Glad you appreciated the dissertation! The idea of government power systems vs. governing capability as distinct lobes of the state apparatus' agency, and the autocracy having led to both these being centralized such that reform and subterfuge are both hazards to the state, is a fascinating one; probably the clearest delineation of the practical problems with reforming the Russian system, from the system's perspective, that I have read.
I do remember listening to "All is Now Against Us" some years ago - a good indicator of how things looked on the other side of the fence. You can really tell how emotions ran during the RCW from the music of the era, and it offers some interesting insights into their aesthetics and ethos of the combatant factions too. Probably the most fascinating example of the dichotomy I can think of is the March of the Siberian Riflemen - a song composed for the Imperial army in WWI, and later used by the Whites in the Civil War - and the March of the Far Eastern Partisans, which was composed using the exact same melody by the Soviets in the dying days of the Civil War. Here they are back-to-back:
Surely at least some of the divergence between the two has been caused by them being remembered differently by different groups of people, but even that is interesting in terms of RCW historiography.
I had forgotten about Antonov still being canned up in Moscow, though I guess it makes sense that Tukhachevsky's command would see to it that he be kept there. Being stuck in a gilded cage while retaining some station bodes better for the peasants' cause in the future than being imprisoned as an enemy belligerent, I suppose. This of course assumes that the Republic does end up winning, and he doesn't simply mirror his OTL fate against resurgent Tsarist armies after fleeing a crumbling Republic.
Fun fact for the curious - while records indicate that it ended up amounting to negligible effect (the rest of Soviet command recognized the horrific collateral damage of the prospect, and there ended up not being any qualified technicians available on-site), Tukhachevsky did sign off on the use of chlorine gas against the Tambov rebels.
Regarding Baku: all eyes are on them indeed. As I mentioned above, the Ottomans aren't quite ready to go in yet but that may well change.
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Considering Enver Pasha was willing to go out leading pan-Turanist rebels while Turkey itself was in near-anarchy ... Though then again, being a head of state that can be reasonably described as extant probably takes policy priority over insane personal adventurism; I guess we will see given time. Ottoman speculation aside, I am also going to be keeping my eyes on Baku, as whether or not the Tsarists hold it seems like a good determinant as to whether or not they will be able to make real use of their fancy German mechanized equipment. Discounting economic/trade benefits and political ramifications with their neighbors, that alone is a potent force modifier for whichever side manages to take hold of and utilize that oil.
Regarding Japan - they certainly have a lot more acting potential here than in OTL (having access to the material resources of formerly-French Indochina means the alleviation of a significant element of that fear of supply starvation; there's also the fact that, unless the communist faction somehow manages to coup the Russian Republic and go on to win the RCW, they won't have a hostile Marxist power right next door), and the United Kingdom facing stability issues is to their benefit, but a lot of the looming specters that drove them to the insanity of the 1930s are still there. For one, the Meiji Constitution has a couple odd points in its structure which lend it to being exploited by bad actors within the military:
- It is illegal to convene and govern with the cabinet in the event any of its positions are unfilled.
- The cabinet's army and navy ministers must be actively serving members of the army and navy; this contrasts most other cabinet positions, which can be staffed with civilians.
- Cabinets must be approved all at once - any one member of a putative cabinet retracting prior to everyone's approval leads to the current effort being reset, necessitating the PM to make a new cabinet.
For another, the issue of Korea is almost certainly not one that will be resolved in an amicable way for everyone. I don't see what exactly sort of events from the PoD onward would avert the sentiments leading to March 1st 1919, and historically that was followed by the galvanization of the Korean independence movement. I wouldn't actually be that surprised if Japan's current system of protectorates in Indochina follows a similar path into annexation that Korea did, with a gradual curbing of the native monarchy's sovereignty until a formal annexation some time later; they would be more difficult to administer in a centralized way for certain, but if that didn't stop France I doubt it would stop Japan. Given that both of them are liable to have strong native nationalist movements, while simultaneously being viewed as vital to retain due to their proximity and resources, I have a hard time seeing the conflict of interests there staying peacable.
Taiwan is a different matter, as policies of civic integration and local government started right around this time and only really concluded with the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It is certain to retain some level of independentism, whether in the form of Chinese nationalists or aboriginal Taiwanese (who have a bad history with the Japanese government which is unlikely to improve anytime soon), but unless Japan undergoes a civil war or pulls some OTL-level tactics to bring on the wrath of the world, there's a real possibility of it being retained long-term.