Alternate Electoral Maps III
- Thread starter killertahu22
- Start date
I would imagine a some kind of Tibetan Autonomist Party or Turkestan Islamic Party to win at least a few constituencies in said regions
The latter is what the Turkestani Party is, and Tibet's National Congress districts are so large and rural (and thus difficult to campaign in) that the Progressives basically have an iron grip on them besides occasional strong challenges from independents.
I don’t think any Democrat was doing that well against Nixon in ‘72 unless Watergate was leaked before the election. Jackson would have done a hell of a lot better than McGovern did though, of course.S C O O P '7 2!
What if the January 1980 poll that showed Carter leading Reagan by 29 points ended up being accurate?
James E. "Jimmy" Carter (D-GA)/Walter F. Mondale (D-MN) - 60.39% PV, 525 electoral votes
Ronald W. Reagan (R-CA)/George H.W Bush (R-TX) - 31.39% PV, 13 electoral votes
John B. Anderson (I-IL)/Patrick J. Lucey (I-WI) - 6.61% PV, 0 electoral votes
James E. "Jimmy" Carter (D-GA)/Walter F. Mondale (D-MN) - 60.39% PV, 525 electoral votes
Ronald W. Reagan (R-CA)/George H.W Bush (R-TX) - 31.39% PV, 13 electoral votes
John B. Anderson (I-IL)/Patrick J. Lucey (I-WI) - 6.61% PV, 0 electoral votes
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Another China TL provincial election, this one for Hubei.
Hubei is well known as a heartland of the Progressives in the otherwise fiercely Kuomintang region of central China, and the biggest province not to have voted Kuomintang since the Tiananmen Square Revolution. Ever since the republic was founded, it’s been a hotbed of political radicalism- the Wuchang Uprising happened in its capital, Wuhan; in 1927 Wang Jingwei founded a left-wing government there (which Chiang Kai-shek ultimately overthrew); it saw considerable insurgent fighting supported by Zhang Xueliang when Imperial Japanese forces seized some of its eastern territories; and in the 1960s, Wuhan was a hotbed for anti-Chiang groups, which culminated in the Wuhan Incident in 1967, where hundreds of suspected communists were detained on mostly fabricated charges.
Suffice to say, all of this made the Kuomintang very suspicious of Hubei’s people. Government spending was diverted away from it, when the democratic election of the president was introduced voting there was very heavily restricted (the presence of the Tuija and Miao minorities in the west didn’t help), and allegedly Moshan joked in an early 1980s political summit to British PM Margaret Thatcher that he was tempted to turn Wuhan into ‘China’s Liverpool’, and simply allow the anti-government city to be left to collapse.
While Zhao Ziyang was more sympathetic to Hubei once he came to power, activists from Hubei who joined the Tiananmen Square Revolution were some of the most influential in ensuring the new Chinese constitution would promise a federal, not unitary, state. As Qin Yongmin, who later became Hubei’s first Premier, put it, ‘Democracy cannot just be a means to obfuscate injustice in China, but to stop it.’
Qin and his supporters’ helped make Hubei the first province to hold provincial elections (though not the first in China- Beijing and Tianjin elected provincial legislatures in 1989), doing so on the 2nd February 1990. The legislature was elected by STV, with 295 members elected and proportionally assigned to each of Hubei’s prefectures (aside from Shennongjia Forestry District, which elected members in conjunction with Shiyan). While the Progressives have won clear majorities of the vote and of the legislature’s seats in every election, they have never been able to win an overall majority because of this electoral system, which their supporters are quick to point out is a stark contrast from how the Kuomintang have never won an overall majority of the vote for the National Congress or most of the provinces they control despite frequently winning majorities of seats in those legislatures.
Nevertheless, the Progressives have managed to use their control of the province’s government to very productive ends. In Qin’s decade as Premier alone, the Hubei government pumped massive amounts of infrastructure spending into Wuhan, provided legislative protection for the right of workers to unionize and strike if democratic ballots were held, introduced single-payer universal healthcare almost a year before President Zhao rolled it out in the rest of the country, established the concept of the provincial flag by establishing the old flag of the Hubei Military Government as the province’s flag in October 1991 (the 80th anniversary of the start of the Wuchang Uprising), adopted one of the highest minimum wages in China and increased the legislature’s term from three to four years in 1999.
In a way, Hubei is sometimes considered an anomaly in Chinese politics akin to California in the US or Kerala in India, in that its political norm is significantly to the country’s left. This has continued under subsequent Progressive provincial governments, which have established legal protections for Tuija and Miao groups (under pressure from the Tuija Party, which supports affirmative action for the province’s minorities, but particularly the Tuija), protection from discrimination for LGBTQ people and legal recognition of gay and lesbian marriage and transgender identity.
It hasn’t all been plain sailing for the Progressives, particularly after the 2011 election saw them ousted by a rainbow coalition led by the Kuomintang’s Chen Quanguo, which sought to reform Hubei’s economy to make it ‘more appealing to businesses’. However, in a way this spell out of power was very much to the Progressives’ benefit, as they had been slowly losing support from the left to the Communists, Greens and Tuija Party, and the latter two, the Economic Liberals and the Loyalists backing this government’s agenda was seen as a massive betrayal.
Unsurprisingly, 2015 saw the Progressives hoover up support from the smaller parties and kick out enough Kuomintang and Economic Liberal members (the latter of which lost almost all their seats) to return to power as a minority government. While new Premier Zhou Xianwang was hardly seen as the most charismatic figure, he did promise to abandon the Kuomintang’s reforms, and once he came to power, he did just that.
The 2019 election was something of a return to normalcy for the province’s politics, as the Greens and Tuija Party distanced themselves from the failed Chen government and switched back to sniping at Zhou for corruption allegations and consequently picked up seats, while the Economic Liberals slightly recovered. The Progressives were yet again forced to rely on a minority government with support from the minor parties to get back into power, though.
Of course, since the election was held back in February 2019, Hubei has been a centre of attention for all the wrong reasons thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic breaking out in Wuhan. At first, this seemed like it might completely change the face of the province’s politics, particularly as Zhou’s response to the crisis was badly botched and did little to contain the virus’s spread. However, after meeting with Jiang Jielian and being convinced to stand down (he was later appointed to a minor role in Jiang’s cabinet, which it has become clear was the reward for his resignation), Zhou’s successor, Li Tie, worked to alleviate the suffering of Hubei’s people in lockdown, such as by expanding the province’s welfare provisions, calling for housing to be recognized as a human right and increasing the minimum wage. These measures have revitalized the Progressives’ popularity, and barring another major catastrophe, it seems likely they will win in 2023 with ease.
*
Chinese provincial/city council election maps
Beijing
Guangdong
Chongqing
Shaanxi
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Tibet
Qinghai
Xinjiang/East Turkestan referendum
Fujian
Hubei is well known as a heartland of the Progressives in the otherwise fiercely Kuomintang region of central China, and the biggest province not to have voted Kuomintang since the Tiananmen Square Revolution. Ever since the republic was founded, it’s been a hotbed of political radicalism- the Wuchang Uprising happened in its capital, Wuhan; in 1927 Wang Jingwei founded a left-wing government there (which Chiang Kai-shek ultimately overthrew); it saw considerable insurgent fighting supported by Zhang Xueliang when Imperial Japanese forces seized some of its eastern territories; and in the 1960s, Wuhan was a hotbed for anti-Chiang groups, which culminated in the Wuhan Incident in 1967, where hundreds of suspected communists were detained on mostly fabricated charges.
Suffice to say, all of this made the Kuomintang very suspicious of Hubei’s people. Government spending was diverted away from it, when the democratic election of the president was introduced voting there was very heavily restricted (the presence of the Tuija and Miao minorities in the west didn’t help), and allegedly Moshan joked in an early 1980s political summit to British PM Margaret Thatcher that he was tempted to turn Wuhan into ‘China’s Liverpool’, and simply allow the anti-government city to be left to collapse.
While Zhao Ziyang was more sympathetic to Hubei once he came to power, activists from Hubei who joined the Tiananmen Square Revolution were some of the most influential in ensuring the new Chinese constitution would promise a federal, not unitary, state. As Qin Yongmin, who later became Hubei’s first Premier, put it, ‘Democracy cannot just be a means to obfuscate injustice in China, but to stop it.’
Qin and his supporters’ helped make Hubei the first province to hold provincial elections (though not the first in China- Beijing and Tianjin elected provincial legislatures in 1989), doing so on the 2nd February 1990. The legislature was elected by STV, with 295 members elected and proportionally assigned to each of Hubei’s prefectures (aside from Shennongjia Forestry District, which elected members in conjunction with Shiyan). While the Progressives have won clear majorities of the vote and of the legislature’s seats in every election, they have never been able to win an overall majority because of this electoral system, which their supporters are quick to point out is a stark contrast from how the Kuomintang have never won an overall majority of the vote for the National Congress or most of the provinces they control despite frequently winning majorities of seats in those legislatures.
Nevertheless, the Progressives have managed to use their control of the province’s government to very productive ends. In Qin’s decade as Premier alone, the Hubei government pumped massive amounts of infrastructure spending into Wuhan, provided legislative protection for the right of workers to unionize and strike if democratic ballots were held, introduced single-payer universal healthcare almost a year before President Zhao rolled it out in the rest of the country, established the concept of the provincial flag by establishing the old flag of the Hubei Military Government as the province’s flag in October 1991 (the 80th anniversary of the start of the Wuchang Uprising), adopted one of the highest minimum wages in China and increased the legislature’s term from three to four years in 1999.
In a way, Hubei is sometimes considered an anomaly in Chinese politics akin to California in the US or Kerala in India, in that its political norm is significantly to the country’s left. This has continued under subsequent Progressive provincial governments, which have established legal protections for Tuija and Miao groups (under pressure from the Tuija Party, which supports affirmative action for the province’s minorities, but particularly the Tuija), protection from discrimination for LGBTQ people and legal recognition of gay and lesbian marriage and transgender identity.
It hasn’t all been plain sailing for the Progressives, particularly after the 2011 election saw them ousted by a rainbow coalition led by the Kuomintang’s Chen Quanguo, which sought to reform Hubei’s economy to make it ‘more appealing to businesses’. However, in a way this spell out of power was very much to the Progressives’ benefit, as they had been slowly losing support from the left to the Communists, Greens and Tuija Party, and the latter two, the Economic Liberals and the Loyalists backing this government’s agenda was seen as a massive betrayal.
Unsurprisingly, 2015 saw the Progressives hoover up support from the smaller parties and kick out enough Kuomintang and Economic Liberal members (the latter of which lost almost all their seats) to return to power as a minority government. While new Premier Zhou Xianwang was hardly seen as the most charismatic figure, he did promise to abandon the Kuomintang’s reforms, and once he came to power, he did just that.
The 2019 election was something of a return to normalcy for the province’s politics, as the Greens and Tuija Party distanced themselves from the failed Chen government and switched back to sniping at Zhou for corruption allegations and consequently picked up seats, while the Economic Liberals slightly recovered. The Progressives were yet again forced to rely on a minority government with support from the minor parties to get back into power, though.
Of course, since the election was held back in February 2019, Hubei has been a centre of attention for all the wrong reasons thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic breaking out in Wuhan. At first, this seemed like it might completely change the face of the province’s politics, particularly as Zhou’s response to the crisis was badly botched and did little to contain the virus’s spread. However, after meeting with Jiang Jielian and being convinced to stand down (he was later appointed to a minor role in Jiang’s cabinet, which it has become clear was the reward for his resignation), Zhou’s successor, Li Tie, worked to alleviate the suffering of Hubei’s people in lockdown, such as by expanding the province’s welfare provisions, calling for housing to be recognized as a human right and increasing the minimum wage. These measures have revitalized the Progressives’ popularity, and barring another major catastrophe, it seems likely they will win in 2023 with ease.
*
Chinese provincial/city council election maps
Beijing
Guangdong
Chongqing
Shaanxi
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Tibet
Qinghai
Xinjiang/East Turkestan referendum
Fujian
No Chappaquiddick and Nixon Tried, the Fight to Restore Trust in the Government in 1976
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Yep. Despite Ford not pardoning Nixon he still gets challenged by Reagan and this time loses.
Yeah looking at it now doesn’t make much sense. I’ll change that.
Why would Kennedy lose West Virginia, but win the Carolinas, Florida, Louisiana, and Arkansas against “State Rights” Reagan?
Sadly, his populism was not heroic enough to win the neighboring state of Kentucky, which Kerry still loses by 6 points under this uniform swing 
But never fear, ancestral Dems, because our hero wins the ancestral blue dog Democrat stronghold of Arkansas by a solid 4-point margin in this very same scenario!
