That night, one of the Japanese seaplanes dropped a flare over the Japanese heavy cruiser Chōkai, having mistaken her for Prince of Wales. After this, the Japanese force of six cruisers and several destroyers turned away to the northeast. The flare was also seen by the British force, which feared they had been identified and then turned away to the southeast. At this point, the forces were approximately 5 miles (9 km) apart but did not sight each other, and the Japanese force was not picked up on the radar of the Prince of Wales. At 20:55, Admiral Phillips cancelled the operation, saying that they had lost the element of surprise, and ordered the force to return to Singapore.

The sun had set at 18:58 hours, and was fully dark by 20:20 hours, and the moon didn't rise till 21:42 so, it was very dark. POW's radar wasn't working right, and I'm very surprised the Japanese didn't see 2 battleship sized targets that were so close. Weather conditions also seemed to be poor, but the Japanese seaplanes must have spotted Chokai by detecting her wake. The British were lucky the seaplanes didn't find the real Force Z, or they might have come under a night arial torpedo attack. Force Z was really sailing on troubled waters. They could've been destroyed in a night surface battle, a night air attack, a submarine attack, or an air attack the next day.
That's 5 miles for the screens, PoW would have been a bit further away. Still should have seen them but the early radars were a bit finicky on atmospherics even when they worked, so range was always an up to ( many examples of air search varying by 50% depending on the day )
 
1941, Sunday 28 September;

A lazy wind flapped the flags aboard HNLMS De Ruyter, flagship of the Dutch East Indies Squadron, and gave some comfort against the heat of the early afternoon sun for the Dutch Rear Admiral, Karel Doorman, standing on the bridge wing, binoculars in hand as he watched the light cruiser being guided into port by a minesweeper. He knew her ships class, was old friends with them all, stalwarts of the Far East. HMS Durban, she didn’t look any different to when he last saw her in Singapore, probably eight months ago, although she had a new commander now, Captain Peter Cazalet, who would no doubt be worrying about making a good impression on his arrival.

But even an old hand would have been alert to the challenges of entering Soerabaja, as change was afoot, both in war precautions and the massive expansion of facilities here. The shore batteries were now operational, controlled minefields laid, and an anti-submarine net with a boom defence vessel operating the gate. And the Westwater channel, the main access in, was being dredged and widened, an ongoing 24-hour operation.

This was home to the Oedjong Naval Complex, the premier naval base for the Dutch East Indies, and a rival for Singapore and Cavite as the best in the Far East. This was where the East Indies Squadron home ported, both her surface ships and submarines. The submarine base featured its own dry docks, a torpedo workshop, battery recharging units, as well as research and development labs. Further drydocks, and workshops serviced the surface fleet, while barracks could accommodate their crews while in repair.

HMS Durban was fresh from a refit in Singapore, and had only just completed her work up. Apart from the new paint, and some dents knocked out, her two 2-pounder pom-pom guns had been replaced by single 20mm Oerlikon guns, with another pair being installed on her quarterdeck. She would stay with the Dutch fleet, on a four-month secondment, allowing further practice in fleet co-operation, something both the British and Dutch desired. On board were several recently commissioned RNVR sub-lieutenants, trained in signalling, but more importantly with some fluency in Dutch, who would be assigned to the Dutch ships of the squadron, to help the work on fleet cooperation, as well as improve their own mastery of the Dutch language.

Apart from the Flagship De Ruyter, the other ships of the squadron were the two light cruisers Java and Sumatra, contemporaries of Durban. Java had been given an extensive refit in Holland, in 1938, but Sumatra hadn’t, and owing to the fall of Holland, was now having a major refit here in Soerabaja, and wasn’t expected to be ready before April 1942. In addition four Admiralen-class destroyers were normally assigned, but currently only three were, Banckert just back from Singapore, having just been fitted and trained with ASDIC, Witte de With, which had already been done, and Van Nes, which was due fitting ASDIC soon. Another two were in the north, while of the last two, Van Ghent was waiting for a dockyard refit as soon as Evertsen came out, both of whom would have ASDIC fitted in Singapore, on completion of their refits.

Well, she looks smart enough, and is handled well, but we’ll know more tomorrow, when I take the squadron out for a week of exercises, thought Doorman, as he lowered his binoculars and turned around, making for his cabin. He would host a dinner for the officers of Durban tonight, and needed to finish working through today’s correspondence and writing up orders, before washing and changing for the evening festivities. Eight hundred and fifty miles north west, HNLMS Tromp was to be found, just dropping anchor in the Johore straits, where she would be joining the Royal Navy, for a similar experience of working on fleet cooperation.
Nice to read the subtle, but significant changes in this TL, which is the earlier cooperation between the Royal Netherlands Navy and Royal Navy surface units. Good to know that HNLMS Tromp is integrated in September 1941 in a RN united instead after outbreak of hostilities as in OTL.
This early close cooperation between the two Navies must have a significant increase in fighting efectiveness.
To bad it looks that HNMS Sumatra will have the same fate as in OTL, which is not ready on time for action If reading the history of this ship, it seems from the contruction slip, haunted with bad luck.
Maybe I missed it, but will the HNMS Jacob van Heemskerck and the O21 class submarines be ready on time and assigned to the East?
:)
 
That's 5 miles for the screens, PoW would have been a bit further away. Still should have seen them but the early radars were a bit finicky on atmospherics even when they worked, so range was always an up to ( many examples of air search varying by 50% depending on the day )
Ok. The range estimate isn't based on radar, or sighting reports since none were made. The estimate is based on their ships tracking from their logs which show where they were at precise times. That estimate would be accurate to about a nautical mile, but might mean from closest ship to closest ship, so POW might have been 7 miles from Chokai when she saw the flare. POW's radar didn't even track the plane that dropped the flare.
 
That night, one of the Japanese seaplanes dropped a flare over the Japanese heavy cruiser Chōkai, having mistaken her for Prince of Wales. After this, the Japanese force of six cruisers and several destroyers turned away to the northeast. The flare was also seen by the British force, which feared they had been identified and then turned away to the southeast. At this point, the forces were approximately 5 miles (9 km) apart but did not sight each other, and the Japanese force was not picked up on the radar of the Prince of Wales. At 20:55, Admiral Phillips cancelled the operation, saying that they had lost the element of surprise, and ordered the force to return to Singapore.

The sun had set at 18:58 hours, and was fully dark by 20:20 hours, and the moon didn't rise till 21:42 so, it was very dark. POW's radar wasn't working right, and I'm very surprised the Japanese didn't see 2 battleship sized targets that were so close. Weather conditions also seemed to be poor, but the Japanese seaplanes must have spotted Chokai by detecting her wake. The British were lucky the seaplanes didn't find the real Force Z, or they might have come under a night arial torpedo attack. Force Z was really sailing on troubled waters. They could've been destroyed in a night surface battle, a night air attack, a submarine attack, or an air attack the next day.
I suspect that they were not that close as neither side saw the other.

That is the obvious explanation as far as I am concerned.

Both navies were very good at night fighting but it is still a confusing affair.
 
HMS Durban was fresh from a refit in Singapore, and had only just completed her work up. Apart from the new paint, and some dents knocked out, her two 2-pounder pom-pom guns had been replaced by single 20mm Oerlikon guns, with another pair being installed on her quarterdeck.

Why would they replace pom-poms one for one with Oerlikons? That sounds like a downgrade in both range and firepower. I'd have thought it more likely that they just tried to shoehorn a couple of Oerlikons on as extra guns.
 
Why would they replace pom-poms one for one with Oerlikons? That sounds like a downgrade in both range and firepower. I'd have thought it more likely that they just tried to shoehorn a couple of Oerlikons on as extra guns.
I'm not sure without more research, but the Dand C class cruisers at one time had single 2lbrs, more like a very heavy MG, as part of their early AAAoutfit. I think these are what was referred to.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Whatever radar was on the POW it wasn't tropicalized so when the time came it malfunctioned. POW failed to detect a surface force 5 nautical miles away and had trouble detecting air contacts. Her radar and anti-aircraft ammo weren't very effective.
and
I believe it was 15 miles. But minor quibble.
I'd say that's a considerable difference
That night, one of the Japanese seaplanes dropped a flare over the Japanese heavy cruiser Chōkai, having mistaken her for Prince of Wales. After this, the Japanese force of six cruisers and several destroyers turned away to the northeast. The flare was also seen by the British force, which feared they had been identified and then turned away to the southeast. At this point, the forces were approximately 5 miles (9 km) apart but did not sight each other, and the Japanese force was not picked up on the radar of the Prince of Wales. At 20:55, Admiral Phillips cancelled the operation, saying that they had lost the element of surprise, and ordered the force to return to Singapore.

The sun had set at 18:58 hours, and was fully dark by 20:20 hours, and the moon didn't rise till 21:42 so, it was very dark. POW's radar wasn't working right, and I'm very surprised the Japanese didn't see 2 battleship sized targets that were so close. Weather conditions also seemed to be poor, but the Japanese seaplanes must have spotted Chokai by detecting her wake. The British were lucky the seaplanes didn't find the real Force Z, or they might have come under a night arial torpedo attack. Force Z was really sailing on troubled waters. They could've been destroyed in a night surface battle, a night air attack, a submarine attack, or an air attack the next day.
I too have read of the incident with the flare over Chokai, and Electra spotting it five miles away, however I posted a question about it, see

And the fact that it wasn't mentioned in Lt Cmdr TJ Cains book on HMS Electra, neither Arthur Mader's 'Old Friends, New Enemies' where he interviews Capt Bell from PoW for first hand accounts of said flare 'report'. Finally nothing is mentioned in the official report of the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, see

I think 15 miles away is possibly the distance, but not any nearer. So why didn't radar pick them up.

That's 5 miles for the screens, PoW would have been a bit further away. Still should have seen them but the early radars were a bit finicky on atmospherics even when they worked, so range was always an up to ( many examples of air search varying by 50% depending on the day )

We have a few possible reasons, as pjmidd says, atmospherics made a difference, especially rain if the target was in the rain, or the rain fell between them. And secondly, I suspect many radars weren't switched on, the British manufacture of valves was small and I think of variable quality, so there may have been a husbanding of these precious valves. I have no facts on that, just a hunch. Certainly I will have to factor in a variable performance on radar in my TL.
 
That night, one of the Japanese seaplanes dropped a flare over the Japanese heavy cruiser Chōkai, having mistaken her for Prince of Wales. After this, the Japanese force of six cruisers and several destroyers turned away to the northeast. The flare was also seen by the British force, which feared they had been identified and then turned away to the southeast. At this point, the forces were approximately 5 miles (9 km) apart but did not sight each other, and the Japanese force was not picked up on the radar of the Prince of Wales. At 20:55, Admiral Phillips cancelled the operation, saying that they had lost the element of surprise, and ordered the force to return to Singapore.

“The remainder of the squadron altered course to the north-westward at 1850 and to the westward for Singora at 1930 (presumably to mislead the shadowers). They were then only about 15 miles to the southward of Admiral Kurita's four heavy cruisers which at that moment altered from a southerly to a north-easterly course to join their battlefleet.”

Considering the distances would have come from comparing various reckoning of two different navies the exact difference is probably academic.

The sun had set at 18:58 hours, and was fully dark by 20:20 hours, and the moon didn't rise till 21:42 so, it was very dark
Same document shows sunset on 9 Dec at 18:00 and end of civil twilight at 18:22.

The British were lucky the seaplanes didn't find the real Force Z, or they might have come under a night arial torpedo attack.
Seaplanes did spot Force Z on the 9th, but lost them in rail squalls and then darkness. A night attack was attempted but did not find Force Z (unsurprisingly).
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Nice to read the subtle, but significant changes in this TL, which is the earlier cooperation between the Royal Netherlands Navy and Royal Navy surface units. Good to know that HNLMS Tromp is integrated in September 1941 in a RN united instead after outbreak of hostilities as in OTL.
This early close cooperation between the two Navies must have a significant increase in fighting efectiveness.
To bad it looks that HNMS Sumatra will have the same fate as in OTL, which is not ready on time for action If reading the history of this ship, it seems from the contruction slip, haunted with bad luck.
Maybe I missed it, but will the HNMS Jacob van Heemskerck and the O21 class submarines be ready on time and assigned to the East?
:)
Hi Parma, HNLMS Jacob van Heemskerck is doing sterling convoy work in the Atlantic Ocean, while the submarine O-21 is of invaluable use patrolling the western Med. Both types of ships are in short supply, its hard seeing the Admiralty reallocating either to a quite backwater.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
At this time the only well trained and experienced air arm for night operations was the RN. a noght Pursuit and DD attack would have been more likely.
Hi Butchpfd, the RN's Fleet Air Arm was the only night operating carrier force, but the IJN land based twin engined bombers (Nells and Bettys) had trained with dusk and dawn attacks, as well as using flares, targeting the ships silhouettes against the light.
 
I was reading up on HMS Exeter earlier and she arrived in Singapore on the 10th Dec to late to join Force Z which apparently was her intention.

She had a couple of Radar sets fitted during her post River plate rebuild and was therefore fairly state of the art as far as sensors are concerned.
 
and

I'd say that's a considerable difference

I too have read of the incident with the flare over Chokai, and Electra spotting it five miles away, however I posted a question about it, see

And the fact that it wasn't mentioned in Lt Cmdr TJ Cains book on HMS Electra, neither Arthur Mader's 'Old Friends, New Enemies' where he interviews Capt Bell from PoW for first hand accounts of said flare 'report'. Finally nothing is mentioned in the official report of the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, see

I think 15 miles away is possibly the distance, but not any nearer. So why didn't radar pick them up.



We have a few possible reasons, as pjmidd says, atmospherics made a difference, especially rain if the target was in the rain, or the rain fell between them. And secondly, I suspect many radars weren't switched on, the British manufacture of valves was small and I think of variable quality, so there may have been a husbanding of these precious valves. I have no facts on that, just a hunch. Certainly I will have to factor in a variable performance on radar in my TL.
With regards to radar not being on?

Quite likely.

A radar emission can be detected many time further away than it provides a useful return.

For example Bismarck think they had been detected despite being out of effective range.

An analogy I once heard was using radar is akin to being in a large blacked out warehouse shining a low powered torch to find other people.

You might find them but everyone now knows exactly where you are!

So given that Phillips was trying to keep his location a secret it is possible that the radar was not used.
 
Why would they replace pom-poms one for one with Oerlikons? That sounds like a downgrade in both range and firepower. I'd have thought it more likely that they just tried to shoehorn a couple of Oerlikons on as extra gunThe 2 pounder Ammunition did not take well in the far east. I fondly remember my father and his brother telling me about how our equipment was not built to work in humid climates. Dads brother my dear missed uncle was on on Repulse when it went down and I remember him telling me of the issues with almost every key system including the pitiful anti air craft guns.

Why would they replace pom-poms one for one with Oerlikons? That sounds like a downgrade in both range and firepower. I'd have thought it more likely that they just tried to shoehorn a couple of Oerlikons on as extra guns.
 
With regards to radar not being on?

Quite likely.

A radar emission can be detected many time further away than it provides a useful return.

For example Bismarck think they had been detected despite being out of effective range.

An analogy I once heard was using radar is akin to being in a large blacked out warehouse shining a low powered torch to find other people.

You might find them but everyone now knows exactly where you are!

So given that Phillips was trying to keep his location a secret it is possible that the radar was not used.
The Allies didn't think the Japanese had radar, or radar detection equipment, and at this time they didn't. If you're afraid of using your radar, you might as well not have it. Radar detection is dependent on what band the enemy can detect. In the Battle of the Atlantic, and the air war over Germany it was a technological race between radar vs jamming, and detection. The Japanese were way behind the curve of the Allies, and even the Germans. At the times when we know the POW used her radar it didn't work very well because of the heat and humidity. Until the British could tropicalize their equipment they were at a disadvantage.
 
the British manufacture of valves was small and I think of variable quality, so there may have been a husbanding of these precious valves.
I don't think either of those things are true. Demand was massively increased over OTL certainly for the valves and of course magnetrons were still cutting edge technology so there was no existing suppliers to call on, but there were a good dozen manufacturers most with modern plant and equipment. I've also not seen anything about quality being a particular problem.

That said I do remember something from Tommy Flowers saying that valves (regardless of nation or manufacturer) had the perception of being unreliable because they don't like being turned off and on. It was one of the arguments used against Colossus, it was thought people would be constantly replacing valves. His experience in the GPO had been that valves were perfectly reliable if you just left them running and the success of Colossus proved that.
So given that Phillips was trying to keep his location a secret it is possible that the radar was not used.
That was indeed the case. The PoW's radar officer states there was a policy of radar silence in operation, based on pre-war exercises which had shown how far away you could detect an operating radar and the experience of radio detection from WW1. Apart from the tactical disadvantages this was doubly unfortunate as it meant regularly power cycling the sets which was bad for the valves, add on the lack of tropicalisation and it explains the the poor reliability of the sets.

Unsurprisingly I believe it was shortly after this that the Admiralty started switching doctrine and encouraged radar use at all times as the default, only going to radar silence for landing operations or similar missions that needed surprise. The replacement of the last of the early war long frequency sets with cm gear was also a factor as it was harder to detect at range so there was less advantage from going silent.

I should also say there was good reason to think the Japanese might have had radar capability, the Yagi aerial was used on many early radars and had been invented in the 1920s by Tokyo University. They had also developed a primitive cavity magnetron around the same time and had published widely on it, even getting it patented in the US. Of course the Japanese military had done nothing with these ideas so Japanese radar was badly behind, but it was not unreasonable to assume Japan had done something further, or at least to cautiously act as if they had. Hence the radar silence policy.
 
I was reading up on HMS Exeter earlier and she arrived in Singapore on the 10th Dec to late to join Force Z which apparently was her intention.

She had a couple of Radar sets fitted during her post River plate rebuild and was therefore fairly state of the art as far as sensors are concerned.

Unless memory fails me, she didn't have much of an AAA fit, but might have at least potentially drawn away some attackers. Arguably a couple of additional Tribal or J,K,L destroyers even with LA 4.7" guns would've been a brilliant addition against torpedo bombers.
 
Unless memory fails me, she didn't have much of an AAA fit, but might have at least potentially drawn away some attackers. Arguably a couple of additional Tribal or J,K,L destroyers even with LA 4.7" guns would've been a brilliant addition against torpedo bombers.
Her last refit gave her 4 twin 4" replacing the singles and 2 Octuple Pom Poms - she had machine guns on her B and Y turret

A second HACS aft as well as a Type 271 and a Type 284

So not good...but not terrible by the standards of Dec 41
 
Her last refit gave her 4 twin 4" replacing the singles and 2 Octuple Pom Poms - she had machine guns on her B and Y turret

A second HACS aft as well as a Type 271 and a Type 284

So not good...but not terrible by the standards of Dec 41
We all are missing a good ship here for Force Z, HMS Mauritius and she had radar. Plus I was doing some research and on the west coast were 2 light cruisers getting repair being done by November, HMS Orion and HMS Liverpool. Both have good radar and have gotten new aaa guns. I'll try to place the link for the ships.
 
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We all are missing a good ship here for Force Z, HMS Mauritius and she had radar. Plus I was doing some research and on the west coast were 2 light cruisers getting repair being done by November, HMS Orion and HMS Liverpool. Both have good radar and have gotten new aaa guns. I'll try to place the link for the ships.
HMS Orion dud not arrive Mare Island until 5 September 1941, she did not complete post repair trials and available for service, until 15 February 1942. HMS Liverpool would have been available from 20 November 1941, she received additional 6 x 1 x 20 mm AA, but no radar update.
IF Liverpool was transfered to Force Z probably not enroute until 25 September, 5 days at 20 kts to Pearl Harbor, 72 hours Pearl Harbor, leaving 3 October for Fiji at 20 kts, arrive 10 October, 24 hours turnaround, leave Fiji for Sydney 12 October, at 20 kts, arrive Sydney 17th October. This timetable works if everything works fine, supplies, fuel, and most importa t no issues with repairs. But would they send her, when her Radar and AA fire control updates were waiting in the UK
 
We all are missing a good ship here for Force Z, HMS Mauritius and she had radar. Plus I was doing some research and on the west coast were 2 light cruisers getting repair being done by November, HMS Orion and HMS Liverpool. Both have good radar and have gotten new aaa guns. I'll try to place the link for the ships.
Mauritius was built with an experimental internal degaussing system.

Unfortunately it was found that this system started to corrode her main water main requiring dry docking at Durban and then at Singapore to try and correct.

She ultimately had to return to the UK for it to be rectified.

Unfortunately it was deemed that without a main water main working correctly she was combat ineffective.

I have tried to determine if this issue was really such an issue and if she could have sortied anyway? But I’ve never found a satisfactory answer.

Another option is HMAS Sydney not forgetting she is a warship and carrying out the search of the raider Kormaron ‘by the book’ and not getting sunk.

However I am not sure if she had radar fitted?
 
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