July 24th, 1943
Operation Zitadelle
Sector of the 3. PanzerArmee - After his triumphant report in Rastenburg, Kluge does not let his army commanders off the hook. The capture of Kiev should be the crowning achievement of his campaign - but there is still a long way to go from the cup to the lips. He must therefore continue to keep the pressure on his subordinates.
Because of his undisciplined character and his contacts with high-ranking members of the Nazi party, Model remains his favorite target. Model is aware of this and is therefore not surprised to receive a letter at dawn (Kluge knowing Model's now well-established habit of leaving very early for the front to keep a close eye on the fighting). In the midst of reproaches about the poor use of the means generously allocated to his army, a major question: when will we see the definitive breaking of the enemy lines? This question, Model asked himself this question as well, and the frustration at the top of HeeresGruppe NordUkraine joins his own. After almost a fortnight of hard fighting, his troops still have a good hundred kilometers to go before they reach their objective. So, before leaving his headquarters, he sends the pressure he is under from Kluge back to the commanders of his PanzerArmee corps in the form of half ironic, half angry messages. He had already told them over and over again: we must win as quickly as possible before the Red Army rises up, which will happen sooner or later. It's time to get started, because Model doesn't want to find himself in the middle of nowhere when the counter-offensive arrives.
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On the ground, the battle is of uneven intensity.
In the north, the XXIV. PanzerKorps continues its march towards the left bank of the river Ouj. Von Langermann-Erlencamp pushes his three divisions, meeting only weak and erratic resistance. The biplanes that prowl around at night, often piloted by women, are a greater nuisance than the small groups of soldiers who tried to harass the Landsers. Refusing a fight that he judges to be ineffective in advance and persuaded - like Vatutin - that the decision will be made in the west, Trofimenko withdraws his forces on the right bank of the Uzh.
However, the bulk of his forces remained east of Ovruch, in the Chernigovka [Mala Chernihivka] salient. Never quiet on the Russian front, the night in this sector is marked by skirmishes of particular intensity: simultaneous attempts by German and Russian patrols to infiltrate the positions of the opposing camp quickly degenerate into a furious fight that extends from Mallye Moshki [Mali Moshky] tto Gladkovichi [Hladkovychi]. The Soviet artillery reacts with unusual speed and precision, crushing the lines of the 38. and 39. ID under heavy fire, aiming at coordinates recognized in the previous days.
At dawn, the 57th Army tries its luck against an opponent supposedly still suffering from heavy losses. But, badly organized, the attack is muzzled by German machine guns, especially since Gagen and Trofimenko also have to prevent the LVI. PanzerKorps from overrunning them from the north.
After tough confrontations, the 290. ID captures Gusarov [Husarivka] but could not do the same with the station a little further south. For its part, the 81. ID is trying to take Novaya Radcha [Radcha] but failed in front of a tenacious defense. Assisted by the 504 s.Pz Abt, the 82. ID makes a narrow breakthrough around Detkovichi [Didkoychi]. During the day, the LII. ArmeeKorps attacks again, supported by Tiger of the 501 s.Pz Abt, gaining ground here to lose some elsewhere. Von Scheele reports this situation to Model; he alerts him to the growing impotence of the Luftwaffe to hold the skies and on the regular arrival of Soviet reinforcements that help to wear down the attackers.
But like the day before, the attention of both camps is fixed on the east of Korosten. The XLVII. PanzerKorps resumes its role as a can opener to break through the Soviet front. In addition to the 2. Panzer and 5. Panzer, Eberbach succeeds in recovering about ten Ferdinand tank hunters just out of overhaul. In the morning, well protected by an air umbrella, he knocks down Domoloch and then Sobolevka [Sobolivka] before turning his effort against Balyarka [Bolyarka]. Around noon, powerfully assisted by Rudel's Stuka and by all the Luftwaffe could engage, the panzers sweep away the Soviet dikes and end up forming a salient a dozen kilometers deep, which sinks to Stremingorod [Stremyhorod] and Meleni. But in the afternoon, the VVS regain control in the air and force a slowing down and then a halt of the progression, saturating roads with PTAB bombs and attacking convoys with rockets and guns. On the Soviet side, the restored air cover allows the supply convoys to reach the first front line units more easily and quickly*. The 5th Army's fierce resistance tends to shift the initially planned German breakthrough along the Korosten-Malin railroad.
If the Stavka is satisfied with the behavior of the 5th Army, the use in counter-attack of the 6th Armored Corps on the other hand is only criticized. The superiority of German gunners and the better length of their tubes condemns to failure each frontal assault of Bogdanov. Supported by Voronov, Vassilievsky soon orders to abandon this tactic, arguing with Stalin about the waste of means it generates and asking to accelerate the arrival of fresh units around Malin, where the final battle will certainly be played.
Opposite, the 4. Panzer, in the process of gathering since its transfer from Ovruch, arrived at the end of the evening. In Model's mind, it should allow the next day to reinforce the beginning of the breakthrough obtained during the day.
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Sector of the 6. Armee - The success of the tanks of the XLVII. PanzerKorps to the north of its positions gives Paulus some air. The 11th Soviet Armored Corps is still prowling on its left wing, but the irruption of the panzers on their right would surely draw them to that side, thus decreasing the risk of an armored counterattack on his forces.
Harassed by their march of the last two days, the men of De Angelis have hardly time to put down their packs before they had to leave. Mobilizing his three divisions, the XLIV. ArmeeKorps attacked the 4th Shock around the city of Lesovshchina [Lisivshchyna], while at the same time the LV. ArmeeKorps tries to seize Ryzhiny [Ryzhany] and Volodarsk [Volodarsk-Volynsky] from the 37th Army. The two German corps nibble away at the positions, making regular gains... but terribly limited.
The discovery of younger and younger bodies on the Soviet side seems to support Zeitzler's idea that the enemy's reserves are running out. But Paulus deduces that the Red Army continues to receive reinforcements. Although inexperienced and falling by the dozen every day, the recruits thrown into the battle by Vatutin gain the time he needs. And he can replace at least part of his losses... unlike Paulus. Using all possible channels of communication, the latter continues to alert the OKH to his growing needs, as well as to the dramatically insufficient number and quality of the few replacements that reach him from Germany or Poland. Devouring its structure, the 6. Armee is losing strength every day, wearing out its men at a much too fast pace. In desperation, Paulus sends a telegram to Kluge to ask him if it will be necessary to send to the front the stretcher bearers and the cooks! The answer of the commander of HG North-Ukraine is fast and without appeal: "Do not forget the veterinarians!"
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Battle of Zhitomir - Spurred on by a threatening call from Stalin demanding that the Germans be driven out once and for all the Germans from the outskirts of the city, Vlassov resumes his assaults against the 205. and 304. ID, reinforced by the SS of the Galizien Division. Getting along discreetly among themselves, the three German divisional officers opt for a strict defense, against the orders of Paulus to fix the 1st Shock Army by constant attacks. Instead, the Germans are content to build a wall of fire with all available machine guns in order to mow down the Soviets at a safe distance.
At the same time, the 5th Shock Army is trying to reconquer Zhitomir quarter by quarter, house by house. The sectors of Pushkinskaya (between the southern part of the church triangle and the Teterev river) and Ivanovskaya street (north of the triangle) arethe focus of the day's fighting. By a sort of tacit agreement, neither the Luftwaffe nor the VVS intervene in the city. For a Soviet airman, "The two sides are so mixed up on the ground that bombing any urbanized area would be like shooting at random in a corridor of a Moscow stadium crowded with Dynamo and Locomotiv fans in the midst of an exchange of good proceedings after an overheated derby. We would hit every time, but not necessarily the supporters of the opposing team." On the other hand, both air forces are not afraid to strike elsewhere. Although outnumbered, the Luftwaffe is still able to bomb, but can no longer prevent Soviet strikes.
Further north, the fighting is "cleaner" than the appalling melee between the two sides inside the city, but they are just as intense. Having managed to keep a direct link with Zhitomir, Leliushenko obtains Vassilievsky's approval to keep his 17th Armored Corps in contact with the enemy, without attacking him recklessly. Voroshilov's proposal to engage these tanks to assist the 5th Shock in Zhitomir is strongly rejected by the Stavka, but Stalin wants to take back the city for good! A patient but determined diplomatic enterprise led by Vassilievsky and Shaposhnikov has softened the ire of the Vojd. Vlassov has an infantry army, Leliushenko has T-34 and KV-85S. Rather than immolate a hundred good tanks and their crews in the face of a German mobile division, we might as well keep this precious force for the future. Protected by the air force, it will be unmovable and will deprive by its only presence the 6. Armee of units of inestimable value for the continuation of the campaign. On the other hand it is advisable to send urgently to Chernyakovsky of heavy artillery and flame throwers to allow him to finish with the occupants of Zhitomir once the next counter-offensives are launched.
In the afternoon, Gollnick launches a new operation to push back the 17th Armored Corps to the east, but faced with an adversary now in a defensive position, the balance of power is no longer the same. Dominated at long range by the tubes of Soviet self-propelled engines, the Panzer IIIs have to take reckless risks to find targets within their range. No doubt something is happening for the Soviets refuse to use this formation offensively. The information is transmitted to Paulus and the OKH, but does not awaken any echo.
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Sector of the 8. Armee - Rokossovsky and Zhukov look with concern at the state of their reserves and especially their communications. The capture of Kalinovka and the irruption of German tanks east of the Vinnitsa-Kazatin railroad strangles the rail traffic to the 3rd and 13th Armies. As trains cannot come from the north, they cannot arrive from the east either. The line from Uman [Uman] via Gaissyn [Haïssyn] and Nemirov [Nemyrov] is impassable, because the KorpsAbteilung B occupies Nemirov. To supply Pukhov and Shumilov, Antipenko has only one paved road left from Uman via Lipovets [Lypovets], but even the mobilization of thousands of trucks cannot compensate for the loss of rail service. However, the risks of a logistical disaster are mitigated by the presence of relatively well-stocked warehouses in Vinnitsa and by the implementation of drastic rationing measures concerning food and supplies deemed secondary. Everything has to be sacrificed to fuel and ammunition!
The German thrust is contained, but neither Hausser nor Kempf have any intention of staying there. The former will have more means of his ambitions.
Manstein orders the 132. ID and the 125. ID (recalled from the west) to attack the 26th Army to immobilize it and prevent it from helping the 4th Guards. The latter is to be the target of a full-scale attack in which the SS, swallowing their pride, agreed to participate under the orders of the Heer. To the north, the 11. Panzer and the 141. ID on the one hand, the Das Reich and the LAH (which made a long detour to bypass Kazatine by the south) on the other hand will be in charge of holding at a distance the two armored corps of Chanchibadze and Katukov while the 305. ID will enter Kazatin from the west. Further south, the Totenkopf will have to repel the threat of the 5th Armored Corps before opening the road to Samgorodok. Well identified, the presence of three Soviet armored corps in the area prompts Göring to personally order the IX. FliegerKorps to concentrate almost all of its remaining resources on the Kazatin sector. Paulus and Kempf will only have the crumbs, to their great frustration.
Taking speed the Soviet fighters having to ensure the protection of the air space over the city, the Luftwaffe strikes first. The price of this promptitude is that the German pilots
pilots lack information and do not know exactly what they are going to fall on. Nevertheless, a poorly coordinated flak allows the bombers to attack fortified points and artillery batteries. Weakened by the strikes, the Soviet barrage suffers a lack of punch and the 305. ID can thus approach Kazatin before entering it under the protection of its own howitzers. Rushing to the sound of the gun, the reinforcements dispatched by the rest of the 4th Guards are dispersed as soon as they leave by the air attacks, while Muzychenko has to cover Belopol'ye [Bilopillia], Verbolozi [Verbolozy] and the north of Kazatin against the 141. ID.
Massed on a narrow front, the LAH and Das Reich vigorously attack Katukov's forces before Chanchibadze is able to react. Burning some of his assets to save the rest, the leader of the 1st Guards Armored Corps withdraws to the northeast and the Sestrenovka [Sestrynivka] station to maintain contact with the defenders of Kazatin.
In the air, the initial blow gradually digested, the planes of the 16th Air Army sent to cover the two armored corps begin to regain the advantage, but Rudenko has difficulty understanding what is happening on the ground.
Confusion is all the 11. Panzer to distinguish itself again.
Refusing to be satisfied with infantry support and aware that the lines of the 4th Guards are still too strong to attempt a solitary breakthrough, Balck seeks to repeat the feat of the 2. Panzer at Lygini. Lacking captured T-34s, his tankers are content to repaint some Panzer IVs with paint cans found in an abandoned field workshop near Berdichev. Once equipped with tracks and surrounded by Landsers dressed in rifle uniforms, the tanks simulated a frantic retreat and presented themselves in front of the Soviet lines at Belopol'ye. However, the untimely arrival of two Junkers Ju 88 gave the alert to the defenders and an inextricable melee ensued. Despite resistance, Balck's men succeed in securing a bridgehead a little further north, at Kashperovka [Kashperivka].
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At Kempf's, the securing of Kalinovka has dampened the hopes of the day before. His III. PanzerKorps is not thirty kilometers from Vinnitsa and two Soviet armies are between him and von Arnim.
This aspect of Zitadelle has hardly been developed during the gestation of the operation. Everything had been thought around the breakthrough of the two armored corps of Manstein, without really thinking what would happen if, contrary to the forecasts, the Soviets continue to hold on to the flanks, or even to one of them. No sensible German officer would have accepted to see his army flanked by two powerful enemy forces and threatened of encirclement! So why did Pukhov not decamp as he should have? And can we continue to advance while letting this threat remain?
There is another option, which Kempf thought about during the night. By temporarily abandoning the idea of pushing eastward and acting in concert with the 2. PanzerArmee, the Ostheer could create a cauldron enclosing both Pukhov and Shumilov. Two complete armies annihilated, Vinnitsa taken back, the right flank of the III. PanzerKorps cleaned up, these arguments seem to be able to convince even the most reticent of the marshals! Reached by phone at dawn, Manstein finds the idea reasonable. But Kluge, contacted in his turn, immediately cools the two men: there was no question of diluting the main effort for what he called "a clean-up operation"! The Soviets would eventually evacuate Vinnitsa.
Kempf returns to the charge: as it is, he does not have enough infantry and he must hold Kalinovka in addition to his other missions. Couldn't we at least find him a fresh infantry division? Another refusal. Heeresgruppe NordUkraine does not have that in reserve anymore! At the most we can give him some battalions of the 9. or 10. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division...which could only arrive, at best, in two or three days. Until then, it will be necessary to maintain elements of the 6. PanzerDivision. This is what is finally decided.
While waiting for the promised battalions, the 7. Panzer and part of the 6. Panzer holds back on its flank and to the rear, Kempf only has the 8. Panzer and the rest of the 6. Panzer. This is enough to continue to push back the Soviet 4th Armored Corps and to make further progress on the ground... but very little: only a few kilometers around Kalinovka. At the end of the day, the German effort is broken by resistance at Staraya Priluka [Stara Pryluka].
But by this time, Kempf has many other problems. He has barely digested his breakfast and Kluge's refusals that the front again ignited on his back. Still covered by the 323. ID and the 7. Panzer, his right flank was once again subjected to Soviet pressure. But this pressure is much more serious today. The entire 13th Army seems to have set out to migrate north with the clear intention to force its way through.
Violent fighting breaks out on about twenty kilometers of the front and at the end of the day, Khmelnik [Khmilnyk] is threatened.
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Sector of the 2. PanzerArmee - Kempf is unaware that the Hungarians of the 4th Corps had indicated that the 3rd Army was also on the move opposite them. It is impossible to know whether this was the beginning of a new offensive against the 2. PanzerArmee, or whether these forces would redeploy elsewhere. Von Arnim does not fail to alert the OKH... but not Kempf, who was not under his authority**! Moreover, he thinks, it would be absurd to consider that Shumilov would attack the latter. The 3rd Army would not abandon Vinnitsa or weaken its defense to attack the III. PanzerArmee in a position to take advantage of it. One would have to be really crazy to decide such a thing! And even Stalin is not that crazy, said his chief of staff.
Von Arnim's thoughts are overshadowed by one last piece of information. Perceptive observers have noted that at Bagramian too there is a certain agitation, especially in the lines of the 10th Army and the 2nd Shock. If it does not yet seem to be a question of preparations, Weidling diplomatically expressed reservations about the strength of the right wing of the 2. PanzerArmee. Opposite him were several infantry armies, including a Shock, which, if they came out, would fall on... not much. Indeed, the right flank of von Arnim's army is formed only by the 7th Hungarian Corps and the XLIX. ArmeeKorps, i.e. a total of five infantry divisions (three of which are Hungarian) and a composite formation, the KorpsAbteilung B, regrouping the remains of two divisions during the Soviet offensive of the previous spring. The only reserves are the 20. PanzerGrenadier and a small assault gun Abteilung. Of course, one could always ask Kluge for the help of an armored division, but one would have to be satisfied with a Hungarian unit, the 23. PanzerDivision being much further north. And it would be useless to ask for air support: all that the Luftwaffe has in the area is to the north - the few valid Hungarian planes would not be able to challenge the 17th Air Force.
Although his situation requires him to keep the 2nd Ukrainian Front at bay, von Arnim also knows that his forces would have to intervene during "Zitadelle". Waiting for a hypothetical attack of Bagramyan would be of no use if he had to assist Manstein further north!
While he is more and more worried, the teletype facilitates (a little) his decision. In response to the uncertainties and in particular to the elements that indicate a conversion towards the north of the 3rd Army, Zeitzler asks him to urgently plan a new attack against Vinnitsa and to commit the IV. ArmeeKorps on the rear of the 13th Army. The aim is to relieve Kempf and even to succeed in encircling two Soviet armies.
But how to attack without tanks and with an army composed of Hungarians and German survivors of the spring... in other words, second-rate troops?
* On express order of the Stavka, priority is given during the whole operation Zitadelle to ammunition, fuel and foodstuffs... vodka is given priority over rations.
** The lack of cooperation between the 8. Armee and the 2. PanzerArmee was the rule rather than the exception during operation Zitadelle. It will be underlined after the war and presented by several former generals and historians - like Manstein and Paul Carell - as one of the causes of the failure of "Zitadelle".