Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
- Status
Add half again or even double it for most civilian vessels, each way. Plus, as noted, Route X was mined, so didn't see that much use.16 miles is 30 minutes for a destroyer
However ..its load the men on - remember, some of them will be wounded, on stretchers. get away from the side, get out of the harbour (avoiding any wrecks), find and get onto the clear route, then its relatively fast (assuming no air attacks, no reports of periscopes, and so on...), then its leave the clear route, avoid any of your own minefields, enter the port, get tied up, unload all those men again, check if you need anything while getting your next orders...
Its a lot more than just sailing between point A and point B
Its a lot more than just sailing between point A and point B
Still saves you an hour or an-hour-and-a-half over Route X, and several hours over Route Y.
That's slightly unfair on the Airacuda, which only ever managed to kill one of its crew.
Then again the Captain was a good idea, badly executed, while the Airacuda was a superficially promising (but misconceived) idea, badly executed.
I don't know what's scarier about that thing - that they built it, that they deployed or that some people actually managed to use it. A short-ranged, low-velocity grenade thrower - as an AA weapon. Right. It makes some of Lindemann's ideas look positively sane.Try this lash up
Holman Projector - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
21 May 1940. 14:00hrs. Duisans, France.
allanpcameron
Donor
21 May 1940. 14:00hrs. Duisans, France.
There was a bit of an argument going on at the crossroads between the commander of A Company 7th Bn RTR and the 2nd Lieutenant commanding the scout platoon of the 4th NF. There were very few maps of the area and the two officers were arguing vehemently over one of them. As the person responsible for reconnaissance, the 2nd Lieutenant was attempting to correct his superior officer about which road to take. A Company’s commander was adamant that the tanks were to take the road that curved eastwards, because that was the way to the start line. The scout platoon commander traced the route that he’d been told that the column had to take, which continued to the south. A few troopers further back had fairly negative thoughts about Ruperts and map reading skills.*
Lt Col Heyland himself arrived, and since there was intermittent fire coming in their direction, had a look at the map, compared it with his own, and ordered A Company to follow the scout platoon south in the direction of Walrus. D Company and B Company had already gone the wrong way. Heyland, got on the radio to the Company commanders and told them to bear right, there was a line of pylons which would lead them to the correct place on the starting line, without getting caught up in the left columns rear. He was inclined to chase after the two companies, but decided to follow A Company towards Warlus. Heyland also got through to Lt-Col Bean who was now about a mile behind the tanks, but since it was already 14:00hrs, and the start line was the best part of four miles off, Heyland couldn’t wait any longer.
Back at Vimy at First Army Tank Brigade HQ, Brigadier Pratt, who’d been trying to keep on top of what his Battalions were doing, was visited by General Martel. The Brigadier couldn’t help himself, he told his commanding officer, in no uncertain terms, “This is going to be a cock-up, the infantry are miles behind us. We are going forward against strong opposition and we know it’s around. We will be absolutely be smashed and we must stop this mess, get things together and try later.” Martel however had been the recipient of regular questions from General Franklyn, whose only concern was to put pressure on Martel to get on with it. Martel therefore had to brush aside Pratt’s concerns. Even if they had wanted to, it was unlikely that the communications between the various elements of the attack would have been able to get a recall message home.
Brigadier Churchill at 151 Brigade HQ got a message from X Company, 4th NF scout platoon, part of the Brigade’s reconnaissance force, out in front of the right column, that German tanks had been spotted south-west of Duisans, a message that was confirmed other sightings from the 12th Lancers. Churchill hadn’t been able to set up the radio net with his Battalions because of the need for radio silence before they got to the start line. He was now ruing his earlier objections to Lt-Col Bean’s breaking of the silence to sort out his own Battalions’ radio network.
Miscommunication was a common feature of war and the anti-tank gunners of the 260th anti-tank battery, screening the western flank of Duisans engaged tanks which appeared out of nowhere, the exchange of fire lasted a few minutes until someone realised that the tanks were in fact French, not German.
A Company, 7th Bn RTR, screened by two Mark VI Light Tanks, as they approached Warlus, began to find themselves engaging what appeared to be roaming bands of German troops, but also, at a distance spotted armour moving, throwing up a lot of dust. Passing the sighting report back to Battalion HQ, A Company were ordered to carry on up the road through the village and the Battalion HQ would follow. Bean, on hearing this news, requested the rest of the anti-tank battery should make haste to join his companies following the tanks.
Sergeant Heppel, in one of the scouting light tanks described afterwards that it appeared the British tanks were back on the battle practice range at Linney Head. Instead of mechanically operated targets, here in front of them were the Czech built Panzer 38s of II battalion of the 25th Panzer Regiment.# No one needed to give the order to fire, but very quickly the three 2-pdr guns of the A12s and ten 2-pdr pompoms of the A11s opened up. The Panzers were crossing fields without cover, and their speed wasn’t high because they were going across country. It was almost a perfect ambush. The side armour of the Pz38 wasn’t much more than 10mm thick, and riveted. The solid 2-pdr shot from the A12s penetrated easily, even the HE shells from the pompoms could disable the panzers at a range of less than 1000 yards.
The Germans were no slouches, and mechanically operated targets followed a fixed trajectory. Within seconds of the first few panzers being hit, the rest of the battalion, seeing that they were being attacked from the east, immediately turned their frontal, heavier, armour to the source of the fire. They picked up speed and the 37mm main guns began to pick out targets of their own. The A12 Infantry Tank Mark IIs tended to the first targeted, it was larger and perhaps more visible. The 78mm armour of the front turret of the A12 proved invulnerable to the German guns, while the 2-pdr solid shot could penetrate the 30mm frontal armour with ease. The British tanks had tended to naturally take as much of a hull down position as they could find, so attempts to hit the more vulnerable tracks was unsuccessful. The British gunners, the majority long serving regulars, with the luxury of firing from a stationary position, found themselves scoring a high percentage of hits. The German doctrine to halt and fire worked against them in this situation.
When facing tanks whose frontal armour was too thick for the main gun to penetrate, something the Germans were finding out all too regularly against the French tanks they had encountered so far, the next thing to do was to try to find a flank and turn it. A Company of the 7th Bn RTR was spread out around the edge of the village. The II Battalion of 25th Panzer Regiment far outnumbered the British tanks. The panzers began to circle around, looking for a way to get a shot at the weaker armour of the sides and rear of British tanks. Heyford was in one of the Mark VI Light Tanks, and because it only had a machine gun, he hadn’t taken part in the fighting. Seeing what was happening, he was aware that without artillery support, infantry or anti-tank guns, his command was going to be in serious trouble. He gave orders for the tanks of his other two companies to come immediately to their aid. He also informed Bean what was happening and advised him to dig in, or withdraw back towards Duisans if he didn’t have anti-tank guns to support him.
The panzers were moving, but still their guns were struggling to overwhelm the British fire. Two sections of A11s reversed from their positions to keep their front armour towards the German panzers, in effect ‘circling the wagons’. As the range decreased, the damage done by the German guns started taking a toll. While the Infantry Tanks weren’t penetrated, there was spalling from the hits that injured the crews. Some of the gear stored on the outside of the tanks also started to burn. The commander of the German battalion had been killed, and so coordination began to breakdown. The British tanks continued to take a toll on the German panzers, but as the ready ammunition was used up, the rate of fire began to drop. Heyford couldn’t help reflect that if the shoe was on the other foot, the British would have popped smoke and withdrawn. Still the Germans came on, and still more of them were put out of action.
Heyford saw the writing on the wall and ordered A Company to begin to withdraw. If B and C Companies appeared, then perhaps, there would be a chance for the Battalion to regroup and really do some damage to the panzers, but fewer and fewer tanks of A Company were capable of moving. Heyford ordered the tanks to use smoke and begin to move back towards Dainville where he believed the rest of the Battalion were. B Company had been closest to the fight, but they were almost two miles away when Heyford had ordered them to change direction towards Warlus. It took them almost ten minutes to come to the aid of their comrades, but when their 2-pdr and pompoms began to hit the Germans in the flank, it was the last straw. The remnants of II Battalion withdrew, and the surviving A Company British tanks withdrew back to Dainville. Only one A12 and five A11s, of the original three and ten had survived. Heyford’s light tank was the only one to re-join the Battalion. A Company and the Battalion HQ had been severely mauled, but it was estimated that half of the II Battalion 25th Panzer Regiment had been destroyed.*
Italic text differs from OTL.
*OTL all three companies of 7th Bn RTR took the wrong road.
# This was one of the 'what ifs' of the battle. If 7RTR hadn't taken the wrong road, they would have hit the flank of 25th Pz Reg at Warlus. The question that remains unanswered is what would the British Infantry tanks (without pompoms) have been able to do against the Pz38(t).
* What would have been the effect of gutting a battalion of panzers at this point?
There was a bit of an argument going on at the crossroads between the commander of A Company 7th Bn RTR and the 2nd Lieutenant commanding the scout platoon of the 4th NF. There were very few maps of the area and the two officers were arguing vehemently over one of them. As the person responsible for reconnaissance, the 2nd Lieutenant was attempting to correct his superior officer about which road to take. A Company’s commander was adamant that the tanks were to take the road that curved eastwards, because that was the way to the start line. The scout platoon commander traced the route that he’d been told that the column had to take, which continued to the south. A few troopers further back had fairly negative thoughts about Ruperts and map reading skills.*
Lt Col Heyland himself arrived, and since there was intermittent fire coming in their direction, had a look at the map, compared it with his own, and ordered A Company to follow the scout platoon south in the direction of Walrus. D Company and B Company had already gone the wrong way. Heyland, got on the radio to the Company commanders and told them to bear right, there was a line of pylons which would lead them to the correct place on the starting line, without getting caught up in the left columns rear. He was inclined to chase after the two companies, but decided to follow A Company towards Warlus. Heyland also got through to Lt-Col Bean who was now about a mile behind the tanks, but since it was already 14:00hrs, and the start line was the best part of four miles off, Heyland couldn’t wait any longer.
Back at Vimy at First Army Tank Brigade HQ, Brigadier Pratt, who’d been trying to keep on top of what his Battalions were doing, was visited by General Martel. The Brigadier couldn’t help himself, he told his commanding officer, in no uncertain terms, “This is going to be a cock-up, the infantry are miles behind us. We are going forward against strong opposition and we know it’s around. We will be absolutely be smashed and we must stop this mess, get things together and try later.” Martel however had been the recipient of regular questions from General Franklyn, whose only concern was to put pressure on Martel to get on with it. Martel therefore had to brush aside Pratt’s concerns. Even if they had wanted to, it was unlikely that the communications between the various elements of the attack would have been able to get a recall message home.
Brigadier Churchill at 151 Brigade HQ got a message from X Company, 4th NF scout platoon, part of the Brigade’s reconnaissance force, out in front of the right column, that German tanks had been spotted south-west of Duisans, a message that was confirmed other sightings from the 12th Lancers. Churchill hadn’t been able to set up the radio net with his Battalions because of the need for radio silence before they got to the start line. He was now ruing his earlier objections to Lt-Col Bean’s breaking of the silence to sort out his own Battalions’ radio network.
Miscommunication was a common feature of war and the anti-tank gunners of the 260th anti-tank battery, screening the western flank of Duisans engaged tanks which appeared out of nowhere, the exchange of fire lasted a few minutes until someone realised that the tanks were in fact French, not German.
A Company, 7th Bn RTR, screened by two Mark VI Light Tanks, as they approached Warlus, began to find themselves engaging what appeared to be roaming bands of German troops, but also, at a distance spotted armour moving, throwing up a lot of dust. Passing the sighting report back to Battalion HQ, A Company were ordered to carry on up the road through the village and the Battalion HQ would follow. Bean, on hearing this news, requested the rest of the anti-tank battery should make haste to join his companies following the tanks.
Sergeant Heppel, in one of the scouting light tanks described afterwards that it appeared the British tanks were back on the battle practice range at Linney Head. Instead of mechanically operated targets, here in front of them were the Czech built Panzer 38s of II battalion of the 25th Panzer Regiment.# No one needed to give the order to fire, but very quickly the three 2-pdr guns of the A12s and ten 2-pdr pompoms of the A11s opened up. The Panzers were crossing fields without cover, and their speed wasn’t high because they were going across country. It was almost a perfect ambush. The side armour of the Pz38 wasn’t much more than 10mm thick, and riveted. The solid 2-pdr shot from the A12s penetrated easily, even the HE shells from the pompoms could disable the panzers at a range of less than 1000 yards.
The Germans were no slouches, and mechanically operated targets followed a fixed trajectory. Within seconds of the first few panzers being hit, the rest of the battalion, seeing that they were being attacked from the east, immediately turned their frontal, heavier, armour to the source of the fire. They picked up speed and the 37mm main guns began to pick out targets of their own. The A12 Infantry Tank Mark IIs tended to the first targeted, it was larger and perhaps more visible. The 78mm armour of the front turret of the A12 proved invulnerable to the German guns, while the 2-pdr solid shot could penetrate the 30mm frontal armour with ease. The British tanks had tended to naturally take as much of a hull down position as they could find, so attempts to hit the more vulnerable tracks was unsuccessful. The British gunners, the majority long serving regulars, with the luxury of firing from a stationary position, found themselves scoring a high percentage of hits. The German doctrine to halt and fire worked against them in this situation.
When facing tanks whose frontal armour was too thick for the main gun to penetrate, something the Germans were finding out all too regularly against the French tanks they had encountered so far, the next thing to do was to try to find a flank and turn it. A Company of the 7th Bn RTR was spread out around the edge of the village. The II Battalion of 25th Panzer Regiment far outnumbered the British tanks. The panzers began to circle around, looking for a way to get a shot at the weaker armour of the sides and rear of British tanks. Heyford was in one of the Mark VI Light Tanks, and because it only had a machine gun, he hadn’t taken part in the fighting. Seeing what was happening, he was aware that without artillery support, infantry or anti-tank guns, his command was going to be in serious trouble. He gave orders for the tanks of his other two companies to come immediately to their aid. He also informed Bean what was happening and advised him to dig in, or withdraw back towards Duisans if he didn’t have anti-tank guns to support him.
The panzers were moving, but still their guns were struggling to overwhelm the British fire. Two sections of A11s reversed from their positions to keep their front armour towards the German panzers, in effect ‘circling the wagons’. As the range decreased, the damage done by the German guns started taking a toll. While the Infantry Tanks weren’t penetrated, there was spalling from the hits that injured the crews. Some of the gear stored on the outside of the tanks also started to burn. The commander of the German battalion had been killed, and so coordination began to breakdown. The British tanks continued to take a toll on the German panzers, but as the ready ammunition was used up, the rate of fire began to drop. Heyford couldn’t help reflect that if the shoe was on the other foot, the British would have popped smoke and withdrawn. Still the Germans came on, and still more of them were put out of action.
Heyford saw the writing on the wall and ordered A Company to begin to withdraw. If B and C Companies appeared, then perhaps, there would be a chance for the Battalion to regroup and really do some damage to the panzers, but fewer and fewer tanks of A Company were capable of moving. Heyford ordered the tanks to use smoke and begin to move back towards Dainville where he believed the rest of the Battalion were. B Company had been closest to the fight, but they were almost two miles away when Heyford had ordered them to change direction towards Warlus. It took them almost ten minutes to come to the aid of their comrades, but when their 2-pdr and pompoms began to hit the Germans in the flank, it was the last straw. The remnants of II Battalion withdrew, and the surviving A Company British tanks withdrew back to Dainville. Only one A12 and five A11s, of the original three and ten had survived. Heyford’s light tank was the only one to re-join the Battalion. A Company and the Battalion HQ had been severely mauled, but it was estimated that half of the II Battalion 25th Panzer Regiment had been destroyed.*
Italic text differs from OTL.
*OTL all three companies of 7th Bn RTR took the wrong road.
# This was one of the 'what ifs' of the battle. If 7RTR hadn't taken the wrong road, they would have hit the flank of 25th Pz Reg at Warlus. The question that remains unanswered is what would the British Infantry tanks (without pompoms) have been able to do against the Pz38(t).
* What would have been the effect of gutting a battalion of panzers at this point?
Last edited:
Significant event right there, I imagine.
A good showing all around from 7th RTR, the qualities of the crews and tanks are on full display.
Not sure how the Germans are going to respond to this, I'd say the best case scenario would have them 'flinch' and pause to regroup and reassess, worst case is for them to charge on regardless of losses and catch B and C Companies off-guard, though this is unlikely thanks to getting the radios sorted out before the fun started.
Remember, the Germans are a continental power. They perceive the ocean as a barrier. The British are a naval power, they perceive the ocean as a highway. The RN simply act as it always had. It rose to the occasion. The Germans fell to it.
Yeah, the RN was pretty powerful up through the Second World War; it's the reason the British Empire got as big as it did...
It's not, it was the Battalion Commander who was killed (Rommel was General of the 7th Panzer Division).
And this sounds like it's going significantly worse for the Germans already.
Last edited:
Now that is an update with a lot of meat to it. Obviously their are more updates to come but if this remains the biggest tank on tank clash for the British pre evacuation then a few things may well happen.
As has already pointed out, the fact that a company of British tanks almost gutted a Battalion of German Panzer's will at least take some of the shine off the idea of the unstoppable Panzer myth in Britain post evacuation. At least in the circles that count.
The fact the British where the ones fighting from a hull down, stationary position may well have consequences. The pre war doctrine of moving fire may well take a hit from this engagement, that will likely speed up the switch to non shoulder fired guns in British tanks and go some way to removing the obstacle's to the Vickers 3" HV being put into the Viktor.
This is likely to have an affect on the Germans too. Whilst it wont be too big, there is enough momentum and success elsewhere right now to scupper much beyond broadly local forces, it will both be a blow and a shock.
Keep up with the excellent updates Allan
As has already pointed out, the fact that a company of British tanks almost gutted a Battalion of German Panzer's will at least take some of the shine off the idea of the unstoppable Panzer myth in Britain post evacuation. At least in the circles that count.
The fact the British where the ones fighting from a hull down, stationary position may well have consequences. The pre war doctrine of moving fire may well take a hit from this engagement, that will likely speed up the switch to non shoulder fired guns in British tanks and go some way to removing the obstacle's to the Vickers 3" HV being put into the Viktor.
This is likely to have an affect on the Germans too. Whilst it wont be too big, there is enough momentum and success elsewhere right now to scupper much beyond broadly local forces, it will both be a blow and a shock.
Keep up with the excellent updates Allan
It's certainly going to put weight behind a doctrine of ensuring heavy armour on turret faces! I suspect a relative reduction in hull armour may result in future to save weight for the turret, so Carden's forward-thinking sloped glacis plate should become pretty universal in the next generation of designs.
Even if they hold the field now, how much longer will they, and will that give them enough time?
The post specifically mentioned
Although whether that is the Watsonian understanding of the time or Doylian has yet to be seen.
They might think that moving in a tank is entirely useless and that hull-down defense is the best use of a tank, similar to how the Chieftain had 350 mm of turret armor compared to only 127 mm of frontal hull armor. In that case, all of the work to increase mobility of tanks might be thrown away for a heavy tank principle.
Meanwhile, the Germans themselves will probably put more effort into developing the Tiger. The tank arms race will probably intensify.
Last edited:
- Status