ThanksAnswer in above post.
Next De Geer should be invited to a long stay (rest of the war) in a Highland Castle. Glamis would do.
With guards having instructions to shoot him if he tries to escape.
ThanksAnswer in above post.
I know this is just a translation of the French original , but why did they go after cruisers etc with 2 battleships still available as targets? It makes no sense except to parallel history despite the greater number of planes.August 24th, 1940
Taranto, 09:30 - A Bloch 174 of fast reconnaissance of the GR II/33 takes pictures of the results of the raid. Its pilot, aviator and novelist Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (who enlisted when he was well over the age limit), later described how he flew towards "an enormous cloud of black dirt, rising on the horizon as if a new volcano had been born at the very tip of the Italian boot" [1]. This smoke comes from the Conte di Cavour, which is still burning after the explosion of its ammunition hold, and from burned fuel depots. Saint-Exupéry dares to descend to 1,500 meters in order to take better photos, his plane easily avoiding the Italian fighters thanks to its speed.
Malta, 12:00 - After examination of the images and debriefing of the crew of the Bloch 174, it is decided to proceed with operation Punishment.
Malta, 14:10 - The GB I/23, II/23 and II/31 take off 36 LeO-451.
Taranto, 15:45 - Flying at 6 000 m and 500 km/h, the French bombers are completely out of reach of the Italian fighters. The port installations and the military warehouses
are again seriously hit by this unopposed raid and left in flames.
While bombing, the French airmen can notice that many Italian ships are leaving the port of Taranto. Fearing a repeat of the attack of the morning, Admiral Campioni obtained from Admiral Cavagnari the authorization to withdraw to the Adriatic bases all the ships in a condition to exit the port. The battleships Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare, three heavy cruisers and seven light cruisers, duly escorted, withdraw in a hurry, leaving only light units on the spot: some destroyers and torpedo boats, the submarines...
"The list of damages inflicted on the Italian fleet by a reduced number of old planes is impressive.
Battleships (in the Mare Grande):
Littorio, hit by three torpedoes and three 450 kg armor-piercing bombs. Serious damage. Sent to Genoa for repairs. Could be operational in early 1942.
Caio Duilio, hit by three torpedoes. Sunk.
Conte di Cavour, hit by two torpedoes and two 450 kg armour-piercing bombs. Sunk.
Cruisers (in the Mare Piccolo):
CA Fiume, hit by a torpedo near the stern and a 450 kg bomb in the engine room (and narrowly missed by two other bombs). Sank to the bottom of the basin. Refloated and sent to Trieste for repairs. Could be operational in early 1942.
CL Duca degli Abruzzi, hit by a torpedo between the A and B turrets, and by two bombs, one in the catapult area, the other in the stern. Severely damaged. Towed to Trieste for repairs, scheduled for completion in October 1941.
Destroyers (in the Mare Piccolo):
DD Aquilone, put out of action by a 450 kg bomb that missed it by a small margin (it was one of those that grazed the Fiume). Capsized.
DD Borea, hit by a bomb that exploded his ammunition. Irreparable.
The Operation Judgement/Punishment was considered a major strategic success. The Italian Navy had been decapitated and its ability to support the troops in Africa had been wiped out in one fell swoop. Politically, "Judgment" also marked a very important point. It demonstrated both the willingness and the ability of the Allied forces to take the strategic initiative in the Mediterranean, which was observed with attention by countries such as Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Finally, this new Italian defeat was also a welcome balm for the morale of the population of occupied France." (J. Bailey, op. cit.).
To say that Mussolini was shocked when he heard the news and discovered that the Allied fleet was able to withdraw without casualties would be an understatement. Two days later, the Grand Council of the Fascist Party had a particularly stormy meeting and the King appointed Marshal Badoglio as head of a Special Commission of Inquiry.
But among the personalities most deeply impressed by Operation Judgment, the Japanese naval attaché in Rome, who visited Taranto on August 30th, and took many notes.
The last word on "Judgment" could be left to an FAA officer, Huguenot of origin... Let's tell Yvon Lagadec's story: "Fished out of the water by a Walrus, I found myself on the Eagle. In the evening, at the debriefing, I was still in a state of shock. At 21 years old, I had had my first fight, my first victory, I had been shot down, but I was still alive and free. So, when the English officer who "debriefed" me, a man named Rochelle, delighted as we all were, remarked, "Wasn't it a good day to have pounded so hard the papists this day?"), though a Breton and a Catholic, I did not get angry. After all, August 24th was the anniversary of St. Bartholomew's Day, and since the Pope was Italian, too bad for him."
The next day, Lagadec has another reason to rejoice: informed of his heroic death during his first battle, but not of his rescue, his superiors appointed him Ensign Second Class Ensign posthumously. And when he resurrects, they don't have the heart to "de-rank" him - after all, he had shot down an enemy aircraft! He will later have the opportunity to earn his rank...
[1] Orphelins du Ciel, from which this sentence is taken, was published in New York at the end of 1941, during the propaganda tour that Saint-Exupéry made in the United States, while writing The Little Prince.
Citations | |
---|---|
Codification | |
Legislative history | |
Other short titles | Vinson-Walsh Act |
Long title | An Act to establish the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes. |
Nicknames | Navy Construction Act of 1940 |
Enacted by | the 76th United States Congress |
Effective | July 19, 1940 |
Public law | Pub.L. 76–757 |
Statutes at Large | 54 Stat. 779, Chap. 644 |
Titles amended | 34 U.S.C.: Navy |
U.S.C. sections amended | 34 U.S.C. §§ 494-497, 498-498k |
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The same confusion of combat that led to the OTL attacks by, for example, the FAA against a HMS Sheffield during the hunt of the Bismarck, or Kurita's misidentifying the ships of Taffy 3. It could even be that the AA fire was less over the cruiser anchorage.I know this is just a translation of the French original , but why did they go after cruisers etc with 2 battleships still available as targets? It makes no sense except to parallel history despite the greater number of planes.
TTL June-July 1940, mainland France is falling to the Germans, and there's no stopping it. In two months, Germany is succeeding where they failed for four years in WWI. And this only 10 months after France - together with Britain - declared war on Germany.The many divergences from OTL in this story are being well examined and plausibly explored. I haven't read all the comments so far. But one idea that occurs to me is since in TTL there is no shockingly rapid Fall of France is whether the American government will still rush to approve the Two-Ocean Navy Act with its massive increase in spending. The Americans may not be quite as alarmed in July 1940 as they were in OTL.
Nice try but no dice , this was not an attack on ships at sea with vague locations/identification. It was a prepared attack on a harbour with photo recon pictures of where the battleships were. It was also in daylight with airborne FAA raid controllers to direct the flights against the best remaining targets. Its like saying , well the Japanese might have only attacked half the battleships at Pearl Harbour due to fog of war, so low probability to be discounted instantly.The same confusion of combat that led to the OTL attacks by, for example, the FAA against a HMS Sheffield during the hunt of the Bismarck, or Kurita's misidentifying the ships of Taffy 3. It could even be that the AA fire was less over the cruiser anchorage.
And how many battleships were not attacked at PH? FAA as I noted also had Raid controllers in dedicated command planes unlike the IJN or USN. Attacking all 5 and only managing to sink 3 is one thing , just not attacking 2 of them is another.You mean the same PH attack where they mistook a target ship for one of the Standard? The same conflict where US Carrier planes during the Lae Salamo raids in 1942 when the USN mis-identified a mine-sweeper as Mogami-class heavy cruiser?
What I'm saying is, bad judgement calls and simply screwing things up has always been a thing, in spite of the most meticulous preparations.
I was wondering however, what is the state of Franco-British Cooperation in regards to equipment procurement, development and the like? French are very reliant on USA for equipment, be it personal weapons, aircraft, artillery, all sorts of vehicles and AFVs, but do they have any plans WRT that, at least once they have a moment to catch a breath and plan for the future? Will we perhaps see Mk.III "Turtle" helmet becoming a standard for both French and British, to give an example.
Also, it is not perhaps the most crucial issue facing them, but what are French going to do in regards to small arms and calibers? I mean, do they have the capability to manufacture 7.5mm French and their own domestic designs, with US arms there to cover the gap, or are we going to see French (at least in MTO/ETO) standardizing on US sourced Arms and Ammunition?
whether the American government will still rush to approve the Two-Ocean Navy Act with its massive increase in spending
There's maybe the chance that the Cavour's large fire was accidentally covering the silhouettes of the Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, making it impossible to clearly attack them and forcing the aircraft to turn on the cruisers instead.The same confusion of combat that led to the OTL attacks by, for example, the FAA against a HMS Sheffield during the hunt of the Bismarck, or Kurita's misidentifying the ships of Taffy 3. It could even be that the AA fire was less over the cruiser anchorage.