Frankly between Corsica and Tunisia, well Italy will prefer Tunisia and giving it up will be less humiliating for France as it's 'merely' a protectorate (sure it will hurt, they will not be happy and there will be resentment but it will politically much more acceptable )
REDUX: Place In The Sun: What If Italy Joined The Central Powers?
- Thread starter Kaiser Wilhelm the Tenth
- Start date
Frankly between Corsica and Tunisia, well Italy will prefer Tunisia and giving it up will be less humiliating for France as it's 'merely' a protectorate (sure it will hurt, they will not be happy and there will be resentment but it will politically much more acceptable )
pls don't ban me
Monthly Donor
yes and no.
officially Italy joined to finish the unification.
Corsica was part of Italy until Genoa was forced to give it France as payment. the Italians would be very pissed if at the end of the war if the government take Tunisia instead of "freeing" other Italians from french occupation.
but frankly speaking, if France loses, Germany in OTL was thinking of leaving them a good chunk of their colonies( like in Kaiserreich) but Italy would have taken Tunisia for sure as per "claim", since the Genoese controlled for some time Djerba
Come to think of it, with Italy having joined the Central Powers France does not only has to maintain an Alpine front but also needs to have some garrisons on Corsica to deter Italy from attempting any incursions and maybe keep an eye on any possible irredentists among the locals (no that there was much of that in OTL WWI, but with Italy an enemy things could develop differently)
Of course neither needs that much soldiers (and just as France needs some Garrisons on Corsica to deter Italy the latter will correspondingly need some extra Garrisons on Sardinia for the same reason) but those will be soldiers not available to the main fighting in Flanders.
Of course neither needs that much soldiers (and just as France needs some Garrisons on Corsica to deter Italy the latter will correspondingly need some extra Garrisons on Sardinia for the same reason) but those will be soldiers not available to the main fighting in Flanders.
Last edited:
pls don't ban me
Monthly Donor
i just thought about something, and hope i'm not mistaken, but weren't the Corsican people threaten very badly by the french since... always?
could there be some interested for the Italians to foment an open rebellion that might lead to France having to commit more troops on the island which might accidentally result in a entente version of the Armenian massacre?
it could be the event that the CP could use to counter the Belgium rapes etc.
i hope i did not some lines, i was just speaking theoretically and of course do not support such actions.
Was Corsica still that Italian by then, though? IIRC French overtook Italian (or was it Corsican? I know there's lots of dialect/language variability in Italy) in the 1850's. I mean, I know the irredentists still considered places like Dalmatia, which only had an Italian minority, as critical places, but would they really value Corsica that much? Would they value it over Tunisia?
There's also the aspect of national security - France holding Corsica leaves Rome pretty exposed, navally speaking, so Italy might want it for that. But if they don't hold the island itself Britain could end up very strenuously objecting to such a transfer, even if France itself has little ability to countermand such a request at the end of the war.
pls don't ban me
Monthly Donor
as far as i know even today Corsicans don't have a particular love for being part of France cause they want some autonomy at least.
i suppose that in the first decades of the 900 they might be willing to go with Italy if treated better.
The majority still spoke Corsican (which is more similar to Italian than many other dialects of the North and South of Italy) and only the elites spoke French (most of them though spoke also Italian). So yes, after Trento and Trieste Corsica was the most "italian" of the Irredente.
I think that the Italian language was still popular at least until WW2.
There is just no way that a victorious Italy will not annex Corsica. If you want an example, is like Bulgaria with North Macedonia
Well, according to Wikipedia (not the most reliable source I know but it is among the fastest to check) the Corsicans were among the most enthusiastic to join the French Army in WWI, although that might have been at least partly due to rather poor job prospects on the island otherwise, so I guess at least initially this ATL will be similar.
Of course should those extra garrisons needed on Corsica overwhelmingly be manned by men from mainland France (granted, there might be the odd coastal bombardment or such but compared to the hell of the trenches doing garrison duty on a Mediterranean Island would almost be like winning the deployment lottery, which rich parents might be enticed to rig for their sons) while the Corsican youth bleeds and dies in northern France then that is very likely to create discontent.
I've read a lot of comments saying that even after France naval defeat the Austrian navy will not risk itself, and I found them all quite logical and convincing, but sometimes war is not all that logic, sometimes is all politics and pride.
What the Italian defence minister told to di Revel, that the military branch capable of delivering results will get the majority of funds and power, is true in all the militaries of the world.
In normal times Austrian ships could have spent the war in port or simply patrolling the coast, but the Italian victory demonstrates that the Allies control over the sea can be contested. It may have been dumb luck, it may have been the French admiral being arrogant, but the fact remains that the Regia Marina got out there and won.
If the k.u.k. Kriegsmarine doesn't do the same, don't even try to do the same, don't they risk to be turned into a nonentity after the war? Little more than a glorified coast guard, forever bottled in the Adriatic by Italy and Italian controlled Albania.
IDK, I'm making sense? It seems to me political and morale concerns (Austria population needs a win too, considering that the army still got pretty mauled by the Russians) will weight on the decisions of the navy. And maybe there is a small window of time where the Austrians can operate in relative safety, while the British in the Med are scrambling to cover France losses but before reinforcements arrive from the Atlantic. Like 1-2 weeks?
What the Italian defence minister told to di Revel, that the military branch capable of delivering results will get the majority of funds and power, is true in all the militaries of the world.
In normal times Austrian ships could have spent the war in port or simply patrolling the coast, but the Italian victory demonstrates that the Allies control over the sea can be contested. It may have been dumb luck, it may have been the French admiral being arrogant, but the fact remains that the Regia Marina got out there and won.
If the k.u.k. Kriegsmarine doesn't do the same, don't even try to do the same, don't they risk to be turned into a nonentity after the war? Little more than a glorified coast guard, forever bottled in the Adriatic by Italy and Italian controlled Albania.
IDK, I'm making sense? It seems to me political and morale concerns (Austria population needs a win too, considering that the army still got pretty mauled by the Russians) will weight on the decisions of the navy. And maybe there is a small window of time where the Austrians can operate in relative safety, while the British in the Med are scrambling to cover France losses but before reinforcements arrive from the Atlantic. Like 1-2 weeks?
And what would be their target? Surface raid on Malta, Cyprus or British controlled Levant to support an Ottoman push?
Futher on the topic of Austro-Hungarian naval power, how can I convince you @Kaiser Wilhelm the Tenth to transfer Madagascar to AH in the peace treaty?
The Austrian navy can't stay all passive, especially not after the latest sea battle in this ATL (as described by the OP) lest Italy would gain more influence for any post-war carve-up (sorry, Vienna, but Montenegro is now an Italian vassal) or even Germany might start to see Italy as the one who actually helps the Central Power's cause in a meaningful way while the Austrian ships sit idly in the Adriatic sea.
Worst case could be that Berlin might start nudging Vienna into ceding at least those areas with substantial Italian majorities (would be an extra booster to Italian morale)
Of course most likely not outright during the war, but some secret diplomatic hijinks might just as well occur if the Austrian performance is all too lacklustre.
So yes, the Austrian navy has to do at least something.
At the minimum a substantial contribution towards guarding the Straits of Otranto (freeing up Italian ships which then can strike (or protect) elsewhere) and some raids into the Ionian Sea (or even the whole Eastern Med) to make those waters a bit more risky for Entente shipping (which would also be a small additional contribution towards keeping Greece neutral)
I do think a Corsica that declares for Italy is possible but I don't think it would be something that would be done due to Italy winning WWI. Perhaps something like France going down the deep end and becoming more authoritarian makes Corsican independence/Italian integration a lot more attractive, and a French civil war occurs where there's two French govs, one in Algeria and one in Paris. When Corsica declares which side its on it declares for Italy instead.
Chapter XIX- The Cold Days of February
Chapter XIX
The Cold Days of February
While the men under Admiral di Revel's command defeated the French off of Cannes, their comrades on land advanced towards the French defences at Menton with less spectacular results. This was through no fault of their own, but rather the logic of attrition which had run the war since the autumn of 1914. It remained far easier for a disciplined commander like di Revel to defy the odds on the open waves than for Italy's First Army to do the same in the mountains.
Operation Aquilla was never about seizing territory, rather it was meant as a diversion from the imminent German push at Verdun. The last-minute German delay opened Cadorna up to baseless accusations of having "jumped the gun", when it was the Italians who were following the initial schedule. Falkenhayn blamed Italy for the fact that France did not collapse after losing at Verdun and judged Aquilla a failure. It certainly cannot claim any prominence in Italian military history, but it was no worse a failure than many other Great War battles (paling, as many Italians delighted in pointing out, besides the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan at the Marne).
Several factors held Aquilla down from the beginning. The operational independence of the German Alpenkorps- imposed by Falkenhayn at the last minute as punishment for Cadorna not delaying the offensive- hampered the Italians and kept them from applying the mountain stormtrooper tactics which made all the difference to the success of future offensives. Geography made logistics an even greater challenge than in the average Great War offensive- one Italian quartermaster quipped that "Hannibal had only to carry elephant food over these mountains; we have to carry the weight of the world and the fate of our homeland!"
All of these things undermined Aquilla, but none of them were what killed it. Armies overcame poor coordination with allies and logistical and geographical challenges time and again during the Great War. Like the French at the Battle of Cannes, an incompetent commanding officer was what doomed Aquilla in the end.
General Roberto Brusati commanded the Italian First Army, and it is he- not Cadorna or the Germans- who deserves blame for the failure of Aquilla. If Admiral Choceprat's indecision threw away a French victory at sea, Brusati did likewise with his aggressiveness, untempered by the lessons of Bardonnechia or the many French offensives. Brusati shared Cadorna's iron will, but lacked his superior's sense, however primitive, of strategy and coordination. First Army had set up headquarters in Cuneo, a medium-sized city northeast of the border, in the summer of 1915. At this point, Italy was not yet at war and all the army commanders were ordered to disguise preparations to give the government plausible deniability if they needed to change course at the eleventh hour. Brusati made a nuisance of himself by writing letters to the Ministry of Defence urging a pre-emptive strike across the border. If war was inevitable, why bother waiting until a start date determined by men who hadn't smelled cordite in fifty years? There was some logic to this- French defences in September 1915 were a fraction of what they would be three months later- but the government was not going to abandon its mobilisation schedule on the recommendation of one general.
Come the first of October 1915, Italy was at last part of the Central Powers- which Brusati took as license to go after the French at will. One day after the declaration, he ordered First Army to conduct a "raid in force" all along the frontline, which achieved nothing but giving Graves Registration their first assignment back of the line. The subsequent French offensive at Menton gave Brusati something to do, but his inability to hit back frustrated him. Squad-sized raiding parties needed twice the time and special mountain boots to do their work. Snipers needed to find a position where they could see the enemy without being seen- and being confident of not falling five thousand feet from peak to gulley. Everything, it seemed, was twice as difficult in the Alps as it was on the Western Front.
Brusati was furious when the General Staff decided to strike at Bardonnechia, with an eye towards Grenoble, rather than Menton, aiming at Nice. Even worse was the humiliation of losing one of his infantry corps to support the offensive- not least because it left him without the manpower to launch even a diversionary attack. How, by God, was he going to cover himself in glory if the General Staff didn't even give him the resources? News of a major offensive peaked his ears, and he made a nuisance of himself demanding the First Army take the lead role and tried to talk Cadorna into stripping other armies of men and materiel on the grounds that, properly equipped, he could take Nice in a few days. This cost Brusati much of his support amongst his fellow generals and, when Aquilla ground to a halt with thousands dead, ensured they had no qualms about denouncing him in the public eye.
For all his eagerness, Brusati never understood what Aquilla was meant to be about. He knew it was meant as a diversion from a German spring offensive, but could not wrap his head around his status as the junior partner. Even a diversionary attack needed an objective, initiative, and above all, glory! Tying down French troops to keep them from Verdun, to kill as many Frenchmen as possible over the next few months, was a nebulous concept compared to "taking Nice!" Cadorna had found the shift odd as well, but an explanation from the Germans got him on board. Aquilla was meant, as British historian Basil Hart wrote two decades later in A History of the World War, as "a mincing machine in miniature". Local geography was almost irrelevant to the choice of battlefield- Cadorna's only reason for selecting Menton was because the French would take the necessary casualties to keep Nice.
Despite almost fifty years of service in uniform, Robert Brusati had never commanded a combat operation before. A boy genius, he had graduated from the Royal Academy of Turin at twenty-one but had not fought in the Risorgimento. Brusati climbed up the ranks over the next four decades but always remained in Italy, not fighting in any East African campaign or against the Ottomans. Without a doubt, this explains his eagerness to get after the foe in February 1916- but it also accounts for how his failure to control the situation once the enemy started firing back. When the French began their naval bombardment on February 13, Brusati sent a panicked telegram to Cadorna in Turin, asking for advice, the supremo replied that as general in command, this was well within Brusati's sphere of competence. Contrary to what Brusati claimed after the war, Cadorna was not looking for an excuse to fire him, but he certainly had one by the end of February 1916.
As planned, Brusati sent the men forward at dawn on February 15. The sun was just coming up over the eastern horizon, ensuring good visibility for the Italians while blinding the French. Bombardment- from both battleships and land guns- had damaged stockpiles but not destroyed them, and Brusati was confident the men could smash the French before exhausting their pre-set supplies. He sent a self-congratulatory telegram to the King in Rome, informing "His Majesty that the glorious colours of the House of Savoy shall, in the shortest time imaginable, fly once more over Nice." Things started to fall apart only a few hours later.
In fairness to Brusati, he had not made the decision to strike at Menton- that had been Cadorna's call- and so cannot be blamed for the complete lack of surprise. What contemporaries and historians alike lay on his shoulders is his total lack of interest in modifying plans to account for the fact that the French expected him. Brusati's strategy, such as it was, was to rely on the bombardment to erode French strongpoints, the remnants of which his infantry would overrun at leisure. Such tactics had produced bloodbaths a year ago, but at least the men behind them had known no better. Now, the results were just as gruesome, but Brusati could not even claim originality of thought or ignorance of the problems at hand.
Italian troops went over the top at dawn on February 15, 1916, just as the sun was climbing over the eastern horizon. French troops, already dazed by four days of bombardment, were blinded by the rising sun while the Italians could see perfectly. For all that, the defenders had a very simple advantage: they could sit in dugouts and behind sandbags, picking off the enemy at long range, while the Italians had to charge across broken terrain with limited supporting fire- and unlike on the Western Front, No-Man's-Land consisted of rocks and crags, each of which invited a man to trip, twist his ankle, and be shot while wiping the blood off his knees.
For several hours, the First Army made its attacks. In the south, the bulk of Brusati's force- four infantry corps- pushed forward into the defences set up by l'Armee des Alpes, the goal being to break through before dusk and approach the edges of Nice, to which they could then lay siege. Further north, two other corps (including a division on loan from the strategic reserve, of whom it was later said "they died just to shut Brusati up") struck in a diversionary attack towards Tende, another mountain town devoid of strategic value.
Brusati's high hopes were soon dashed. The French had foreseen his every move and were more than ready for his attack. Tactical reserves braved the creeping barrage to man rear trenches and ensure that enemy infantry could not break through. 75-millimetre guns were light and mobile; while that made them underwhelming on the Western Front, it was a blessing in the Alps. French artillerymen were able to set their guns up on ridges or plateaus with a minimum of notice, and blast the Italians wherever they looked like breaking through. In a few places, the enemy was able to punch through a few hundred metres of defences, but elsewhere they were stopped cold. Geography proved a better defensive line than anything the French could have built with shovels. Mountains and gulleys channeled the Italians into a handful of narrow valleys, which the French had spent the last six months littering with barbed wire and mines- and only then setting up their actual trenches and gun positions.
Aquilla was meant to draw French troops into a meat-grinder and tie down the enemy's strategic reserve to keep it from defending Verdun when the Germans attacked. Instead, it had the opposite effect. The first day of fighting had been a complete failure, with perhaps ten thousand Italian soldiers killed or wounded- a more precise estimate would have to wait until the fighting ceased. Months of preparation amongst First Army's men (much of it conducted by junior and mid-level officers on their own initiative) had been proven a waste in twelve hours. Only now did Brusati realize what a fool he had been to attack here without decent preparations, but it was too late. He had helped devise the plan and pushed it to the detriment of every other idea. Cadorna and the General Staff may have conceived Aquilla, but the planning was Brusati's creature and he would have to live with the results. Being frank with Cadorna about how little progress he was making, to say nothing of breaking off the offensive would have signified ultimate failure, so Brusati opted to keep fighting until he was ordered to cease while praying that such an order would come sooner rather than later.
Cadorna's opinion of Brusati had crashed and burned over the last twenty-four hours, but he was not about to abort the offensive. A mincing machine, by definition, was going to eat both sides. As much as he hated the idea, the Italians were going to have to suffer casualties beyond anything they had seen to date. The battle had to last, at minimum, until word came from Falkenayn that the French were breaking at Verdun. Given that that offensive was not due to go ahead for another week, Aquilla had to last longer than planned. Cadorna may not have been eager to let the fighting continue, but he understood the lack of an alternative.
If 'confidence' is too strong a word, then much of Cadorna's determination stemmed from his command of logistics. He has been slow to receive due praise for this, with only academic histories published in the last twenty years or so detailing what a minor miracle he worked in circumstances which made the Western Front seem a quartermaster's paradise. Naval bombardments had destroyed precious supply reserves and chewed up coastal roads, while the mountain roads were no better than the ones over which Hannibal had crossed two thousand years earlier. When men needed to pull artillery up and down peaks because there was no path through, or when they died of oxygen loss due to altitude, their commander cannot bear the blame for shell and bandage shortages. Cadorna overcame all these obstacles under immense pressure and made sure that whatever else they faced, the soldiers of Aquilla had the bullets and beans to get the job done. A lesser man could not have fought in the French Alps at all, and despite all the men he killed in pointless charges or condemned to stand before a firing squad, Cadorna's ability to do so attests to his professionalism.
As Aquilla dragged on, even Brusati realized that the First Army wasn't getting into Nice. Multiple attacks into French defensive positions had achieved nothing except diminishing the numbers on both sides. Six weeks of near-continuous combat shoved the French out of Menton proper, so they fell back three miles down the coast to Roquebrune and nothing changed. To the north, the defenders of Briel-sur-Roya (a glorified set of mountain farmer's huts) held the Italians out, blocking the road north. Sospel, straddling the stream of La Bevera five hundred metres above sea level, held. Mounting casualties forced the Italians to implement troop rotation. Broken regiments were removed from the line and replaced by units from other divisions- this caused plenty of anger at the General Staff level, as officers resented having their subordinate units come under Brusati's command.
Roberto Brusati's downfall came at the end of April, just as the French were beginning to crack at Verdun. A month and a half of continuous combat had depleted First Army to the point where most of its units had taken on reinforcements from other units or the strategic reserve- this left Brusati with too many enemies who resented him feeding their units into the mincing machine. Cadorna was personally indifferent to who led the offensive (he would never let anyone run it into the ground) as long as it was breaking the French. Brusati made a fine scapegoat for the losses the homeland had taken at Menton. Sacrificing him would win Cadorna credit amongst his fellow officers, as well as deflecting any potential blame. So Roberto Brusati was transferred, in his own words, "to running the naval defences of the Swiss border." His reputation never recovered from having been made a scapegoat.
For all that, Aquilla achieved its goal. Germany's offensive opened up at Verdun on February 21 and the pressure slowly mounted on the French. Little by little, the two mincing machines ate away at the French Army. There was no elegance, no tactical genius, no elan, no glory- just a generation of hopes and dreams being crushed on the banks of the Meuse and the Alpine peaks, as the cold days of February dragged on.
The Great War was about to enter a new phase, one to make everything which had come before look tame.
True, but the Morale hit to the French Navy is going to count for a lot and will delay their return to active operations.
Are the italian casualties ITTL going to be less than in OTL? On one hand they are fighting against a more "advanced" army than the A-H one, but it doesn't seems likely that a Caporetto will happen this time.
Little corrections, if I may.
The correct word is Aquila (both in Italian and Latin).
Wasn't Tenda/Tende annexed by France after WW2? Or did the French conquer it earlier and I forgot?
Little corrections, if I may.
The correct word is Aquila (both in Italian and Latin).
Wasn't Tenda/Tende annexed by France after WW2? Or did the French conquer it earlier and I forgot?
Damn, could Italian society even absorb and withstand the death count from an Alpine Verdun? Or would the OTL 12 Isonzo's fit in that category?
Thus concludes Part II of the timeline- part III will cover everything from Verdun through the French ceasefire sometime in 1917 (haven't quite worked out the details yet). Part IV will encompass the peace process, which will be far more chaotic than either 1.0 or OTL. After that is very much up in the air.
There's been some incredible discussion over the last few pages on Italian war aims and what they can realistically do to achieve them. Rest assured, I read and ponder every single comment, even though I don't always reply- this is typically because I'm at work/school and can't type out a whole post, or I want to focus on writing a chapter. In general, a criticism/critique will always get a response. That being said, here's my thoughts on Italian war aims in rough order of priority:
#1: Trentino and Zadar. Austria-Hungary had to promise plebiscites in these areas as a condition for Italy to join the Central Powers- it should come as no surprise that Rome already views these territories as "theirs". South Tyrol is another question, as Austria-Hungary has no intention of giving it up, but it is still seen as rightful Italian territory. This will be a bone of contention between the two states in the future, I imagine.
#2: Historic Savoy and Nice. Both spent large swathes of time under Piedmontese rule, and having the dynastic homeland under French control is still seen as a snub (something the Italian propaganda machine is keen to point out). Several key figures in the Italian military have called for these territories to be taken by force rather than ceded at the peace table, the idea being that if France consents to hand them over, even under duress, then Germany will try and claim credit.
#3: Colonies. Getting Eritrea/Somalia back is the top priority (not going to happen), then resolving border disputes with British Egypt to Italy's satisfaction. Given that the Senussi are not only sitting on both sides of that border but control most of Italian Libya, the question is moot even if Britain cedes land on paper. Tunisia is next on the list, and some still dream of marching on Tunis after the Senussi are vanquished, then Djibouti.
#4: Naval expansion. The battles of the Ligurian Sea and Cannes affirmed the Italian conviction that capital ships are not merely "aesthetic" or ways to show strength, but are vital if the country is to go from regional power to Great Power. What better way to ensure this than by taking some of the vessels the Regia Marina didn't sink at Cannes?
#5: The Balkans. Obviously none of the fantasies about annexing Dalmatia are going to come to fruition here, but the Italians have a protectorate in Albania, and keeping that strong is going to be a priority- including whatever annexations they can get from Montenegro/Serbia. This could make Italy a major player in Balkan politics, and it's not impossible that Albania could drag it into a hypothetical Third Balkan War.
#6: Corsica. Gallipoli showed just how difficult amphibious operations are, while the naval battles of the Ligurian Sea have shown how high the stakes are- anything short of a comprehensive victory and thousands of good men are going to end up on the bottom of the ocean. Nor is there much of a precedent for the island being under Italian rule- France has controlled it uninterrupted since 1768. It would help with power projection in the Western Mediterranean, but integrating it into Italy would be impossible for at least a generation. Nice to have- and certainly part of irredentist fantasies- but not really worth it in the short term.
Thank you all for commenting; next part should be up soon.
There's been some incredible discussion over the last few pages on Italian war aims and what they can realistically do to achieve them. Rest assured, I read and ponder every single comment, even though I don't always reply- this is typically because I'm at work/school and can't type out a whole post, or I want to focus on writing a chapter. In general, a criticism/critique will always get a response. That being said, here's my thoughts on Italian war aims in rough order of priority:
#1: Trentino and Zadar. Austria-Hungary had to promise plebiscites in these areas as a condition for Italy to join the Central Powers- it should come as no surprise that Rome already views these territories as "theirs". South Tyrol is another question, as Austria-Hungary has no intention of giving it up, but it is still seen as rightful Italian territory. This will be a bone of contention between the two states in the future, I imagine.
#2: Historic Savoy and Nice. Both spent large swathes of time under Piedmontese rule, and having the dynastic homeland under French control is still seen as a snub (something the Italian propaganda machine is keen to point out). Several key figures in the Italian military have called for these territories to be taken by force rather than ceded at the peace table, the idea being that if France consents to hand them over, even under duress, then Germany will try and claim credit.
#3: Colonies. Getting Eritrea/Somalia back is the top priority (not going to happen), then resolving border disputes with British Egypt to Italy's satisfaction. Given that the Senussi are not only sitting on both sides of that border but control most of Italian Libya, the question is moot even if Britain cedes land on paper. Tunisia is next on the list, and some still dream of marching on Tunis after the Senussi are vanquished, then Djibouti.
#4: Naval expansion. The battles of the Ligurian Sea and Cannes affirmed the Italian conviction that capital ships are not merely "aesthetic" or ways to show strength, but are vital if the country is to go from regional power to Great Power. What better way to ensure this than by taking some of the vessels the Regia Marina didn't sink at Cannes?
#5: The Balkans. Obviously none of the fantasies about annexing Dalmatia are going to come to fruition here, but the Italians have a protectorate in Albania, and keeping that strong is going to be a priority- including whatever annexations they can get from Montenegro/Serbia. This could make Italy a major player in Balkan politics, and it's not impossible that Albania could drag it into a hypothetical Third Balkan War.
#6: Corsica. Gallipoli showed just how difficult amphibious operations are, while the naval battles of the Ligurian Sea have shown how high the stakes are- anything short of a comprehensive victory and thousands of good men are going to end up on the bottom of the ocean. Nor is there much of a precedent for the island being under Italian rule- France has controlled it uninterrupted since 1768. It would help with power projection in the Western Mediterranean, but integrating it into Italy would be impossible for at least a generation. Nice to have- and certainly part of irredentist fantasies- but not really worth it in the short term.
Thank you all for commenting; next part should be up soon.