Churchill concealed the route of the AIF divisions from the Middle-East when they were recalled home. Churchill believed they were more useful in Rangoon rather than as was initially supposed the NEI and then later in Australia. The Australian Government believed that London would abide by the agreement which governed their deployment to the Middle-East. Churchill did not. He changed the course not once but twice without telling Canberra and Canberra reacted most negatively to the news when they learned it. The ships had not been loaded tactically because of the hurriedness of their redeployment and when Churchill learnt that he relented and ordered them back to Trincomalee to refuel. This only occurred after some terse exchange of telegrams between London and Canberra. If they had reached Rangoon, there is no doubt they would have gone straight into the Japanese bag.

That was his worse effort, but not his only one. Churchill was not to be trusted.
Churchill was not a dictator - he was a Prime Minister

First among equals and a bully certainly but he could not dictate troop movements in the same fashion as Stalin or Hitler could.

He could influence massively but not dictate the decisions made.

If the Australian government were not aware of where their troops were going or what they were about is that not a damning indictment on them?

As for going into the bag - neither the Burma Division (militia in all but name) or the decimated 17th Indian Army division or the 7th Armour Brigade which were all involved in the fighting around Rangoon 'Went into the bag' - therefore why would Australian troops if they arrived do so?
 
If the Australian government were not aware of where their troops were going or what they were about is that not a damning indictment on them?
It pissed off the independent anti-Labourites sufficiently that Labor took power in parliament with their supply and confidence. Churchill didn't just burn Labourite Australia's goodwill: he burnt conservative and liberal good will who viewed Nation as the way to achieve Empire. Only those who saw Empire as the way to achieve Nation really were left with any confidence in the Imperial parliament.

Churchill burnt Australia badly enough that Australia declared political independence by ratifying the Westminster statute. Australia's labourite nationalist imperialists with the support of nationalist imperialists were so specifically pissed off that they ratified it backdated to the moment war was declared.

In the game of deliberate understatement this is pretty much drawing a knife, and explains the MacArthur government and later use of Australian forces.
 
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Churchill was not a dictator - he was a Prime Minister

First among equals and a bully certainly but he could not dictate troop movements in the same fashion as Stalin or Hitler could.

He could influence massively but not dictate the decisions made.

If the Australian government were not aware of where their troops were going or what they were about is that not a damning indictment on them?

As for going into the bag - neither the Burma Division (militia in all but name) or the decimated 17th Indian Army division or the 7th Armour Brigade which were all involved in the fighting around Rangoon 'Went into the bag' - therefore why would Australian troops if they arrived do so?
You appear to have missed the main point: When Australia went to war it did so as a Dominion, not a colony. As such it had an agreement with the UK's Government over how the dominion's troops were to be employed. It expected that agreement to be abided by. Their troops were to be kept together, where possible and employed as a cohesive whole formations, they were not to be employed without Australian commanders, they were to be informed where they were employed. They were to be treated as allied, not colonial soldiers where the British saw fit. This is did not happen in the case of Greece or in the case of Burma. Australia was being treated as a colony. That was not on in the eyes of Australia. Our experience in WW1 had taught us something.
 
MWI 41060311 Progression On The Airfields

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 03 June;

The De Havilland Dominie came to a stop, and the young Australian flight sergeant ran to the door located behind the wing, and opened it, allowing Air Vice Marshal Keith Park to climb out. He’d had a pleasant flight from Seletar, Singapore, and had asked the pilot to circle above a few minutes, so he could observe the airfield below. Kluang and its surrounding area was still a hive of activity, although they’d completed one concrete runway, with the second nearing completion, further works were ongoing on the railway sidings where a number of buildings including hangers were in the process of being built.

The RAF personnel stationed here were used to seeing visitors, although nearly always by car, and a much lower rank, as staff officers and experts from supporting organisations visited with concerns about provisions, planned allocated facilities, and timetables. But Park’s visits where ever he went, always created a buzz, an excitement, a morale booster, and the chance to catch a glimpse of the Battle of Britain hero, maybe even some brief few words with the great man.

A wing commander, the station commander, led him over to a waiting Hillman Minx, a requisitioned model, painted RAF Blue, which they climbed into, before the short drive to the officer’s mess, a newly built wooden Kampong, situated among a number of rubber trees, with a wide staircase leading onto a big veranda, rattan chairs and tables scattered along its length. He would have a progress report on the construction of the airfield, while having a cool drink, before a tour of the station, meeting the building contract managers, as he toured, and then attend the invited evening dinner in the officer’s mess, with recently promoted Sqn Ldr Gordon Steege, fresh from the Middle East and his officers of the newly raised RAAF 450 Sqn.

Here at Kluang he would find the airfield incomplete, with numerous buildings still to be built, although all the ground clearance had long been completed. So, the drawings would show a munition dump, while he would see an area cleared of undergrowth, pits scrapped out, just leaving mature trees standing, awaiting the bunkers to be constructed. Similarly, roads had been scrapped out awaiting a bed of firmly packed rock and gravel, leading to incomplete, at best, aircraft pens.

However, over by the newly built rail sidings, were a large number of big sheds, workshops and hangers, with more being built, for the newly forming RAF 155 MU, which had been given the task of assembling all newly arrived crated aircraft, and the repair of the seriously damaged in accidents and operations. Some members had been transferred from 151 MU in Seletar, but many were newly arrived from the UK, and hadn’t got their knees brown yet.

Also, in situ was the RAF Operational Training Unit (Malaya) which had been using Buffalos, but would be the first to use the Hurricanes, when they arrive. It was also planned to operate a few Battles and Blenheim’s, to train new crews as they arrive, although that was currently being done by the newly forming squadrons themselves.

And the construction work force had changed, as the PWD heavy earth moving equipment were already in Batu Pahat, in the middle of four weeks’ worth of ground clearance, and levelling work, expanding the single runway, and readily the site for the provision of all the other facilities now required of a military airfield. Kluang was now seeing lorries with a different logo, owned by a civilian contractor, ferrying Chinese labourers, aggregates, cement, treated sawn lumber, and numerous other items. Most of the workmen were living in tents, while they worked on the assorted buildings required to make up an operational airfield, and its supporting infrastructure. They had a challenging schedule, to deliver most of the facilities by the end of July, which Park hoped would happen, but privately was sceptical it could be done in time.

Further north, major work was ongoing at Taiping, the civil airfield there being turned into one that could operate two bomber sqns, with a hard runway being built, and the grass one being extended. The airfield would be operational well before November, but some other facilities would probably take longer to be completed. Butterworth was also coming along nicely, similar to Taiping, while at Ipoh, development of the airfield was somewhat restricted, and it would only be suitable for one sqn. Already other sites were being surveyed, and he hoped to begin work on some of them by September.

Park would stay the night here in Kluang, and next morning be driven to Kahang, where he would inspect the new airfield complex that was under currently under construction. There he would find the 3rd RCAF Airfield Construction Company, which had only arrived mid-May, but was already hard at work, on ground clearance, and levelling, extending the grass runway, and preparing the ground for protected munition and fuel dumps, dispersal areas with aircraft pens, hutted accommodation, all for one fighter sqn, well in front of their timetable.
 
With greater jungle canopy coverage available than was available in England during the BoB, will Park's TTL airfields attempt to better camouflage their aircraft and infrastructure?
 
You appear to have missed the main point: When Australia went to war it did so as a Dominion, not a colony. As such it had an agreement with the UK's Government over how the dominion's troops were to be employed. It expected that agreement to be abided by. Their troops were to be kept together, where possible and employed as a cohesive whole formations, they were not to be employed without Australian commanders, they were to be informed where they were employed. They were to be treated as allied, not colonial soldiers where the British saw fit. This is did not happen in the case of Greece or in the case of Burma. Australia was being treated as a colony. That was not on in the eyes of Australia. Our experience in WW1 had taught us something.
That's all great and all but....

We are discussing the narrative that Churchill was lying to the Australian government about the movement and employment of the 6th and 7th Divisions in the Far East

So these units were being returned to Australia in Jan/Feb 42 and given the speed of success by the Japanese the 6th was rerouted to Burma and some thought to employment of 2nd AIF in Java (a proposal backed by Wavell, Churchill and Roosevelt)

It was on the 15th Feb (day Singapore surrendered) that Gen Sturdee presented Curtin with an analysis of the proposed use of 2nd AIF units as part of the Java plan and (threatening to resign etc) convinced them that the whole force sent to Java would be lost and at this point the Australian government dug it heels in and by the 23rd Feb the 2nd AIF was no longer going to be employed in that fashion (Rangoon or Java) and instead returned to Australia.

As it turned out 2 Brigades of the 6th garrisoned Ceylon for 6 months - not returning until Aug 42

So was it a lie or did Churchill (read UK Gov) instead scrambling to events order the 6th to Rangoon, start making plans to move the 7th to Java, told the Australian Government what they were doing only for the Australian government also shocked in the face of the failure of the Singapore defence plan and stunned by the speed of the Japanese advance elsewhere with the knowledge that the Militia was not nearly ready to defend Australia - quite understandably ask for their army back?
 
The 6 and 7 Divisions were intended to move to Java originally. It was then decided that they would move to Australia. Churchill however decided that the 6 Division should move to Rangoon without telling the Australian Government. When Canberra disagreed how their troops were to be employed Churchill then explicitly lied about where the 6 Division was going to Rangoon. He ordered them to continue on to Rangoon. This was against how they were be employed according to the original decision that Canberra had signed to cover their original deployment. Churchill did not give a stuff to Australia's wishes. They were Australian troops and were meant to be employed how the Australian Government wished. Wake up to yourself, you are condoning double-dealing and lies. Australia was a self-governing dominion not a colony and had not been a colony since 1 January 1901. It deserved to be treated as a self-governing dominion nothing less.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The diversion of the Australian I Corps from the Middle East to the Far East is of great interest to me, and I need to do a lot more work on its timelines, and the arguments around its deployment. This was during a time of a quickly deteriorating defence of Malaya and Singapore, along with increasingly growing concern in Australia about their say in the direction of the war, and how their own troops were used. Differences in how the war was to be fought quickly became a chasm between London and Canberra. With a possible better, and longer defence of Malaya, those tensions may be less, we'll have to see how this plays out. I'll provide a breakdown of how the deployment of the I Australian Corps played out historically, in the next week or so, and invite comment.

I'm also going to have to do a piece on firstly Robert Menzies, the PM who took Australia into the war, and then John Curtin, who, like Menzies, formed a minority government in October 1941. Curtin was much more assertive in his dealings with Churchill.
 
MWI 41060511 Training The Dutch

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 05 June;

They were the first two ships of the Dutch East Indies Squadron equipped with ASDIC, as part of the ongoing co-operation between the British and the Dutch. Both HNLMS Witte de With and Banckert had been drydocked in Singapore for the work which had taken about a week for each. Installing the dome, and cable all the way up to the small ASDIC room had been done carefully. The retracting dome had to be cut and fitted in the hull, the cable run through holes cut into the bulkheads and then sealed, and a small ASDIC room built at the back of the bridge. Other ships would gradually be fitted as sets became available.

All seven remaining Admiralen class destroyers were planned on being modified, and to lighten their topside weight, in order to accommodate the two racks of depth charges being fitted on the stern, a total of 24 being carried on each ship, their aft mast was taken out, the Fokker C.VII-W seaplane’s had been landed, and the crane’s removed at Surabaya Naval Base in Java.

But in many ways that was the easy part, or at least the quickest. The real challenge was teaching them how you use ASDIC and while they’re at it, learning how to co-ordinate with the British. Part of the key for that was having officers who could speak both English and Dutch. So, both navies were training newly recruited dual linguist Sub Lieutenant’s into the role of a Liaison/Signals Officer.

South of Penang, in the Malacca Straits, HNLMS Banckert began her attack, HMS Thanet standing off, working as her partner. On the bridge of Banckert, with the commander, Lt Cdr Goslings was 37-year-old Yorkshireman, Sub Lieutenant Thomas Frobisher, RNVR who, three months ago, had been a shipping agent in Singapore. He’d previously been a private in the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force, before they had identified a better use of him in this role. Now he was leading a signal party of one petty officer, newly promoted from HMS Dragon, and three seamen of the Royal Navy.

He still shook his head in disbelief sometimes, the fact he knew Dutch was due to his wife Saskia, who he’d been married to for 9 years now. How proud he had made her, his small portly figure squeezed into a uniform of the Royal Navy, and yes, he did know a little bit about shipping, but this was, well, so much more exciting. These last three months had been a whirlwind, six weeks at the Naval Base, on a bespoke basic officer’s course, along with another 14 others, who’s ages ranged from 19 to 48, followed by another 4 weeks of signalling, working with newly trained Malay signallers, and a young, confident, keen, petty officer. On HMS Thanet was his counterpart, 34-year-old Evert Lange, nearly two months a Luitenant ter zee der 2de klasse, formerly a part time sergeant in a coastal battery at Batavia, and until his conscription, a hotel deputy manager. His English wasn’t as good as Tom’s Dutch, and as yet he hadn’t got his sea legs.

Beneath them some 1800 yards away was HMS Regent, acting as the target, listening on her hydrophones, waiting for them to close into the dead zone, before she manoeuvred. After this round of exercises, Regent would be returning to Singapore for a week’s refit before rotating out to Hong Kong, along with her sister HMS Rainbow, while the two submarines currently there, HMS Regulus and Rover would return to Singapore.

It was Banckert’s third attempt today, and Goslings was getting increasingly frustrated with the whole thing. The co-ordination of the signal’s teams, the ASDIC team, and his depth charge crew, manning the newly installed depth charge racks at the rear of the ship, was at best poor. He prided himself on his ship being the best, in his eyes, in the fleet, but she hadn’t acted like that today. Whats more, Witte de With, the other Dutch destroyer in these manoeuvres had done quite well on her second attempt. He hated the thought of her commanding officer, Schotel crowing over him later over drinks.
 
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Its very nice to see that Dutch capabilities are growing, especially considering just how limited are the Allied forces in the region. Aside from Dutch ASW getting an upgrade, this further builds up on CW-DEI working together, so I do hope that by the time shooting starts, there should be less confusion, with communications sorted out.

The seaplanes that were rendered surplus due to DEI DDs being refitted, they can also find their place. They may be obsolete 1920s design, but considering the lack of airframes, I am certain they can be pressed into service, in one way or another. I mean, for ASW role it would still probably be useful, allowing for a more modern aircraft to be used elsewhere.
 
The diversion of the Australian I Corps from the Middle East to the Far East is of great interest to me, and I need to do a lot more work on its timelines, and the arguments around its deployment. This was during a time of a quickly deteriorating defence of Malaya and Singapore, along with increasingly growing concern in Australia about their say in the direction of the war, and how their own troops were used. Differences in how the war was to be fought quickly became a chasm between London and Canberra. With a possible better, and longer defence of Malaya, those tensions may be less, we'll have to see how this plays out. I'll provide a breakdown of how the deployment of the I Australian Corps played out historically, in the next week or so, and invite comment.

I'm also going to have to do a piece on firstly Robert Menzies, the PM who took Australia into the war, and then John Curtin, who, like Menzies, formed a minority government in October 1941. Curtin was much more assertive in his dealings with Churchill.
Menzies was notorious for viewing himself as, "British to his bootstraps!" A statement he once made in Parliament. He also resigned a commission in the Militia before he could be sent overseas to serve in the 1st AIF in WWI, which earnt him a reputation as a coward in some circles downunder. Curtin, on the otherhand, was gaoled in WWI for protesting against the idea of conscription but he was intrumental in introducing it in WWII. He and his foreign minister, Herbert "Doc" Evatt, were more assertive with London than with Washington. He basically handed over direction of the war effort to MacArthur when he landed from the Philippines in the hope that Australia would be given a higher priority than it was. Curtin was an alcoholic and died from it before the end of the war. Menzies was elected Prime Minister for a second time in 1949.
 
To be fair to Menzies, his decision to resign from the militia ( bearing in mind Militia could not by law, be sent o/s; all AIF members were volunteers), was as a result of a family conference. He had, IIRC, 2 brothers already serving. But, yes, it was used to smear him as a coward later.
 
Love the updates.
Nice to read that at least all Admiralen class destroyers of the RN Navy are in the Far East defending for what they were build. I hope this will be the same for the submarines. And there unique division tactic with their aerial reconnaissance by Do-24 flyboats in this time line.
I read once that the Dutch submarine crews were unpleasant suprised, or terrified, when confronted the first time with the Japanese equivalent of Asdic/ active Sonar applied by Japanese subhunters/destroyers.
 
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1941, Thursday 05 June;

They were the first two ships of the Dutch East Indies Squadron equipped with ASDIC, as part of the ongoing co-operation between the British and the Dutch. Both HNLMS Witte de With and Banckert had been drydocked in Singapore for the work which had taken about a week for each. Installing the dome, and cable all the way up to the small ASDIC room had been done carefully. The retracting dome had to be cut and fitted in the hull, the cable run through holes cut into the bulkheads and then sealed, and a small ASDIC room built at the back of the bridge. Other ships would gradually be fitted as sets became available.

All seven remaining Admiralen class destroyers were planned on being modified, and to lighten their topside weight, in order to accommodate the two racks of depth charges being fitted on the stern, a total of 24 being carried on each ship, their aft mast was taken out, the Fokker C.VII-W seaplane’s had been landed, and the crane’s removed at Surabaya Naval Base in Java.

But in many ways that was the easy part, or at least the quickest. The real challenge was teaching them how you use ASDIC and while they’re at it, learning how to co-ordinate with the British. Part of the key for that was having officers who could speak both English and Dutch. So, both navies were training newly recruited dual linguist Sub Lieutenant’s into the role of a Liaison/Signals Officer.
"The real challenge was teaching them how you use ASDIC"-Fatboy Coxy. How to teach them? With lots and lots of lovely practice.
 
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Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Menzies was notorious for viewing himself as, "British to his bootstraps!" A statement he once made in Parliament. He also resigned a commission in the Militia before he could be sent overseas to serve in the 1st AIF in WWI, which earnt him a reputation as a coward in some circles downunder. Curtin, on the otherhand, was gaoled in WWI for protesting against the idea of conscription but he was intrumental in introducing it in WWII. He and his foreign minister, Herbert "Doc" Evatt, were more assertive with London than with Washington. He basically handed over direction of the war effort to MacArthur when he landed from the Philippines in the hope that Australia would be given a higher priority than it was. Curtin was an alcoholic and died from it before the end of the war. Menzies was elected Prime Minister for a second time in 1949.
Despite their personal shortcomings, am I right in assuming both are lauded as great prime ministers of Australia.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Love the updates.
Nice to read that at least all Admiralen class destroyers of the RN Navy are in the Far East defending for what they were build. I hope this will be the same for the submarines. And there unique division tactic with their aerial reconnaissance by Do-24 flyboats in this time line.
I read once that the Dutch submarine crews were unpleasant suprised, or terrified, when confronted the first time with the Japanese equivalent of Asdic/ active Sonar applied by Japanese subhunters/destroyers.
Hi Parma, I'd love to know more about their surprise at experiencing the Japanese sonar, can you remember where you read that?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
"The real challenge was teaching them how you use ASDIC"-Fatboy Coxy. How to teach them? With lots and lots of lovely practice.
A true classic film for me, real life and gritty, never saw it at the cinema, but countless times on TV. I love the part Stanley Baker plays, the new first lieutenant, a martinet, which covers his own personal fears, and his delight at eating sausages, or Snorkers! as he exclaims. An underrated actor for me, who, when given his big chance, as Lt Chard, was upstaged by the cinematic charisma of Michael Caine as his second in command, Lt Bromhead.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Which ASDIC set is in use aboard HNLMS Banckert? Is the HMS Thanet using the Type 144? If so here is a bit of trivia for the set operation.

Fantastic find Nevarinemex, thank you.

HMS Thanet was most probably equipped with the Type 124 ASDIC set, and for ease of story line, I'll say the Dutch destroyers will also be fitted with this set. But there will be others sets sent out, to equip smaller vessels. See


and

 
One thing that really makes this TL great is a different approach to the subject. The focus is not so much on the units and various materials of war, but the logistics side of things, the ability to not only send units to the theatre, but to be able to sustain them there for long term periods. That is where this Timeline really shines, in its devotion to Logistics, the True God of War.
 
Australians tend to decry their politicians and laud their personal failings. Both are considered “effective” for what they stood for happening to Australians. Despite the excellence of their personal failings they advanced the causes they stood for.
 
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