Attrition
The ugly down spiral of attrition
In World War II, based on American records (and numerous sources), American combat divisions suffered a rate of attrition of 2.6% while in contact with the enemy on a quiet front with contact limited to patrol actions and harassment. For the front line combat companies and troops this rate was double that figure (so 5.2%). For every seven men that became a casualty, typical experience was 1 dead, 1 psychological casualty (battle fatigue, combat exhaustion or more pronounced forms of PTSD), 1 permanently disabled due to wounds, 2 wounded requiring 60 days or more of treatment and 2 wounded required less than 60 days of treatment. In the European Theater of Operations this worked out usually to be 7.3 casualties per 1,000 men in an infantry division.
These are combat casualties only.
In addition, another 1% losses are suffered daily due to accidents (combat zones are by their nature unsafe work environments).
Based on the previous I am assuming a casualty rate of about 6% a day for the combat formations and 3% for the everyone else. That works out to be about based on 110,000 overall troops and about a third of them being in combat battalions (roughly 40,000) about 40 dead, 40 permanently crippled, 80 severely wounded (and in the hospital for 60 days or more, effectively out of the campaign), and 80 seriously or lightly wounded treated and released fairly quickly (often simply treated at their battalion aid station and sent back to the line) plus 40 a day lost to combat exhaustion (about half return to duty, the other half are effectively out of the campaign).
So every week roughly 2,000 men out of action, of which about 700 are able to return to duty. As the size of the force falls so does the number of casualties from attrition (after all it is percentage based) but effectively 2,000 – 1,500 men lost a week over the course of the campaign. There are no replacements for these losses. Japanese losses will be similar (almost no combat exhaustion evacuations but that just means those people end up dead or wounded).
Disease attrition
The principal disease problems in Bataan are Malaria and Dengue Fever and while intensive efforts were made pre campaign to deal with major mosquito breeding areas this is the tropics, standing water is everywhere, and in the low lying areas there is simply no way to eliminate them all. There is no cure for Malaria, only medicines that suppress it and while quinine was stockpiled in very large quantities pre war and more was found after the fighting started, it is still ultimately just a suppressant.
Historically 65% of the force developed malaria during the campaign. Taking into account the previous, I am going to assume that 45% will get it during the campaign. This seems to fit 1943 figures for New Guinea and the Solomon Islands where atabrine was widely available (also a suppressant) and active measures were taken for mosquito control. In effect about 5,000 men a week are combat ineffective due to malaria and dengue fever (which has no preventives but is less severe with adequate energy levels from adequate food). Of these, roughly 100 men will die from the 2 diseases. Japanese casualties were about the same level historically in this campaign. However they have replacements available. Historically for almost 6 weeks the Japanese were about as shattered as the American and Filipinos were just from disease and attrition.
It will be roughly the same here.
This does not include combat casualties from major actions.......
The siege alone will eventually wear down the American and Filipino troops at Bataan although it will take months. Everyone is well aware of this fact.
some useful sources:
"How to Make War" James Dunnigan (there are 4 editions)
"The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II" John Ellis
"Dirty Little Secrets of World War II" James Dunnigan
"Touched With Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific" Eric Bergerud
and here is a good online source on the medical situation historically
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/Malaria/chapterIX.htm
and of course the US Army official History (the known of course as the Green Books) which can be found online
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-2-1/CMH_Pub_5-2-1.pdf
In World War II, based on American records (and numerous sources), American combat divisions suffered a rate of attrition of 2.6% while in contact with the enemy on a quiet front with contact limited to patrol actions and harassment. For the front line combat companies and troops this rate was double that figure (so 5.2%). For every seven men that became a casualty, typical experience was 1 dead, 1 psychological casualty (battle fatigue, combat exhaustion or more pronounced forms of PTSD), 1 permanently disabled due to wounds, 2 wounded requiring 60 days or more of treatment and 2 wounded required less than 60 days of treatment. In the European Theater of Operations this worked out usually to be 7.3 casualties per 1,000 men in an infantry division.
These are combat casualties only.
In addition, another 1% losses are suffered daily due to accidents (combat zones are by their nature unsafe work environments).
Based on the previous I am assuming a casualty rate of about 6% a day for the combat formations and 3% for the everyone else. That works out to be about based on 110,000 overall troops and about a third of them being in combat battalions (roughly 40,000) about 40 dead, 40 permanently crippled, 80 severely wounded (and in the hospital for 60 days or more, effectively out of the campaign), and 80 seriously or lightly wounded treated and released fairly quickly (often simply treated at their battalion aid station and sent back to the line) plus 40 a day lost to combat exhaustion (about half return to duty, the other half are effectively out of the campaign).
So every week roughly 2,000 men out of action, of which about 700 are able to return to duty. As the size of the force falls so does the number of casualties from attrition (after all it is percentage based) but effectively 2,000 – 1,500 men lost a week over the course of the campaign. There are no replacements for these losses. Japanese losses will be similar (almost no combat exhaustion evacuations but that just means those people end up dead or wounded).
Disease attrition
The principal disease problems in Bataan are Malaria and Dengue Fever and while intensive efforts were made pre campaign to deal with major mosquito breeding areas this is the tropics, standing water is everywhere, and in the low lying areas there is simply no way to eliminate them all. There is no cure for Malaria, only medicines that suppress it and while quinine was stockpiled in very large quantities pre war and more was found after the fighting started, it is still ultimately just a suppressant.
Historically 65% of the force developed malaria during the campaign. Taking into account the previous, I am going to assume that 45% will get it during the campaign. This seems to fit 1943 figures for New Guinea and the Solomon Islands where atabrine was widely available (also a suppressant) and active measures were taken for mosquito control. In effect about 5,000 men a week are combat ineffective due to malaria and dengue fever (which has no preventives but is less severe with adequate energy levels from adequate food). Of these, roughly 100 men will die from the 2 diseases. Japanese casualties were about the same level historically in this campaign. However they have replacements available. Historically for almost 6 weeks the Japanese were about as shattered as the American and Filipinos were just from disease and attrition.
It will be roughly the same here.
This does not include combat casualties from major actions.......
The siege alone will eventually wear down the American and Filipino troops at Bataan although it will take months. Everyone is well aware of this fact.
some useful sources:
"How to Make War" James Dunnigan (there are 4 editions)
"The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II" John Ellis
"Dirty Little Secrets of World War II" James Dunnigan
"Touched With Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific" Eric Bergerud
and here is a good online source on the medical situation historically
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/Malaria/chapterIX.htm
and of course the US Army official History (the known of course as the Green Books) which can be found online
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-2-1/CMH_Pub_5-2-1.pdf
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