451. In a search for wunderwaffe #2
“Thank God, men cannot as yet fly, and lay waste the sky as well as the earth.”
Henry David Thoreau, Winter Journal, 3 January 1861
“I hope none of you gentlemen is so foolish as to think that aeroplanes will be usefully employed for reconnaissance from the air. There is only one way for a commander to get information by reconnaissance, and that is by the use of cavalry.”
General Sir Douglas Haig, British Army, addressing the British Army Staff College, Summer 1914
“Another popular fallacy is to suppose that flying machines could be used to drop dynamite on an enemy in time of war.”
William H. Pickering, Harvard astronomer, Aeronautics, 1908.
“To affirm that the aeroplane is going to revolutionize naval warfare of the future is to be guilty of the wildest exaggeration.”
Scientific American magazine, 16 July 1910.
“Aviation is fine as a sport. But as an instrument of war, it is worthless.”
General Ferdinand Foch, 1911.
“There are a lot of knowledgeable people, but few specialists.”
A.S.Yakovlev
“It's interesting to fly sober, but it's a little unusual!”
Unknown military pilot
“The fleet affects politics by the very fact of its existence.”
A.Mahan
“What is naval laughter? That's when you were missed.”
A. Pokrovsky
“Мы сильные, мы бравые,
У нас торпеды ржавые,
Не трогай нас, и дольше проживёшь!” [1]
S.Trophimov, ‘Submarine’
“- I'm a battleship. Change the course for 20 degrees!
- You change the course. I'm a lighthouse"
naval exchange of the signals
In the air and on the sea.
A person who tried to kill the battleships.
In 1921 colonel William Lendrum Mitchell of the US Army finally convinced the Navy's and Army’s Secretaries to test his theories of destruction of ships by aerial bombing. They agreed to a series of joint Army-Navy exercises, known as Project B, to be held that summer in which surplus ships could be used as targets. The Navy reluctantly agreed to the demonstration after news leaked of its own tests. To counter Mitchell, the Navy had sunk the old battleship Indiana near
Tangier Island,
Virginia, on November 1, 1920, using its own airplanes. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, had hoped to squelch Mitchell by releasing a report on the results. The Navy report stated “
The entire experiment pointed to the improbability of a modern battleship being either destroyed or completely put out of action by aerial bombs”. (Un)fortunately for the Navy the news leaked that the Navy's "tests" were done with dummy sand bombs and that the ship was actually sunk using high explosives placed on the ship, Congress introduced two resolutions urging new tests and backed the Navy into a corner.
However the top brass did not like an idea and the Chief of the Air Corps attempted, unsuccessfully, to have Mitchell dismissed a week before the tests began, reacting to Navy complaints about Mitchell's criticisms. The Navy set rules and conditions that enhanced the survivability of the targets, stating that the purpose of the tests was to determine how much damage ships could withstand. The planes were forbidden from using aerial torpedoes, would be permitted only two hits on the battleship using their heaviest bombs, and would have to stop between hits so that a damage assessment party could go aboard. Smaller ships could not be struck by bombs larger than 600 pounds, and also were subject to the same interruptions in attacks. The chosen testing site was chosen to minimize the effective time the Army's bombers would have in the target area. [2]
The Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aircraft had been dropping 230, 550, and 600 lb (100, 250, and 270 kg) bombs on an old battleship with the Navy doing its best to prevent this bombing from being effective and stopping the test before all their bombs had been dropped. There were few direct hits of a minor significance but at least three of the bombs landed close enough to rip hull plates as well as cause the ship to roll over.
Mitchell repeated the performance twice in tests conducted with like results on the U.S.
pre-dreadnought battleship Alabama in September 1921, and the battleships
Virginia and
New Jersey in September 1923. The efficacy of the tests remains in debate but the budgets had been redrawn for further air development
presumably forcing the Navy to look more closely at the possibilities of naval air power. It did in its usual way by putting orders for more …. battleships and blocking an idea to establish a "General Headquarters Air Force" as a vehicle for modernization and expansion of the Air Service, to be funded through shared appropriations for aviation with the Navy. Mitchell was demoted from his temporary rank of a brigadier to a permanent rank of a colonel. Few years later he was court-martialed for criticizing his superiors, found “guilty of all specifications and of the charge" and suspended him from active duty for five years without pay.
On the other side of an ocean (or two oceans?) information about Mitchell’s tests got a completely different reception because “father of the Russian naval aviation” who also was Inspector General of the Russian Aviation (both land and naval), full Admiral of the Russian Navy [3] and the Regent of Russian Empire, saw in them not just confirmation of his own ideas but also a potential solution of a major strategic strategic problem which the Russian Empire may, sooner or later, face on the Far East in the case of a war with Japan or any other major naval power which may attack Russian possessions on a Pacific coast.
Even with the fast industrialization of the Russian Far East, it was obvious that maintenance of a major conventional fleet there is extremely problematic even if just because of a little number of the suitable ports: most of them had been too far to the North in the areas communication with which was limited by the climate and chances to develop the major manufacturing facilities in which were close to zero. OTOH, in the case of a major naval conflict Russia would have to defend a “perimeter” stretching from Vladivostok to Alaska and, preferably, be able not to limit itself to a passive defense. To a great degree the same applied to the land defenses: a border, including Mongolia was extremely long, terrain difficult and a powerful aviation would be one of the main tools for fighting a numerically stronger opponent.
As Mitchell put it, for the cost of one battleship you can build a thousand planes and, as was already demonstrated, Russia could build the modest sized aircraft carriers capable of carrying 25 - 30 planes for 4 - 5,000,000 rubles and those carrying over 80 (and having a much greater speed) for approximately 20 - 30,000,000 while already obsolete dreadnought of the “Empress Maria” class cost 27 - 30,000,000 and a new battleship of “Vladivostok” class over 100,000,000. There was no need for many big carriers but the numerous small-sized ones could provide a reliable defense of the Kuril - Aleutian perimeter while combination of the land- and carrier-based naval aviation could made navigation in the Sea of Japan quite difficult. Under certain, not too fantastic, circumstances the Hokkaido and even Honsu island can come under aerial attacks.
But the main advantage was a relatively simple maintenance during the war. With the Pacific Theater being far away from the main weapons-producing plants there would be a need to upgrade metallurgical plant in Khabarovsk to a degree allowing to produce 16” naval guns, high quality armor plates of up to 500 mm and to have in Vladivostok and/or Nikolayevsk-on-Amur dock capable of housing ship of almost 60,000 tons (better, more than one), etc. with the total expenses easily going up to the amount comparable to a cost of one of these ships. An alternative of transporting the “big stuff” across most of the Russian Empire would be cheaper but extremely cumbersome and there still would be a need in the big docks and many other things. OTOH, even a big air-carrier was only around 30,000 tons with the docks of that size available and no need in production, transportation and installation of the huge pieces of equipment. Transporting planes was not a major problem and neither was their repair and to add to the existing aviation schools couple more on the Far East was easy.
The main issues would be:
- Training the flying and deck crews.
- Developing an efficient system of the carriers deployment and escorting (composition and operations of the squadrons combining carriers, cruisers of various types and destroyers) and rigorous training.
- Both for carrier- and land-based naval and army aviation to have enough of the high quality planes of all necessary types.
There were already rather encouraging moves in the area of the long range heavy bombers: the test flight of a prototype Pe-8 demonstrated the range of 3,700 km with a maximum speed of 443 km/h, ceiling 9,300 m and bomb load of 5,000 kg.
The great bonus in that area was a high degree of cooperation with the German aviation designers and manufacturers. The militaristic enthusiasm of Wilhelm II was steadily dwindling after the Barmalei War and, after the two major economic crisises, and in an absence of the credible enemies, the country under the new emperor was steadily emphasizing development of a “peaceful economy”. Of course, a recently acquired colonial empire required strong navy and high quality troops to its maintenance but it did not need a
huge army because a major land war with the existing system of the alliances and “affiliations” was
extremely unlikely. As far as aviation was involved, its military usefulness was beyond the doubt but the existing geopolitical framework put the practical limits on its numbers with the main emphasis being upon the
commercial aviation. As a result, the military segment of the aviation industry had considerable intellectual resources available for the foreign contracts and that type of relations existed between the German and Russian empires for many decades. Among others, company
Heinkel Flugzeugwerke was working on design of a heavy bomber that would have a range of up to 6,000 km and bomb load up to 7,000 kg. If these heavy bombers projects proved to be successful in a big numbers production, then a big part of Japan would be reachable not only from Vladivostok but from Khabarovsk as well.
But, of course, Mitchell’s “thousand planes” would have to include a wide variety of plane types and most of them were going to be the fighters and light bombers.
“On the other side of equation”:
- In1921 Japan launched Hōshō, its first aircraft carrier and was planning to build more. The interesting part of this was that, in a rather masochistic action, the Brits and Americans sent their consultants to help Japan to get familiar with this area.
- In keeping with its doctrine, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the first to mount 356 mm (14 in) guns (in Kongō), 410 mm (16.1 in) guns (in Nagato), and began the only battleships ever to mount 460 mm (18.1 in) guns (in the Yamato class).
Japan, like Britain, was almost entirely dependent on foreign resources to supply its economy. To achieve Japan's expansionist policies, IJN had to secure and protect distant sources of raw materials, mostly controlled by foreign countries. To achieve this goal, she had to build large warships capable of long range assault. Due to the growing tensions around China, where the Japanese and American interests were in a direct contradiction, the IJN began to structure itself specifically to fight the United States.
However, geography of the needed materials was much more extensive, including South-East Asia (oil and raw materials in the British, French and Dutch colonies), the US (mostly scrap metal), Mexico (oil in Southern California), RE (oil in Northern Sakhalin and other materials). Quite a few targets but the US had the greatest presence on the Pacific and, as such was considered a potential enemy #1.
Two schools of thought battled over whether the navy should be organized around powerful battleships, ultimately able to defeat American ones in Japanese waters, or aircraft carriers. Neither really prevailed, and both types were developed. An attempt to build as many ships as possible as soon as possible led to the not too obvious but quite serious problems with their design and training of their crews.
As far as the aviation training was involved, an inherently faulty system was adopted: the most experienced pilots were expected to fly first and for as long as they are alive. In the case of war this would produce initial high scores but, with the shrinking numbers of the high quality fliers being engaged in fighting, there was going to be a shortage of experienced people capable of teaching the new pilots. The systems based upon rotation from the field to training or fast promotion of experienced fliers to the commanding positions may not produce the individual high scores but were going to be more productive in a long run in the terms of victories and losses numbers.
However, the serious conflict was not there, yet, and each country had the best system in the world. 😉
_________
[1] We are strong, we are brave,/Our torpedoes are rusty,/Don't touch us and you'll live longer!
[2] Actually, this
worst case scenario was exactly how the testing has to be done. What sense does it make to rest something under the best case scenario? 😉
[3] It would be unsuitable for a regent to be inferior to anybody in a military rank.