S C O O P '7 2!
I would imagine a some kind of Tibetan Autonomist Party or Turkestan Islamic Party to win at least a few constituencies in said regionsI've been working on making this map on and off for a veeeeery long time, but finally, here's the most recent National Congress election in my China TL!
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China’s history is one of the longest and most storied of any nation in the world, but its current form of government- a democratically elected, federal presidential republic- is shorter than people sometimes remember. It was not until the reforms following the Tiananmen Square Revolution in 1989, in which the Kuomintang government organized a new constitution allowing for party competition, devolution and a democratically elected legislature, that the country’s modern system was officially established, and until 1975, the country was simply a dictatorship with the President of China being entirely unaccountable.
Modern China's politics is perhaps comparable to a strange fusion of the politics of two of Asia’s other most populous and influential countries, India and Japan. The former comparison is evoked due to the heavy federal influence of the governments of each province, and the latter due to China’s significant role in the international technology industry and its dominant party system.
The National Congress, the unicameral legislature of the republic, is a fairly simple institution on its face, with 900 members each elected to single-member districts much like the US House of Representatives every four years (fittingly for the most populous country in the world, the National Congress is one of the largest democratic legislative bodies in the world). Unfortunately, it shares some of that chamber’s faults- malapportionment is common, as is gerrymandering to create majority-minority districts (which packs non-Han Progressive support into smaller areas which they overwhelmingly win), and some have criticized the FPTP system as entrenching the Kuomintang’s support and called for PR to be introduced (particularly the opposition parties). The Kuomintang’s usual defence is to point out that compared to Malaysia or Japan, China’s districts are much more equally sized (each district serves roughly 1.5 million people, and unlike those countries barely any of them are twice or half that size) and great pains are taken by the country's electoral commission not to split counties or prefectures unless absolutely necessary.
Regardless, the status quo is very much to the Kuomintang’s advantage by inflating its legislative majorities (as FPTP tends to do), and the worst it has managed in a National Congress election was falling 8 seats short of an overall majority in 2009. That legislative session was generally agreed to show the weakness of the divided opposition, particularly as the right-wing Economic Liberals simply propped up the government for the most part, and in 2013 the Kuomintang secured over 75% of the National Congress’s seats on 46% of the popular vote, its best ever result, to just 31% and 176 seats for the Progressives.
2017 saw an election dominated by a cooperative display from the Progressives (led by Jiang Jielian) and the Communists (led by Leung Kwok-hung), which had the goal of depriving the Kuomintang of the two-thirds majority that gave it the power to enact constitutional changes (such as repealing term limits to allow Wang Yang to run for and win a third term in 2015) and emphasizing China’s increasing wealth gap. The election saw a big swing away from the Kuomintang, who did indeed lose their two-thirds majority in the National Congress.
Despite this, the National Congress was dominated by the Kuomintang and continues to be so, even factoring in special election losses during the period. With the election of Progressive Jiang Jielian as President, numerous Kuomintang figures in Congress have suggested they will roadblock his agenda, and while electoral reform was a key policy goal of the Progressives it is unclear at present exactly what Jiang will do. Some have suggested he should turn the National Congress into a bicameral legislature with a second chamber elected by PR (akin to what happened in Guangdong after the Kuomintang lost power for the first time), while others in his party have advocated for an overhaul of Congress' electoral system ahead of the 2021 election. With new elections due in October and public opinion on the Kuomintang's obstructionism souring, it seems possible Jiang may choose to hope for an unprecedented Progressive victory in Congress and then implement a new electoral system.
Kuomintang: the dominant party of modern China (for the most part), known ideologically since the multi-party era began for small-c conservatism and centrism, and which has used this to pivot to gather voter support at all costs (a little like the PRI in Mexico or Fianna Fáil in Ireland, though like those its star has started to fall). Since 2010, it has been led in the National Congress by businessman-turned-politician Wang Jianlin, who sits for Liaoning’s 15th district (the southern tip of Dalian) and was integral in steering it through the minority government years of the early 2010s. In the 2017 election, they won 40.2% of the popular vote and 574 seats.
Progressive: the strongest opposition party and the main voice of the centre-left in Chinese politics. It mainly draws its support from poorer Chinese voters and ethnic minorities (except in Xinjiang/East Turkestan, where the situation is more complicated), but has always struggled to win enough ground against the Kuomintang to form more than token opposition. Under its National Congress leader and 2020 Presidential election victor Jiang Jielian (who until 2021 sat for Beijing’s 4th district), however, it has started to establish a left-wing populist streak and gather significantly more popular support. The 2017 election saw it win 34.1% of the vote and 280 seats.
Communist: the descendants of the Kuomintang’s old opponents of the 1920s and 30s, they represented only minor insurgent groups until the Tiananmen Square Revolution saw them legalized as a democratic political force. In this form, they’re comparable to the communist parties of India or Japan ideologically, siding with the Progressives on most matters but not really formally for the most part (an exception to this was their decision not to stand in the 2020 Presidential election). Led by Leung Kwok-hung of Guangdong’s 3rd district since 2008, the party won 22 seats and 7.3% of the popular vote in 2017, benefitting from tactical voting agreements with the Progressives.
Loyalist: by some margin the most right-wing party in the National Congress, the Loyalists are led by the populist former newspaper editor Hu Xijin (who presently sits for Tianjin’s 5th district having previously represented Beijing’s 2nd district), and mainly win seats based on personal votes for their populist candidates or by capitalizing on racial tensions from Han voters in regions with a large non-Han population. They won 3.8% of the vote and 9 seats in 2017, 10 seats less than 2013 due to the protest vote campaign by the Progressives and Communists seeking to decapitate as many of them as possible (though the Kuomintang also benefitted from their losses in some seats).
Economic Liberal: a libertarian party currently led by Soong Chu-yu (aka James Soong, the representative for Hunan’s 7th district, based in his hometown of Xiangtan), they effectively sit to the left of the Kuomintang socially and to its right economically. They were traditionally either the third or fourth-biggest party in China, but when they supported the 2009-13 government eagerly in return for concessions like tax cuts, they made themselves enormously unpopular, losing dozens of seats in 2013. They made little recovery in 2017, currently sitting at 6 seats and having won 6.1% of the national popular vote.
Turkestani: the only party representing one of China’s ethnic minorities to have seats in the National Congress, the Turkestani Party supports the rights of the Uyghur majority in Xinjiang/East Turkestan. (Their party's traditional colour is actually the light blue used on the East Turkestan national flag, but the majority map uses purple so as to differentiate them from the Kuomintang.) They vary on whether they are actively pro-independence or merely supportive of civil rights, and on other issues are generally fairly socially conservative and economically leftist. Due to Xinjiang/East Turkestan’s small proportion of China’s population, they only won 0.2% of the national popular vote, but 32.5% of the vote and 6 of its 14 seats (more or less the same as the Progressives won in the province).
Green: as in most countries, the Greens are a fairly simple green politics-focused party. What makes them significant in the context of Chinese politics, of course, is the country’s serious pollution problem. Since 2009, they have held 2 seats- Shaanxi’s 8th district (based in Xianyang, a badly polluted city home to Xi’an’s main airport and several universities) and Hubei’s 37th district (home to Shennongjia Forestry District)- and its leader, Li Hsin Chang (aka Lena Li), sits for the former seat. They took 2.6% of the vote in 2017.
Independents: with the Progressives unseating Tenzin Tethong in Tibet’s 2nd district, the only independent returned to the National Congress in 2017 was Guo Quan, who has represented Jiangsu’s 3rd district (comprising his home district, Gulou in Nanjing) since 2009. Guo originally stood for the 2009 election as a nonpartisan critic of the government’s handling of the Sichuan earthquake, and beat the Kuomintang in a traditionally very safe seat in one of their strongest provinces. In the 2013 and 2017 elections the Progressives stood aside in his favour, allowing him to hold onto a sizeable personal vote. Overall, 4.9% of the vote went to independents and minor parties in 2017, a slight increase from 2013 but significantly less than the peak of 8.3% in 2009.
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(Here's a version without the majority shading, in case people find that easier to see.)
The latter is what the Turkestani Party is, and Tibet's National Congress districts are so large and rural (and thus difficult to campaign in) that the Progressives basically have an iron grip on them besides occasional strong challenges from independents.I would imagine a some kind of Tibetan Autonomist Party or Turkestan Islamic Party to win at least a few constituencies in said regions