252. More reforms. Prussia
“… most of the generals and officers in command of the small units do not possess significant knowledge of tactics and neither do they have noticeable military talents…”
Clausewitz
“Operations of the large military masses cannot be studied in peacetime. It is to be limited to the study of individual factors, for example, of the area and the experience of previous hikes. However, the success of technology, the improvement of means of communication and communication, new weapons, in short, a completely changed situation - make more inapplicable the means that previously gave victory, and even the rules established by the greatest commanders.”
Moltke
“There are only four types of officer. First, there are the lazy, stupid ones. Leave them alone, they do no harm…Second, there are the hard-working, intelligent ones. They make excellent staff officers, ensuring that every detail is properly considered. Third, there are the hard-working, stupid ones. These people are a menace and must be fired at once. They create irrelevant work for everybody. Finally, there are the intelligent, lazy ones. They are suited for the highest office.”
Manstein
“What a fool will be doing without a governmental employment? Where would he go?”
Leskov
“God, don’t let me to become a general and get stupid without any fault of mine!”
A.K.Tolstoy [1]
“Oh, damn, it's nice to be a general!”
N.V.Gogol [2]
“The ancient Prussian simplicity recommended by Frederick the Great to his representative in London, in the saying: "If you have to walk, say that 100,000 people follow you," testifies to bragging; the witty king could only say it in a fit of excessive stinginess. Now everyone has 100 thousand people, but it seems that we didn't have them in Dresden times.”
Bismarck
[May be somewhat boring but needed for understanding the future developments]
Prussia.
Things were not going too well for the Prussian monarchy, at least as far as the greater ambitions had been involved. On a positive side, Zollverein was working and economy was steadily improving. But the Erfurt Union started cracking soon after its creation and in the middle 1850s fall apart due to the combination of various factors:
Austrian diplomacy managed to persuade the electors of Saxony and Hanover that their interests will be better served by them remaining the top level personages of the HRE than by turning into the vassals of Prussia.
Even without Austria, three governments could agree upon the common constitution and a joined parliament never materialized.
In Prussia itself conservative nobility and feudal-corporate and anti-national (aka, pro-Prussian) groups ralliying around the General
Ludwig Friedrich Leopold von Gerlach increasingly successfully opposed Union policy which they considered too liberal.
- Demonstrated Prussian military weakness. In 1850 Austria allied with Bavaria in the name of HRE planned to invade Hessen in order to assist the beleaguered prince there. However, the military roads that connected the western part of Prussia with the eastern part ran through Hessen. Prussia wanted to protect these roads militarily. Declared Prussian mobilization proved to be a clear disaster and FWIII had to back off with a terrible loss of face. His Erfurt allies choose to join a prevailed side.
The problem was that for the “state attached to the army” Prussia had an army too weak to be impressive in the modern times. The last war in which Prussia fought, the Great Polish War of 1805-06, already demonstrated the numeric inadequacy of the Prussian army but the problem was in the plain fact that economically poor Prussia could not afford a significant increase of its standing army. The only Prussian officer of that time who had both brains and enough of a clout to push through his ideas, Scharnhorst, was appointed Minister of War. One of his ideas was creation of up to 70,000 trained reservists: period of service in the army was cut short and the adequately trained soldiers had been discharged and replaced with the new recruits (the companies having 40-60 soldiers at the time of peace had been monthly discharging into reserve 5 soldiers). Another idea which he managed to push through in the face of a strong opposition was
universal military service. If fully implemented, it would sharply increase size of a Prussian army demanding a number of officers much greater than their traditional supply source, Prussian nobility, could provide. Which meant a great influx of the bourgeoisie into the officers’ corps and, understandably, the resistance was quite serious but he prevailed, at least in theory. By 1813 Prussian army had 25 regiments and 142,000 troops including 70,000 reservists and 30,000 untrained new recruits. But this expansion of the standing army was not big enough to accommodate the great influx of the human material resulting from the universal military service while expansion beyond the existing limits was too costly for the Prussian finances.
The solution was
Landwehr. Each province was obligated to mobilize as many men of the ages between 17 and 40 as it could equip. In other words, landwehr was intended to be a properly organized people’s militia that would fight side by side with the regular troops. By 1815 landwehr had 209 battalions of infantry and 174 squadrons of cavalry. At least initially, it was short of the uniforms and weapons but eventually these problems had been resolved. Still, until the 1850s, when its economic situation greatly improved, Prussian Ministry of War could not maintain an army numerically comparable to those of Austria, France or Russia: out of general budget of 48 millions thalers the military expenses amounted to 24 millions and as a result the standing regular army of a peace time was only 125,000.
For the ambitious plans of German unification this was inadequate and the question was how to increase these numbers significantly at the time of war. One of the needed things was to provide an adequate training of the new soldiers within a short period of their service and for this purpose the army units retained the huge proportion of the non-commissioned officers (up to 30 per infantry company). The poor economic situation allowed, for a very low salary and a promise of a low-level civic employment after 12 years of service, to promote and retain enough of the most promising of the soldiers conscripted for a short term. The mandatory 5 years service was broken to 3 years of active service and 2 years of reserve. This was good but a small size of the regular army did not allow to accumulate enough of a reserve in the case of war. An attempt to create “reservists of the reserve” proved to be a failure: these people passed through 4 months of training in a summer time (to save money on accommodations and their heating and uniforms - these reservists had been wearing their own trousers) after which they were for 5 years moved into a reserve. The maneuvers of 1830 demonstrated that these people were forgetting their brief training and were not usable.
An attempt to remedy this problem was a further shortening of the active service to 2 years with 3 in reserve adopted in 1832.
Landwehr still remained the major instrument for “consuming” surplus of the recruits but the issue was immediately politicized. The conservatives did not like a notion of the “armed masses”:
“To arm the people means to organize the resistance to the authorities, to exhaust the finances and even to damage the Christian principles” Wittgenstein, Prussian Minister of Police.
“
It is better to weaken Prussia than the regime” Duke of Mecklenburg, commander of the Prussian Guards Corps.
Alexander I warned the Prussian generals that he may find himself forced to save the Kingof Prussia from his own landwehr and Nicholas I in 1846 recommended FWIV to get rid of it.
In the 1810s the leading British military authority, general Sir Arthur Wellesley, after visiting Prussia commented that thanks to landwehr Prussia is even in a more anarchic state than France because nobody has an authority.
Prince Wilhelm of Prussia was its convinced enemy: “
communications and discipline are bad and unqualified officers can’t improve them.”
Landwehr’s cavalry, composed of the people coming with their own horses of all sizes and colors, looked silly and was a butt of numerous jokes.
On the opposite side of a political spectrum landwehr was considered a potentially useful tool of a potential opposition to the conservatives which was not endearing it to the King and military establishment and did not guarantee its loyalty to the regime.
Prussian Minister of War in 1841-47, Leopold Hermann Ludwig von Boyen, was quite supportive of this institution and was taking explicit care pf it being quite different from the regular army with its addiction to the parade-ground training but his efforts resulted only in a mutual hostility between these types of the troops.
Landwehr was divided into two classes. The 1st class - young men of 20-25 who did not get into the regular army and the men of 25-32 who passed through the regular service and whose reservist status was exhausted. The 1st class had some local training and once per year participated in the army maneuvers (14 - 28 days).
After the serving in the 1st class they were moved for 7 years into 2nd class which would perform the rear services and form garrisons of the fortresses. They were trained for 8 days per year.
Landwehr was organized based upon the existing administrative units with a battalion corresponding to the district with population of 50-60,000. It had its commander (who chaired the local military recruitment commission), a doctor providing at home services to the battalion’s members, warehouse of uniforms, weapons and other equipment. The battalions in a greater administrative areas were united into the regiments and in each province there was a general in charge.
The new officers had been elected by the serving battalion officers and confirmed by the King. The first candidates had been chosen mostly out of those who passed the regular service as the “volunteers” [3] who after the service went directly into landwehr bypassing the reserve. Then they could be the retired officers and non-coms if they possessed some real estate property and finally anybody with a property of at least 10,000 thalers. Obviously, unlike officer corps of the regular army dominated by the junkers, one of the landwehr was dominated by the bourgeoisie with the resulting differences in a political loyalty.
During mobilization a brigade was formed out of one regular and one landwehr regiment.
Reform.
In 1857 WFIV got a stroke and in 1858 his brother, Prince Wilhelm, became a regent and, after his death in 1861, a king Wilhelm I. By “profession” he was a military man serving starting from the age of 12 in various command positions and successfully performing various diplomatic missions in between. After the death of his father in 1840 and due to the childlessness of his brother, King Frederick William IV, Wilhelm, as the alleged heir to the throne, received the title of Prince of Prussia, was promoted to general from the infantry and appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Council of State. During revolution of 1848 he insisted on suppressing uprising in Berlin by the force of arms and this did not add his popularity. The king and the ministers considered it more prudent to remove him abroad for a while.
In 1850 he was appointed commander in chief and got the first-hand experience of how mobilization
should not be conducted.
Taking into an account that the humiliating
Die Olmützer Punktation, a deal which paved the way to disbanding of the Erfurt Union, had been conducted by Otto Theodor von Manteuffel who soon afterwards became unpopular Minister-President of Prussia, popularity of Prince Wilhelm (as a potential champion of the Prussian interests) kept growing. As a regent Wilhelm was trying to improve position of Prussia within the HRE but the opposition of Austria and the Middle German states convinced him that achieving the goal requires, first of all, the transformation of the military structure in Prussia itself, which he undertook, entrusting its implementation to the new Minister of War, Roon.
By 1858 Prussian army at the time of peace had 130,000 and during mobilization it was expanding to 200,000 plus 150,000 of the landswehr of the 1st class with 110,000 being left for the rear services. So, with the rear being well provided for, Prussia could move to the theater of war up to 350,000. Disadvantage of that system was that at the time of peace the Prussian army had been providing annual training of only 38,000 of new soldiers and three quarters of the eligible population did not get any training because army was not noticeably growing since 1815 and population between 1815 and 1860 grew considerably [4]. Landwehr, which consisted mostly of the fathers of the families in their 30s, was usable for a defensive war but not as good for the offensive ones as the younger units of a regular army not having any political ideas.
Actually, Wilhelm I had rather conventional ideas popular through out the major European armies: “
I don’t need students and rich people in the army” (aka, “no bourgeoisie”). He preferred the well-drilled regular armies and was explaining the French success against the Austrians by the advantage of the long serving troops over the army half of which were the raw recruits.
Wilhelm with Roon outlined framework of the military reform as following:
- Increase annual call to the army by 66% (up to 63,000).
- Increase service from 2 to 3 years (this and previous measure increased peacetime army to 213,000).
- Increase service in a reserve from 5 to 7 years (as a result the reserve included 4 age groups and grew up more than by 100,000)
- Increase peacetime army by 49 new regiments which would increase mobilized army by 75% (350,000)
- Create reserve of 126,000 to compensate losses of the regular army during the war.
- Abolish landwehr of 2nd class.
- Landwehr of the 1st class lost two younger age groups (25-27) which became reserve of the regular army and would be used exclusively for the rear services; it also lost the young men of 20 who previously were not call into the regular army and now consisted only of the ages 27-32 who already served in the regular army and its reserve.
As a result, size of a peacetime army almost doubled and military budget was increasing by 9 millions thalers and in the case of war the government had the same 350,000
but exclusively regular troops without landwehr. The army became younger and more uniform in its composition. Two parts of this program, increase of the active service by 1 year and practical elimination of landwehr, went against interests of the liberal bourgeoisie with a resulting fight in Landtag: even after the new regiments had been formed, Landtag refused the credit and for few years did not approve the budget. Wilhelm, who was facing opposition from all sides, including his own son, followed Roon’s advice and on 23 September 1862 appointed Bismarck
Minister President and
Foreign Minister. Bismarck managed to bully Landtag into the submission: from his bellicose speeches it was clear that he is not planning to keep an army as a royal toy (the main accusation against WI) and that rather soon it is going to be used for unification of Germany under Prussia, something that the Prussian liberals wholeheartedly approved of [5]. Now the Hell was in the details.
Commanders. Roon’s main goal was to have enough of the well-educated competent officers capable to educate the new recruits in the peacetime and during a war to choose the more suitable course of action. Starting from the early XIX the care was taken that the officers corps is monolith without any class distinctions. Prussian officer, regardless his small salary, had a high social status and all of them had been equal with the greatest respect going to those serving in the army units with the staff officers being somewhat inferior to them.
Education, service in the General Staff or the Guards were not guaranteeing a faster promotion. As a result, for the first 20 years of service the Prussian officers had been growing in rank very slowly and only at the high level the careers were accelerating, mostly because all officers unsuitable for the next eligible promotion had been mercilessly fired. Existing system of attestations, which involved “friendly” inputs from the colleagues, seemingly working well,
except for the very top level.
The highest level commanders were not too impressive: most of them had been “heroes” of 1848. They had, at best, a vague idea regarding military history and if they did, this information mostly served as a ballast preventing from studying the new trends in the warfare.
General Staff. As established in 1814, the General Staff in a peacetime was a just school through which the big numbers of the capable officers have to pass to be able to accomplish the serious tasks during the war. In other words, it was just a part of the army providing a better education for the officers. Nobody would be allow to stay in it for more than 4 years and deep specialists in the bureaucratic paperwork and legalistic were not required. Each year 25% of its officers would return back to the field service and only very few outstanding individuals would later return to it to serve in the higher positions.
Preparation of the General Staff officers was taking 9 years: 3 in academy, then 6 years of the “assignment”: topographic studies in the Big General Staff, service in the staff of an army corps, then 2 years of field service in a branch in which officer did not serve yet. After 3-4 years of service in General Staff an officer would be sent back to the army service.
Jobs requiring deep professional knowledge (like those related to the railroads) had been done by the officers who graduated from the academy but did not make it into the General Staff. All bureaucratic work including details of mobilization had been delegated to “adjutanture”, specialists of the paper work, leaving the General Staff free to dedicate itself strictly to the issues of a military art. As a result, the Prussian General Staff was few times smaller than those of France and Russia.
Role of the General Staff in operational planning and development of the general strategies was negligible, mostly preliminary studies and statistics collection. There was also department of the military history. In 1821 the General Staff was separated from the Ministry of War and became the “Big” General Staff with his chief having a right of a direct report to the king. Well, every commander of an army corps had that right and it was rarely used because bypassing a Minister of War was tactless and plain foolish: the report would be transferred … to the Minister of War. Real task of the Chief of the General Staff was to monitor the military situation in Europe and be ready to report about the chances of war with specific neighbor and about preferable campaign scenario. However, Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not sending information to the General Staff and neither did Minister of War, except when he felt otherwise. By 1857 the General Staff had 64 officers 18 of which constituted the “Big” General Staff.
A
big gap was deployment of the railroads in the military purposes. Basically, nobody was studying it with any seriousness.
To change situation a major authoritative and very talented figure was needed but there was none. [6]
Mobilization. An attempt of 1850 proved to be a fundamental fiasco. No work had been done by the Ministry of War to make a realistic usage of the available railroads. Mobilization of the reserves and all landwehr had been announced at the same day. Hundreds thousands of the reservists, high priority shipments of artillery and intendancy departments, and the army units hit the railroad stations simultaneously. Crowds of the hungry reservists had been staying for weeks near the stations, sleeping on a ground and loudly expressing their feelings. Due to the fact that infantry and artillery were in a process of rearmament, their supply caused additional misunderstandings. Landwehr was short of the uniforms and weapons and quite a few of his members found themselves with the smoothbore muskets, cartridges for the rifles and in the civilian clothes. The old ages of Landwehr had been leaving their families without means for existence and the special law was issued ordered the regional administrations to help them with a promise to compensate expenses later on. An operation that had to take a week, took 6 weeks.
It took a considerable effort to fix this problem by 1859. Ministry of War established mobilization schedule based on which the railroads had to prepare themselves to the future activities. Each corps military district was handling its own mobilization issues with the Ministry of War doing general management and in a peacetime replenishing the depots in military districts. Creation of a centralized military depot for the whole army (as was done in Vienna) was an obsolete idea.
Tactics. The weapons could be new but the brains of top level remained the same. Wilhelm I and his generals firmly held to the bayonet push in the close formations. Successful French bayonet charges in Italy only strengthened this idea but additional opportunities presented by Dreyse needle rifle were slowly creeping into the practice. It was definitely making sense to start with shooting before attacking. But this was still more or less a low level initiative to be tested in a real war.
____________
[1] Actually, AII tried to make him a general but he refused and retired. But he was (a) poet and (b) independently wealthy.
[2] Wishful thinking. 😂
[3] Usually well off people who joined army voluntarily and had certain privileges during the service.
[4] In OTL from 10 to 18 millions but I have no idea about the numbers without Polish territories and those on the left bank of the Rhine.
[5] The bellicose liberals were not uniquely British or Russian or French or American (did I miss some countries? feel free to add) phenomena: it was just a matter of a “good cause”, which was rarely absent. 😜
[6] After weighting all pros and contras I decided that von Moltke was not lucky enough to defeat the Turkish medicine and died in the Ottoman-Egyptian War. It will be considerably more fun without the Prussians having such an unfair advantage. 😂