Foreword:
Not sure if I’ll manage to make it into a TL (or if it will generate enough interest) but at least for the starters, the preamble is that Peter is mostly the same person as in OTL with the main difference him getting a habit to think first and act then and not other way around. With the benefit of a hindsight he eventually acknowledged in OTL that at the time he entered the GNW he was completely “blind” about the enemy. His exercises on the Pruth and in Persia had been pretty much along the same lines. Making him less cruel, obnoxious, etc. would be unrealistic (
) but perhaps less impulsive modus operandi can be believable without introduction of the friendly ASBs.
While it is tempting to pile up all imaginable innovations in all possible areas, I think that limiting the activities to those which did happen in OTL during his reign or within 2-3 decades after his death and required the same level of technology and scientific knowledge are realistic and should fit into “think first, then act” behavioral model. OTOH, the fundamental social reforms, like abolishing serfdom, are going to be a pure fantasy.
1. Azov Campaigns
In 1696 after a great effort Russian army forced capitulation of Azov.
There was a huge celebration in Moscow but Peter was much less euphoric than most of his entourage: it took two campaigns (the first one failed), a tremendous effort to build some kind of a functional flotilla, great losses and as a result the besieging army of almost 60,000 could not take a rather obsolete fortress ( nothing like the Vauban-style fortresses of the Western Europe) by storm and garrison was starved into the honorary surrender and allowed to leave with the honors.
The war demonstrated weaknesses in pretty much all areas and they had to be addressed ASAP:
1. The logistics was simplified blue to the ability to provide supply by the river but otherwise the supply system was lousy (and suppliers not up to the task).
2. The siege artillery proved to be completely inadequate.
3. Not only the irregulars (Cossacks) but the regular troops as well had firearms of all imaginable calibers and even within the same regiment uniformity was anything but guaranteed.
4. Calibers of the field and siege artillery also were all over the place, guns’ carriages were of a low quality and for transportation the peasants had been commandeered with their horses.
5. Military production was absolutely not up to the task. In 1695 armory in Tula (pretty much the only big manufacturer of the firearms) produced only 1,000 muskets and Russia had to buy the firearms (assembled and in parts) abroad, mostly courtesy of the merchants of Amsterdam. Underlying issue was a weakness of the domestic metallurgy: it simply did not produce enough iron and steel. Situation with the materials needed for cannons (copper and tin) was not much better but at least there were plenty of the old cannons which could be melted and used to produce the new ones.
6. Training of the troops was clearly inadequate and the plug baginets proved to be a bad idea when used against the Janissary with their swords and yatagans.
Fortunately, the Ottomans had been mostly busy fighting on the European theater and simply incapable to bring more troops to the unimportant far end of their empire.
So, after Azov capitulated the both sides had been running a low intensity campaign with Sheremetev operating on the low Dnieper and building small forts there and Peter capturing Kerch at the entry to the Black Sea. By that time the Great Ottoman War had been coming to its end and the Russians were up to the next big disappointment which forced Peter to start paying serious attention to geopolitics (up to that time he was following the course of the Sophia-Golitsin foreign policy)….
Not sure if I’ll manage to make it into a TL (or if it will generate enough interest) but at least for the starters, the preamble is that Peter is mostly the same person as in OTL with the main difference him getting a habit to think first and act then and not other way around. With the benefit of a hindsight he eventually acknowledged in OTL that at the time he entered the GNW he was completely “blind” about the enemy. His exercises on the Pruth and in Persia had been pretty much along the same lines. Making him less cruel, obnoxious, etc. would be unrealistic (

While it is tempting to pile up all imaginable innovations in all possible areas, I think that limiting the activities to those which did happen in OTL during his reign or within 2-3 decades after his death and required the same level of technology and scientific knowledge are realistic and should fit into “think first, then act” behavioral model. OTOH, the fundamental social reforms, like abolishing serfdom, are going to be a pure fantasy.
1. Azov Campaigns
In 1696 after a great effort Russian army forced capitulation of Azov.
There was a huge celebration in Moscow but Peter was much less euphoric than most of his entourage: it took two campaigns (the first one failed), a tremendous effort to build some kind of a functional flotilla, great losses and as a result the besieging army of almost 60,000 could not take a rather obsolete fortress ( nothing like the Vauban-style fortresses of the Western Europe) by storm and garrison was starved into the honorary surrender and allowed to leave with the honors.
The war demonstrated weaknesses in pretty much all areas and they had to be addressed ASAP:
1. The logistics was simplified blue to the ability to provide supply by the river but otherwise the supply system was lousy (and suppliers not up to the task).
2. The siege artillery proved to be completely inadequate.
3. Not only the irregulars (Cossacks) but the regular troops as well had firearms of all imaginable calibers and even within the same regiment uniformity was anything but guaranteed.
4. Calibers of the field and siege artillery also were all over the place, guns’ carriages were of a low quality and for transportation the peasants had been commandeered with their horses.
5. Military production was absolutely not up to the task. In 1695 armory in Tula (pretty much the only big manufacturer of the firearms) produced only 1,000 muskets and Russia had to buy the firearms (assembled and in parts) abroad, mostly courtesy of the merchants of Amsterdam. Underlying issue was a weakness of the domestic metallurgy: it simply did not produce enough iron and steel. Situation with the materials needed for cannons (copper and tin) was not much better but at least there were plenty of the old cannons which could be melted and used to produce the new ones.
6. Training of the troops was clearly inadequate and the plug baginets proved to be a bad idea when used against the Janissary with their swords and yatagans.
Fortunately, the Ottomans had been mostly busy fighting on the European theater and simply incapable to bring more troops to the unimportant far end of their empire.
So, after Azov capitulated the both sides had been running a low intensity campaign with Sheremetev operating on the low Dnieper and building small forts there and Peter capturing Kerch at the entry to the Black Sea. By that time the Great Ottoman War had been coming to its end and the Russians were up to the next big disappointment which forced Peter to start paying serious attention to geopolitics (up to that time he was following the course of the Sophia-Golitsin foreign policy)….
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