Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon
- Thread starter galveston bay
- Start date
I appreciate the heads up, but please take your time. Real life can be a pain, but it takes priority over any demanding fan.
So are you done yet?
I am well past the age of exams (chuckle) It has been a trying year thus far. Also I didn't like the outline I came up with and am rewriting
Operation Shoe String (part 2)
Operation Shoestring (Part 2) The Japanese Navy changes the equation
In May the Japanese had 2 light cruisers, 12 torpedo boats (corvette sized warships that are old destroyers), 6 patrol boats (fast gunboats), 8 minesweepers, and several minor support vessels plus 30 float planes (various types), 9 Mavis Flying boats. The Battle of Batangas Bay cost the Japanese the light cruiser Tatsuta sunk, PB32, PB1 and PB2 badly damaged (and sent home to Japan for repairs), 4 minesweepers sunk or wrecked, and the career of Rear Admiral Ifune was ruined. He is relieved on May 30, 1942 and replaced by Vice Admiral Masaichi Niimi, is given command of all Japanese Naval Forces in the Philippine Islands and the newly organized Southwest Fleet. Picked because he was handy (previously commanding the 2nd China Fleet) along with many of the reinforcements assigned, he turns out to be an inspired choice.
Niimi brings with him 3 Special Naval Land Forces (1st Maizura, 4th Yokosuka, 8th Sasebo), 60 landing craft, 4 more minesweepers, 4 Tomozuru class torpedo boats (giving him 13 total), plus the large gunboats Saga, Ataka, Hashidate, and Uji, all taken from the China Fleet. Soon after his arrival, once the extent of the Army fiasco during their landing attempt on May 24-26 becomes clear, Niimi requests and is given 30 Susie Dive Bombers, which are assigned to an operational training group.
Suspecting that the Americans are supplying their garrison by submarine, his hunch is soon validated as coastwatchers spot an American submarine anchored off Corregidor on June 2. An expert on antisubmarine warfare as he wrote a report on British efforts during the Great War (and fluent in English) Niimi is well aware of the usefulness of submarines as a blockade runner. He requests additional material in the form of mines, and those begin arriving on July 2. Meanwhile he orders stepped up night time air patrols by his float planes, and has his aircrews practice laying mines in rigorous training in Lingayen Gulf.
On June 10th, Admiral Niimi meets with General Tanaka and discusses the situation. The Army will not be ready to begin the bombardment again until June 21, and cannot make a landing until July 6 as the newly arrived assault regiment (5th Imperial Guards Infantry) will need training and to remedy some of the problems of the first landing the new amphibious engineer regiments are undertaking remedial training as soon as they arrive as well. However the Navy can be ready by June 20th, and Niimi persuades Tanaka to let him send his SNLF units against Caballo Island (Fort Hughes) which when taken will enable the Navy to put guns close enough to the main American fortress as to prevent any further reinforcement or evacuations by submarine.
Meanwhile on June 10th the American submarines are leaving Rabaul en route to Manila Bay and Ormac Bay. It is a 2,200 nautical mile voyage, and the submarines will take nearly 20 days to reach their destination, as they can only cruise at 18 knots during night time hours after the first day to avoid Japanese air and sea patrols and their speed submerged is only 5 knots.
Vice Admiral Masaichi Niimi
In May the Japanese had 2 light cruisers, 12 torpedo boats (corvette sized warships that are old destroyers), 6 patrol boats (fast gunboats), 8 minesweepers, and several minor support vessels plus 30 float planes (various types), 9 Mavis Flying boats. The Battle of Batangas Bay cost the Japanese the light cruiser Tatsuta sunk, PB32, PB1 and PB2 badly damaged (and sent home to Japan for repairs), 4 minesweepers sunk or wrecked, and the career of Rear Admiral Ifune was ruined. He is relieved on May 30, 1942 and replaced by Vice Admiral Masaichi Niimi, is given command of all Japanese Naval Forces in the Philippine Islands and the newly organized Southwest Fleet. Picked because he was handy (previously commanding the 2nd China Fleet) along with many of the reinforcements assigned, he turns out to be an inspired choice.
Niimi brings with him 3 Special Naval Land Forces (1st Maizura, 4th Yokosuka, 8th Sasebo), 60 landing craft, 4 more minesweepers, 4 Tomozuru class torpedo boats (giving him 13 total), plus the large gunboats Saga, Ataka, Hashidate, and Uji, all taken from the China Fleet. Soon after his arrival, once the extent of the Army fiasco during their landing attempt on May 24-26 becomes clear, Niimi requests and is given 30 Susie Dive Bombers, which are assigned to an operational training group.
Suspecting that the Americans are supplying their garrison by submarine, his hunch is soon validated as coastwatchers spot an American submarine anchored off Corregidor on June 2. An expert on antisubmarine warfare as he wrote a report on British efforts during the Great War (and fluent in English) Niimi is well aware of the usefulness of submarines as a blockade runner. He requests additional material in the form of mines, and those begin arriving on July 2. Meanwhile he orders stepped up night time air patrols by his float planes, and has his aircrews practice laying mines in rigorous training in Lingayen Gulf.
On June 10th, Admiral Niimi meets with General Tanaka and discusses the situation. The Army will not be ready to begin the bombardment again until June 21, and cannot make a landing until July 6 as the newly arrived assault regiment (5th Imperial Guards Infantry) will need training and to remedy some of the problems of the first landing the new amphibious engineer regiments are undertaking remedial training as soon as they arrive as well. However the Navy can be ready by June 20th, and Niimi persuades Tanaka to let him send his SNLF units against Caballo Island (Fort Hughes) which when taken will enable the Navy to put guns close enough to the main American fortress as to prevent any further reinforcement or evacuations by submarine.
Meanwhile on June 10th the American submarines are leaving Rabaul en route to Manila Bay and Ormac Bay. It is a 2,200 nautical mile voyage, and the submarines will take nearly 20 days to reach their destination, as they can only cruise at 18 knots during night time hours after the first day to avoid Japanese air and sea patrols and their speed submerged is only 5 knots.
Vice Admiral Masaichi Niimi
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The Japanese put this man on the shelf after the capture of Hong Kong and then retired him. Probably should have kept him around, as he was vigorous enough to live to be 106 years old!
He should have been the man in charge of Japanese ASW and Convoys
"He was sent to the United Kingdom as a naval attache from 1923–1925, during which time he was further promoted to commander on 1 December 1924. In 1922, he wrote a report to the Navy General Staff on the importance of protecting merchant shipping in times of war"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masaichi_Niimi
I don't know much about him, although prewar he was commander of the Naval Academy, so either the Navy thought he was too old, or he spoke ill of Navy doctrine (see report above). With the butterfly of Batangas Bay, the failure to take the Rock in the first amphibious assault, and with an embarrassed Army and Navy getting even more serious about the Philippines, a Vice Admiral seems a good fit for a now more important command area and while important, the Japanese are not going to send what they think are the first team. So an old man nearing retirement is a good fit.
He should have been the man in charge of Japanese ASW and Convoys
"He was sent to the United Kingdom as a naval attache from 1923–1925, during which time he was further promoted to commander on 1 December 1924. In 1922, he wrote a report to the Navy General Staff on the importance of protecting merchant shipping in times of war"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masaichi_Niimi
I don't know much about him, although prewar he was commander of the Naval Academy, so either the Navy thought he was too old, or he spoke ill of Navy doctrine (see report above). With the butterfly of Batangas Bay, the failure to take the Rock in the first amphibious assault, and with an embarrassed Army and Navy getting even more serious about the Philippines, a Vice Admiral seems a good fit for a now more important command area and while important, the Japanese are not going to send what they think are the first team. So an old man nearing retirement is a good fit.
Alamo in the Philippines: The Battle of Fort Hughes June 20-21, 1942
American Garrison (Colonel Valentine Foster, US Army, commanding)
3rd Coast Artillery (Philippine Army) 350 men, 36 M2 (30 caliber) machine guns, 36 BAR, organized into 3 companies of 90 men each, the remainder combat support and command.
3rd Battalion / 59th Coast Artillery (US Army, with Philippine Army and Navy replacements) 450 men, manning Batteries Gillespie, Woodruff, Craighill, Leach, Fuger, Williams, and Idaho.
HQ and support garrison command (30 men, mixed US Army and Philippine Army)
total garrison: 830 men
Heavily pounded during the 1st and 2nd Bombardments, Fort Hughes has 2 x 14 inch guns operational (Battery Gillespie and Woodruff), 1 x 12 inch mortar operational (Battery Craighill), but the open mounts of the Battery Leach (2 x 6 inch guns) and Battery Williams (3 x 155 mm guns) were total wrecked beyond repair, and only 1 of the 3 inch guns of Battery Fuger and 2 of the 3 inch AA guns of Battery William remain operational.
The island is very similar to Corregidor in topography, with a low, middle and topside of the island, albeit on a much smaller scale. The heavy guns and AA guns are topside, with the mortars middleside and the smaller guns on the lowest portion of the island (essentially the tale). One company of machine gunners is assigned to each portion of the island. The glaring weakness is that only a single anti landing craft gun and it is facing the wrong direction. Little can be done however is there are no other guns available on the island and no way to move any from Corregidor.
Japanese assault force
Admiral Niimi commits his entire landing force, 3 reinforced battalions of troops, each with 4 companies of infantry and 1 heavy weapons company. He has 60 landing craft available and they have been practicing since they arrived on June 5 at Balayan Bay. Leading the force and in command of the landing attempt is a veteran of several amphibious landings in China, Captain Keiji Shibazaki, who has been brought over from China Fleet staff for just this purpose. The landing craft move along the shore taking advantage of a gap cleared over the previous days by very careful mine-sweeping by Japanese sailors in small boats.
The attack force is organized into 8 waves, each with 5 assault craft, with 20 landing craft modified into gunboats (each with 2 x 25 mm guns, 1 x 75 mm howitzer and 2 x 120 mm mortars). The narrowness of the landing zone dictates the size of the landing zone. The heavy mortars and light artillery from the landing forces are meanwhile moved to Fort Frank in the days leading up to the landing. Spotters are also moved to the burned out wreckage of Fort Drum to better observe American positions on Corregidor and Caballo.
The Assault
At 2200 hours June 20, Navy float planes begin dropping flares over Corregidor and in the waters between the two islands which serve to back-light Caballo Island and thus make it easier for the landing craft to aim for it while keeping them in darkness. Navy bombers make a continual stream of runs over Corregidor and Caballo (a pair at a time for several minutes each) dropping small bombs which serve to hide the sound of the approaching engines and also keep the garrison under cover aside from anti-aircraft crews.
Meanwhile the Japanese landing forces departs Cavite just before dark and by midnight the first of the landing craft and their supporting gunboats are within 2,000 yards of the island.
The Japanese first wave is a mere couple of hundred yards from the beach when the first observers from the garrison determine something is amiss, and dropping their ramps before anyone can give the order to fire. Thus 3 companies of the 8th Sasebo SNLF are ashore and amongst the defenders of the 1st platoon, Battery L, 3rd Coast Artillery (Philippine Army) before the machine gunners can open up. The Filipino troops and single American (the platoon sergeant) are overwhelmed in a brief and savage fight, and none manage to escape. However the flanking platoon opens fire soon after, and a scratch force of American and Filipino gunners from Battery Fuger and Battery Leach counterattack, and buy a little time although with devastating casualties that shatters the entire Filipino-American force.
By then the second wave is landing, and 3 companies of the 1st Maizura are ashore and bypassing the fight underway, begin making their way up the hill toward Battery Craighill and positions held by Battery H, 3rd Coast Artillery. Now fully alert, but still handicapped by the darkness, the defenders are hard pressed to find targets which makes up for the confusion the Japanese Naval troops are having as they climb up a steep hill in the dark.
Unmolested by shore fire, the remaining waves continue to land troops and supplies over the next
2 hours, along with a handful of light tanks and several small mountain guns, while heavy mortars from Carabao Island rain high explosives and illumination rounds on the top of the island and on the positions held by Battery Gillispie and Woodward, Battery Idaho, and the remainder of the 3rd Coast Artillery and the command posts. This keeps the defenders pinned down and under cover.
It takes two hours for the Japanese to wipe out the defenders holding the middle and lower ends of the island, with only a handful of Filipino defenders and a single American escaping up the hill. Japanese losses are heavy but acceptable, with 200 or so wounded or dead, and all 3 of the Japanese landing teams are intact and combat effective. At this point, at 0300, Colonel Foster attempts to surrender and orders the destruction of his remaining artillery. Sadly, in the confusion and darkness, the men he sends forward to offer that surrender are killed by Japanese fire. Postwar it is determined that most likely the Japanese did not understand what was happening in the darkness.
At 0330, the Japanese launch their final assault, and while the defenders inflict some casualties they are quickly overwhelmed. There is no organized surrender although as the fighting lasts until first light a few dozen Filipinos and a few Americans are able to successfully surrender. Japanese casualties run to another 150 in the last fight. There are no other survivors among the defenders aside from the 34 Filipino and 4 American enlisted men who managed to successfully surrender once it was light enough to see and who survived the process of trying to surrender. Only a single American managed to successfully swim to Corregidor after hiding on the 21st and he is taken to Malinta Hill just after midnight on June 22.
Within days the Japanese have mortars and light guns in position to open fire at will on the lower portions of Corregidor and a valuable observation post within easy sight of most of the island.
victor at Fort Hughes, Captain Keiji Shibazaki
3rd Coast Artillery (Philippine Army) 350 men, 36 M2 (30 caliber) machine guns, 36 BAR, organized into 3 companies of 90 men each, the remainder combat support and command.
3rd Battalion / 59th Coast Artillery (US Army, with Philippine Army and Navy replacements) 450 men, manning Batteries Gillespie, Woodruff, Craighill, Leach, Fuger, Williams, and Idaho.
HQ and support garrison command (30 men, mixed US Army and Philippine Army)
total garrison: 830 men
Heavily pounded during the 1st and 2nd Bombardments, Fort Hughes has 2 x 14 inch guns operational (Battery Gillespie and Woodruff), 1 x 12 inch mortar operational (Battery Craighill), but the open mounts of the Battery Leach (2 x 6 inch guns) and Battery Williams (3 x 155 mm guns) were total wrecked beyond repair, and only 1 of the 3 inch guns of Battery Fuger and 2 of the 3 inch AA guns of Battery William remain operational.
The island is very similar to Corregidor in topography, with a low, middle and topside of the island, albeit on a much smaller scale. The heavy guns and AA guns are topside, with the mortars middleside and the smaller guns on the lowest portion of the island (essentially the tale). One company of machine gunners is assigned to each portion of the island. The glaring weakness is that only a single anti landing craft gun and it is facing the wrong direction. Little can be done however is there are no other guns available on the island and no way to move any from Corregidor.
Japanese assault force
Admiral Niimi commits his entire landing force, 3 reinforced battalions of troops, each with 4 companies of infantry and 1 heavy weapons company. He has 60 landing craft available and they have been practicing since they arrived on June 5 at Balayan Bay. Leading the force and in command of the landing attempt is a veteran of several amphibious landings in China, Captain Keiji Shibazaki, who has been brought over from China Fleet staff for just this purpose. The landing craft move along the shore taking advantage of a gap cleared over the previous days by very careful mine-sweeping by Japanese sailors in small boats.
The attack force is organized into 8 waves, each with 5 assault craft, with 20 landing craft modified into gunboats (each with 2 x 25 mm guns, 1 x 75 mm howitzer and 2 x 120 mm mortars). The narrowness of the landing zone dictates the size of the landing zone. The heavy mortars and light artillery from the landing forces are meanwhile moved to Fort Frank in the days leading up to the landing. Spotters are also moved to the burned out wreckage of Fort Drum to better observe American positions on Corregidor and Caballo.
The Assault
At 2200 hours June 20, Navy float planes begin dropping flares over Corregidor and in the waters between the two islands which serve to back-light Caballo Island and thus make it easier for the landing craft to aim for it while keeping them in darkness. Navy bombers make a continual stream of runs over Corregidor and Caballo (a pair at a time for several minutes each) dropping small bombs which serve to hide the sound of the approaching engines and also keep the garrison under cover aside from anti-aircraft crews.
Meanwhile the Japanese landing forces departs Cavite just before dark and by midnight the first of the landing craft and their supporting gunboats are within 2,000 yards of the island.
The Japanese first wave is a mere couple of hundred yards from the beach when the first observers from the garrison determine something is amiss, and dropping their ramps before anyone can give the order to fire. Thus 3 companies of the 8th Sasebo SNLF are ashore and amongst the defenders of the 1st platoon, Battery L, 3rd Coast Artillery (Philippine Army) before the machine gunners can open up. The Filipino troops and single American (the platoon sergeant) are overwhelmed in a brief and savage fight, and none manage to escape. However the flanking platoon opens fire soon after, and a scratch force of American and Filipino gunners from Battery Fuger and Battery Leach counterattack, and buy a little time although with devastating casualties that shatters the entire Filipino-American force.
By then the second wave is landing, and 3 companies of the 1st Maizura are ashore and bypassing the fight underway, begin making their way up the hill toward Battery Craighill and positions held by Battery H, 3rd Coast Artillery. Now fully alert, but still handicapped by the darkness, the defenders are hard pressed to find targets which makes up for the confusion the Japanese Naval troops are having as they climb up a steep hill in the dark.
Unmolested by shore fire, the remaining waves continue to land troops and supplies over the next
2 hours, along with a handful of light tanks and several small mountain guns, while heavy mortars from Carabao Island rain high explosives and illumination rounds on the top of the island and on the positions held by Battery Gillispie and Woodward, Battery Idaho, and the remainder of the 3rd Coast Artillery and the command posts. This keeps the defenders pinned down and under cover.
It takes two hours for the Japanese to wipe out the defenders holding the middle and lower ends of the island, with only a handful of Filipino defenders and a single American escaping up the hill. Japanese losses are heavy but acceptable, with 200 or so wounded or dead, and all 3 of the Japanese landing teams are intact and combat effective. At this point, at 0300, Colonel Foster attempts to surrender and orders the destruction of his remaining artillery. Sadly, in the confusion and darkness, the men he sends forward to offer that surrender are killed by Japanese fire. Postwar it is determined that most likely the Japanese did not understand what was happening in the darkness.
At 0330, the Japanese launch their final assault, and while the defenders inflict some casualties they are quickly overwhelmed. There is no organized surrender although as the fighting lasts until first light a few dozen Filipinos and a few Americans are able to successfully surrender. Japanese casualties run to another 150 in the last fight. There are no other survivors among the defenders aside from the 34 Filipino and 4 American enlisted men who managed to successfully surrender once it was light enough to see and who survived the process of trying to surrender. Only a single American managed to successfully swim to Corregidor after hiding on the 21st and he is taken to Malinta Hill just after midnight on June 22.
Within days the Japanese have mortars and light guns in position to open fire at will on the lower portions of Corregidor and a valuable observation post within easy sight of most of the island.
victor at Fort Hughes, Captain Keiji Shibazaki
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students of the Battle of Tarawa will recognize Shibazaki
He was available at this time in OTL, and as an expert on amphibious warfare, is a logical choice to send as he happened to be assigned to the China Fleet at that time
While important, Fort Hughes does not overlook directly the anchorage that the submarines have been using, which is right off of west end of the island due to the minefields north and south of Corregidor. But previously hidden positions, like the Navy Tunnel, are now vulnerable to direct fire by the Japanese
He was available at this time in OTL, and as an expert on amphibious warfare, is a logical choice to send as he happened to be assigned to the China Fleet at that time
While important, Fort Hughes does not overlook directly the anchorage that the submarines have been using, which is right off of west end of the island due to the minefields north and south of Corregidor. But previously hidden positions, like the Navy Tunnel, are now vulnerable to direct fire by the Japanese
It was inevitable at some point that Bataan and Corregidor would fall. However here they are lasting longer, and costing the Japanese a great deal more. Additionally the southern islands are going to be the scenes of better and longer resistance, even before counting the better resistance movements everywhere. To repeat the obvious, seriously upsetting the Japanese timetable and burning up Japanese men and materiel is vital. The Japanese have neither spare time nor spare resources. They can't ignore the PI, so they must do whatever it takes to secure them. ITTL the total US casualties are fewer, key personnel are evacuated. Those who remain will be in better shape when they enter captivity, unlike OTL, which will mean the odds are substantially more of them will survive the war (which hopefully will be shortened).
From the very beginnings of the "modern" War Plan Orange in 1919/1920, relief, as opposed to retaking, of the PI was at best a long shot and recognized as such. Putting the money and effort in to making the PI strong enough to resist invasion in such a way and for long enough for a true relief/reinforcement to be effected was not in the cards - especially once the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1934. Especially during the Depression, the USA was simply not going to pour a great deal of money in to the defenses of someplace that was going to be independent in 10 years. Even before this it was generally accepted that sooner or later the PI would be independent.
MacArthur, who had previously been Chief of Staff of the US Army, was very well aware of the WPO assumptions that the PI could not and would not be held absent rather significant changes in defense policy and expenditures. His comments about being let down, abandoned, etc were pure bullshit as he knew better. In essence the PI were going to be a delaying action, a sacrificial rearguard, even with the increased resources sent to the PI in 1940/41. Given the size of the IJN, and the location of the Japanese islands between Hawaii and the PI, even absent PH and the destruction of the battle line the USN simply could not rush to the aid of the PI. That was never contemplated in any WPO variant, securing island bases along the way was always in the plan. At least ITTL the additional resources sent to the PI 40/41 are not squandered, and the sensible defensive plans are put in motion.
From the very beginnings of the "modern" War Plan Orange in 1919/1920, relief, as opposed to retaking, of the PI was at best a long shot and recognized as such. Putting the money and effort in to making the PI strong enough to resist invasion in such a way and for long enough for a true relief/reinforcement to be effected was not in the cards - especially once the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1934. Especially during the Depression, the USA was simply not going to pour a great deal of money in to the defenses of someplace that was going to be independent in 10 years. Even before this it was generally accepted that sooner or later the PI would be independent.
MacArthur, who had previously been Chief of Staff of the US Army, was very well aware of the WPO assumptions that the PI could not and would not be held absent rather significant changes in defense policy and expenditures. His comments about being let down, abandoned, etc were pure bullshit as he knew better. In essence the PI were going to be a delaying action, a sacrificial rearguard, even with the increased resources sent to the PI in 1940/41. Given the size of the IJN, and the location of the Japanese islands between Hawaii and the PI, even absent PH and the destruction of the battle line the USN simply could not rush to the aid of the PI. That was never contemplated in any WPO variant, securing island bases along the way was always in the plan. At least ITTL the additional resources sent to the PI 40/41 are not squandered, and the sensible defensive plans are put in motion.
Driftless
Donor
With the more protracted fight of this universe, there would also be a much larger group of Filipino veterans with expanded leadership skills. That could have had a significant impact on the soon to be independent Philippines of the post-war era
That is an interesting butterfly. I don't feel qualified to judge how significant, but surely very much so (Filipino history since 1945 is not exactly a strongpoint for me), but I wouldn't mind seeing someone come up with ideas.
I did kill off Ferdinand Marcus though so at least HE isn't going to be an issue