Of course if even greater CP success against Russia leads to Nicky cutting his losses some time in 1916, then that might very well lead indirectly to "things going better for Russia" than in the previous version or even OTL.
REDUX: Place In The Sun: What If Italy Joined The Central Powers?
- Thread starter Kaiser Wilhelm the Tenth
- Start date
The Alps is a very, VERY bad place to fight over. But welp, Italy's joining the war and will not see much success besides being a distraction.
Well, that's an interesting sign. Looking forward to it!
As they say in Italy, calm and chalk. Before guessing, on the Italian war plans in the First World War, it is advisable to consult the archive of the historical office of the Italian Army General Staff, which is publicly available on the Internet.
Archivio documentale
www.esercito.difesa.it
First point: due to the bizarre and unforeseen circumstances with which Cadorna obtained his role, he did not have the time to elaborate any battle plans and had to adopt those elaborated by his predecessor Enrico Cosenz in 1894. If this OTL applies to the front Austro-Hungarian, ITL will be the same for the French Front. Now, Cosenz had two different operational hypotheses in the war against France, which varied according to whether or not English neutrality was.
If London had remained neutral, the Italians would have remained on the defensive in the Alps, counting on the wear and tear of the French troops, they would have occupied Corsica and subsequently landed at the mouth of the Rhone, in an attempt to lock the Army of the Alps in a pocket ... Attempt doable ? Probably not, but both the Italian army and the fleet have engaged with exercises and with the adoption of the appropriate means to make this operation feasible. Think of the ships of the Stella d'Italia Class and Lauria, which had a dual role: battleship and landing ship ... To the appointment of a capable and particularly aggressive admiral, far superior to the French counterpart, the Duke of Abruzzo, who between the other used studies and exercises on possible landings to organize and guide the Serbian evacuation. To the operational doctrine of Thaon di Ravel, on naval warfare that used aircraft and MAS to bottle the enemy fleet in the port, in the prediction that the French had damaged, during the landing operations, the Italian battleships and cruisers, making them unusable. Among other things, the Italian general staff was convinced that even the French, in their war plans, had planned a landing near Rome ... Which led to one of the most colossal waste of public money in Italy. , the construction of the system of fortresses and batteries to defend the city, never used
If London had been alongside Paris, the Italian high command was a little smarter than the German one, obviously, since the Italian fleet was not suicidal, the plan would have been different. Corsica would still have been occupied, in the Alps the Italian army would have been on the defensive, but the troops involved in the landing would have been moved, in some way, Cosenz had also proposed to rent the Swiss railways, in Alsace, to give a hand to the German ally ... If you notice, no North African scenario is foreseen, because at the time of the drafting of the Cosenz plan, the conquest of Libya was far from coming and no one had bothered to update the plans. So, Cadorna, having no time to hypothesize anything else, would have adapted to variant b, unloading on the Germans the problem of how to best use the troops made available in France
Second point: Cadorna was not autonomous in his decisions. OTL His choices were the result, in addition to an infamous operational scenario, one thing is fighting in Flanders, one thing in the snow at 2000 meters high in the Dolomites or in that stone hell that is the Karst, where there is no water and it is impossible to dig trenches, even of the continuous compromise with the requests of the allied commands, who did not have the faintest idea of what the Italian front was like and made far-fetched requests and the manias of Roman politicians ... ITL will be the same thing: Cadorna's decisions will be subordinated to German decisions ... And since in Berlin they know it's idiotic to attack in the Alps, Cadorna will not
Nicky is not the sort of man capable of doing that, though. He had about a dozen opportunities in 1916 alone to arrest/delay the February Revolution and he didn't take a single one of them. There's a reason revolutions tend to happen under hilariously incompetent monarchs.
Impossible; the Romanov Dynasty's future is tied up in the war. If Russia loses, then so ends the Romanov Dynasty.
Thanks for the detailed feedback-- this is going to be very helpful in writing out the war. You've highlighted several weaknesses in both my preexisting chapters and notes/head-canon, for which I'm grateful. Much of this makes sense- I can easily see tensions between the centralised German high command, with its vision for the war, and the fiercely independent Cadorna.As they say in Italy, calm and chalk. Before guessing, on the Italian war plans in the First World War, it is advisable to consult the archive of the historical office of the Italian Army General Staff, which is publicly available on the Internet.
Archivio documentale
First point: due to the bizarre and unforeseen circumstances with which Cadorna obtained his role, he did not have the time to elaborate any battle plans and had to adopt those elaborated by his predecessor Enrico Cosenz in 1894. If this OTL applies to the front Austro-Hungarian, ITL will be the same for the French Front. Now, Cosenz had two different operational hypotheses in the war against France, which varied according to whether or not English neutrality was.
If London had remained neutral, the Italians would have remained on the defensive in the Alps, counting on the wear and tear of the French troops, they would have occupied Corsica and subsequently landed at the mouth of the Rhone, in an attempt to lock the Army of the Alps in a pocket ... Attempt doable ? Probably not, but both the Italian army and the fleet have engaged with exercises and with the adoption of the appropriate means to make this operation feasible. Think of the ships of the Stella d'Italia Class and Lauria, which had a dual role: battleship and landing ship ... To the appointment of a capable and particularly aggressive admiral, far superior to the French counterpart, the Duke of Abruzzo, who between the other used studies and exercises on possible landings to organize and guide the Serbian evacuation. To the operational doctrine of Thaon di Ravel, on naval warfare that used aircraft and MAS to bottle the enemy fleet in the port, in the prediction that the French had damaged, during the landing operations, the Italian battleships and cruisers, making them unusable. Among other things, the Italian general staff was convinced that even the French, in their war plans, had planned a landing near Rome ... Which led to one of the most colossal waste of public money in Italy. , the construction of the system of fortresses and batteries to defend the city, never used
If London had been alongside Paris, the Italian high command was a little smarter than the German one, obviously, since the Italian fleet was not suicidal, the plan would have been different. Corsica would still have been occupied, in the Alps the Italian army would have been on the defensive, but the troops involved in the landing would have been moved, in some way, Cosenz had also proposed to rent the Swiss railways, in Alsace, to give a hand to the German ally ... If you notice, no North African scenario is foreseen, because at the time of the drafting of the Cosenz plan, the conquest of Libya was far from coming and no one had bothered to update the plans. So, Cadorna, having no time to hypothesize anything else, would have adapted to variant b, unloading on the Germans the problem of how to best use the troops made available in France
Second point: Cadorna was not autonomous in his decisions. OTL His choices were the result, in addition to an infamous operational scenario, one thing is fighting in Flanders, one thing in the snow at 2000 meters high in the Dolomites or in that stone hell that is the Karst, where there is no water and it is impossible to dig trenches, even of the continuous compromise with the requests of the allied commands, who did not have the faintest idea of what the Italian front was like and made far-fetched requests and the manias of Roman politicians ... ITL will be the same thing: Cadorna's decisions will be subordinated to German decisions ... And since in Berlin they know it's idiotic to attack in the Alps, Cadorna will not
Going to do my best to translate the documents you've linked to, but I may ask you questions about one or two things as I need to.
Thanks again for the constructive criticism and especially the resources-- it all helps, believe me!
Hm. For a while now I’ve thought the most productive thing a CP-aligned Italy could do would be to focus on the Balkans instead of attacking the French directly. Occupy Albania and hit the Serbians from behind, maybe even destroy their army if the offensive is well-coordinated. The commitment of manpower would also help convince Bulgaria to enter the war and dissuade Romania from doing the same.
And then the advantage snowballs, as Austrian troops are freed up to fight the Russians, which frees up German troops to fight in the West. If Italy has men to spare they could take up occupation duties in quiet sectors of the front to free up even more troops. It’s not a sexy contribution and won’t satisfy Cadorna’s need for death or glory, but it seems like the wiser move. It also positions Italy to make sure they get what they’re promised in Albania.
And then the advantage snowballs, as Austrian troops are freed up to fight the Russians, which frees up German troops to fight in the West. If Italy has men to spare they could take up occupation duties in quiet sectors of the front to free up even more troops. It’s not a sexy contribution and won’t satisfy Cadorna’s need for death or glory, but it seems like the wiser move. It also positions Italy to make sure they get what they’re promised in Albania.
This is the most persuasive argument in favor of Italy insisting on this tack, especially since it’s hard to do much of anything in the Alps
You raise a great point.
The only issue would be logistics: supplying an expeditionary force in the Balkans would be tricky. However, there'd be at least some political will to do it (securing Italian interests in the region), and it would nicely dovetail with the final crushing of Serbia. The trick will be getting Cadorna and the German high command to okay it.
This one's going in the notes.
I think you have Falkenhayn, at least, at "This strategy could free up German troops to win the Western Front."
Supply wise, it’s not that hard. I doubt the Entente will be able to contest the Adriatic.
I'm inclined to agree Albania is Italy's best bet. They shouldn't have too much trouble supplying or overrunning Albania. It's one of their big war aims, and it's their most realistic war aim. Just the presence of Italy occupying Albania may significantly weaken Serbia also, possibly making it doomed before OTL. Italy and Austria Hungary collectively should be able to mostly control the Adriatic. Given that Germany ok'd a big offensive against the Serbians historically in 1915, I suspect they'd be happy to have the help.
The presence of Italian armies holding the Alps may also tie down some more French forces, because they do have to at least honor the threat. Not sure how many forces they had there historically.
Yeah, even stationing troops in the Alps, and not necessarily high quality for that matter, would achieve the intended purpose.
I dont think Italy needs to worry about making an impact from the onset. Draw some French forces south, overrun Albania and help defeat Serbia thereby liberating 600000 Austria-Hungarian, German, and Bulgarien troops, that accelerating the defeat of Russia. It’s only when they only have the western enemy left the troubles begin.
Also keep in mind that the figure of Cadorna is much more complex than you think and her actions are not silly, but respond to a specific rational logic.Cadorna was a man of the nineteenth century, stubborn as a mule, not very diplomatic, incorruptible, something very rare among Italian generals, and with a great cold blood: something that many ignore, he was boundless culture in all fields including the history of art. also helped by an out of the ordinary memory (he recited the Divine Comedy by heart); he spoke French as well as Italian. He loved the mountains and knew the whole front line which he had also painted in various watercolors.When he was appointed in place of his predecessor Pollio, he was on the threshold of sixty-one years, he had not yet received any operational command on the theater of war. So, I have experience, he found himself catapulted into the middle of the Great War.
The first problem he had to face was politics: unlike France, Russia and Germany, where his reasons were subordinate to those of the generals, which precipitated events in 1914, the opposite happened in Italy. Cadorna knew that he would have to fight, but not against whom and when. Thus, he who since 1912, when he was put at the head of the second army, stationed in Genoa, had dedicated himself to preparing the fortifications of the border with France and to the study of cooperation between infantry and artillery, in order to stop the advanced enemies, in a few months he had to redesign all war plans from scratch.In particular, the negotiations with the Entente, which began on March 4, the negotiations lasted until April 26, while the uncertainty that reigned at the time in political-diplomatic circles, a consequence of a conduct based on similar opportunistic criteria, determined a significant delay in issuing the first mobilization orders
After the first provisions for a partial and purely precautionary mobilization, only on May 5 Cadorna was explicitly informed by Salandra of the need for a general mobilization, with a view to going to war against Austria-Hungary by the 26th of the same month.Article 2 of the Pact of London, signed by Salandra (but guarantor of the King) without Cadorna's knowledge, obliged Italy to keep the Austrians busy with all its resources. In fact, it therefore placed the Italian army under the allied command which requested its commitment every time the Germans attacked the French front, which greatly limited Cadorna's operational freedom, as happened on the occasion of Caporetto.
The second problem was tactical-organizational: Pollio's Prussian approach, with its enveloping and pincer maneuvers, presupposed a high level of training of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, officers of considerable preparation and a suitable terrain: due to the chronic lack of funds , the first two requirements had never been met, leading to petty figures in Libya. For the second, the Alps and the Karst did not allow the same mobility and tactical flexibility as the Polish plains and northern France.To find an alternative, he needed genius: Cadorna, despite his flashes of creativity, did not have one, as on the other hand Joffre, Haig and Nivelle. His ideas were no different from those of his contemporaries generals: from the French doctrine essentially centered on elan, to the Austrian maxim of "Vorwärts bis in den Feind" ("Always and in any case forward to the enemy").
Cadorna in his "red book" said he was convinced that an offensive movement would always result in a frontal attack, made very expensive by modern weapons if not well prepared and conducted; he believed, however, that the coordination of the various weapons, the exploitation of the land by the chains of advancing shooters and a cold determination of the commander would have made it possible to carry out a successful frontal attack as well. However, authoritative commanders, close-knit cadres, disciplined troops were needed: and precisely the last part was dedicated to the education of the departments, in whichthey recommended exercises of cadres to opposing parties on the ground and on paper.
The same conclusions that the German generals had reached: only that they had these things, the Italians did not. To get them, Cadorna started with the easiest things: knowing the chickens and mindful of the figures of chocolatiers made in previous years due to generals engaged in bickering among themselves, he centered his command on himself; moreover, not having this great charisma, he became convinced that the best way not to cause his troops to fall into chaos was to impose an iron discipline.
And the objective situation did not help him: Pollio had left an operetta army in his hands, on paper modern and efficient, in practice a madhouse: the lack of education of the third category recruits forced the recall of 13 enlisted classes to find the staff of soldiers to be sent to the front line, with an increase in times all in favor of the enemy; the mobile militia, provided for in the Army system, had not even been constituted; the fortress artillery was not in sufficient number to arm all the works completed and declared operational; in case of mobilization
general only some army corps had updated the list of quadrupeds to be ordered; of the 36 field artillery regiments envisaged on the map, 5 were not yet constituted and 5 were in the completion phase; of the 86 batteries of 75mm guns model 1911 - Deport - which were expected to enter service as early as 1913, only 12 were built in 1914; for the mountain batteries the material had not yet been foreseen, while the heavy field regiments had the howitzers but not the guns.
For the type of war that was taking shape, the situation of the machine gun sections was also serious: the equipment on paper was one section of machine guns per infantry battalion of the standing Army, one for each regiment of mobile militia and for each Regiment. cavalry, and there should also have been two sections for each Alpine battalion; in reality, in the event of mobilization, one could only count on 150 sections of machine guns for the entire Army.
Military education was also lacking due to the scarcity of shooting ranges and training camps, which made it difficult for already discharged soldiers to be recalled for education. The icing on the cake, given that for the Triple Alliance we had to make war on France, the geographical maps of the Austrian territory were old and of a very large scale, and there were no detailed ones. In addition, there were no railway connections dedicated to military transports and in the border stations the number of tracks for the stop of arriving and departing trains was inadequate.
Cadorna, with an unexpected organizational talent, managed to make this brothel a dignified instrument of war. And he did this with relentless energy, cleaning up, exonerating 206 generals and 255 colonels, organizing dignified logistics, and expanding the staff: the 548 infantry battalions of 1915 became 867 in 1917, with immensely superior armament, with 3,000 pieces of medium caliber instead of 246 and 5,000 of small caliber instead of 1,772.
The third problem was strategic and here Cadorna could do very little: the Alps are what they are and despite the good will of the Duke of Abruzzi, planning the landing on the French coasts is one thing, the Dalmatian coasts are one thing.At the same time, clashing with both Italian politics, anchored to a Risorgimento perspective, and allied commands, which were unable to look beyond Flanders, had a global perspective on the conflict. He would have liked to reduce the Italian forces in Libya and Albania and increase them in Macedonia, where they could represent a real danger to the enemy. He was also in favor of closer coordination with the allied armies, seeking the support of the Russians and Serbs in 1915, unleashing more than one agreed offensive with the Anglo-French, proposing in 1917 the concentration of the efforts of the Entente against Austria. -Hungary, weak point of the enemy coalition.
Cadorna, unlike what is said, was one of the few generals of World War I to have understood modern warfare, the Materialschlacht, a natural consequence of the war of attrition induced by the advent of the trenches. Also in this case the reasoning underlying Cadorna's decisions followed a simple quantitative logic (in relation to the quality of the troops, the characteristics of the terrain, the logistical situation and the alliances), based on the approach that required greater firepower to undermine entrenchments. more and more extensive and profound.
A strategy that, however, to be effectively implemented, needed an industrial base that Italy did not have: having to marry with dried figs, at the beginning it had to rely cynically on the human mass, counting on the greater Italian capacity to bear the losses.
Over time, as already mentioned, it was gradually replaced by firepower: this approach was leading Austria-Hungary to defeat by virtue of the simple disparity of the forces involved: already at the time of the conquest of Gorizia, Cadorna had just started to affect their human reserves, while the Austro-Hungarians had at that moment to face the first serious crisis since the beginning of the operations.
In the aftermath of the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, the Austrian situation had become desperate, with only Mount Ermada now remaining to block the passage of the Italian advance across the Karst towards Trieste: the resistance had reached a breaking point , and precisely this evidence induced the German High Command to finally grant the coveted reinforcements that led to the constitution of the XIV Army in view of that planned offensive of lightening.
In fact, Caporetto was the unexpected consequence of his strategic vision ... ITL Cadorna is aware that the battle of numbers is in favor of France: therefore, while waiting to modernize the Italian army with German help, it will maintain a delayed attitude. He will organize an expeditionary force in the Balkans, which given the difficulties in coordinating with the Austro-Hungarians, will not do much and will probably open an African front: this implies that the Italian attempt to find a compromise with Senussia, which due to both OTL shares failed, here could have a positive outcome
Can't tell how much of this is accurate, but I'm looking forward to the replies. Actual discussion instead of memeing is always welcome with figures like Cadorna.
I guess I'm still surprised to be hearing that even by 1914 the Italian army was still so fixated on war plans against France that when they entered the war IOTL they simply had no contingency planning for war with Austria-Hungary instead. Everything I've heard around here said that the Italians were so outraged by the Bosnia Crisis in 1908 that they were out for Austrian blood ever since. As a result, they'd never honor the Triple Alliance and would turn on them at the first opportunity because they felt that betrayed.
If their righteous indignation didn't even get them to stop making war plans exclusively against the French, I'm starting to suspect posters were greatly exaggerating Italian rage over Bosnia just to make Austria-Hungary the villain in 1915.
If their righteous indignation didn't even get them to stop making war plans exclusively against the French, I'm starting to suspect posters were greatly exaggerating Italian rage over Bosnia just to make Austria-Hungary the villain in 1915.
Thanks for taking the time to type this out. So much to work with here.
You're right in that I've probably taken too harsh of a view on the man and it's great to get a different perspective. Factors you mentioned- the lack of a solid industrial base and inadequate railways- all made a huge difference in OTL's war; the same will hold true here. And it's natural that those, not just incompetence or haha stupid funny general, were prime causes of failure. Memes and cliches are all well and good but, if I'm trying to write 'hard' alternate history, analysis is preferable.
I really hope to do the man justice here, even if his career will still probably end similar to OTL's.
Now my question is: what books have you read on Cadorna, as well as WWI Italy more generally, which have informed your view? I'd be interested to do some more research on the topic myself and any pointers would be much appreciated.
And below we have a political update... the last one before war breaks out. Hopefully it will clear up a few things as to how Italy swings from an anti-British neutral to an active combatant. (Though I will confess the German diplomats display unusual skill and the Austro-Hungarian and Italian ones unusual tolerance for one another). Also, if I've erred in my depiction of Salandra's replacement Sidney Sonnino please do let me know... I think the depiction of him makes sense but you know Italian politics better than I.
*Second to last before war.* Bullets will fly in Chapter VII and that's a promise*
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