.

Chapter 19 b : Revolution (November)

Nothing seems faster than rumor. Though the unrest at Wilhelmshaven was rather quickly quelled some its story was passed on to relatives, other sailors elsewhere, politicians of the radicals (USPD) with connections to sailors. And on its travel the story grew, inflated, took on enough momentum to cause a mutiny at Kiel [1], mainly between the minesweeper crews. News spread further now and also dock and yard workers in Hamburg and Bremen 'joined' the unrest. In this an unholy alliance was formed and the mutinees were supported in their undertakings by revolutionary forces.
In a weeks time supported mainly by workers and soldiers revolution had come over Germany. But curiously when Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the German republic the coastal towns had now quieted. It might have been symptomatic, that the attempt to form a 'revolutionary sailors ans soldiers counsel' in Wilhelmshaven failed due to lack of sailors support and the attempts had to be repeated with much more 'worker' or USPD support than soldiers in Hamburg. Most of the forming local 'sailors and soldiers' councels on the coast were more concerned in keeping law and order than whatever social experiments like 'grassroot leadership'. Quite some numbers of sailors that went to Berlin driven by the moment later returned rather quickly and a wee bit ashamed having violated the still existing l'esprit du corps, leaving only the most radical 'mariners' to keep on going with revolution.

The admirality - the Seekriegsleitung was dissolved almost immediatly after the signing of the armistice - with Scheer and Hipper at the helm and the still existing Imperial Naval Office in Berlin, headed by Ritter von Mann in close relation Scheer were able to keep control of almost all of the remaining navy, aside a few minesweeper crews maybe and that only temporarily. With a lot of persuasion Admiral von Reuter was compelled to take on the probably most bitter task and duty any Navy Officer in history had ever to fulfill - the surrender of the German fleet.

Already before the last german ship entered Scapa Flow the quarreling and bickering between the victors began who should get which ship. At first it seemed rather easy : the US and Britain each gets one of the newest Battlecruisers and Battleships - Graf Spee and Mackensen, respectivly Bayern and Baden. But ... France and Italy didn't really showed the necessary 'respect' for this 'splendid' decision of the anglo-americans. In the end, neither of this was to come to pass. The German marines scuttled every one of the interned battleships and battlecruisers.


Chapter 19 c : Into the dark (November to January)

After the armistice was signed the writing-on-the-wall had been read clearly by the admiralty. The war was lost and all that mattered now was how to get revenge and restore the German honour. Quickly, before politicians and revolutionaries could act or interfere - having still loyal 'true mariners' within the different revolutionary counsels did help a lot - and with the help of the Allgemeine Marinedepartment administration of all the depots, stores and aquisitions, (including contracting yards and any kind of equipment) of the Naval Office were transferred to a newly formed string of holding companies by the Navy. In this endeavor, a young KorvettenKapitän (Lieutenant Commander) with the 'right' family connections owned himself quite some merits.

One of the holding companies started building up a controlling share in North-German Loyd’s shipping, one in the upcoming Danish shipping company Maersk as well as several other companies in the neutral countries around germany. One of the first actions of Maersk was to purchase the Giant diesel engine that had been slated for the successor of the Mackensen’s, in order to have it running in a merchant ship by early 1919. In turn, one of the first actions of Loyd’s was the employment of 2/3’s of the ship designers and engineers from the Construction-Department of the Reichsmarineamt as well as from the Imperial Yards (in this decision some of the less performing and elderly members had been omitted).
Between a number of smaller companies whatever could be salvaged from the unfinished shipbuildings, esp. of the cruisers and Torpedoboat was - officially - sold to some 'scrap'-metal traders or similar and secretly stored also quite some already launched shipshulls were sold to danish, swedish and norwegian suddenly popping up shipping companies. What looked at first as a big sell-out was furst an foremost a buy-out, out of govermental and with it the victors control.

While the terms of the armistice might shatter the beliefs of the German populace, the officers and officials of the Admirality and the Reichsmarineamt acted with determination : Yes, terms were harsh, but the objective was clear. The Marine had to be ready for round 2 in 20 years or more. This realization meant that a lot of the salvaged ships and infrastructure, that had limited role in this timeframe was sold off to other countries around the world. One might think the government would have gone after young Lohman, but the goverment would be rather pleased, when a year and a half later it was offered at least a share - no need to tell them everthing - of the profits the Allgemeine Marinedepartment and its later so-called 'Seetransportabteilung' under young Lohmann. The rest of the proceeds were carefully guarded and reinvested and would in turn form an unofficial investment fund of the new Marine.

Chapter 19 d : Through the dark (January to March)

Aside from these material questions organisational problems came to the fore by the political drama that was played at the revolutionary circus Berlin that was in early 1919. While the army was almost in free fall desintegration the navy was in a much better shape with Scheer and Hipper, recommended Heroes, able to muster even most of the file and rank of the navy behind them. However this reputation also somewhat backfired as the 'professional' revolutionaries envied him, defying their attempts to get their hands on naval affair.
When in march the army got somewhat reconstituted by law but also changed in its structures, politicians attempted the same for the navy and especially to get rid of Scheer and Hipper. It wasn't helpful for them either, that the british and americans were craving for their heads on the silver plate or 'war criminal'. Politicians were aimed at mergeing and thereby greatly reducing the Admirality and Naval Office. If only to spare their salaries.
But the german navy, its possible future size and structure were also topics of the negotiations at Versailles ... as well as its gossip factories. The germans weren't invited to officially participate but most of the politicians - rather anti-naval - were prepared to completely skip any navy at all aside some kind of civil coast guard police force for concessions elsewhere - a thought unbearable for Scheer and Hipper.

The navy was adamantly fighting against the revoloutionaries, and there was at least one brighter spot that could be exploited. This would be decisive :
The President of this new, republican germany that still had to find its constitution was a commiting navy-fan as a true child of imperial germany. That helped a lot. First in guaranteeing, that the new navy Leadership (Marineleitung) would be independant from such ungovermental bodies as the 'Council of the 53' or other revolutionary institutions. Second he let Scheer and Hipper almost a free hand in determining the highranking personnel. Later the firm opposition of the navy high command would serve them well as the revolutionary councils fell from grace, and it helped to remove the stain from the mutinies. Thus, in the folklore of the 20’s and 30’s, the Navy high command would stand out as those who had fought with courage, valor and tenacity to preserve Germany and its honor. This was a status the navy would use to its advantage in the decades to come.

In selecting the future core of the naval command, some distinguished people nevertheless had to be omitted. The brave Ernst Ritter von Mann had tried to act as a last State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office and as solicitous he had done his work as Inspecting Admiral for Torpedowarfare and later the Submarine-Office, mainly the latter made him a persona non grata in especially the public abroad. He also lacked some chief executives qualities needed for rebuilding a navy.
In the end the nominally Vice-Admiral, then promoted to Admiral Friedrich Boedicker, meritorious subcommander of the Reconnaisance-Forces, was selected to deputize Scheer, and at occasions took the head of the Admirality, later Marineleitung. In that position he continued to 'deputize' Scheer, counselling and keeping him informed as he wished. He was even granted his own office at the Reichpietschufer - unofficially of course as officially he had (to) quit the navy.
Chief of the Central Department - M - later staff of the chief of the Marineleitung became then Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) William Michelis who had already organized so well the sell-buy-out-hiding operations so far – an activity he continued with the assistence of Walter Lohmann and his newly fromed Sea-Transport-Department. Michaelis concentrated more on keeping from public eyes what the Scheer-circle came up with than the politics abroad and at home as well as economic reality. Chief of personnel-department became von Trotha after the former Naval Cabinet of the Kaiser was officially dissolved with some young Frigate Captain as his right hand : Erich Raeder. Another in later times important personnel decision was to make Admiral Paul Behnke part of the Marine-Kommando-Amt, amomg other tasks responsible for doctrine and education.

EDIT no 2: The numbers in brackets refers to the reference numbers in the subchapters of chapter 19 written by NoMommsen