REDUX: Place In The Sun: What If Italy Joined The Central Powers?

Just think that Joffre and Michel accused La Croux, who had formulated the hypothesis of 21 days, of defeatism: but among other things, they are the same ones who hypothesized, thanks to the XVII plan, to march through the streets of Berlin by Christmas ... But the Germans too were convinced of a short war. The only skeptic on the rapid war was the Italian General Staff: Cosenz, Pollio and Cadorna had hypothesized in their scenarios a war of two or three years, with a rate of losses which, although lower than what actually took place, was far higher than that hypothesized by the French and Germans ... This is because they were based on the analyzes that Caviglia had made on the Russian-Japanese war ...
How are you convincing me that the Italians were the realistic ones in the Great War?! Either way, your posts have been rather helpful in getting me to reconsider my assumptions about the competency of various forces in WWI.
 
Two of these are definitely happening.
I hope Corsica becomes Italian clay.
How are you convincing me that the Italians were the realistic ones in the Great War?! Either way, your posts have been rather helpful in getting me to reconsider my assumptions about the competency of various forces in WWI.
I think it's more that Cardona didn't change tactics while France, Britain and Germany had to evolve or die.
 
How are you convincing me that the Italians were the realistic ones in the Great War?! Either way, your posts have been rather helpful in getting me to reconsider my assumptions about the competency of various forces in WWI.

The problem is that a disproportionate amount of documents both from the Supreme Command and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being written in Italian, are not known abroad, so there is a distorted idea of what is happening in Rome and of the rationales that are behind a series of decisions. For example, there is all the correspondence between San Giuliano, foreign minister, and Pollio, Cadorna's predecessor, who is pro-German. The general, instead of declaring himself ready to mobilize, literally begs the minister to find a compromise and mediation, because 1) defines the Moltke plan. which he knew broadly, for joint exercises and coordination between staffs "garbage destined for failure" and which lead to the British naval blockade "harmful to Italian interests" 2) Quoting Caviglia's report on the Russian-Japanese war, he hypothesizes a huge bloodbath 3) It highlights that the Italian army, due to lack of artillery and machine guns, will not be ready to fight before the "Second half of 1916"

Among other things, the Caviglia report should also be on Google Books, since the general published it with the title

The war between Russia and Japan (1904-1905)

to then rework it in the essay

The Secret of Peace: Russo-Japanese War

with all his analyzes on war, on the machine gun-barbed wire pair

Or the report of the military attaché at the Paris embassy to the Italian government, written shortly before the Battle of the Marne, Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni Giuseppe Breganze which ended by saying

"Despite the German successes, I would like to postpone the intervention as late as possible. I believe that this war will be very long and painful".

In Italy, however, unlike in Germany, the politicians and not the generals commanded: for this reason the General Staff, despite its perplexities, was unable to impose its reasons and was forced to fight a war in conditions that it considered not optimal.

Among other things, the Russian-Japanese war, which the Italians, unlike the French and Germans, studied in depth, was also analyzed by the admirals ... Here are several studies on the subject


Other interesting material, which I hope has been translated into English, is the volume Generali in Guerra, of the historical office of the Italian army, which contains the unpublished diary of Major General Alberto Michele Cangemi and the official reports of the Marshal of Italy. Enrico Caviglia, especially for the first chapter, on the phases preceding the entry into the war
 
In Italy, however, unlike in Germany, the politicians and not the generals commanded: for this reason the General Staff, despite its perplexities, was unable to impose its reasons and was forced to fight a war in conditions that it considered not optimal.
Well Giolitti was strongly pro neutrality because know that Italy was not really ready for the bloodbath as many other, unfortunely the one currently in the government and the king are not among them; plus there is the problem of Cadorna character...as he really doesn't have a lot of friends in the goverment and the one that will have been crucial to keep Italy out of this was also the one that he hated the most
 
Well Giolitti was strongly pro neutrality because know that Italy was not really ready for the bloodbath as many other, unfortunely the one currently in the government and the king are not among them; plus there is the problem of Cadorna character...as he really doesn't have a lot of friends in the goverment and the one that will have been crucial to keep Italy out of this was also the one that he hated the most

Attention, however, the problem of neutrality arises well before Cadorna: the first supporter, in the military summits, I do not say of neutrality, but of participating as late as possible, so that the execution is dignifiedly ready is the predecessor, Pollio, who died on July 1, 1914, but before the crisis broke out, he had already raised the flag on the risks and problems of war, well before the ultimatum to Serbia: this is because, being a personal friend of both Conrad and Moltke jr, he had clear the air ... Among other things, the idea of the impossible character of Cadorna is a construction in retrospect, when it is useful to make him the scapegoat of Caporetto, saving the rest of the hut ... Cadorna is chosen because considered much more malleable than the alternatives Baldissera and Zuppelli and had excellent relations with Vittorio Emanuele III and Sidney Sonnino .... Many of his decisions, as a good Italian, also arise from the need to keep the protectors good politicians...
 
My guess is the Italian navy won't seek a Jutland with France. Trading a lot of ships with the French is a bad deal for Italy. Tying up the French and British fleets with a joint 'fleet in being' while spending minimal coal and even more minimal blood and steel is more in their interest.
 
Thanks as always for the comments guys.
Next couple chapters might be a little delayed as I need to sit and do some research. Taking the time to get it right is key.


Personally, I'm hoping Italy still gets amply compensated for all her losses, much like in the first version of this TL. Trentino and Trieste for starters, then Albania, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, plus Tunisia and Djibouti. Oh, and getting Eritrea and Italian Somaliland back, the British will almost certainly occupy that colony in the war. Maybe no border revisions in Libya, or getting British Somaliland, I'll admit in hindsight Italy getting Britain to give them those was somewhat far-fetched, likewise for being able to buy Malta.

Still, everything else was fine. If nothing else, it binds Italy closer to their allies in the north...and that maybe someday, there'll be a timeline where the victorious CPs get ISOT to OTL just as the Entente are patting each other on the back...and Orlando, on seeing CP Italy drunk on the spoils of war - and more to the point, the Triple Alliance actually kept its word on promised gains - compared to OTL's mutilated peace, proceeds to rip his shirt off before punching Wilson twice, turns him around, and finishes him with a German suplex.

Okay, maybe that's too crazy...well, not really, imagining Wilson getting sucker-punched before Clemenceau gets a kick in the balls before the bodyguards manage to drag Orlando off (but still giving Lloyd-George the one-finger salute) is just darling.
Italy will get some compensation but it won't be everything they'd hoped for. There will absolutely be no sale of Malta in Redux- no way the British would sacrifice their position in the central Mediterranean for any amount of cash. Nor will they gain British or French Somaliland; if anything, they might lose their own East African holdings at the peace table (even if they get compensation). Remember British-Italian relations are far worse in this version.

Perhaps once TTL is finished, I could write such a short story. The comic value would be immense.

Sure Cadorna and god it pain me phisically said that, was greatly constricted by the terrain in his effort and strategy and was extremely good at organize and logistic as the preparation of the army before the Dow and the transfer from the French to the A-H border has been something short of a miracle, plus was a good strategist as the counterattack during the Battaglia degli Altipiani showed...unfortunely once the war started and become a 'war of attrition' all his 'good' bit become not only secondary but overshadowed by his bad part aka an abysmall capacity to manage and relate with the human side of the equation, something that was a characteristic of all his previous career and that in such a long war become a very important factor. His 'my way or the highway' united to a 'never my fault attitude' really doesn't win any loyalty or friendships, his horrible relationships with the goverment really stopped any type of real coordination; he has always been an harsher disciplinary in any of his previous assignement but frankly the excess during the war basically broke the italian army, at Caporetto many soldiers, my grand grandfather among them, were faced with the decision to chose between surrender and hope for the mercy of the enemy sometimes even shooting themselfs in the foot or return to the tender care of the army and Cadorna...many gone for option 1 (my grand grandpa among them and he always said that was the only reason he come back alive even if in the end the self inflicted wound that never healed properly killed him, more than 60 years later).

Said that, sure even him will point to the fact that the OG plan was to send the troops in Germany because, well the terrain is THAT difficult, but this will also mean put the troops on German command (something that will generally dislike a lot)
Some great points here, and thank you for sharing your great-grandfather's tale; it's a reminder that "war is hell and you cannot refine it". Hopefully he would have pulled through in TTL.

Cadorna's personality will be the same here but his French opposite number (Joffre) was the same sort of person. It'll be interesting to watch two of WWI's most aggressive, stubborn commanders go against one another... all in the world's worst terrain.

As the next update will show, Cadorna's reluctance to put Italian troops under German command will keep the expeditionary force from the Western Front for some while.
That doesn't bode well for Italian War Gains
A good catch-- no it does not!
Imagine if the Italian military was operating with the same philosophy as the Italian government. What would a sacro egoismo military do?

Well, in my opinion it would attempt to gain its objectives with as little fighting as possible. It would posture by putting a substantial force on the French border in the Alps. It would probably skirmish a little with alpine troops, which I understand it actually has good exemplars of, but not commit to much besides probes and the like. It's main value there to the Germans would be forcing the French to honor their threat, probably pulling divisions and artillery.

Similarly its navy would not seek any decisive engagement, but would in concert with the Austria-Hungarian (and maybe even part of the Ottoman) navies would make the Adriatic theirs and would deter the Entente navies from decisive engagement. This might force the UK to detail more naval forces to the Med, which would weaken them elsewhere.

And by rapidly taking Albania, which should be pretty easy, they then threaten Serbia from the south (and Montenegro as well). This forces both of those Entente powers to weaken their defenses against Austria Hungary which might well cause a breakthrough without the need for Italians to spend much blood or treasure.

The true coup of sacro egoismo is probably beyond its Italian practitioners though. That would be to get the Entente to peace out sometime in early 1916 with France in worse shape than OTL, Serbia and Montenegro crushed, Romania not in the Entente (and maybe in the Triple Alliance), Russia on the ropes, and the US not interested in getting involved. That would allow Italy to get a substantial windfall at a low price in blood and treasure.
Some great analysis here.

There are voices on both sides ITTL calling for the sort of strategic defence you're describing but, at least on land, it's not "glorious" and so won't fly. I actually wrote several lengthy paragraphs in my test thread on the French adopting this strategy before deleting them-- this wasn't how Joffre thought. The same applies to Cadorna.

Regarding the Navy you're right- a fleet in being spread throughout the coast will keep hostile ships away from Italian internal waters. Austria-Hungary's navy would be a great asset in this though there might be political problems.

I'm considering having a Italian campaign in Albania but we'll have to see.

I agree with you on "the true coup of sacro egoismo"-- parts of it will happen ITTL though Germany will be the driving force of events.
Or for that matter, keep Greece out of the war. If the Italians occupy Albania, while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria occupy Serbia and Montenegro, and either Romania stays neutral or joins the CP, even Venizelos wouldn't be crazy enough to join the Entente. Greece would be dogpiled and stomped flat.
Greece will not be joining the war ITTL: Venizelos and King Constantine, while nowhere near friends or allies, will at least not be establishing rival governments here!
Nice chapter and the story is really interesting… but I found just a couple of issues with some spellings as you have written inghlesi instead of inglesi and Bolanzo instead of Bolzano
Thanks for the kind words and corrections. Will fix.
Great readig. Only one thing, UK territorial waters back then were 3 nautical miles ie little over 5 and half kilometers (5.556 km) from coast line, and same goes for France too. The OTL expansion of terrtorial waters from 3 to 12 miles was for most countries in the second half of 20th century, UK did it in the late mid 1980-s (precisely 1987), France's 1967 straight baselines study says recent legislation of 12 miles. When the Italian ship was forced from the mid channel to British waters by British laid minefelds, then a good lawer could present it as a act of piracy. Or alternatively British commander did lie and Italians were not in UK waters. So or so, the orders from UK commander to Italians were probably illegal. It could end up quite nasty for the personell of UK-s Royal Navy.
International maritime law is not my area of expertise-- thanks for pointing this out.
Let's say the British commander lied; that's just as plausible and plays into Italy's TTL grievances perfectly.
(Even though Britannia obviously rules the waves, so- wait...)
Of course the reaction of OTL Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd-George as well as their Central Powers counterparts toward Italy being seemingly the MVP of that timeline if the Redux follows the first version narrative would also be priceless.

OTL German and Austian delegates "We won thanks to those Cheating Tomatoes!?"

OTL Entente Delegates and Commanders "Where was all that competence and success when they were on OUR side!?"

Skip to German and Austrian delegates returning to their now victorious nations, along with their new Italian "best friends, while Clemenceau screamed in rage of a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory and even more French territories being lost to Germany AND Italy. Llyod George banging his head against the wall and an unconcious Wilson with both Britain and the USA public being just done with this shit. They already gone through hell for 4 years, no way they are going to try it again against a stronger Central Power.

Would be funny if TTL Japan also comes along with territories in Southeast Asia stolen from France. Clemenceaus rage would be apocalyptic in response to Japan smug reply of " French Colonies? What French Colonies? There are only independent asian nations under our " protection"."
See above-- I like the allegorical humour!
Later, during the Imperial Conference...

Australia and Canada: We can't trust the Japs! They're sneaky little backstabbers! Look at what they did to France once they saw the opportunity! Besides, they're just yellow monkeys! We shouldn't have to lower ourselves to consort with them.
Britain: *raises hands placatingly* Okay, okay...I'll see what I can do.

...then when the topic of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance comes up...

Britain: Sorry, Japan, we can't be allies with you anymore. Rule, Britannia, and all that. Good luck, though, it was great while it lasted.
Japan: Okay.
Britain: Wait, really?
Japan: We saw this coming, you know. I mean, you are Perfidious Albion, after all.
Britain: :mad:
Japan: U mad, bro?

...and finally, CP and Japanese delegates announce the formation of the new Quintuple Alliance.

Britain: FUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU-!
The CPs: :cool::cool::cool::cool::cool:
Once again very funny- I should add though that it's actually quite a plausible sequence of events. My plans for Japan in this version are far more developed than in 1.0 and this is fairly close to the mark.

Let's start with a couple of data, both geographical and historical. In geographical and military terms, the border between Italy and France favors France. The theater of operations from the border to the Rhone has a depth of 200 km of mountainous terrain with multiple dams. The Italian side is shorter, all the valleys descend directly to the Po Valley, with different lengths. The greatest depth in the north with the Aosta valley; it decreases with the Susa and Chisone valleys (the route between France and Italy most traveled by armies); it becomes minimal between the Monviso and the Turin plain (less than 20 km as the crow flies); it grows again going down towards Cuneo and then the sea. There are five passes that can be traveled by vehicles: the Piccolo San Bernardo to the north, towards the Aosta valley. Mont Cenis and Montgenèvre in the center, towards Turin. Colle della Maddalena (col de Larche for the French) and Colle di Tenda to the south, towards Cuneo. Plus the narrow road along the coast. The other passes were accessible only on foot and by mules. so they were not practicable for any offensive.

Historical fact: in 1904 the Deuxième Bureau, the secret service of the French army, learns of the fundamental lines of the war plan adopted by the enemy general staff, thanks to the sensational revelations of the German spy Le Vengeur, an officer of the Germanic army of which has never been able to discover the identity that during a series of daring meetings with French emissaries, presents, upon payment of a large sum of money, an important documentation that revealed the first version of the so-called Schlieffen Plan: which then they didn't believe you, it was one of the great mistakes of World War I. However, the French had no knowledge of Cosenz's plans.

They knew neither of the occupation of Corsica, nor of the hypotheses of landing on the mouth of the Rhone: they only knew that the Italians would be on the defensive in the Alps and that they would transfer an expeditionary force to Alsace. Therefore, in a much less detailed way than Plan XVII, they had hypothesized the following strategy, based on three lines of attack: Cuneo via Col di Tenda, Turin via Moncenisio and from Nice towards Liguria, all supported by an action by the fleet on Genoa and Livorno ...

All based on the principle that the positive characteristics of the French soldier, according to the General Staff of Paris naturally led to the attack and endowed with momentum (elan) and courage (cran) superior to the soldiers of any enemies, would have allowed to overwhelm the Italians and occupy Piedmont in 21 days ... Obviously, with the occupation of Turin, Paris believed that Italy was asking for a separate peace. Then, that the Italians, starting with Cosenz, had a clear idea of the enemy strategy and were fortifying and organizing the defense of those passes, would have been a different matter ...
Thank you again for the information. This will all come into play over the next few chapters.
That'll be the Italians' one bright spot: France thinking élan makes them bulletproof.
Indeed!
Wow and i always thought that was the japanese military leadership in WW2 that have such adversial relationship with reality but the French planning staff is giving them a serious challenge. 21 days to pass through the alps and occupy Piedmont? If they can do that they can march directly towards Berlin
The distance from the border to Turin approximately equals that from Ypres to Ghent or Artois-Loos to Mons, and over some of Europe's roughest terrain.
Want to bet?
How are you convincing me that the Italians were the realistic ones in the Great War?! Either way, your posts have been rather helpful in getting me to reconsider my assumptions about the competency of various forces in WWI.
Me too- for which I'm grateful.
Attention, however, the problem of neutrality arises well before Cadorna: the first supporter, in the military summits, I do not say of neutrality, but of participating as late as possible, so that the execution is dignifiedly ready is the predecessor, Pollio, who died on July 1, 1914, but before the crisis broke out, he had already raised the flag on the risks and problems of war, well before the ultimatum to Serbia: this is because, being a personal friend of both Conrad and Moltke jr, he had clear the air ... Among other things, the idea of the impossible character of Cadorna is a construction in retrospect, when it is useful to make him the scapegoat of Caporetto, saving the rest of the hut ... Cadorna is chosen because considered much more malleable than the alternatives Baldissera and Zuppelli and had excellent relations with Vittorio Emanuele III and Sidney Sonnino .... Many of his decisions, as a good Italian, also arise from the need to keep the protectors good politicians...
I agree that Pollio was a major influence on Italy's war, even if he never lived to see it. I actually considered having him survive as the new PoD, but decided against it.
You're right in that Caporetto probably did undue harm to Cadorna's reputation- after all, many other WWI generals committed the same errors he did yet he was the only one to suffer a strategic defeat on that scale.

Sonnino's good relations with Cadorna were a factor in making him Salandra's replacement ITTL.

Unique and interesting TL, liked and watched :D
Glad to have you aboard!
 
My guess is the Italian navy won't seek a Jutland with France. Trading a lot of ships with the French is a bad deal for Italy. Tying up the French and British fleets with a joint 'fleet in being' while spending minimal coal and even more minimal blood and steel is more in their interest.
Having a fleet in being would make more sense-- but I can see an attempted shore bombardment escalating.
There's also the question: will France seek a Jutland with Italy?
 
Having a fleet in being would make more sense-- but I can see an attempted shore bombardment escalating.
There's also the question: will France seek a Jutland with Italy?
Yeah that's a serious question. It's bad for France too. Trading ships with Italy would reduce France's naval rank considerably on the world scene. But the French don't seem to think that way, at least the WWI French. They might well try to get a decisive naval battle with Italy even though pretty much every outcome (other than ASB levels of exchange) is really bad for France in the long term.
 
Having a fleet in being would make more sense-- but I can see an attempted shore bombardment escalating.
There's also the question: will France seek a Jutland with Italy?
Nah. The lack of scouting assets, especially once the British battlecruisers are withdrawn, and their small margin of dreadnought superiority over the Italians means they'll have no interest in trying such. And, in fact, the Italians have a small window in late 1915/early 1916 where they have a margin of superiority of their own.

At that point the British will have to make a pretty hard choice about Indomitable and Inflexible, not to mention any other reinforcements. They need more battlecruisers in the North Sea, because the diversions to hunt down Von Spee's squadron dangerously narrowed their margin over the Germans in that category. But without the battlecruisers, the Italian armored cruisers and Italo-Austrian scout cruisers are going to be extremely difficult for the French to stop on their own, and with a nominal dreadnought superiority of 9 or potentially even 10 to 4 they could very well go for a major fleet battle.
 
Yeah that's a serious question. It's bad for France too. Trading ships with Italy would reduce France's naval rank considerably on the world scene. But the French don't seem to think that way, at least the WWI French. They might well try to get a decisive naval battle with Italy even though pretty much every outcome (other than ASB levels of exchange) is really bad for France in the long term.
Agreed. Politically, being able to say "we've sent the Italian fleet to the bottom!" would be a great boost for morale/prestige. It would hurt Italy especially badly, that country lacking a fleet on the scale of the other Great Powers.

I agree with @CV12Hornet that it would be ill-advised tactically and strategically... but if the political will is there I can see it happening.
 
Agreed. Politically, being able to say "we've sent the Italian fleet to the bottom!" would be a great boost for morale/prestige. It would hurt Italy especially badly, that country lacking a fleet on the scale of the other Great Powers.

I agree with @CV12Hornet that it would be ill-advised tactically and strategically... but if the political will is there I can see it happening.
I seem to recall that the French and Italian navies in WWI were pretty close, with the advantage to Italy if closer to their bases than France. But maybe the French could get a combined fleet going with the UK, using some of what was historically deployed in the Gallipoli campaign. That would be a pretty epic naval battle if the Austrian and Ottoman and Italian navies went up against the Entente combined navy in the Med. Thing is, the only ones who'd win that battle would be the Germans, the US, and Japan.
 
French:

4 Dreadnoughts (Courbet-class)
6 Semi-Dreadnoughts (Danton-class)
6 Armored Cruisers (2 Leon Gambetta, 2 Edgar Quinet, Jules Michelet, Ernest Renan)
17 Destroyers (11 Bouclier-class, 6 Bisson-class)

Italo-Austrian

9 Dreadnoughts (Dante Alighieri, 3 Conte di Cavour class, 2 Andrea Doria class, 3 Tegetthoff class)
9 Semi-Dreadnoughts (2 Regina Margherita-class, 4 Regina Elena-class, 3 Radetzky-class)
5 Armored Cruisers (2 Pisa-class, 2 San Giorgio-class, Sankt George)
7 Scout Cruisers (3 Novara-class, 2 Nino Bixio-class, Quarto, Admiral Spaun)
22 Destroyers (6 Tatra-class, 6 Indomito-class, 2 Ardito-class, 2 Audace-class, 4 Rosolino Pilo-class)

Just for the record, these are the battle fleets we'd be looking at for a hypothetical late 1915 Med-Jutland, absent any British vessels. A combined Anglo-French fleet, based on what was committed to the Dardanelles, would probably look more like this:

Anglo-French:

5 Dreadnoughts (Courbet-class, Queen Elizabeth)
2 Battlecruisers (Invincible-class)
6 Semi-Dreadnoughts (Danton-class)
6 Armored Cruisers (2 Leon Gambetta, 2 Edgar Quinet, Jules Michelet, Ernest Renan)
4 Light Cruisers (3 Town-class, Phaeton)
??? Destroyers (11 Bouclier-class, 6 Bisson-class, lol I'm not trawling through the British destroyer list)

Which is a lot dicier for the Central Powers. But also not something that wants to offer battle to that combined fleet, either, in absence of knowledge of the Tegetthoff-class' lemon status.
 
Having a fleet in being would make more sense-- but I can see an attempted shore bombardment escalating.
There's also the question: will France seek a Jutland with Italy?
I think they'll try, but at the same time, Italy might also be considering it. The best way to describe any naval actions in the Med between the two powers is basically two cats, circling one another.

Which in and of itself, is a victory, as it means France has to be a lot more conservative with naval deployments.
 
I did a little more digging on the timing - and yeah, the British battlecruisers are back in the North Sea by now. Which is bad news bears for the Entente. Until the Brits can get them back into the theater, the Italians are going to have a pretty significant scouting advantage over the Entente in the Mediterranean.
 
The Germans can station zeppelins in Italy now for even more of an advantage in naval reconnaisance, right?
 
Italy's cruisers have a qualitative advantage too: 10-inch guns against French 7.6s. The RM can probably put one or two in the line if they really need to.
 
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