Right, plus the MG and possibly some 7.7 ammo. One bonus point that has not been talked about is that the hull gunner/radio operator in the hull can also assist with transfering ammo from the hull bins to the turret. The driver's position on the left is probably also more comfortable now.
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
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And the weight of the extra machine gun and its ammunition. We can still assume that these tanks are NOT going to be Matilda's in terms of protection but rather more akin to the Cruisers we saw in service at least in terms of protection. So hopefully proof against 20mm AP and resistant to 37mm AP. If they're armed with the 2lb gun its a perfectly capable weapon against the Panzer III and IV as well as the Stug and if there's a 75mm armed CS tank with them, operating as a group then they should be able to get AT guns too.
I also think that the logistics savings of the infantry, RA and tanks having the same gun had something to do with it.
Well I kind of assumed that the weight of the machine gun was counted as part of the weight of the turrets that got dropped. But yeah, jumping the armour thickness on the front from 15mm to .75" (~19mm) doesn't seem like it should add that much weight. OTOH, less weight means the engine is less strained, so that probably means the thing can go faster than the multi-turreted A9, and cross rough terrain a bit better.
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When considering the 3.7 inch mountain howitzer as used in the CS version of British Tanks at the time, it is actually quite a useful weapon firing a decent HE round out to any range a tank could be expected to use direct fire at. Unfortunately the doctrine of the British Army at the time simply was unable to exploit this weapon. A Hull down CS, chucking 20lb HE and shrapnel shells at antitank guns in the desert battles of 1941/2 might have made a real difference.
Mark1878
Donor
Sorry I don't see your point. The Birch gun had the standard RA gun of the time the 18 pounder. Now it would need a 18/25 or 25 pounder
allanpcameron
Donor
That was my thinking. At this point 15mm is all that is required by the specification. With the weight saving Carden can make the tank more mobile, but can also give a little more protection to vulnerable areas. It isn't much, and in a sense it isn't asked for, but it makes the whole thing slightly better.
Allan
Not just more mobile, but less weight also likely means a little less wear on the tracks, suspension and drive-train for any given distance travelled, and thus slightly lower overall maintenance costs.
Aye, and don't forget that at the time, the Panzer III had 15mm of armour all round, its not a heavily armoured tank. So if the new tank (has it got a name or number? I'm getting confused with all the Mark's and A *INSERT NUMBER HERE* being thrown around) has at least 19mm of armour on its front, thats better than a Panzer III. But, the Panzer III was also up-armoured to 30mm fairly quickly so the British tank will need to have that capacity.
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Later, yes, but now? That guns simply too big for the tank. I know the 18lber always gets trotted out as the ideal british AT gun as it was a decent weapon but you need a driver for it, what gets you to the point where you need a 84mm gun? Basically realising that the 75's simply not enough or not suitable. And trying to squeeze a big 'ol gun like the 18lber into a tank would require a larger and different tank.
Sort of. There was a lot going on at the time. The EMF and later the Armoured Force showed a lot of how things could be done. Even when handicapped the EMF was able to perform really well, things like limiting the force to 10mph max showed it was still a highly mobile force. That's not to say it was without issues, Logistics where always suspect at best and tactically there where a few issues at times. There were other issues such as inadequate or lacking radio's for example, this made communication between different units and arms difficult.
The thing is though the EMF was really ahead of its time in quite a few ways. Add to that the rate of progress and change occurring as well as the lack of cash and it was always going to be at best a guide. The big reason it was disbanded wasn't because of some inter army politics against tanks or in favour of other branches, instead it had served it's purpose. Had the British kept it going they would have been endlessly repeating the same exercises and learning the same lessons on the same terrain. Letting the other side have a go per-se is actually a good idea, you get a wider range of experiences and may learn some new things you can incorporate later. The big problem wasn't that the lessons where forgotten, though that was a big issues. It was that as things kept progressing the goalpost's kept moving so what was hard or bordering impossible in the late 1920's was perfectly feasible by the mid to late 1930's. Take the Radio issue for example, despite how bad things were for Britain in 1939 it was an awful lot better than in 1929. Lessons learnt when you have no radio's are probably going to be of limited value when you have a decent number of OK radio's.
That comes back to the point of it being ahead of it's time. Had the EMF been formed in 35 for example and then been given a couple of years to experiment the lessons will be far more relevant and will highlight deficiencies in Britain's current equipment. As it was Britain had lessons about it's 1929 equipment that where mostly useless. Now imagine of the British army had gone all in on the EMF in 1929 and funded massive arms expenditure on things like the Birch Gun. That would give the British army a world beating force for the late 20's and early 30's yes but one that would quickly become obsolete. Think about all the late 20's tech going against the Germans in 39. The money would have been spent and replacing a lot of it would be a big ask. Things like fitting radio's would have been difficult if not impossible and all the equipment is nearing a decade old and that will affect reliability.
So yes, whilst their was some treasury related issues going on and their are always inter army issues the fundamental decisions weren't the worst.
I'd point out that when the Cruiser III was uparmoured into the Cruiser IV (14mm applique on the turret, 28mm driver's cabin), the weight only grew by 800kg tops it seems. The Cruiser II was about 1300kg heavier than the Cruiser 1 because the armor on the hull was more extensively added.
With ITTL Cruiser I, even if the redesigned front still weighed as much as the configuration with MG turrets (though I think there is room to add ~300kg to get to 19mm on the front), with the redesigned suspension and tracks being more reliable it is not completely impossible to take a middle ground and slap applique on the turret only to bring it to 30mm while still keeping enough mobility and reliability. Upgrading older versions to a new level when war comes isn't particularly uncommon.
With ITTL Cruiser I, even if the redesigned front still weighed as much as the configuration with MG turrets (though I think there is room to add ~300kg to get to 19mm on the front), with the redesigned suspension and tracks being more reliable it is not completely impossible to take a middle ground and slap applique on the turret only to bring it to 30mm while still keeping enough mobility and reliability. Upgrading older versions to a new level when war comes isn't particularly uncommon.
Eh, the A10 is effectively the A9 with more armour on it, so it's already there. Also, the British have more Cruisers in the works.
I was more thinking that the tank Carden design's is likely to be an intermediate tank. By that I mean it will start out with a 2pdr but will be able to take a 6pdr with no issues. Up gunning beyond that will be an issue however as will adding more armor weight. That means a second tank would be needed that may be designed to take a 3inch-ish gun (75mm HV, 77mm HV or 17 pounder type) but with room to take a larger 95mm weapon in the future.
Ahh so its called the A10, and this is an 'infantry support tank' in theory right? Because if it can do 35kph thats not bad at all and far faster than the Matilda II which could only do that speed if you drove it off a cliff. Will Mr Carden be designing any Cruisers too because i'd say the A10 could be called a 'Heavy Cruiser'.
So it seems to me that the 'HE' issue is 2 fold
One a bigger gun - 2 pounder is never going to cut it
75mm / 3" seems to be the bench mark we should be aiming at - anything lighter is always going to be ineffective
The problem is that tanks in the late 30s could have a large short barrelled gun that was good at lobbing HE/Smoke or a smaller gun that was good at punching holes in things but not a gun that did both.
I would like to see an A10 type tank with twice the thickness of Armor - a more powerful engine to compensate, a 3 man turret with a 13 pounder 9CWT 3" gun capable of firing HE and APBC rounds.
The HE round to use a half charge and for the round itself to 'intrude' into the case to allow for a slower MV, allowing for a thinner walled shell with greater HE content
Same for Smoke.
Oh and for the love of all that is right in the universe - nice big hatches.
In other words a true universal gun tank in 1939!
Now the real problem with British tanks in 1939-41 was not the designs so much, or lack of HE throwing ability...oh no.
It was numbers of tanks, trained men and educated officers who could make use of the weapon platforms and processes and indeed parent formations to command and direct them
In the early years of the desert war the 'come as you are' desert force often fought in hodge podge Brigade sized formations (Jock Columns etc) trying to mix divisional assets into a Brigade slice in an attempt to try and find the right balance of Infantry, Artillery and Armor
What they should have been doing is fighting as a division and even corps formation and making use of all of the concentrated assets at the point of combat
However there was not enough trained men, not enough educated officers with the experience and training to fight at the divisional level in a cohesive fashion.
This was overcome by the addition of UK trained Divisions arriving in theatre during 1942 who had been training as Divisions, and the older units through both experience and in theatre training and finally by Monty insisting that they fought in such a fashion.
So again we come back to having enough people which means expanding the army before late 38 and introducing some form of conscription well before early 39
The lack of trained men and educated officers cannot be overcome by simply improving equipment
Lack of HE shells in a 2 pounder armed tank squadron being engaged by and AT gun screen could easily be rectified by having an attached FO from the Divisions Artillery regiments in an attached armoured FO vehicle calling in fire from Divisional and Corps level artillery to supress
It was found by the end of the Desert war and beyond that a company or Battalion could get support fire from Division and Corps level artillery far quicker than they could often get from their own 3" mortars.
But this level of all arms Cohesion took time, training, practice and often actual war time experience to get right and required more trained men and educated officers (both at Field and Staff level) than the British had to hand in the first couple of years of war.
One a bigger gun - 2 pounder is never going to cut it
75mm / 3" seems to be the bench mark we should be aiming at - anything lighter is always going to be ineffective
The problem is that tanks in the late 30s could have a large short barrelled gun that was good at lobbing HE/Smoke or a smaller gun that was good at punching holes in things but not a gun that did both.
I would like to see an A10 type tank with twice the thickness of Armor - a more powerful engine to compensate, a 3 man turret with a 13 pounder 9CWT 3" gun capable of firing HE and APBC rounds.
The HE round to use a half charge and for the round itself to 'intrude' into the case to allow for a slower MV, allowing for a thinner walled shell with greater HE content
Same for Smoke.
Oh and for the love of all that is right in the universe - nice big hatches.
In other words a true universal gun tank in 1939!
Now the real problem with British tanks in 1939-41 was not the designs so much, or lack of HE throwing ability...oh no.
It was numbers of tanks, trained men and educated officers who could make use of the weapon platforms and processes and indeed parent formations to command and direct them
In the early years of the desert war the 'come as you are' desert force often fought in hodge podge Brigade sized formations (Jock Columns etc) trying to mix divisional assets into a Brigade slice in an attempt to try and find the right balance of Infantry, Artillery and Armor
What they should have been doing is fighting as a division and even corps formation and making use of all of the concentrated assets at the point of combat
However there was not enough trained men, not enough educated officers with the experience and training to fight at the divisional level in a cohesive fashion.
This was overcome by the addition of UK trained Divisions arriving in theatre during 1942 who had been training as Divisions, and the older units through both experience and in theatre training and finally by Monty insisting that they fought in such a fashion.
So again we come back to having enough people which means expanding the army before late 38 and introducing some form of conscription well before early 39
The lack of trained men and educated officers cannot be overcome by simply improving equipment
Lack of HE shells in a 2 pounder armed tank squadron being engaged by and AT gun screen could easily be rectified by having an attached FO from the Divisions Artillery regiments in an attached armoured FO vehicle calling in fire from Divisional and Corps level artillery to supress
It was found by the end of the Desert war and beyond that a company or Battalion could get support fire from Division and Corps level artillery far quicker than they could often get from their own 3" mortars.
But this level of all arms Cohesion took time, training, practice and often actual war time experience to get right and required more trained men and educated officers (both at Field and Staff level) than the British had to hand in the first couple of years of war.
Actually, the A10 was called a 'heavy cruiser'. Also, the A10 has 6-30mm or armour, where the Matilda II has 20-78mm, so it weight a lot more.
As to later cruisers, with Carden still alive, the Britain might have some decent cruiser tanks earlier, to supplement the chronically poor Nuffield models.
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No, if i'm right in my head the tank that is being discussed in the post is the A9. The thing is it's much improved over the OTL A9. The A10 (an improved and slightly heavier armoured A9) is still coming as is the A11 (Matilda 1 but improved) and A12 (Matilda 2 probably as OTL). The tank Carden is proposing is likely going to be TTL's A13 and a completely new tank.
1 June 1937. 10:00hrs. London, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
1 June 1937. 10:00hrs. London, England.
Sir Hugh Elles, the Master General of Ordnance, chaired the meeting at which Sir Harold Brown, as Director General of Munitions, brought together the work of his department regarding placing orders for tanks. Brown’s department had two main directorates: Industrial Planning and the Directorate of Progress. This was a relatively new set up for the army and it was worth beginning the meeting with a review of the current situation regarding contracts for the production of tanks.
Since 1934 a number of orders had been made to various companies to provide tanks for the Cavalry Regiments that were undergoing mechanisation. Vickers had received the first order for twenty Mark V light tanks in January 1934. Fifteen Mark IV light tanks had been ordered from Royal Ordnance Factory Woolwich in May 1934, along with another fifteen Mark IVs from Vickers. The first 40 Mark VI had been ordered in July 1935 from Vickers, with five more in December 1935 and five from Vulcan Foundry in February 1936. The largest orders of tanks had been given in November and December 1936 when Vickers was awarded a contract for 110 Mark VIB light tanks; Vulcan Foundry’s contract was for 100 Mark VIAs; and then another 100 Mark VIA were ordered from Vickers.
Since the beginning of 1937 North British Locomotive Company and the agricultural vehicle engineers, Ruston & Hornsby had each received orders for 50 Mark VIB Light tanks. These were two new companies to the manufacture of tanks and the Directorate of Progress was keeping an eye on how they were responding to the challenge. A further 100 Mark VIBs had been ordered from Vickers-Armstrong. Altogether, over six hundred tanks had been ordered since 1934. A tank regiment would normally have around 60 tanks, so there were enough tanks on order to equip ten regiments. The designated regiments for the Light Tanks were the Cavalry Regiments currently undergoing mechanisation.
The question that had to be resolved now was what to do about the Royal Tank Corps, whose Medium IIs were in dire need of replacing. There were currently two heavy tanks in development, the A11 and A12. The changes that Vickers has made to from the A11E1 to the A11E2 had increased the cost per tank over what had originally been called for. The A11E2 was believed to be better for the improvements and the results of the tests at Farnborough were positive. Brown recommended ordering 60 of the A11 from Vickers immediately, this would provide one of the RTC battalions with a replacement for their worn-out vehicles and allow training on the new type to commence. The A12 mock up by Vulcan Foundry had been seen and approved for the next phase of building an A12E1 prototype. Realistically the Directorate of Industrial Planning couldn’t see this tank entering production until late 1938 at the very earliest. Overall, the A12 was likely to be the better choice for an infantry tank in the long term, but the needs of the RTC were extreme. Brown suggested it might be prudent to consider a second order for 60 A11s in the 1938 budget, providing a second battalion’s worth of tanks. Then they could count on ordering an initial 60 A12s in 1938, and 180 in 1939 when the budget was expected to bigger again, to equip four battalions of the RTC with the A12. This would provide two complete Army Tank Brigades with Infantry tanks.
The A9, as a direct replacement for the Medium tanks, had also been successfully tested and was ready to go into production. Both Vickers and Harland and Wolff would be able to build these if contracts were given. However, the new type of fast tank based on the Christie suspension, the A13E2 was due at Farnborough in October. This was considered more desirable by the RTC, but wouldn’t be available for production until well into 1938. Likewise, Vickers’ A10 was due shortly for testing, and if the omens were read correctly, then it may well be worth investing in it for the RTC, as it would be more likely to be ready for production before the A13.
The problem was having five new types of tanks all coming along at the same time and a limited budget. The two Infantry tanks were straightforward, the A11 would be a stopgap until the A12 could come along in large enough numbers. It would seem therefore that the same logic should apply to the A9/A10 and A13 tanks. By ordering 60 A9s now, and 60 A10s in 1938, the last two of the eight battalions of the RTC would be equipped with modern tanks. Brown recommended splitting the order for 60 A9s between Vickers (30) and Harland and Wolff (30).
The problem in the 1938 Budget was that there would also be the need for another 600 Light Tanks for the next tranche of mechanisation of the Cavalry Regiments. It has been calculated that the army would need 1,182 Light Tanks by the end of 1939 to equip twenty cavalry regiments. The plan to increase the battalions of the RTC to eight and equip them would need 480 medium and infantry tanks.
The current cost of a Mark VIB light tank was £4000. It was expected that the A11 would cost nearer £8000 than the originally planned £5000. The A9 was expected to cost £12700 and the A10 would be over £13000, while the A13 was expected to be closer to £12000. The A12 was provisionally costed at £18000. The cost of 1182 light tanks would be £4.75 million. The heavier tanks were likely to cost over £6 million. The need for the budget to increase to allow this to be in place by the end of 1939 was becoming critical.
Both the Directors for Industrial Planning and Progress were unsure whether it would be possible for the current state of tank production to actually produce all these tanks for the end of 1939. Currently only the Mark VIB was in production and the A9 was almost ready to go into production. There were a lot of companies who were starting from scratch, especially Vulcan Foundry and Nuffield designing and building the A12 and the A13 respectively. There were many foreseeable problems that could well delay the implementation of the desire to acquire an extra 1000 tanks in 30 months. The only company with anything like the capacity and experience was Vickers-Armstrong. A suggestion was put forward to scale back the numbers of light tanks to be ordered from Vickers to allow more production allocation to be made to the A9 and A11. It might be better if Vickers could make a start on these types in the next twelve months, giving the RTC four battalions worth of tanks by the end of 1939.
The contracts for Mark VIA and VIBs given to Vulcan Foundry, the North British Locomotive Company and Ruston & Hornsby earlier this year were so that these would acquire the experience and skills for building tanks, starting with something quite straightforward. Other companies, such as Harland and Wolff (working with Vickers on the A9), Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company and Metropolitan-Cammell Carriage & Wagon Company could also be brought on to the War Potential program, perhaps working with Vickers to produce the A10. Once Vulcan Foundry and Nuffield had developed the A12 and A13 all these other companies, with a year’s experience on the light tanks, might be in a better position to make the more sophisticated models.
Giffard Martel noted that A13’s potential was such that the A9 and A10 would merely be stopgap tanks, just like the A11 would be for the A12. It may well be the case that what the Cavalry Regiments needed was this kind of fast tank, with a proper gun, rather than the light tank. If the decision was made in 1938 to order only 300 Mark VIBs instead of 600, and slow the process of mechanising the cavalry regiments for an extra year or two, £1.2 million budget saving could be invested in 100 of the A13 fast tanks, but that would mean converting only seven cavalry regiments instead of the planned ten. Providing either five of those regiments each with a squadron’s worth of A13s (18 tanks), or three regiments with almost two squadrons, would make them a bit more capable of doing more than simply reconnaissance. Once the A13 was in full production, if the budget allowed, ordering more of them could replace squadrons of light tanks in the previously mechanised cavalry regiments, would allow these to be more rounded in their capability.
While General Elles agreed with most of Sir Harry Brown’s recommendations, he did feel the need to ask a question. If the A11 costs £8000 and the A12 will cost £18000, wouldn’t it make more sense to order an extra 60 A11s? From the description of the A11E2, it was certainly less capable that the proposed A12, but not by as much as the original A11E1 would have been. If Vickers was asked to concentrate more on the A11 and less on the Mark VIB, it might mean that three battalions of the RTC would be fully equipped with Infantry tanks by the end of 1939 instead of two. If the A12 wouldn’t enter production in any numbers until mid-1939, as suggested by the Director of Industrial Planning, then the RTC would be at 50% of its required inventory of Infantry tanks by the end of 1939 instead of 30%.
What General Elles proposed was ordering 120 A11s immediately; then order another 60 in 1938 along with the first 60 A12s; then order another 120 A12s in 1939 once they were in production. This would provide the RTC with three battalions of infantry tank A11 by the end of 1939 and three with the A12 by the end of 1940. In addition to the infantry tanks, ordering 120 A9s this year would give the other two RTC battalions the tanks they desperately needed, and hopefully be fully equipped by the end of 1939.
Elles agreed with Martel’s idea of cutting the numbers of Mark VIBs to be ordered, and slow the process of mechanising the cavalry regiments. He went further, in his opinion, it would be better to order only 240 of the planned 600 light tanks next year and freeze this year’s number at about the same. If the A13 was everything that Martel hoped it would be, and if the tests were satisfactory, then an initial order for 100 A13s could be made in 1938. If these were delayed in coming into production, which was highly likely going by the fact they were a completely new design from an unexperienced firm, then they could order 60 of the A10 from Vickers in 1938. If the A10 had problems, then this could easily be changed to the A9. With sixty each of A13s and A10s ordered in 1938, then increase the A13 order to 120 per annum for the cavalry regiments along with 240 light tanks, mechanising six regiments per year.
The idea of providing mixed squadrons of tanks to the cavalry regiments for their different roles was sensible, but would increase the problems of training. Having a regiments worth of gun tanks as quickly as possible might make it possible for a troop’s worth to be given to each regiment to become familiar with while they await their full allocation.
Sir Harry Brown could see the logic of this, but wondered at the political backlash that would come from slowing the process of mechanisation of the cavalry regiments. Nobody wanted to say that Brown’s background in the Royal Navy meant that he probably didn’t realise that a good number of the old boys of the Cavalry Club were resisting giving up the horses. Delaying the inevitable would probably play better in political circles than was expected. If the deal was sweetened with something like promising the A13 as a proper cavalry tank, then so much the better. The other thing that Brown noticed was that the A10, with its thicker armour, would probably better a better fit for the RTC battalions than the A9. Elles and Martel agreed that perhaps as the A9 and A10 started appearing, that some reassignment of vehicles could be made, but a bird in the hand was currently worth more than two in the bush.
For comparison: OTL
Sir Hugh Elles, the Master General of Ordnance, chaired the meeting at which Sir Harold Brown, as Director General of Munitions, brought together the work of his department regarding placing orders for tanks. Brown’s department had two main directorates: Industrial Planning and the Directorate of Progress. This was a relatively new set up for the army and it was worth beginning the meeting with a review of the current situation regarding contracts for the production of tanks.
Since 1934 a number of orders had been made to various companies to provide tanks for the Cavalry Regiments that were undergoing mechanisation. Vickers had received the first order for twenty Mark V light tanks in January 1934. Fifteen Mark IV light tanks had been ordered from Royal Ordnance Factory Woolwich in May 1934, along with another fifteen Mark IVs from Vickers. The first 40 Mark VI had been ordered in July 1935 from Vickers, with five more in December 1935 and five from Vulcan Foundry in February 1936. The largest orders of tanks had been given in November and December 1936 when Vickers was awarded a contract for 110 Mark VIB light tanks; Vulcan Foundry’s contract was for 100 Mark VIAs; and then another 100 Mark VIA were ordered from Vickers.
Since the beginning of 1937 North British Locomotive Company and the agricultural vehicle engineers, Ruston & Hornsby had each received orders for 50 Mark VIB Light tanks. These were two new companies to the manufacture of tanks and the Directorate of Progress was keeping an eye on how they were responding to the challenge. A further 100 Mark VIBs had been ordered from Vickers-Armstrong. Altogether, over six hundred tanks had been ordered since 1934. A tank regiment would normally have around 60 tanks, so there were enough tanks on order to equip ten regiments. The designated regiments for the Light Tanks were the Cavalry Regiments currently undergoing mechanisation.
The question that had to be resolved now was what to do about the Royal Tank Corps, whose Medium IIs were in dire need of replacing. There were currently two heavy tanks in development, the A11 and A12. The changes that Vickers has made to from the A11E1 to the A11E2 had increased the cost per tank over what had originally been called for. The A11E2 was believed to be better for the improvements and the results of the tests at Farnborough were positive. Brown recommended ordering 60 of the A11 from Vickers immediately, this would provide one of the RTC battalions with a replacement for their worn-out vehicles and allow training on the new type to commence. The A12 mock up by Vulcan Foundry had been seen and approved for the next phase of building an A12E1 prototype. Realistically the Directorate of Industrial Planning couldn’t see this tank entering production until late 1938 at the very earliest. Overall, the A12 was likely to be the better choice for an infantry tank in the long term, but the needs of the RTC were extreme. Brown suggested it might be prudent to consider a second order for 60 A11s in the 1938 budget, providing a second battalion’s worth of tanks. Then they could count on ordering an initial 60 A12s in 1938, and 180 in 1939 when the budget was expected to bigger again, to equip four battalions of the RTC with the A12. This would provide two complete Army Tank Brigades with Infantry tanks.
The A9, as a direct replacement for the Medium tanks, had also been successfully tested and was ready to go into production. Both Vickers and Harland and Wolff would be able to build these if contracts were given. However, the new type of fast tank based on the Christie suspension, the A13E2 was due at Farnborough in October. This was considered more desirable by the RTC, but wouldn’t be available for production until well into 1938. Likewise, Vickers’ A10 was due shortly for testing, and if the omens were read correctly, then it may well be worth investing in it for the RTC, as it would be more likely to be ready for production before the A13.
The problem was having five new types of tanks all coming along at the same time and a limited budget. The two Infantry tanks were straightforward, the A11 would be a stopgap until the A12 could come along in large enough numbers. It would seem therefore that the same logic should apply to the A9/A10 and A13 tanks. By ordering 60 A9s now, and 60 A10s in 1938, the last two of the eight battalions of the RTC would be equipped with modern tanks. Brown recommended splitting the order for 60 A9s between Vickers (30) and Harland and Wolff (30).
The problem in the 1938 Budget was that there would also be the need for another 600 Light Tanks for the next tranche of mechanisation of the Cavalry Regiments. It has been calculated that the army would need 1,182 Light Tanks by the end of 1939 to equip twenty cavalry regiments. The plan to increase the battalions of the RTC to eight and equip them would need 480 medium and infantry tanks.
The current cost of a Mark VIB light tank was £4000. It was expected that the A11 would cost nearer £8000 than the originally planned £5000. The A9 was expected to cost £12700 and the A10 would be over £13000, while the A13 was expected to be closer to £12000. The A12 was provisionally costed at £18000. The cost of 1182 light tanks would be £4.75 million. The heavier tanks were likely to cost over £6 million. The need for the budget to increase to allow this to be in place by the end of 1939 was becoming critical.
Both the Directors for Industrial Planning and Progress were unsure whether it would be possible for the current state of tank production to actually produce all these tanks for the end of 1939. Currently only the Mark VIB was in production and the A9 was almost ready to go into production. There were a lot of companies who were starting from scratch, especially Vulcan Foundry and Nuffield designing and building the A12 and the A13 respectively. There were many foreseeable problems that could well delay the implementation of the desire to acquire an extra 1000 tanks in 30 months. The only company with anything like the capacity and experience was Vickers-Armstrong. A suggestion was put forward to scale back the numbers of light tanks to be ordered from Vickers to allow more production allocation to be made to the A9 and A11. It might be better if Vickers could make a start on these types in the next twelve months, giving the RTC four battalions worth of tanks by the end of 1939.
The contracts for Mark VIA and VIBs given to Vulcan Foundry, the North British Locomotive Company and Ruston & Hornsby earlier this year were so that these would acquire the experience and skills for building tanks, starting with something quite straightforward. Other companies, such as Harland and Wolff (working with Vickers on the A9), Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company and Metropolitan-Cammell Carriage & Wagon Company could also be brought on to the War Potential program, perhaps working with Vickers to produce the A10. Once Vulcan Foundry and Nuffield had developed the A12 and A13 all these other companies, with a year’s experience on the light tanks, might be in a better position to make the more sophisticated models.
Giffard Martel noted that A13’s potential was such that the A9 and A10 would merely be stopgap tanks, just like the A11 would be for the A12. It may well be the case that what the Cavalry Regiments needed was this kind of fast tank, with a proper gun, rather than the light tank. If the decision was made in 1938 to order only 300 Mark VIBs instead of 600, and slow the process of mechanising the cavalry regiments for an extra year or two, £1.2 million budget saving could be invested in 100 of the A13 fast tanks, but that would mean converting only seven cavalry regiments instead of the planned ten. Providing either five of those regiments each with a squadron’s worth of A13s (18 tanks), or three regiments with almost two squadrons, would make them a bit more capable of doing more than simply reconnaissance. Once the A13 was in full production, if the budget allowed, ordering more of them could replace squadrons of light tanks in the previously mechanised cavalry regiments, would allow these to be more rounded in their capability.
While General Elles agreed with most of Sir Harry Brown’s recommendations, he did feel the need to ask a question. If the A11 costs £8000 and the A12 will cost £18000, wouldn’t it make more sense to order an extra 60 A11s? From the description of the A11E2, it was certainly less capable that the proposed A12, but not by as much as the original A11E1 would have been. If Vickers was asked to concentrate more on the A11 and less on the Mark VIB, it might mean that three battalions of the RTC would be fully equipped with Infantry tanks by the end of 1939 instead of two. If the A12 wouldn’t enter production in any numbers until mid-1939, as suggested by the Director of Industrial Planning, then the RTC would be at 50% of its required inventory of Infantry tanks by the end of 1939 instead of 30%.
What General Elles proposed was ordering 120 A11s immediately; then order another 60 in 1938 along with the first 60 A12s; then order another 120 A12s in 1939 once they were in production. This would provide the RTC with three battalions of infantry tank A11 by the end of 1939 and three with the A12 by the end of 1940. In addition to the infantry tanks, ordering 120 A9s this year would give the other two RTC battalions the tanks they desperately needed, and hopefully be fully equipped by the end of 1939.
Elles agreed with Martel’s idea of cutting the numbers of Mark VIBs to be ordered, and slow the process of mechanising the cavalry regiments. He went further, in his opinion, it would be better to order only 240 of the planned 600 light tanks next year and freeze this year’s number at about the same. If the A13 was everything that Martel hoped it would be, and if the tests were satisfactory, then an initial order for 100 A13s could be made in 1938. If these were delayed in coming into production, which was highly likely going by the fact they were a completely new design from an unexperienced firm, then they could order 60 of the A10 from Vickers in 1938. If the A10 had problems, then this could easily be changed to the A9. With sixty each of A13s and A10s ordered in 1938, then increase the A13 order to 120 per annum for the cavalry regiments along with 240 light tanks, mechanising six regiments per year.
The idea of providing mixed squadrons of tanks to the cavalry regiments for their different roles was sensible, but would increase the problems of training. Having a regiments worth of gun tanks as quickly as possible might make it possible for a troop’s worth to be given to each regiment to become familiar with while they await their full allocation.
Sir Harry Brown could see the logic of this, but wondered at the political backlash that would come from slowing the process of mechanisation of the cavalry regiments. Nobody wanted to say that Brown’s background in the Royal Navy meant that he probably didn’t realise that a good number of the old boys of the Cavalry Club were resisting giving up the horses. Delaying the inevitable would probably play better in political circles than was expected. If the deal was sweetened with something like promising the A13 as a proper cavalry tank, then so much the better. The other thing that Brown noticed was that the A10, with its thicker armour, would probably better a better fit for the RTC battalions than the A9. Elles and Martel agreed that perhaps as the A9 and A10 started appearing, that some reassignment of vehicles could be made, but a bird in the hand was currently worth more than two in the bush.
For comparison: OTL
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