A savage mauling
The Japanese primary attack during 1st Bataan was by the older reservists of the 65th Brigade and the veterans of the 4th Division, supported by most of the 14th Army artillery and 100 tanks. It fell upon 6 regiments of American and Filipino troops of the 12th US and 1st Philippine Divisions in the hardest fighting of the campaign so far. The American/Filipinos defense line consisted of an outpost line held by 12 companies of infantry in platoon outposts (dug in for all around defense), a main line of defense held by another 12 companies of infantry plus the battalion and regimental heavy weapons (machine guns and mortars) companies, also entrenched for all around defense, and a reserve line held by 12 more companies of infantry (again entrenched for all around defense) where the divisional 75 mm field guns, anti tank guns and 4 batteries of .50 caliber machine guns from the Filipino 3rd Coast Artillery Regiment were dug in. Behind these lines were the divisional and corps artillery (French and American 105 mm guns and a pair of batteries of French 155 guns).
In front of the outpost line was a 50 meter stretch of minefields and barbed wire, while communications trenches connected the three lines of defense. All artillery was preregistered, and while most of the mines were makeshift (improvised from 3 inch mortar rounds and command detonated by wire) the wire and mines were enough, in the face of heavy artillery fire, to make the initial Japanese attempt a bloody shambles. Even using infiltration tactics it took the Japanese 2 days to clear the main defense line and push the American and Filipino troops back, and the nature of the fighting was very much reminiscent of the Great War.
By the time the Japanese penetrated this line, the first American reserves were up, including additional heavy machine guns manned by Marines from the 1st Separate Battalion and Filipino Coast Defense troops from the 4th Coast Artillery. Also assisting in the initial counterattack were 50 Bren Gun Carriers which were used as heavy machine gun carriers, plus the reserve infantry companies from the reserve line and every single gun that could bear. Japanese losses by the third day were running at 50% or more of their attack force, with most officers dead or wounded, many of the more energetic NCOs also lost, and and tank losses were also running high. In the face of the withering artillery and heavy machine gun fire, the last gasp of the attack were mowed down with Japanese companies reduced to weak platoons.
The counterattack by dismounted Cavalry troopers of the 26th Cavalry and troopers riding on scout cars, trucks and on the back of tanks of the 112th Cavalry, plus the engineers from the 12th and 23rd Engineer battalions and the tanks of the 192nd and 194th was the crowning blow. Advancing under heavy artillery support, the American cavalry and armor shattered a final last gasp attack by Japanese tanks and engineers, wrecking two Japanese tank regiments (battalion sized organizations) and an engineer regiment, and the Japanese retreat was hurried enough to almost be considered a route. Only the die hard defenders of a Japanese anti – tank battalion with their 47 mm guns and several infantry companies which had to be rooted out position by position bought the time for the rest of the two Japanese formations to retreat with a semblance of order.
American losses were not cheap however. Most of the infantry companies in the outpost and main line of defense took serious to severe losses, and indeed a company of the 13th Infantry Regiment (PA) was reduced in size to a single squad lead by a 2nd Lieutenant Ferdinand Marcus which was finally wiped out on day 3 after being cut off for three days. His recommendation for a Medal of Honor was later downgraded to a Distinguished Service Cross which was awarded post war to his family. However a more successful stand by Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment (PA) by 1st Lieutenant (and then Captain) Ramon Magsaysay whose company was in the outpost line and blocked the narrow track that the Japanese considered their primary attack against the 1st Division not only held up the Japanese for two days, but he led 45 survivors back to the mainline of defense, took over command of the 1st Battalion after his seniors were killed or wounded, and retreated skillfully in the face of the enemy until reinforcements from the 101st Infantry Regiment reached him, allowing him to hold in place and then regain ultimately the forward position where his company had started. His Medal of Honor was awarded in 1944 and would carry him to high office in the Republic of the Philippines, ultimately the Presidency in 1953.
The Japanese attack was skillfully carried out, well supported and indeed with reserves could have carried the American and Philippine positions (and indeed did push through the main line of defense). The primary Japanese error was underestimating the firepower and skill of the defense, and assuming that they could route the enemy out of well supported and defended positions by flanking action. As it turns out there were no flanks to be turned due to the nature of the defensive position (prepared for all around defense) and even cutting them off was difficult due to reserves who could counterattack and bring forward ammunition as needed. But finally the attack failed because attrition had so reduced the Japanese attack that it simply was not strong enough to hold off a combined arms counterattack by American and Filipino tanks, light artillery, heavy machine guns, engineers and well trained infantry.
