Summary to Date

OK, we’re only ten posts from kick-off, and this is probably a good place to have a review of where we are in this alternate defence of Malaya. I promised months ago that I would post OOBs to help people follow the conflict as it unfolds, but more recently, there have been requests to provide an overview of the changes to the historical path, and my reasonings behind those changes. And that seems a very fair point to me, so here goes.

...........It’s now or never: the die is cast!

Orders of Battle to follow.
Bravo Zulu
 
I think that the chronic shortfall was more caused by an false assumption prior to start of the campaign. The staff that was responsible for the feeding of the troops assumed troops would be feed by the field kitchens most of the time. C or K rations were only be used as an last resort if the normal field kitchen was not availble. In reality this was reversed due the problems getting supplies forward.

Also during the testing phase at the start of the war, the failed to accurate recreate the demands for the daily caloric intake for troops in combat. The C and K rations only provided enough calories for troops at rest / in barracks.
Pretty much, though the testing did take into account athletic activity, what they didn't take into account was that a) combat burn calories on a whole different level than, lets say, a sports activity. The stress, fear, lack of sleep, and carrying full combat loads just doesn't compare. Then there's b) how the environment often factors in. The freezing cold of a Continental European winter; the miserable mud and rain combined with the steep terrain of an Italian mountain winter; The baking heat of a Saharan summer; the draining swamps, humidity, heat, endless wet, and rain of the New Guinea rain forests. All also sucked calories at prodigious rates even without combat!
Add in that indeed the field kitchens couldn't reach troops on the front lines as often as planned, not even close, and that troops themselves tended to not eat the rations as prescribed, but only the bits they liked (still an issue with the MRE) and you see the issue. Even with the field kitchens the troops would've been chronically underfed.
It was a solid, well thought out effort, but without truly realistic conditions available to test against, it was bound to come up short. The MRE is as close to a truly well thought out combat ration as I've seen, being based on studies of calorie usage under real combat conditions. Nonetheless, as said above, even then it only works if the person eating it eats all of it as prescribed. Few do!
 

Driftless

Donor
I had tossed in the "C" and "K" combat rations for comparison to the common lower calorie ration the Japanese soldiers were working from during the OTL Malaya, DEI, Burma campaigns. IF the Commonwealth and KNIL hold on longer, or even achieve stalemate, the Japanese logistical train is going to be challenged to keep those soldiers at operational efficiency, no matter how disciplined and inured to hardship as they were.

I can imagine some rations can be "requisitioned" from local residents, but enough?
 
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Now comes the hardest part, most especially for the author. Who, I hope succeeds brilliantly as this interesting and ambitious storyline soon enters its most complex phase.
 
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ctayfor

Monthly Donor
One of the easiest ways to keep calorie intake up in modern rations is their supplementation with "energy bars." When I was in the Royal New Zealand Army Corps 45 years ago, such things didn't exist, but we were issued a 100g Cadbury "Energy" chocolate bar with our daily (mainly tinned) rations. It was quite dark chocolate and fairly sweet, suitable for nibbling or for throwing into boiling water in a canteen cup with milk powder and possibly an extra sachet of sugar, to make a good cup of hot chocolate. That was one part of the ration pack that I don't recall anyone discarding or looking to trade.

Not fantastic basic nutrition because of the fairly high refined sugar (" empty calories") content, but the fat is a good energy source and the theobromine helps with alertness. A good supplement for battle rations, rather than basic food value.
 
One of the easiest ways to keep calorie intake up in modern rations is their supplementation with "energy bars." When I was in the Royal New Zealand Army Corps 45 years ago, such things didn't exist, but we were issued a 100g Cadbury "Energy" chocolate bar with our daily (mainly tinned) rations. It was quite dark chocolate and fairly sweet, suitable for nibbling or for throwing into boiling water in a canteen cup with milk powder and possibly an extra sachet of sugar, to make a good cup of hot chocolate. That was one part of the ration pack that I don't recall anyone discarding or looking to trade.

Not fantastic basic nutrition because of the fairly high refined sugar (" empty calories") content, but the fat is a good energy source and the theobromine helps with alertness. A good supplement for battle rations, rather than basic food value.
The Australia Army learnt a valuable lesson from the fighting in New Guinea - the soldier needs all the help available in his rations. They need to be nutritious and appetizing, easily prepared and interesting to eat, hot or cold. We worked on issuing 10 man ration packs when in combat supplemented by 1 man, 24 hour ration packs. When available fresh rations were to be issued but they were not necessary. We could supplement it with cordials for hot weather and rum rations for cold weather. Americans when attached would quite often eat an entire 24 hour, 1 man pack at a single sitting and then asked, "what was next? " They were used to receiving only a single meal MRE and we had to explain patiently that was not how we operated. Our rations were based on a 24 hour period and assigned accordingly. They were surprised at the quality of our rations, which were usually excellent. Their MREs have improved over time but still don't measure up that well to our 24 hour 1 man ration pack, which comes in 5 different varieties.
 
The goal for field fielding has historically been to minimize the use of preserved/packaged rations for three reasons: they’re generally not appetizing, they’re relatively expensive compared to fresh food, and they were often nutritionally incomplete. Even in SWPA, US forces made efforts to maximize the usage of fresh foods- there were field bakeries at the divisional level (one formed a provisional rifle company at Bataan after the flour ran out), gardens at Hollanding, and the famous coke and ice cream plants. The nominal plan for field feeding was to feed at least one hot meal a day for troops in the line with a goal of two plus supplements of soup and coffee all prepared by the company mess section.

This often broke down quickly in combat, especially in landing operations or offensive operations when the kitchens couldn’t be put into operation. Because they were likely to be committed first, combat arms troops and their attachments were typically on field rations the longest. Paradoxically, light forces, who burn the most calories because of the physical nature of their operations, are most likely to short themselves on rations by “field stripping” the ration to what they’ll really eat in an effort to save weight. An example from the Vietnam War novel the “13th Valley” based on the author’s experiences during operations in and around the A Shau Valley in 1979-71 shows infantrymen taking their issued three a day MCI (C-rations) and stripping them to a can of fruit for breakfast, a can of cheese and crackers for lunch, and a main meal can for dinner. Over a prolonged period this practice causes loss of muscle mass, fatigue, and nutritional deficiencies. These effects are exacerbated in extreme climates and by the stress of continuous operations and close combat.

Extensive research was, and continues to be done into field rations and the effects of calorie deficient. In the US, many of these studies were done using students in the US Army Ranger School, where food deprivation is used to induce stress in the students during field exercises (one ration meal a day, two a day in winter, typically eaten cold in about 5 minutes a meal) This is an ideal test environment because it provides a very controlled environment, since ranger students are isolated from outside food sources (even during garrison operations students generally subsist solely on dining facility meals) and are likely to consume their entire ration for the day (no hoarding or scavenging of MRE components is allowed, and students can only eat when permitted by the Ranger Instructor). Parallell studies were done with soldiers receiving the standard issue of MRE rations. This research led to the fortifying of ration components, the refinement of menus to include more varied and familiar items like commercial candies, inclusion of flameless ration heaters, more snacks, and the addition of “helpful hints” in ration packets reminding soldiers to “eat a little of eve component” if they couldn’t eat the full ration.

Studies from recent combat operations show that this was a mixed success. While many units operated from fixed sites using contracted food, forces engaged in protracted combat operations, as was common in 2003-2005 in Iraq and 2001-2011 in Afghanistan continued to field strip rations, consume insufficient calories, and suffer from disproportionate weight loss compared to their peers in more static units. For our purposes, heat and fatigue were cited as two reasons why troops did not consume a full ration, while the nature of infantry combat (many infantry units used “3 day” or ”assault packs” similar to a civilian commuter backpack for mobility in urban or mountainous terrain) meant that weight and space were at a premium and food competed with water, ammunition, and batteries. In one operational study soldiers conducting dismounted operations were found to have lost an average of 10% of their body weight in a month between commitment and being pulled out for refit. To combat this, the current trend is to issue soldiers in these circumstances a 24 hour ration composed of numerous fortified snack items designed to be eaten cold or on the move direct from the wrapper, such as pocket sandwiches, fortified squeezable applesauce, energy bars, and enriched gum.
 
During the draft-lottery phase of Nam, I was classified 1-Y (not draftable until all the 1-As had been used up), eventually changed to 4-F (medically rejected), I think due to my red-green colorblindness. However, a further potential problem would have been my allergies to chocolate and coffee, which have long been key elements of field rations. What do armies do about soldiers that can't eat chocolate, when that's so broadly used as a base ingredient of high-calorie desserts (WWII) and energy bars (now)?
 
Summary to Date

OK, we’re only ten posts from kick-off, and this is probably a good place to have a review of where we are in this alternate defence of Malaya. I promised months ago that I would post OOBs to help people follow the conflict as it unfolds, but more recently, there have been requests to provide an overview of the changes to the historical path, and my reasonings behind those changes. And that seems a very fair point to me, so here goes.

My POD started with Britain yielding to Japanese pressure to close the Burma Road in July 1940, which had raised great concerns over the defence and security of British interests in the Far East. Adding to the little that was done to improve the defences in the Far East, I had Pound stopping the transfer of the four Rainbow class submarines to the Med, while Dill authorised the expansion of the Malay Regt and the raising of two British officered Chinese regiments, the Singapore (Chinese) Regt and the Hong Kong (Chinese) Regt. Both of these changes tests the plausibility of my timeline. Regarding the submarines, the Royal Navy needed every submarine it could spare for the Med, to stop Italian supplies to North Africa, along with the advancing creep of the Axis in the Eastern Med. The second is more about Britain's underlying concern about the growth of Communism among the Chinese, and fear that Communists might penetrate the British system.

A month later, with Japan moving into Northern French Indo-China, I used the opportunity to highlight the squabbles between the Army and RAF in Malaya, and allude to the poor civil administration, both of which were known, but ignored. In my TL, Churchill is more decisive, replacing the military and civilian leadership except for the Royal Navy. Placing Andrew Caldecott there is somewhat tricky. At the time, he was firefighting in Ceylon, where there was growing nationalism, but I don’t think the move is too much of a stretch. Lord Gort for Brooke-Popham is giving preference to the Army over the RAF, as the Army will be the senior partner in any defence of the Far East for some time. Gort is very much part of the establishment, and politically a reasonable choice. Park is a different thing, a talent, who has fallen foul of RAF politics, and I think I can use that excuse to take him.

The October local commander’s appreciation of what was needed to defend Malaya gave me my next opportunity for changes. Finding aircraft for the RAF is quite hard. The Fairey Battles are very much make do, but they were no longer front line in Europe, and there were a lot of them, so I feel safe sending them, and I’ve retained the Buffalos, while slightly increasing the Blenheims. Reducing the Hong Kong garrison to something more symbolic is often suggested, and I’ve followed that idea. Those forces go to Malaya, as well as a couple of British infantry battalions which should have gone to or stayed in India. That’s a bit naughty: there were already fewer units there than the CoS would have liked for security reasons. Also, at this time the Admiralty floated (do you like the pun) the idea of an American naval squadron being based in Singapore, which Roosevelt slapped down when Churchill mentioned it. In my TL, Churchill really takes this to heart, recognising the USA will not defend British Empire colonies, although at this moment he still retains the hope that the Americans will manage any Japanese aggression.

Next, I have the Singapore Conference in November 1940, where closer cooperation between the British, Dutch and Americans is discussed. I have remained historically true to the American position, as I have hopefully throughout the TL, until the shooting starts, but I have allowed the British a little more leeway in working with the Dutch. So, given Churchill’s appreciation that he will get no help from the Americans in holding Malaya, he has quietly lent leaned on the Dominions to do more voluntarily in whatever way they can. New Zealand really can’t do much, the two Article XV sqns I have are merely recognising the two sqns of fighter they manned historically. I lean towards them finding more aircrew for the FAA, which will now expand by two squadrons, one of Swordfish, the other, a bit later with navalized Buffalos. This is another reach on my part: expanding the FAA was difficult in the early war years, due in part to aircraft numbers. The Australians are able to do better, earmarking the entire 8th Australian Division to Malaya, as opposed to holding back the 23rd Bde, and a few other units, which they did historically. She has also raised two Independent Companies for Malaya, as well as a Medium Artillery Regt, using ex-Hong Kong and Indian guns. And she has contributed more aircrew, allowing extra Article XV squadrons.

South Africa has not provided any forces; her constitution stops them serving outside of Africa, unless they join the British services as individuals. But industrially, she is sending a reasonable amount of war material, including armoured cars. India is able to do a bit more: a second Cavalry Regt is sent, with both regiments to convert to those South African armoured cars. Here I have swapped the 3rd Cavalry for the 5th King Edward VII’s Own Lancers (Probyn’s Horse), and added the 6th Duke of Connaught’s Own Lancers (Watson’s Horse), simply because I have a little thing for these two old regiments. India has also sent five auxiliary battalions of the Indian Pioneer Corps, which are non-combatants, but help immensely with manpower shortages in preparing and constructing defences. She has also provided another two Brigade HQ’s along with associated smaller units, and has seen the raising of six Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regts, equipped with the nearly obsolete 3-inch AA gun.

The last Dominion to help is Canada, who, despite not sending C-Force to Hong Kong, has contributed massively. Firstly, two of the auxiliary cruisers, HMCS Prince David and Prince Henry, have been altered differently to from their historical rebuild, retaining an ability to carry up to 450 troops/passengers, while keeping all their other military improvements. These ships have been transporting Canadian servicemen to Singapore/Malaya, where a significant RCAF presence has been established. Five Article XV RCAF squadrons have been raised; also two airfield construction companies and a Royal Canadian Signals communication construction company are deployed and a decent number of Canadians are serving in the expanded radar network that Keith Park is building. But more importantly than its her military contribution, is the war materials it she is supplying. Generous amounts of rails and railway engineering equipment is are being shipped, along with cement, and other important building materials. Large numbers of motor vehicles are being supplied, and lastly, over 150 Hurricane aircraft, minus their engines, have been sent. All of it is carried by Canadian chartered tramp steamers crossing the Pacific, which don't have to be convoyed.

Britain has done more too, robbing West African ports of designated radar units to provide Keith Park with a reasonably effective network covering Singapore, as well a few strategically placed in Northern Malaya. The replacement of the Buffalo by the Hurricane is a second major step in providing a decent air defence. The recognition that the Hurricane is no longer a premier fighter in Western Europe, doesn’t detract from the fact that it can do a good job in the Far East. Its robust design allows it to work off poor airfields, as well as take quite a bit of damage, and it can be repaired easier.

Even though the Dominions have given more, Churchill and the RAF have had to alter strategy. They have sent 200 aero engines to power the Hurricanes, and shipped less war material to the USSR, the Hurricane being the most obvious reduction. Britain has also sent further units: 151 Wing of RAF fighters, a regiment of Valentine tanks, a company of Royal Marines, and small increases in Wrens, staff officers, etc, while extra equipment includes 180 3-inch AA guns, ASDIC, and specialist vehicles.

Locally, Malaya and Hong Kong have done their bit, Hong Kong recruiting probably over extra 5,000 Chinese for the local armed forces, as well as another 3,000 in civil defence duties. For Malaya, another 3,500 Malays are in the Army, as well as 3,000 Chinese, and more of both serve with the RAF and Royal Navy. Also, Lord Gort has taken the brave decision to disband many volunteer forces, enabling a lot of the Europeans to serve in roles much better suited to their own personal skill sets. This is a minus on paper, but in general, performance overall - in administration, planning, and organisation - will be better than it was historically.

Strategy in Malaya has changed too. Park is putting more emphasis firstly on his southern airfields, and has generally improved defensive measures on them all. Wann’s RAF 223 Group, in northern Malaya, has shaped into a reasonable attacking force, admittedly only with Battles and Blenheims, but Hunter’s RAF 225 Group is still equipped with Hudson and Vildebeest aircraft. However, Vincent’s RAF 224 Group, linked with a working radar network, provides a decent air defence in the south, though somewhat patchy in the north.

The Army under Percival still has the angst of not knowing if Matador is a going concern or not, but it is stronger, a bit better equipped, and somewhat better trained. If Matador happens, it will be led by the Australian 8th Division under Rowell. If Matador doesn’t happen, it will be Godwin-Austen’s Indian III Corps which will defend Kelantan and Kuantan in the east, and the Jitra line in the Northwest, but with a viable backstop line at Gurun. It will also conduct smaller operations into Southern Thailand, i.e. securing the famous ‘Ledge’.

Force Z has arrived, the Prince of Wales has her radars working, and they’ve been augmented, with four cruisers and a few extra destroyers. Working more closely with the Dutch, means the Dutch are contributing to a light squadron, and adding submarines to the small RN flotilla.

But perhaps a bigger change is the attitude among colony residents. They know they are close to war, but it's something they have been preparing for for over a year, recognising they need to train hard and realistically. This has all been driven from the top. Caldecott has persuaded the Malay and Chinese populace to buy into this, with recruitment into the services, and also plenty of contracts awarded to local firms.

Elsewhere, things are less rosy, Burma is as unprepared as it was historically, and Borneo has been stripped of any defensive force, merely left with a denial of resources plan. Hong Kong, also stripped of over half of her garrison, and with no C Force, now relies on recent Chinese recruits to help a small British garrison provide an honourable defence of the colony. In the Philippines, MacArthur holds sway, while Hart is doing all he can to save the Asiatic Fleet. The Dutch are desperately trying to rearm, and Australia has only just realised she needs to take a lot more responsibility for her own defence. Japan is as ready as she’ll ever be. It’s now or never: the die is cast!

Orders of Battle to follow.

If they could raise that many extra forces though, why not send them to Egypt or Malta that are bordering on collapse. Singapore and Malaya are ultimately lower priority then North Africa, and success early on in Malaya means nothing if changes result in North Africa collapsing.
 
The. British rations in the 80s were dire the only thing good in them was the chocolate bar cheese and sausages the rest were only fit for a dog. Thankfully we copied the American MREs eventually.
 
During the draft-lottery phase of Nam, I was classified 1-Y (not draftable until all the 1-As had been used up), eventually changed to 4-F (medically rejected), I think due to my red-green colorblindness. However, a further potential problem would have been my allergies to chocolate and coffee, which have long been key elements of field rations. What do armies do about soldiers that can't eat chocolate, when that's so broadly used as a base ingredient of high-calorie desserts (WWII) and energy bars (now)?
They eat other foods. There is plentiful cheese and ration biscuits for them to consume instead of Chocolate. They would have disliked the Australian Army Chocolate ration anyway. Most soldiers do, initially. It is usually issued near white, with the Cocoa solids separated by heat from the milk solids. It is perfectly alright, just not as appetizing as normal civilian Chocolate.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
If they could raise that many extra forces though, why not send them to Egypt or Malta that are bordering on collapse. Singapore and Malaya are ultimately lower priority then North Africa, and success early on in Malaya means nothing if changes result in North Africa collapsing.
Hi Viper91, yes that's a good question, but I'd say, they had enough troops in the North African theatre, just not trained, or the units were being rebuilt from the disasters of Greece and Crete. And as you can see in my Operation Crusader posts, the British do have the upper hand. Malta is a bit of a different story, I don't think it was troops, and I'm guessing your arguing for more aircraft there (Hurricanes), the problem here was one of getting them there, and the high attrition rate. So yes, I do agree there is some questioning of my allocation of Hurricanes to Malaya, although I'd say the RAF had plenty, and most of the pilots of the Article XV squadrons in Malaya are somewhat green, probably not that desirable for Malta. And on that note of Malta, you might recognise some of my Canadian pilots when we get to the air action, from Malta.
 
During the draft-lottery phase of Nam, I was classified 1-Y (not draftable until all the 1-As had been used up), eventually changed to 4-F (medically rejected), I think due to my red-green colorblindness. However, a further potential problem would have been my allergies to chocolate and coffee, which have long been key elements of field rations. What do armies do about soldiers that can't eat chocolate, when that's so broadly used as a base ingredient of high-calorie desserts (WWII) and energy bars (now)?
During the MRE development cycle, the US Army introduced commercially made kosher/halal MRE type meals (actually managed through unit chaplain supply channels) and later and MRE type Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR). The HDR is vegetarian and has “widespread cultural and religious acceptability”. Some of the vegetarian entrees of the kosher/halal meals eventually made it into the MRE itself (look up the veggie omelett, aka “vomlette”). Otherwise there is no accommodation in MREs.

There are soldiers who do not use elements of the ration for various reasons (religious, medical, etc). Usually there is enough swapping of rations or there are acceptable meals available to them. Ironically, many soldiers in prolonged combat discarded the MRE dessert items before they discarded bland foods like breads, which was a factor in calorie deficient. Otherwise, a medical history of allergies, especially ones leading to anaphylaxis is considered disqualifying for enlistment. If developed on active duty the allergy may lead to a restriction on career field and assignment or separation following an evaluation of medical fitness.
 
Agree with Mr. Coxy's premise - the only additional bodies of troops that have gone to Malaya have been pretty much green troops which would have been unhelpful in North Africa or Malta. similarly the hurricanes that have gone to Malaya have been airframes which were then married up to engines from Canada so no way they could have gone to Malta easily. The 4 R's and the Valentines are the biggest stretch but they were using Valentines to equip Indian units anyway and it is reasonable to suppose that after very heavy losses of the large pre war boats in the med that the R's were kept back as otherwise being deathtraps in a high risk warzone
 
The. British rations in the 80s were dire the only thing good in them was the chocolate bar cheese and sausages the rest were only fit for a dog. Thankfully we copied the American MREs eventually.

I have to disagree.
Not everything was great but a lot of the rations were good enough or even quite tasty.
Being short of water could be a problem if you were issued an arctic pack but I have fond memories of mixing rolled oats and hot chocolate
 
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If the airfields are attacked at night as is likely the aircrews will be alive but the groundcrews and most importantly the torpedo armourers (a very specialised task) could well be out of the picture.
Attacking airfields at night is almost impossible. You just can't find them in the dark. The chances they will be lite up for the attackers is about nil, and there are almost no landmarks to guide them in. That's why it was almost never done.
 
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