AHC: Peerless Air Ministry

[sonofpegasus]

12.11 Every Action Causes A Reaction



Late in December the mid night oil was being burnt in the Air Ministry as the CAS and the higher echelons of the RAF attempted to keep up with what was happening in the Mediterranean as Operation Compass started to unfold. The reaction from the Axis was not long in coming and was first made apparent in decryptions of Luftwaffe command signals broken by the Ultra team working at Bletchley Park. Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS and Sir Peter as AM were both on the select list of people with access to the Ultra intercepts. These intercepts showed that the entirety of Fliegerkorps X was being sent to southern Italy and Sicily. This move was soon confirmed by other intelligence gathering sources

It was abundantly clear to Sir Peter and Sir Hugh that the Germans sending such a powerful Luftwaffe unit south could only result in larger and probably more effective attacks on the Island of Malta. It also meant that naval operations and convoys in the middle Mediterranean were likely to be subject to far greater air threat. With regard to operation Compass, this move would place the Luftwaffe within easy reach of the Italian North African airfields from which they could directly attack O’Conner’s forces. Therefore this movement south of the Luftwaffe had import for all three services. One immediate effect of the arrival of German Me 109’s in Sicily and southern Italian would be in all likelihood to seriously hamper the effectiveness of the reconnaissance aircraft based on Malta. The current Martin Marylands operating from bases in Egypt, Greece and the Maltese airfields would need to replaced with aircraft that could live in contested airspace.

The decision to move reconnaissance aircraft south was complicated by the sortie of the German heavy cruiser Hipper into the Atlantic via the Denmark Strait on the sixth of December. This occurred with no reconnaissance or Maritime patrol aircraft spotting her. This was the cause of a hurried internal AM inquiry as to how she had been missed. Several failings had quickly been identified.

Firstly, there was no regular surveillance of Williams haven or Kiel, neither was there constant coverage of the Skagerrak. Unless there was another indication of a sortie or other activity, patrols and photographic sorties were done on an indeterminate basis.

With Convoys to cover crossing the north Atlantic, Maritime Air Command had insufficient long range assets to keep a standing patrol of RDF equipped aircraft over the Denmark Strait.

Signals intelligence especially ‘traffic analysis’ regarding Krieg marine operations was not being shared rapidly between the RN and the RAF. Whilst Maritime Patrol Aircraft were under the operational control of the RN, PRU assets were not and requests for sorties from the RN to the RAF were often not given the priority desired by the Admiralty. Requests for such sorties could originate either directly from the Admiralty or via Maritime Air Command on the Admiralties behalf. This could cause duplication of effort or the discounting of the request as unimportant. As a result of the Hipper’s sortie a single avenue via Maritime Air Command was established for the coordination and instigation of all reconnaissance requested by the Admiralty.

As a Counter balance to these failings the success of the RDF equipped patrol aircraft in detecting the approach of the Hipper to the very important convoy WS 5A, consisting of twenty troop ships, five of which were assigned to Operation Excess, the fast convoy to Malta and Egypt, gave the escort time to position themselves between the approach raider and the convoy. HMS Furious was able to launch a strike of Albacores, that whilst not scoring any torpedo hits did cause the Hipper to turn away from the convoy. At this juncture HMS Berwick had exchanged several salvoes at long range with Hipper resulting in the Hipper, fearing a torpedo attack from the escorting Destroyers and further airstrikes to break off the attack and to escape at high speed. The heavy use of fuel this entailed, curtailed further operations by Hipper and she had to proceed to Brest. Hipper’s only successes were a couple of independently sailing merchant ships that were easy pickings. This incident again showed the dilemmas currently facing Maritime Command in that there simply did not as yet exist sufficient RDF equipped long range aircraft to carry out both convoy defence patrols and actively track German raiders at the same time.

With the arrival of Hipper into the French Naval port at Brest there was now the requirement for almost daily photographic reconnaissance mission over the port and the only viable asset to accomplish this task was the limited number of high speed PRU spitfires.

In their discussions the heads of the AM and RAF with the Admiralty over these issues the interconnectivity of these events was remarked on. Making the right choices as to where to deploy resources was in some peoples view a lottery, however the case of convoy WS 5A was considered a vindication of the current policy of prioritising the use of Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft for the defence of the convoys.

One saving grace at the moment was that due to decisions made earlier to concentrate on getting both the Spitfire MK III and the PR Mk IV into service there was now a steady stream of the long range PR Spitfires leaving the factory at Eastleigh.

The decision to send four PR Mk IV Spitfires to Malta with subsequent deliveries to Egypt was relatively easy to make and get accepted by the War cabinet. The problems started to arise with how to keep these very specialised airframes flying in a hostile environment. Whilst tropical sand filters might not be essential for aircraft stationed on Malta those assigned to Egypt would certainly require them. Also the PR spitfires used different Merlin engines to those already in use on Malta or in Egypt and would require not only specialised tools but men trained to use them. The solution again as with the recent relocation of Seventy Three Squadron to Malta was to call on the services of an RN Cruiser to act as a high speed transport to run sufficient supplies and personnel to cover the immediate needs of the four Spitfires being sent to Malta.

Another decision that needed dealing with was the lurking presence of the Hipper in Brest. Whilst she was sitting there unmolested she was a threat in being to every convoy crossing the Atlantic of heading for Gibraltar and all points south. Until she was neutralised every convoy would need an escort sufficiently strong to defend it against a fast modern eight inch gunned cruiser.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12.12 Much Beating of the Brest.

The confirmation on the 28th of December of the arrival of the Hipper in the French Naval port of Brest sent waves rippling through the Air Ministry and the Admiralty, as stated elsewhere the ramifications of the fact that Hipper had escaped detection on her voyage from Germany through the Denmark Strait was already becoming the subject of an investigation.

Even whilst this enquiry was being set up the RN was dealing with the ramifications of the presence of the German heavy cruises so close to the vital convoy routes. Over in the AM the activity was twofold, firstly Maritime Command were moving assets and making plans for a continuous patrol off Ushant to discover and track any sortie by the Hipper. This was basically a simple addition to the aerial patrols already maintained to track the movement of U-boats to and from the French Atlantic ports where they were now being based. Secondly Sir Hugh had called Sir Charles Portal as AOC Bomber Command instructing him to plan a raid by Bomber Command to destroy the Hipper as quickly as possible. Sir Hugh had informed Portal that any and all of Bomber Commands assets should be dedicated to this objective and that he required a plan for the earliest possible execution of such a raid to be ready for presentation to the War Cabinet within forty eight hours. Portal had not been slow to point out that such a raid would inevitably lead to considerable destruction in the city of Brest and the loss of French lives. Sir Hugh had replied that the political implications of such an attack was for the Government to assess and Portal’s task was to plan the raid so as to minimise the area and scale of damage around the target.

Sir Hugh had instructed that Portal should present an outline of the plan to him for discussion the next day. Sir Hugh was expecting a lot of opposition from Portal about the diversion of resources to attack a German Warship in a French dock, so the outline plan presented at the meeting, where no less than five wings of bombers would be used, including all the available heavies was a bit of a surprise. Portal had espoused that using a sledge hammer attack would have more chance of destroying the Hipper in the first attack as it was inevitable that the port defences would be strengthened rapidly afterwards. For bombing accuracy and to avoid French casualties a daylight attack had been considered but the potential losses and the need to provide a continuous fighter escort made many consider this option as a last resort. In essence the plan was to use the expertise of Maritime Command and their ASV equipped Wellingtons to identify and fly up the ‘Rade Du Brest’ dropping a line of flares to illuminate the target. As soon as the target was lit and identified, three Wellingtons, with elite crews, each carrying sixteen of the new two hundred and fifty pound incendiary bombs would act as target markers. If the marker bombing was on target the main force would then be instructed to bomb on the markers, if the markers were off target then the Bomb leader would call an offset correction.

Portal went on to explain that the plan was to carry out the attack on the next full moon, this gave a short time for training and to assemble the required ordinance. After discussion with the Admiralty, a mixed bomb load had been devised, with various elements of the raid carrying different bomb combinations. The selected ordinance included, 2000lb Armoured piercing, 500lb semi-armoured piercing, 1000lb and 500lb medium capacity and 250lb incendiary bombs.

Each bomber would carry a combination to achieve maximum bomb load for the fuel load required and its position within the bombing schedule. The majority of the 2000lb AP and 1000lb MC bombs would be carried in the Stirling Bombers of the first wave. The Second wave of Manchester Bombers would carry more 500lb SAP and 500lb MC bombs. The third wave of Halifax Bombers would carry a combination of SAP, MC and 250lb incendiary bombs.

These three waves each consisting of a wing of three reinforced squadrons were planned to have forty four aircraft of one type assigned to them. This would give the first wave a bomb load of four hundred and forty thousand pounds and the subsequent two waves a bomb load of three hundred and fifty two thousand pounds each. The total weight of bombs for the raid would equate to just over five hundred tons and would be the greatest weight of bombs dropped in a single raid on a target in the war so far. The Wellingtons and other bombers from Bomber Command would be attacking other targets in the occupied countries and Germany to divide the defence and to disguise the primary objective.

This raid would be the first raid to fully utilise the new methodology and tactics that had been developed since the start of the night bombing campaign. These included, the bomber stream, time on target and set routes, a master bomber and target marker aircraft, all these elements had been tried out individually or in combinations but this was the time that they had all been combined for a single target with the full mass of the available heavy bombers

Portal had concluded his preliminary briefing by stating that his team considered this the best chance to not only destroy the Hipper but send a message to the German naval High Command that their warships would not find a safe haven in France.

Sir Hugh had responded with a number of questions, these included how many aircraft from the OTU’s were being used to strengthen the squadrons and was there a sufficiency of the heavier bombs available. Further was there an alternative target that the later waves could be diverted to if the target was either destroyed of obscured.

With this it was decided that detailed planning would be proceeded with as quickly as possible so that the War Cabinet approval could be sought. Due to the size of the raid and the type of target the possibility of major damage to the town of Brest and casualties amongst the French population would be inevitable and therefore political approval for the raid would be a necessity.

Sir Hugh had quickly briefed Sir Peter as AM on the outline plan, suggesting that Portal should give a full briefing to the War cabinet as soon as possible. Sir Peter considered it wise that Churchill should sound out the Free French regarding their attitude to the possible French casualties, the elephant in the room was of course last summers bombardment of the French Fleet, forewarned would be forearmed. Sir Hugh suggested that the canvassing of the Free French should be left to the last possible moment for security reasons.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12.13. To Make an Omelette you have to Break eggs.





Early on the Morning of the ninth of January Sir Hugh Dowding had arrived at his desk to receive a personal report from Portal on the effectiveness of the attack on the Hipper in Brest the night before. Knowing Dowding’s concern for the aircrew he sent in harms way, Portal started with the information that four of the big bombers had failed to return resulting in the capture or death of thirty two airmen and that a further two aircrew had been killed and six injured in a crash landing upon return to base. Initial reports from the bombing point photographs were that the attack had been accurate. At the debriefing of the raid leader and the RN observer aboard his aircraft, both stated that they were convinced that the dock and the Hipper had been hit and a large explosion/conflagration observed. They also noted that the incendiaries used as targets markers had not been as effective as expected but the lead bombers had been able to set their new Mk XIV sights and bomb with an accuracy unobtainable by the earlier Mk IX Course setting bomb sight. Unfortunately the Mark XIV was so new that only a couple of dozen preproduction examples were available and these had been fitted to the lead marking aircraft and the flight leaders in the Stirling wing. Whilst there were sufficient Mk XIV sights for the wing and squadron leaders in each of the two follow on wings the rest of the bomber force had to rely on the older Mk IX sights.

It had always been expected that the first wave would be the most accurate, even here there would be a certain degree of dispersion as the terminal velocity could only be set for one type of bomb and with a mixed bomb load this would throw bombs with a higher or lower terminal velocity either short or over in respect of the aiming point.

The bomb leader had considered sending the third wave to the alternate target due to smoke obscuring the target however as the Halifax’s approached their initial point an intense fire broke though the smoke and the bomb leader considered that as an aiming point it was close enough to the original target aiming point to probably be the target itself burning. The leader of the Halifax wing had called that he had a clear visual of the fire and the bomb leader instructed the third wave to bomb as planned.

One or two aircraft from each wave returned with aim point photographs that showed that they were clearly off target and that there would be considerable damage in the commercial and residential districts of Brest.

A selected set of bombing point photographs was being rushed to the AM from Bomber Command Headquarters as would the mornings PR picture when they became available.

It was not till almost mid day that a dispatch rider arrived at the AM with a duplicate set of the photographs taken by the morning PRU Mark IV Spitfire. A brief phone call from the Photographic interpretation unit had informed Sir Hugh Dowding that despite some smoke still covering the target area that at least one of the pictures had shown that the Hipper had been badly damaged in the dry dock. In fact the initial assessment of the damage was that the forward magazine had detonated and the bows of the ship was basically destroyed. Even if she was not a constructive total loss her repairs would take many months according the RN assessment. Unfortunately the photographs also showed extensive damage to the city along the line of the docks on the waterfront.

Sir Peter and Sir Hugh set out together to the cabinet war rooms to give Churchill a full briefing on the effectiveness of the attack. The First Sea Lord and his team also attended to give their evaluation of the outcome of the operation. The initial conclusion was that the primary aim of the attack had been fully achieved. Hopefully subsequent photographic reconnaissance would confirm the full extent of the damage not only to the Hipper but to the important dockyard infrastructure.

Churchill arranged a hasty meeting with the Free French leaders in London to appraise them of the success of the attack and also of the inevitable but highly regretted loss of French lives. It was arranged that there would be a broadcast that night in French on the BBC announcing the destruction of the Hipper and praising the citizens of Brest whilst informing the rest of occupied France of the sacrifice made by their fellow citizens in order that France might one day stand again as a proud and free nation.

Back at the AM, Sir Hugh had called Tizard to discuss the analysis of the raid that was only now getting going and had asked that Blackett be brought in to revue the performance of the Mark XII bomb sight as the design needed to be refined for mass production, if Bomber Command was going to hit defined targets let alone precision ones by day or night. The biggest problem would be ramping up production to a level where all bombers could be fitted with it. Whilst this bomb sight was not considered as accurate as the American Norden one, the Americans were touting as the worlds best, it was considered by those in the know within the AM and RAF as the most practical and usable precision bomb sight available and when paired with the Automatic Course Setting Sight that was in development and would be at least comparable for accuracy with the Norden, Bomber Command would be well equipped to hit any target.



By the evening of the ninth a second PR Spitfire had made a run before the sun set in the west, diving from altitude and running up the Rade Du Breast at less than 200 ft the pilot had obtained a full set of oblique pictures of the docks and river frontage. These confirmed that both the Hipper herself and the dockyard had been hit hard by the bombing. The initial impression given was that the Hipper had suffered a deflagration in her forward magazines that had basically ruined her forward of the bridge. There was also evidence of major blast and fire damage abaft the funnel.

What was obvious was that the Hipper would not be ready for sea for months if ever at all. From the RAF perspective it was a spectacular success showing what that a force of around one hundred heavy bomber could achieve. So from the Navy's point of view the attack had also been a major success in that the Hipper was no longer a threat in the short term at least. Whether the attack would make the Germans think twice about sending major warships to the French Atlantic ports remained to be seen.

As to the political repercussions caused by the damage and destruction wrought on Brest and it’s citizens only time would tell. Off course the German propaganda machine was making as much noise about the killing of innocent French civilians whilst hardly referring to the fact that the Hipper was in the docks in Brest at all. The war of words would obviously continue for some time.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12.14 The Illustrious Blitz and the defence of Malta.



The attack on the RN carrier Illustrious on the tenth of January during operation Excess has been very well detailed the official histories. The defence put up by the carrier’s air group especially the Follond Falcons has been of much scholarly debate as it was the first major test of RDF controlled carrier fighters against first rate fighters and competent dive bombers. However it is the effect of the arrival of the damaged aircraft carrier into the Grand Harbour on Malta late in the evening of the tenth and what subsequently became known as the ‘Illustrious Blitz’ which is relevant to this history.

Operation Excess had several objectives, these were to pass a major resupply convoy through the Mediterranean to Alexander so saving many weeks of shipping time, to run a supply convoy to Malta and retrieve empty shipping and finaly to cover a ‘Club run’ delivering replacement Hurricanes to Malta. In all these objectives the operation was successful. The result however of the need for Illustrious to seek refuge in Malta’s Grand Harbour to undergo emergency repairs prior to sailing for Alexandra was to make her the epicentre of the most intensive bomber attack yet experienced by the island and to tax the RAF fighter defences to their very limit.

Even before Illustrious reached the Grand Harbour from the moment she came in range of the islands Hurricane fighters a standing air patrol had been maintained over her and her escorts. One immediate problem discovered was that as Illustrious had not carried RAF fighters as part of a ‘club run’ she did not at that time have VHF radios on compatible frequencies with the Hurricanes from Malta. Once Illustrious steamed within coverage of the RDF/PPI station on Malta the effectiveness of the standing patrol was greatly increased.

Even before the carrier reached Malta the remains of her air group had. Due to damage to the flight deck landing on had not been an option and all the surviving aircraft that had been in the air at the time of the attack had to divert to Malta, a couple of the Folland Falcons had stayed to long defending their ship and had been forced to ditch short of the island. The, by now well practiced, air sea rescue organisation of the island had been able to pluck both pilots from the sea and deliver them safely back to the island. Of her original air group of forty two aircraft, only twenty three had made it to the Island. Seventeen Folland Falcons several of which were exhibiting the ferocious attentions of the Me 110’s were accompanied by two Fairy Albacore TBR aircraft and four Fairy Fulmar FBR aircraft. The Falcons would be a welcome addition to the islands air defences as would the Fulmars as long as they could be kept out of the clutches of the Me 109’s. Remarkably soon after Illustrious had made it into the Grand Harbour a steady but slow trickle of trucks started to arrive a Hal Far airfield carrying aircraft fitters and handlers to look after the refugee aircraft along with spare, stores and ammunition as it was salvaged from the wreck of the hanger and the surviving stowage and magazines. By morning there were sufficient stores to keep at least the undamaged Falcons flying for a few days and even the two damaged ones were being worked on in the expectation of getting them flying again.

For some reason unknown to the expectant islanders the Luftwaffe did not appear at dawn the next day to finish off the damaged carrier. Though there were spasmodic incursions when the weather permitted, that were met by the Hurricanes and on the most part thwarted in reaching the harbour area. It was not until the sixteenth of January that there was a major attack. Although not apparent at the time one reason for the delay in addition to the poor weather was the rough handling Fliegerkorps X had received at the hands of the FAA in their initial attacks on the tenth of January. Post war it was revealed that of the combined force of sixty He 111’s and Junkers Ju57’s no less than twelve had been destroyed over the fleet and a further six had ditched or crash landed, with more exhibiting various degrees of damage. Additionally three Me 110’s had been lost.

With the skies clearing on the Sixteenth a major attack comprising some seventy JU 57’s and JU 88’s with and escort of around thirty Italian Cr.42’s was detected by RDF as it assembled over Sicily. Having been expecting an attack for some time the Malta fighter defences were ready and primed. With only two squadrons of Hurricanes currently on the island the addition of twelve operational Falcons was very much appreciated. The Maltese Fighter Direction centre had radios capable of talking directly to the FAA fighters. The immediate response to the first indication of aircraft assembly over Sicily was to get the Falcons airborne, with their greater range and endurance they could climb for height and then meet the attack prior to it reaching the island. The FAA fighters had been instructed to attack and draw of the escorting fighters. The full squadron of Hurricanes that was scrambled would then concentrate on the bombers. The experienced Hurricane pilots on the Island had been very persuasive in their advice to the FAA Pilots flying their Falcons in combat with the very nifty and nimble Cr 42. The mantra was do not try and dog fight with the biplane, use height and power to gain positional advantage and your cannons will knock the hell out of the Italian aircraft.

So it was that the Ground controller got the FAA Falcons at height on the track of the Italian fighters, initially using the Null Node effect on the reception of the signal on the RDF system the Control was able to get a good estimate of the height of the incoming attack. The New GL RDF system used by the heavy AA batteries was now able to get an accurate height reading at greater range thereby making the controllers task easier as the attacking aircraft got closer to the island. In this attack with HMS Illustrious sitting in the Naval Dockyard like the bull’s-eye on a dartboard the objective of the enemy was not hard to discern so the controllers could place their fighters at advantage. Close co-ordination with the AA control was essential as the AA Barrage over the Harbour would be intense and indiscriminate of friend or foe.

The first swooping assault of the FAA Falcons scattered the Italian fighters like a flock of startled pigeons, send several wrecked aircraft plunging earthwards. Those FAA pilots who ignored the advice given to avoid dog-fighting the Cr 42 soon learnt that this particular pigeon had teeth and could bite. However applying the height and power tactics the Falcons were able to force the Italian fighters into defensive tactics rather than defend the Luftwaffe Bombers.

With the fighter escort otherwise engaged the Hurricanes swept in to attack the bomber formation concentrating on the Ju 87 dive bombers as they were considered the greater threat.

By the time the last enemy aircraft had departed the area around the dock and HMS Illustrious had been turned into a moonscape of Maltese stone rubble. An armoured piercing bomb had unfortunately penetrated an underground shelter resulting in the death of the fifty one civilians sheltering there. Though HMS Illustrious received some further superficial damage from near misses no direct hits were achieved. Work on repairing her steering gear and damaged hanger continued night and day.

Of the seventy German bombers and thirty Italian fighters committed to this attack the defending fighters and the combined AA barrage claimed no less than forty eight destroyed and a further dozen damaged. These figure were known to be impossibly optimistic and the intelligence officers of all three services attempted to sort out the multiple claims and achieve a realistic consensus figure. What was certain beyond doubt was that the RAF had loss four Hurricanes and one pilot and the FAA had lost two pilots and three Falcons. Counting wrecks on the island and confirmed crashes into the sea or the harbour still gave a base figure of twenty nine aircraft destroyed, even deleting the seven defending aircraft lost, that still left an impressive twenty two enemy aircraft destroyed as a minimum. Whilst Malta could not afford continue losing fighters at the current rate the consensus was that a loss rate which had to be greater than twenty percent the Luftwaffe would not be able to sustain the attacks either.

Urgent calls went out to the AM and British Government that reinforcements of fighters for Malta , and better ones at that, needed to be a priority.

The consensus on Malta was the sooner the Illustrious could sail the better, As she was a target the Luftwaffe could not ignore. Amazingly some of the RAF fighter pilots seemed please by this situation, one a veteran from Eleven Group had baldly stated that it was a good chance to gut the German Flieger Corps X currently flying from Sicily.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12.15 Benghasi or Bust.

With the capture of Bardia in the first week on January and then Tobruk at the end of the third week the British government became awake to the possibility that the five day raid could and should get as far as Bengazi. In North Africa there was a scramble to repair and refit equipment as the herculean task of getting sufficient supplies forward for the advance to continue. This in combination with the intense air attacks on Malta combined with the threat to Greece was causing much angst in the corridors of Whitehall.

Antony Eden not long after his return from the middle east had identified a major difference in outlook between the powers that be in London and those actually participating in the campaigns in the Mediterranean and Africa. In the simplest of terms, those in London considered that the campaign to drive the Italians out of Libya was the key to holding Malta, whereas those in theatre considered that the survival of Malta as an offensive base, able to interdict the flow of supplies from Italy to the African ports was the only way that the Libyan offensive could prevail.

Sir Hugh Dowding was firmly of the opinion that the commanders on the spot were right and that Malta had not only to survive but also continue to destroy the essential supplies needed by the Italian army in Africa. However when discussing the African campaign with Sir Peter, Sir Hugh emphasised that the two were inexorably linked and that the defence of Malta and the support of O’Conner’s forces must have precedence over not only the operation in Italian East Africa but also any potential aid to Greece. In conjunction with the other two services the AM was persistent in advocating that RAF reinforcements should be sent to Greece but not Ground troops. The Chief of the General staff was fully committed to this stance as was the Admiralty. Aircraft could be recovered quickly from Greece if the German sledge hammer was to be swung via Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, whereas ground troops would almost certainly be forced to retreat hastily from Thrace and just as at Dunkirk eventually have to be retrieved by the Navy, leaving all the Army’s heavy kit behind again. The Admiralty had been advocating reinforcing the current garrison on Crete and preparing the islands defence. This gelled with Sir Hugh’s thinking, in what he saw as the advent of the probable loss of mainland Greece, then holding the Island of Crete became essential to protect the sea routes from Alexandria west to the Libyan battle fields. As long as the two Islands of Crete and Malta held then the RAF could be decisive in choking supplies to the axis in Africa whilst being guardian of the sea lines of communication for the British in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

The reports from the RAF contingent currently if Greece was that the airfield position was very poor. There were few all weather fields near or on the Albanian front let alone in Thrace. Only around Athens and down into the Peloponnese were there sufficient all weather airfields. To reinforce the RAF in Greece and protect the convoys to Crete was vital, here again there were few airfields and all, like the major ports were all on the islands north shore.

Since the arrival of the British and Commonwealth Garrison force the geography of the island had been studied and annualised in an attempt to solve not only the logistics but also the communications . Road wise the island was virtually dived in to three separate parts running east to west and the north and south shores were almost unknown to each other.

RAF Marylands had photographed the entire island to provide a picture mosaic from which accurate maps could be drawn. Initially there had been one airfield site at Heraklion to be expanded and sites chosen at Maleme in the west and Retimo in the East for construction of airfields. Further sites for landing fields had been located at Pediada, Kastelli, Messara Plain and finally at Kassamos Kastelli. Further to these sites dispersion fields for the three main northern airfields were also surveyed.

The only site for an airfield on the southern side of the island identified so far was at Tympaki

Additionally the FAA and the RN had identified a site a Chiania close to Suda bay that could be developed as an air field to protect the Suda Bay anchorage and provide a base for FAA aircraft to stage to and from aircraft carriers operating in the eastern arm of the Mediterranean sea. All these sites had one thing in common, they would all take considerable resources of manpower and machinery to develop. Building landing strips was not enough with these bases being within easy reach of hostile bombers, dispersals and blast pens would need to be built as would protected fuel and munitions store.

Recognising the import and scale of the task in hand the original intention of only sending a lowly flight officer to oversee the construction was very quickly revised and in early January Tedder was sent to appraise the situation in person. Tedder’s first action was to fly over all the locations listed as being suitable for airfields. Of these all but two were on the north shore, the exceptions being Tympaki on the southern shore and Kastelli sited on about the only piece of flat land on the entire island’s interior. What was also blazingly obvious was that road communications were practically no existent, So in all likelihood more effort would need to be expended on road building than airstrips. Also on the ‘to do’ list was to set up a numbers of AMES units to provide RDF cover for the island and a communications network to link it all together. All in all a Herculean task, a term Tedder found rather appropriate.

Whilst the existing garrison on the Island were working to prepare both defences and airfields it was obvious that more manpower was required. Too this end a couple of labour/construction battalions had been raised in Palestine and were now beginning work on the island.



Back in Whitehall, the higher echelons of all three armed forces were pondering the various options, political and military. As far as the RAF was concerned the capture of more airfields in the western part of Libya was highly desirable for a number of reasons. The further west the RAF bases were the better the support available to the Army and the better the air cover for the Navy both Mercantile and RN convoying supplies both along the coast and across to Malta. Further the Western airfields made interdicting the Italian supply convoys easier and every ship sunk helped the army move further west. With evidence of the Luftwaffe moving into Tripoli then fighters based forward would become vital to curtailing their efforts to wrest local air superiority from the allies.

Looking at the probable size of the Luftwaffe intervention based upon the effectiveness of the attacks on Illustrious and Malta made it plain in the opinion of Sir Hugh Dowding that any involvement of British ground forces in Greece could spell disaster on all fronts in the Mediterranean theatre of operations. In discussions with the AM Sir Hugh Dowding was advocating sending the largest possible RAF reinforcements to the Mediterranean as fighting the Luftwaffe there would have more benefit than losing both pilots and aircraft trying to engage the Luftwaffe over France and the other occupied countries. With this in mind Sir Hugh Dowding was proposing that a minimum RAF force to be based on Crete would comprise at least one full squadron of fighters at each of the available air fields. Plus a couple of Squadrons of Wellington Bombers to be based at Pediada Kastelli. Finding these squadrons and getting them to Crete would be only the first of many problems to be resolved which was made much simpler by the agreement with the Polish Goverment in exhile that the PAC could be deployed to Crete from Egypt. This force comprising five squadrons of Hurricanes, two of wellingtons and a Beaufighter Squadron would form a coherent and formidable core for Cretes air defence.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12. 16 To Bengasi and Beyond,

On January the twenty fourth O’Connor and the Desert Army were ready for the next phase of the capture of Italian north Africa. By sending the Australians along the coast towards Benghazi via Barce and both the seventh and fourth Armoured Brigades strait across to the bulge of Cyrene to the coast south of Benghazi to cut off the Italians line of retreat.

To say this ploy was successful would be a real understatement, by the fifth of February the coastal thrust had reached Barce and the Brigades sallying across country had capture Msus. Commencing on the night of the fifth of February a major battle was fought at Beda Fomm as the Italian tenth Army attempted to break through the units of the fourth and seventh Brigades now holding blocking positions.

In a brutally fought battle against great odds the blocking force prevailed and the bulk of the Italian tenth army were forced to surrender.

With Benghazi captured supplies could be shipped forward directly from the delta. The need to get the port up and running again and to basically completely refit the forces under O’Connor would necessitate a delay in any further advance. O’Connor was acutely aware that time was of the essence and that what units he still had capable of manoeuvring in the field needed to be pushed as far west as possible. Meanwhile the RAF were very thankfully taking ownership of the Italian air bases in and around Benghazi.

Despite O’Connor’s remonstrations the Indian forth Division had been withdrawn from his command and was even now begging to commence operations against Italian East Africa in the Sudan. Wavell was apprehensive of another pending visit from Sir Antony Eden this time accompanied by Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff which could result in all his plans and dispositions being changed at short notice. Unless or until the priorities given to Wavell were changed by his political masters the reduction of the Italians in Libya and in Italian East Africa would remain the focus of operations with the establishment of the RAF on Crete in force with an adequate garrison for defence would be the next objective.

The decision by the Polish Government in Exile for the PAC to go to Crete, whilst a logistic headache was a godsend. Since their arrival in Egypt the Polish flyers had been champing at the bit whilst they and their aircraft adapted to the new environment. The chance to punish the enemy even if it was only the Italians was welcomed with a ferocious enthusiasm familiar to those who had fought alongside the Polish squadrons in the summer battles over England. The news that the Luftwaffe were in Scilly and Italy was met with disappointment in these circles but the possibility of the Germans entering Greece was welcomed.

The advent the arrival of Luftwaffe units in Rhodes at the end of January and the laying of mines by HE 111’s of II/KG 26 on the night of the thirtieth of January had real ramifications. The defence of the Port Said and Suez Canal had become a priority for the Polish night fighters and AMES GCI units had been positioned to cover the entire canal, whilst an AMES CH unit could detect approaching enemy aircraft almost from take off on Rhodes. So whilst the attack by He111’s of II/KG 26 was unexpected, they were tracked by RDF as they approached the port and canal.
The biggest surprise of the night was undoubtedly that experienced by the HE 111 crews who found themselves being attacked by night fighters. Whilst the Polish Night fighters had had some success, in definitely destroying one aircraft, damaging another and causing a third to jettison its mine over the desert some mines did fall into the canal. The airborne Magnetic minesweeping Wellingtons managed to explode a number of these mines but a sobering discovery was made when a Naval bomb disposal office came to defuse a mine that had missed the canal and failed to explode when it landed in soft sand nearby. Upon examination it was discovered that this mine had a new combined acoustic/magnetic exploder and that relying on magnetic sweeping would not clear all the mines from the canal. So all ships in the canal were stopped, as a large ship sunk in the canal could have been catastrophic.
Closing the canal was a last resort so a hasty sweeping system was devised but still shipping was brought to a standstill for nearly a week. Mine clearing was greatly helped by the information provided by the AMES site that had tracked the attacking aircraft and could therefore indicate where they had crossed or flown along the canal. Closing the canal for any length of time would have a large negative effect on the logistics of supplying the army in the desert and the Navy in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore the efforts of the Polish Night Fighters were given a high priority and the two squadrons of Wellingtons with the PAC were tasked to regular attacks on the airfields on Rhodes.

The insistence by the Polish Government in Exile that their RDF AI equipped Beaufighters used by their Night Fighter squadrons were sent with them to the middle east had been justified in a single night, much to the relief of Sir Hugh Dowding who had given his backing to the Polish proposal.

With Benghazi having been captured on the sixth of February, Elements of O’ Connors force pushed forward to El Agheila by the eighth of February where they were instructed to hold in place whilst logistics caught up and the tens of thousands of Italian prisoners processed and sent east.

With Wavell now confirming that no further troops would be taken from O’Connor’s command the race was on to re-equip is units and press on towards Tripoli before the Italians could recover and strengthen their defences. It was now a logistics race, who could get reinforcements and supplies in place first would have a huge advantage. The Italians had to ship everything from Italian ports either north of Scilly and via narrows with Tunisia or south of Scilly passing by Malta. For the British and their allies, first everything had to be shipped to Egypt, then moved over a thousand miles from the delta by a combination of road, rail and coastal shipping. Rail as yet could only take supplies as far as Mertha Matruth, though the New Zealand railway pioneer units were breaking records to push the track west, the rest of the way was by truck or ship. Ships were of course more efficient but only if they had secure ports to dock in. Torbruk was now running at capacity, as were Bomba and Derna for what they were worth. Getting Benghazi operational and providing it with an effective air defence both by fighters and anti aircraft guns was now to be a major priority.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Chapter 12.17 Middle East Mission.

Initially the insistence by Sir Hugh Dowding that he joined the diplomatic and fact finding mission to the Middle East that Sir Antony Eden and Sir John Dill amongst others were going on was rebuffed by the prime Minister and the War Cabinet. Persistent pressure from the AM and Dowding, reminding Churchill that as the Prime Minister had been a consistent critic of the use of manpower by the RAF in the Middle East as CAS Dowding had a duty to go and investigate for himself the actual situation in theatre. This insistence that he actually see the evidence and the reality for himself was wholly consistent with Sir Peter Cunlffe-Owen’s understanding of what made Sir Hugh such a valuable and astute leader. Sir Peter had finally got Churchill and the War Cabinet to agree that Sir Hugh Dowding should join the mission to the Middle East.

One restriction put on Sir Hugh joining the mission to the Middle East was imposed by the War Cabinet and that was that Sir Hugh would have to travel separately so as not to have all of Britain’s eggs in a single basket or aircraft so to speak.

Sir Hugh being Sir Hugh of course did things differently, whilst Dill and Eden flew out to Gibraltar via Lisbon on the Imperial Airways Flight, Sir Hugh had departed for an RAF Maritime Command air station in Cornwall.

Not one to waste an opportunity Sir Hugh had arranged to join the crew of a Maritime Command VLR Stirling on the very long duration great southern loop patrol. This would take the aircraft in a long flight path from the Western Approaches out along the convoy routes as far as the Azores before heading south and east to cover the straits of Gibraltar with the aircraft eventually landing on the now extended runway at Gibraltar. After a days rest the aircraft and crew would fly the reverse route back to the UK.

Sir Hugh had joined this patrol to see for himself the problems and the benefits of these long range patrols. As a super-numery he had time to observe all the crew at work and even flew the aircraft himself for a time. It gave Sir Hugh a chance to understand how the myriad new equipment being deployed on the aircraft was used and whether it actually worked. It also gave Sir Hugh a chance to experience and appreciate the conditions generated for the crew by these very long patrols.

As they landed in the late afternoon on Gibraltar after nearly eighteen hours in the air Sir Hugh had nothing but admiration for the aircraft crew. As he left the aircraft Sir Hugh was met by the station commander and Sir Hugh’s ADC who had flown out to Gibraltar on a Blackburn B20 Buccaneer seaplane earlier that day. As they walked away from the aircraft on the Apron tucked under the looming heights of the northern face the rock Sir Hugh noticed six bulldozers parked neatly in a row. Asking the Station AOC what they were doing there he was informed that they had been used in extending the stations runway and since that work had been completed they had just sat there, Ostensibly they were being kept ready to carry out repairs if or when necessary. The AOC had added that he had asked the Ministry of Supply if the bulldozers could be used for other work required on the Rock and was told in no uncertain terms that the machines were the property of the Ministry of Supply and could not be used by any other organisation. In His book written about his time as ADC to Sir Hugh Dowding Sir Max Aitkin had commented that Sir Hugh had simply told him to make a note of the bulldozers location and numbers,

After a night on the Rock and meetings with senior commanders Sir Hugh and his entourage flew on in the Blackburn B20 Buccaneer to Malta. The high cruising speed of the B20 made it a very useful courier and VIP transport aircraft. Arriving at RAF Kalafrana Sir Hugh carried out the usual obligatory inspection before heading off to Valetta to await the arrival of Eden and Dill. Sir Hugh was concerned to see as he walked around the base that most of the critical maintenance equipment and stores were in Un protected sheds and in close proximate to each other. A single stick of bombs could cripple all aircraft maintenance on the island, another note went into Max Aitkin’s note book.

Having travelled on to the Air field at Hal Far Sir Hugh had proceeded on to Valetta and a series of meeting with the Military Governor and senior service officers.

When Sir Hugh Dowding had arrived at Government House he met the Governor and military commander of the island lieutenant-general Sir William Dobbie Royal Engineers, Sir Hugh renewed an old acquaintance and confirmed for himself how influential Dobbie had been in ensuring that the RAF had the resources to construct and prepare for the defence of the islands airfields. It also explained why the Matilda tank based bulldozer based at Hal Far sported the name ‘Dobbie’.



One of the priorities for Sir Hugh during his visit to Malta was to review the operational command arrangements for the RAF. Due to the size of the Island and the RAF forces deployed to it there was no distinct or separate Maritime Command element on the island just Squadrons on detachment to the Islands RAF AOC. Whilst coordination and cooperation was working to some extents there had been a string of vaguely concealed muttering about failings in cooperation by the Admiralty when requesting reconnaissance and strike assets.

The increasing attacks on Malta was also causing losses particularly to the flying boats that were exposed and vulnerable on their moorings. This was a problem that would need to be addressed. Sir Hugh whilst not the most diplomatic of people was at least pragmatic and could see the merit in a well argued case. One benefit of the capture of Beghazi was that the airfields there were close enough for Hurricanes to fly in to reinforce the island. Contingency plans had been made to temperedly evacuate the flying boats and the bombers if the island airfields and flying boat moorings became untenable during daylight hours. Both bombers and flying boats could stage in for operations although this would incur increased crew fatigue and flying time. Sir Hugh was impressed by the underground control centre and even more so when told that all the GCI stations were similarly protected and provide with appropriate communications system so that any CGI station could take over as primary control if the Central control was disabled. Having experienced a heavy air raid shortly after his arrival Sir Hugh could well understand the veracity of all the effort put into protecting as well as defending the island defence assets.

Flying on to Alexandra and then Cairo the three VIP’s continued their fact finding and diplomatic tour. Sir Hugh had expressed real concerns over the Vichy French in Syria and the immerging evidence that Luftwaffe bombers stationed in Rhodes were refuelling in Syria before bombing targets in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.



Discussions on operation Mandible showed that the forces allocated were not yet either proficient or sufficient to achieve the task of Capturing the Islands of Rhode. Further diluting the RN forces and logistical support was seen as not viable. The Navy were of the opinion that the ships allocated to Operation Mandible would be far more valuable in supplying the push to Tripoli and the reinforcement of Crete.
It was suggested that the Commandos and other forces destined for the invasion of Rhodes would be more profitably employed if their training was to continue on Crete where they could further bolster the defence and the landing craft allocated to them could aid the logistics of getting supplies over the beach in the face of the lack of port facilities.

One additional factor that had recently come to light was a major miscalculation by the Ministry of Supply as to the available pool of shipping tonnage. Somehow in a classic administrative cock up the figures for available shipping tonnage for all uses including the shipping of Military units and supplies to Greece had been based on figures where all the Norwegian and Greek ships already on long term charter to the British had been included in the British Merchant Marine tonnage and then counted again as part of the tonnage available via either the Norwegian or Greek Governments. As Sir Hugh had commented to Cunningham not even the civil servants at the Ministry of supply could magic the same ship in two different places at the same time. Therefore hard decisions would be needed to allocate the shipping where it was needed and movements of units or supplies would be constrained by the available sea lift capacity.



Depending on who was present at the meeting the consensus view on what the Allied priority in the Mediterranean should be would subtly shift. The situation was finally resolved when Sir Antony Aden Showed Dill and Sir Hugh a message he had received from the Prime minister that read :

“Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your Hearts you fell it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But of course you know how valuable success would be.”

Sir Hugh had looked across at Admiral Cunningham and had commented that there was always a ‘but’ when talking with politicians and continued to suggest that the value of the success was far outweighed by the cost of failure, The Admiral had nodded in agreement and so it was that by the last week of February the decision had been made and a meeting held in Athens to inform the Greeks that the only British forces being sent to the Greek mainland would be further RAF squadrons and limited at that. However more troops and RAF squadrons would be sent to secure Crete.

Though this decision would not please everybody the new prime minister of Greece M. Koryzis had been pragmatic is his response, the loss of British troops was not his biggest worry the Greek Government and Army had problems that the British could not sole, Principally that the Greek Government was politically unable to make the Harsh decision to abandon the Campaign in Albania and surrender Greek soil to achieve a frontline that could possibly resist a German advance and secondly the Greek military were fast running short of all forms of arms and the ammunition to use in it. Domestic production was far below consumption and sufficient imports could not be had for love or money.

Whilst in the Middle East Sir Hugh and his party had been receiving the latest intelligence briefings from the local HQ staff as well as the coded updates from the UK. Pursuint to the decision to limit aid to Greece and continue on to Tripoli the interdiction of Italian reinforcements and what the latest signal were identifying as German units as well before thy had reached Africa had become a priority. The mining of the Libyan ports, Tracking of convoys and the bombing of the points of departure were all discussed as part of a coordinated plan with the navy to choke off the Axis forces in Italian North Africa.

Sir Hugh had had briefings in Malta with the combined Naval and Air staff and plans had been made accordingly. As an Army Liaison officer had quipped at one of these meetings it was much more effective to sink the enemy soldiers and supplies by the ship load than it would be for the Tommy to kill the enemy individually face to face.

Sir Hugh and Longmore had had Major discussions regarding the allocation of the limited resources available for as of mid February Longmore was committed to reinforcing Greece with five more squadrons, these being Eleven Squadron flying Blenheims, One One Two and Thirty Three Squadrons flying Hurricanes, with One One Thee Squadron with Blenheims and Two Zero Eight Squadron flying Hurricanes to follow on as soon as suitable airfields had been made available in Greece.

Here Sir Hugh Dowding showed a slight of hand any politician would have appreciated when he instructed Longmore not to send any of these squadrons to mainland Greece put to get them up to Benghazi and the surrounding area as quickly as possible to reinforce what was now being called the Dessert Air Force in its support of the renewed offensive into Tripolinia. As to the promised extra five squadrons that would be fulfilled by the arrival of the Polish Air Contingent in Crete. Sir Hugh had emphasised to Longmore that getting the three Hurricane Squadrons who had just completed their training in close support flying operational and @up the blue’ as it was termed locally was a priority.

The news from the RAF in Greece had at least become more positive with the Squadrons under D’Albiac now concentrating on close support of the Greek army.

28th of February Twenty eight Hurricanes engaged some fifty enemy aircraft over the Greek lines and destroyed twenty seven for the loss of one Hurricane, the pilot of which bailed out seriously wounded but was rescued by the Greek army and evacuated in a Lysander to Athens. This single action cemented the reputation of the RAF is the eyes of the Greek Army for the rest of the campaign.





Whilst on a flying visit to Crete prior to his return to the UK Sir Hugh was able to see tangible evidence of his endeavours, for moored in Suda Bay was the heavy Cruiser York which was unloading three of the Bulldozers she had carried from Gibraltar onto lighters to be taken ashore, One would go to Canea Airfield and then on to Maleme. The other two would be ferried on local craft to Heraklion and Retimo. The Last Bulldozer on board would be landed from HMS York on the south side of Crete to speed up completion of the airfield at Tympaki. Here was a good example in Sir Hugh’s opinion of inter service cooperation and ‘Action this day’ so beloved by Churchill. This visit also gave Sir Hugh a chance to have substantial discussions with Tedder over the Role tha island was to play and the RAF’s role. In the past Sir Hugh Dowding had what could be called ‘a stained service relationship’ with Air-Vice Marshall Arthur Tedder. The origin of this had been in nineteen twenty nine when Sir Hugh had tried to have Tedder court-martialled for a minor breech of RAF regulations. In the years since both men had had to work together and people such as Sir Peter as AM had done there best to achieve a reproachment between the two men. Here in Crete that objective was finally achieved as Sir Hugh emphasised the importance that the role of Crete would play in the entire Mediterranean campaign that was being fought and that Tedder was the man for the job.



In Private meetings with Longmore Sir Hugh had had wide ranging discussions regarding the difficulties, opportunities and special circumstances regarding such a wide spread and far reaching command as that given to Longmore. Longmore was much impressed with Tedder and appreciated greatly having him as a second senior officer in the area. One delicate topic covered was that of Longmore’s replacement, not that such an action was currently on the agenda but Sir Hugh was conscious that the stress of the current command could only be carried for so long and that if Longmore wished to be relieved of his command at any time Sir Hugh was determined that his replacement would be as effective and already up to speed. Therefore the natural choice unless Longmore had other thoughts was Tedder. Longmore had confirmed that Tedder would be his choice as well. As to where Longmore might go, that was an open book as the world wide commitment of the RAF and the volatile nature of wartime politics could mean that an officer of his seniority and command skill could be needed almost anywhere at short notice. Other discussions had ranged over the performance or otherwise of other officers under Longmoor’s Command, those who should be shunted aside and those who could be promoted.

Longmore expressed concern that he had had to strip Persia of all it’s Hurricanes to make up for losses in Greece and the Western desert as the supply from the UK had not kept up in the short term. Currently Persia was defended solely by Gloster Gladiators or older aircraft and with long range German aircraft staging through Vichy Syria it could be seen that a need for better fighter in that area might become urgent. Currently the few remaining Bolton and Paul Defiants were being used in East Africa and these were being replace with Tomahawks as they became available. Here Longmore expressed his approbation of the decision by the British Purchasing commission in the USA to have two of every twelve aircraft ordered delivered as parts. This in effect gave a twenty percent level of spares when the aircraft was delivered. Included with this was that tools for twelve aircraft were also delivered then attrition and loss by mechanics was also somewhat emolliated. The early aircraft had been delivered without British Equipment fitted but now sufficient parts were being provided to enable the base workshops to run what amounted to a production line process for getting the crated aircraft fit for combat and delivery to the squadrons. Longmore had again reiterated the value of large cargo aircraft within his command. Being able to fly parts and mechanics out to where they were required did much to maintain the operational availability of the squadrons.

When the discussions had got round to cooperation with the Army in the field Longmore was adamant that one of the key requirements was to have RAF officers at every Army headquarters at least down to Brigade level and forward observers attached to every battalion. This would require a vast increase in the number of personnel and radio equipment. Longmore enquired if Sir Hugh as CAS could help speed the process up as some who flew Mahogany Bombers in Whitehall seemed to have no conception of the requirements for a Forward Air Control Officers and the equipment require for them to fulfil their function. Each FACO required a dedicated vehicle suitable for the formation to which they were attached, a radio operator, and a driver and often an armed escort. These could not be provided by the host unit as they had their own manpower problems.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Chapter 12.18 The siege of Malta begins.



What was to become known as the second siege of Malta had really started with what was now being called the ‘Illustrious Blitz’. The arrival of Luftwaffe aircraft in Sicily signalled a step change in the air assault on Malta.

Whilst the Italian and German air forces strove to reduce the defences of Malta the main object was to actually curtail the offensive capabilities of the RAF and Royal Naval units based there. It was a classic battle of logistics. The island had to be resupplied and sustained which meant that supplies had to be shipped from either the Eastern Mediterranean, which basically meant Port Saied or Alexandria, or from the Western Mediterranean via Gibraltar.

Meanwhile the same Axis air forces were also tasked with protecting the shipment of supplies and personnel from Italy to the ports of North Africa.

For the RAF the task was similar but inversed, The Maltese squadrons had to defend and secure the island whilst ensuring that the vital supplies arrived. The purpose of this effort was to enable the interdiction and destruction of the Italian supply line to north Africa.

If the Axis air forces managed to prevent the Maltese squadrons from carrying out patrols and offensive operations then North Africa might not only be held but also Cyrenaica and Egypt threatened.

So it was that the full might of the axis air forces fell upon an island of less than one hundred square miles and turned it into what was at that time the most bombed place on earth, not a day went past that the air raid sirens did not sound, often multiple times and bombs fall to destroy this ancient fortress in the sea.

With the nearest enemy airfields only seventy miles away the RDF units had precious little time to provide warning for both the fighters and the population. However the system used was well tried and had been honed in the months of the battle of Britain and many of these now charged with defending Malta had learned their trade in that campaign. The integrated defence system and the advanced GCI units on the island gave the defence an important force multiplier but even the latest Mark of Hurricane was going to struggle against the newer types of Me 109 that they now faced. The arrival of the seventh Staffel of Jagdrschader twenty six with their new Messerschmitt Bf 109 E7 under their highly experienced commander oberleutnant Joachim Muncheberg saw a definite shift in the Germans favour in the dogfights over the island,

On such a small island now with multiple airfields crammed onto its rocky soil disguising and protecting these air fields would always be difficult, in the weeks before the Illustrious Blitz much effort had been put into dispersing the aircraft and providing blast pens for every last aircraft. Since the start of the Luftwaffe attacks those efforts had redoubled and the passive defences made as good as possible,

The capture by the British of the airfields around Benghazi was a major advantage for the defence of Malta as this brought the island within the flight range from the African shore of the Hurricane fighter. This meant that reinforcements could be flown directly out to the island. The problem was keeping those aircraft supplied with fuel and ammunition. This made the convoys to the island vital to its operational value. Longmore had had long discussions with Sir Hugh Dowding during the latter’s visit to the Middle East and Sir Hugh himself had experienced the current conditions on the island. Amongst the topics discussed had been the viability and importance of an air bridge to bring in supplies and personnel and to evacuate the wounded. Sir Hugh had promised to find the aircraft for such a bridge if it was at all possible. At the moment the only practicable aircraft currently in the operational area were the Wellington Bombers. If they were being used as transports they could not be used for offensive tasks and that was a serious problem. Ideally Longmore would have a fleet of Envoys for this task, they could carry larger stores and more people than any other aircraft the RAF had. Unfortunately there just were not that many of them.

As in the battles over the south of England that had been fought only six months earlier those squadrons defending Malta were made acutely aware of the importance of their task but also of the advantage of ‘playing at home’. Fighter pilots on the island had it drummed into them that they did not go haring off in pursuit of damaged enemy aircraft, they were to stay close to the island so that if they were hit they had a chance of bringing their aircraft home and if they did bale out they were close enough to be rescued. Every fisherman on the island knew that the most valuable days catch he could land was a live pilot. Another innovation started by Sir Hugh’s arrival on his way out to Cairo was the provision of an emergency landing field on Gozo. In the short period he had been away work had commenced at hacking a strip out of the rocky terrain of the island. When he departed for Gibraltar the aircraft he was in had deliberately over flown the site of this new landing strip so that Sir Hugh could see the progress being made, Whilst at low altitude and knowing what and where he was looking for Sir Hugh was not only able to Judge how much progress had been made but how good the efforts by the RAF and the Royal Engineers were at camouflaging the works and the landing strip.

The effects of the accumulated stress that constant action and bombardment put on the young pilots was by now better understood and both the medical officers and the higher command watched the pilots like hawks so that they could intervene before a pilot became a liability or a casualty. Here just a break off of the island even as brief as a couple of days could make a very big difference. Not that many of the fighter pilots who found themselves flying an aircraft back to the base workshops that had been established at Benghazi during the months of the siege realised that it was often they who needed an overhaul as much as the aircraft they flew. Only post war would it become apparent to historians just how much effort was made under Sir Hugh’s patronage as CAS to preserve the physical and mental well being of the young men he was entrusted to put into harms way on a daily basis.

With the full backing of the CAS Longmore was empowered to move and use his forces over the vast area of his command as he saw fit to exploit every advantage in the widely diverse campaigns being fought. However in their discussions in Cairo and elsewhere during Sir Hugh’s recent whirlwind of a tour certain priorities hade been set out for Longmore in both the short terms and longer term. Sir Hugh had defined these periods as the next three months and the next six months.

In order Longmores priorities were to be:-

In the short term.

The defence of Malta and offensive operations from the island,

The support of General O’Conner’s continuing advance towards Tripoli.

Support of the Greek Army and the defence of Crete.

In the longer term.

The prosecution of the Campaigns in Italian East Africa,

The containment of hostile activity via Vichy Syria

The defence of Iran, Iraq and the Persian oilfields.

The protection of the sea trade routes in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.



To say that Longmore had his hands full was an understatement. Giving Tedder responsibility for the RAF in both Crete and Greece unified those two commands and took a proportion of the weight off Longmores shoulders. Before leaving the Middle East Sir Hugh Dowding had official confirmed that Air Vice Marshall Arthur Tedder was not only Longmores deputy but his designated successor for the Middle East Command.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Chapter 12.19 Rewrite.

Below is a quick rewrite of chapter 12.19 to get rid of the anomaly of a ship I had already sunk miraculously sailing again!
comments please as to whether this works or not.






12.19 The Kreigsmarine sally forth

Looking back on the recent events in the North Atlantic and the current state of affairs with the availability of safe havens in France the Admiralty were revising their strategic dispositions to counter and contain the Kreigsmarine’s major surface units.

With the evidence showing that in all likelihood the German heavy cruiser Hipper was a constructive total loss and that it would take months to clear and repair the dock in which she lay the Admiralties attention and perforce that of Maritime Command now turned to the problem of containing and hopefully destroying the remaining major surface units of the Kreigsmarine. These ships were now posing a serious problem and threat. As with the Bismarck now operational and the Tirpitz working up, as well as it becoming apparent that Scharnhorst had completed her repairs it would not be to long before it was theoretically possible for the Germans to send a flotilla into the Atlantic consisting of two fast fifteen inch gunned battleships, two eleven inch gunned Battle Cruisers and an eight inch gunned heavy cruiser.

If all these ships combined in a sortie at once they would form a force that would be difficult to counter. Even if the Admiralty was able to get, The Hood, Renown, Repulse and the newly commissioned battleship King George the Fifth together as a division they would be hard pressed until further support could arrive. The second of the KG V class was due to commission before Easter and hopefully this would ease the situation. The one advantage the RN truly had was the Fleet carriers and the FAA, air attack could degrade the fighting qualities of the German ships prior to and engagement and therefore ensure that the RN was fighting at advantage. Of course to attack your enemy you first had to know where they were. Signals and secret intelligence could often tell you were your enemy had been and might even tell you where they could be going but to know where your enemy actually was accurately enough to enable an attack to be launched in reality required someone to get their mark one eyeball onto the target. This was the main task of the RN’s cruiser screen and the FAA out in the open ocean though that was not the case in the North Sea.

In what were called the Narrow Seas it was however to the RAF and principally Maritime Command that the Navy was looking too in order to contain and track the German heavy units. This of course was easier said than done but so far the combined efforts of the two services had enabled them to keep a fairly reliable plot of the location of all the German Navies major units. Sober thinkers in both the Admiralty and the RAF were well aware that by bad luck or subterfuge some but hopefully not all the German ships might evade their watchers and sortie to the open Ocean. Containing a single heavy cruiser had proved difficult enough and the fact that the Hipper had made it to Brest unmolested had been a very sanguine experience for the British.

Therefore the news in early February that the Scharnhaust and Prince Eugen had been spotted transiting the Skagerrak and that neither Maritime Command or The PRU aircraft had spotted them in any Norwegian fiord or port caused grave concern. Royal Navy units had been immediately sent to reinforce the cruisers patrolling the waters north of Iceland. Also Maritime Command had increased its patrol activity pushing aircraft and crews to the limit of their endurance. The fist break for the British came on the second of February when a Stirling LRMPA picked up two large ships heading south west less than thirty miles from the RN cruiser patrol line. Despite a delay by the Stirling aircrafts crew in realising that the ASV target they had was tracking south west and not maintaining the patrol line of the two cruisers they were expecting to find, eventually as they approached the two ships they were fired on and when they sent an indignant radio message about the cruisers aircraft identification skills only to be told that the cruisers had yet to see or hear any aircraft that day due to heavy rainsqualls all round them that the penny dropped that these were in fact two enemy warships. Due to the weather conditions producing poor visibility and skilful use of their own radars the two German battle cruisers had managed to hide in the rain squalls and evade the patrolling RN cruisers. Now it became a stern chase with the British cruisers striving to close the distance and maintain contact with the German ships whilst the Stirling sent messages to all who could hear as to what was heading their way. To the South HMS Ramalies was ordered to remain with her Convoy HX 106 for the time being but as a caution the convoy course was altered to take them on a more easterly course away from the surface threat.

Admiral Lutjens was now in a difficult position the presence of the aircraft meant that he had lost the cloak of anominity in the vast expanse of the Ocean and with at least two RN eight inch gunned cruisers in close proximity he was being forced to steam at high speed that was consuming fuel at a very high rate and straining the ships machinery. Lurjen’s could choose to turn and confront the British cruisers before they were reinforced by other RN ships. For this to succeed the Germans who had the advantage of heavier armament but slightly inferior speed would need to cripple both the British cruisers without taking serious damage themselves. The alternative for Lutjen’s was to try to slip the chase in the dark of the night whilst using the poor weather conditions to his advantage.

Later that day a patrol aircraft based in New Foundland reported a tanker of Cape Farewell that did not respond satisfactorily to the aircrafts challenge. Whilst the patrol aircraft kept in contact with the tanker using its ASV set the nearest available RN units were sent to investigate. Despite being unable to keep an aircraft in continuous contact with the tanker the LRPA were able to track her sufficiently and regain contact soon enough to guide an RN Cruiser to within RDF range on the morning of the third of February. The tanker had initially tried to bluff it out by broadcasting ‘RRR’ continually at full power on her radio. The Cruiser Captain was not fooled and as a warning shot landed close, to the German tanker Schlettstadt, she hove to and fired scuttling charges. Before she sank she sent a brief coded message warning the two German ships of her demise along with the fuel she carried.

The Radio rooms on both German warships had picked up the message from the Schlettstadt and this now added to Lutjen’s dilemma, with his fuel replenishment ship lost and his approximate location known, with two British cruisers still in close proximity, although they had lost contact during the night, his primary objective of commerce raiding was compromised. In addition yet another message had been received from the Prince Eugen informing the Admiral that the ship was having a recurrence of the problems with the high pressure steam tubes. Therefore in compliance with his orders not to risk his ships unnecessarily Lutjens gave instructions for the ships to turn their bows to the north east. The first task was to either evade or destroy the two RN cruisers shadowing him. Here the British Cruisers took a page out of the Germans play book and as soon as their surface search RDF indicated ships steaming towards them they split up and used the frequent rain squalls to disengage. Both ships did not avoid damage but by broadcasting their position and the new course off the two German ships they had accomplished their primary task.

The evasion of the RN by Scharnhorst and Prince Eugen entered the legends of the Kreigsmarine and cemented their reputation as lucky ships. Despite the best efforts of Maritime Command the German ships were able to break contact and it was not until some days later that a PRU spitfire managed to photograph the two German ships being refuelled in and replenished by an Altmark class tanker in Kaa Fiord Northern Norway.

Now the problem for the British was would the two ships stay there to provide a fleet in being and threaten another breakout for the Atlantic. Would the other German heavy ships come and join them.

Was it possible to attack these warships so far north? All that could be done in the short term was keep as tight a watch on them as the weather permitted. The navy had requested the RAF to plan to bomb the ships if possible whilst the RN started panning a strike by their fleet carriers.

The British would not have long to wait for an answer as within days the anchorage was empty. Both warships headed south and as they past the south western tip of the Lofoten islands Prince Eugen was struck by a single torpedo from a salvo fired by an RN submarine that had been stationed there to cover the Vest Fiord and the port of Narvick. Despite considerable flooding prince Eugen was able to steam onto Trondhiem where temporary repairs were carried out before she followed her consort back to Kiel for permanent repairs.

The mayhem that these two German warships could have caused if they had got in amongst the Atlantic convoys had sent shivers down the spines of all concerned in the Admiralty, RAF and Government in Britain.

Upon his return to the UK Sir Hugh had been embroiled in the aftermath of these events. The navy view was that it had been a very close run thing and now were calling for even more of the RAF’s resources being devoted to the Maritime war.

The success of the attack on the Hipper was causing the RAF to seriously consider if an all out attack on the major German naval dockyards might be a viable way of curtailing the effectiveness of the U-boats and restraining, if not eliminating the threat the Kriegsmarine’e heavy warships.

With the current escort capabilities a daylight raid was out of the question so the decision was whether or not a night raid was practical and if the inevitable cost in aircrews and aircraft would be justified. To help with making this decision Sir Peter had instigated an investigation into defining some of the important factors that had to be fulfilled to make an attack on any of the major German Naval Dockyards viable.

These included the type of target that could be bombed.

The density of such targets with the target area.

The ease with which the designated targets could be identified at night.

Whether the selected targets were actually vulnerable to the ordinance that the RAF could place on target.

The level of opposition expected both in AAA and night fighters.

Whether a single target should be hit and the further locations hit in sequence or whether this was a one time operation and a number of locations had to be hit simultaneously.

Could Bomber Command launch sufficient sorties to hit multiple targets or would this dispersal of effort make all the attacks ineffectual.

However much effort was put into resolving these questions the answers could not be obtained overnight so in tandem another plan was being pursued as a means of constraining and curtailing the ability of the Kriegsmarine to conduct another major sortie.

To this end the efforts to track down any more remaining German supply ships at large in the oceans of the world were redoubled. Also the mine laying operations of both the RN and the RAF were being reassessed and redirected accordingly.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Chapter 12.20 Preparing the ground in Tripolania





General O’Conner had a problem, even with the decision not to strip his command of its experienced divisions they were currently strung out on a very long logistics trail stretching all the way back to the Nile Delta and thence from there via vulnerable sea line of communications back to the UK and the empire. How soon they could resupplied and recommence offensive operations against the Italians was a prime concern. The news from the intelligence services that not only were elements of a German Fleigerkorps arriving in Libya but there was evidence of one or more German armoured division being shipped over to Tripolitania as well was a cause of real concern.

In discussions with Wavell, General O’Conner had tried to resolve the tactical and strategic conundrum that this news of Italian and German reinforcement presented , one option was to keep forces in place and built them up in anticipation of an attack by a combined Italian and German army with the intention of holding the line and then pushing the Axis back towards Tripoli. This would then turn the campaign into a war of attrition and logistics. Another option was to push forward now before the Italians could fully recover from their earlier defeats and the Germans could establish a powerful Corps in Africa. There were some who were advising a mid way house, that was to build up the Desert Army in it’s current defensive positions but to send powerful forces forward to aggressively patrol and disrupt the Axis preparations.

All concerned understood that almost everything depended upon the success or otherwise of the RAF and the Navy in destroying or at least preventing the arrival of supplies to Tripoli. In Tripoli, the Italians possessed the largest port west of Alexandria on the north African shore with its facilities to handle up to six large freighters at a time. Despite the continuous air attacks on Malta the RN was keeping a powerful force of destroyers based there supplemented by Cruisers whenever required or judged necessary to interdict the flow of supplies from Italy. Likewise during his recent visit Sir Hugh had seen for himself the critical role that offensive actions by the RAF based on Malta would have not only in tracking the Axis convoys but also in attacking them. Both directly and indirectly by mining the port areas on a regular basis.

With the decision not to send Army units to Greece sufficient shipping had been freed up for another major convoy to be run eastwards to Malta. Shipping was also being used to supply the RAF in Greece, where possible this was being shipped using Greek owned vessels. Other ships, principally vessels of two thousand tons or less were being used to take supplies to Crete and along the coast of Africa as far as Benghazi.

The problem for Wavell and the British was that a lot of the equipment such as tanks and trucks was just worn-out. Whilst great efforts had been made to repair and refit what the army already had and with motor transport in particular to organise a proper system for the use and maintenance of the large stock of captured Italian lorries. The Royal Army Service Corp, ran not only the motor transport but also the railway system and even had their own flotilla of coasters and other vessels for moving supplies. This integration was very significant in their success in the western desert. The cooperation with the RAF was also a fundamental part of the campaign as having two supply systems fighting to use the same resources could have been a major source of delay and confusion. Under Longmore’s Command the RAF logistics and the RASC worked closely together.

One major problem being the shortage of transport aircraft. This problem had been highlighted to the CAS on his recent flying visit to the area. Unlike most rear echelon troops the RASC were fully armed and combat trained as they were expected to provide their own security and defence when and where necessary. It was to an extent on the experience and the interaction with the RASC that the forward based RAF personnel started to be armed and trained for airfield defence. Shortly after the fall of France the first of the RAF Defence Squadrons had been formed and now in the western desert these came of age.

The original two RAF Armoured Car Squadrons had more than proved their worth in Operation Compass and now several squadrons, bearing squadron numbers between seven hundred and one onwards into the eight hundreds were operational. Equipping these squadrons and providing arms for the RAF base personnel had been solved to an extent by issuing them captured Italian arms and equipment. The one thing the RAF did not get from captured Italian stocks were anti aircraft guns, The Italin guns were to largely remain where they were to defend the former Italian infrastructure now being put to use by the British and Commonwealth forces. The decision had been made that the RAF would use AA ordinance from their own stocks. Therefore base workshops had been making mounts for K-guns, aircraft browning machine guns and Hispano cannons to supplement the few forty millimetre Bofors that had found their way to the RAF.

The gathering of intelligence and the sharing of the same was to be of prime importance in the campaign to be fought in Tripolitania. Whilst the work of the air reconnaissance aircraft was well known the work of the Y service stations was just as important. The interception and interpretation of radio signals was of vital importance. Techniques learnt by RAF personnel at Bletchley Park were to be a force multiplier for the allies. Principle amongst these innovations was the closely guarded secret of traffic analysis. Whilst breaking codes was important much could be learnt of the your enemies dispositions and movements simply by understand who was talking to whom, how often, for how long and occasionally actually knowing about what. The flip side of this was of course signals security and in their working with the RAF during operation Compass and generally, the lack of signals security on the Army radio networks had become a point of some contention between the two services. This friction had got to such a point early in the New Year that Wavell had asked the Navy to investigate. The results of this enquiry were quick and sobering. Naval listening teams at various locations had submitted their interceptions of both Army and RAF signals for a period of one week. These intercepts had then been interpreted by an Naval intelligence team who had no prior information of what was being intercepted just that it was ‘enemy signals’ traffic. Just using intercept time, locations, bearings and other data provided not only did this team give an appreciation of the size and location of the units involved but often were able to identify their purpose and function. Whilst the RAF and Army bases were fairly easy to locate the Army units in the field were a little more difficult to locate, however far more detail of the army units size and purpose was deduced and their movements logged than the High Command had anticipated. In fact the Naval intelligence team were able to provide an order of battle for the British forces, that whilst only partial in places was accurate enough to cause real concern. Suddenly signals security had become a very hot topic. An adjunct to this was that it became clear that the RAF were using false signals to disguise their bases, this was being done mainly by the Q units who were setting up decoy airfields and supply dumps to divert attention from the real RAF facilities. By creating signal traffic from these site their validity as targets to the enemy was enhanced. This signals deception concept would now be taken up and expanded by the Army in the field.



Continuous mining of the waters around Tripoli and the bombing of the port was slowing the flow of supplies to the Axis but had not choked it off. Bombers would sortie from Malta and from the Benim airfields around Benghazi. As often as possible the two Polish squadrons of Wellingtons now based on Crete would also be sent, however this was becoming less frequent as the need to slowdown the enemy build up on the Greek frontiers became acute. By early March there were indications that German units were assembling in the area to the west of Buerat , in Tripolitania. General O’Conner had a hard time persuading Wavell that it was wise to maintain out west so far beyond El Agheila, the plan was form a series of hard points inland from Sirte from which aggressive patrolling could be done but the main line of resistance would be back towards El Aghelia until O’conner’s forces were ready to strike out for Tripoli. The distance involved had to be appreciated travelling by road, to Sirte was a gruelling trek of almost two hundred miles to El Aghelia and the same distance again to Bengahzi.

Longmore had ordered a series of landing fields to be built along the coast, with fuel and stores for both the forward basing and quick movement of aircraft. To south of the coastal plain O’Conner had instructed the LRDG under the command of Ralph Bagnold to make far reaching patrols to watch for any move to outflank the Commonwealth forces. Here the previous rudimentary system of air supply was refined to keep the patrols out in ’The Blue’ for extended periods. The most important weapon carried by the LRDG was their radio.

Elsewhere a parallel race to strike a decisive blow was being run, in East Africa the forces from both the Sudan and Kenya were now advancing into Italian Somalia and after having been checked for a time were now making progress aided by the squadrons of SAAF Hurricanes and Tomahawks. Such was the situation at the beginning of March.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Chapter 12. 21 long range spitfires.

Having sent a coded message from Egypt to the Air Ministry copied to the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Ministry of Supply regarding whether the production of the long range Spitfire Mark V could be brought forward Sir Hugh was disappointed but not surprised to have not received any response prior to his arrival back at the Air Ministry in Whitehall.

What was surprising was to be appraised by his Private Sectary that both Joseph Smith and Jeffrey Quill had been telephoning from Supermarines Design Headquarters at Hursley House near Winchester on a daily basis wishing to set up a meeting with Sir Hugh at Hursley or Eastleigh as a matter of some urgency. So it was just a few days later that Sir Hugh was shown into a meeting room in Hursley house where a number of Supermarime staff were gathered including Smith and Quill. After introducing all the various people there Joseph Smith got strait to the purpose of this meeting. The Enquiry regarding the advancement of the long range Mark V had been forwarded by the MAP in such a manner as to convince Supermarine that no matter what answer they gave to the MAP neither the MAP or the MOS would take action commensurate with attempting to rush the new Mark V into service. Sir Joseph then asked Sir Hugh how important the early availability of a long range spitfire was.

In response within the bounds of security Sir Hugh had explained the situation in the Middle East and the importance of both ferry range and operational sortie range. Joseph Smith had responded that whilst getting operational Mark V’s available before the end of the year would cause serious disruption to production of the current Mark III Supermarine had an alternative solution to the problem. Here Joseph Smith handed over to Jeffry Quill.

Jeffry remind Sir Hugh the Five Mark III Spitfires had been lifted from the production line to be used as development aircraft for the Mark V. Two of these had been modified to various degrees with the stronger undercarriage swept further forward, leading edge and wing tanks plus the forty eight gallon main lower tank. The third of these Mark III’s had been further modified as the Basis of the PR Mk IV. The last two air frames had still been in the factory undergoing different modifications, One was in the process of having the fuselage modified to remove the rear spine and fit a ‘Bubble’ style canopy. This loss of the spine had reduced the capacity of any aft tank for this aircraft to sixty six gallons. One Trade off had been that unlike the Mark V this version of the Mark III would only be armed with two 20mm cannons and four three-o-three machine guns due to weight and space restrictions in the wing. It was not practical at this time to introduce the new stronger wing spar that was being developed as a core part of the new Mark V. As Quill had wryly remarked ‘ you could only do what you could do’

On their own cognisance Smith and Quill with the backing of Supermarine Management had taken the final test aircraft and had fitted it with all the practical range extension modifications and planned Mark V improvements within the constraints of the existing airframe but completing it to operational standard. This had been accomplished in only two weeks as all the drawing and most of the parts were already available somewhere within the Supermarine organisation, it was just a case of marrying them all together was the Wry comment from Joseph Smith.

This had resulted in an aircraft that had the enlarged main tanks holding ninety six gallons, inner leading edge tanks holding twenty gallons each, internal wing bag tanks holding eighteen gallons each and an aft tank hold sixty six gallons. This latter size was chosen as it meant that no further modifications would be needed if the fuselage was changed for a teardrop canopy configuration (the smaller tank and lighter fuselage aft potentially helping to offset the rearwards movement of the aircraft’s CoG with a full fuel load). This aircraft had in the last few days been put through extensive tests and on internal fuel alone could fly a genuine one thousand two hundred and fifty miles at an average distance per gallon of five and a quarter miles whilst ballasted to full war equipment load. Cruising speed clean was two hundred and thirty miles an hour. With a ninety gallon conformal external tank the range extended to one thousand six hundred and seventy miles at a lower average cruising speed of two hundred and twenty miles an hour. Though there were larger capacity conformal tanks being made they had severe drag penalties and took the aircraft beyond it’s current certified maximum take off weight.

Next to speak was a senior Production manager, He explained that unlike Castle Bromwich that was set up for maximum production capacity of a single aircraft mark, the dispersed nature of multiple workshops and suppliers in the Southern Group made their production and final assembly more agile and capable of building various Marks of the same aircraft simultaneously. Currently standard Mark III’s were being built whilst alongside a smaller number of PR Mark IV’s were also being constructed with no loss of total production. The Mark III LR could be slotted into production on a one for one basis once all the sub assemblies and parts had been made and delivered to the final assembly shop at Eastleigh.

At this Juncture Quill rose to speak again, He reiterated that the current trials aircraft was in a suitable condition that it could be delivered for flight testing and approval by the A&AEE strait away. Joseph Smith then added that construction drawings which were basically an amalgamation of the original Mark III, the now dormant Griffin engine Mk IV, The PR Mark IV and the Mark V were being completed and finalised as he spoke. Once approval of the aircraft for operational use had been give the Board of Supermarine were confident that the Spitfire Mk III LR could be rolling out of the Eastleigh flight shed in eight to ten weeks. One last thing comment was that if Sir Hugh approved of this proposal then Supermarine would leave it to him as CAS to smooth over what were bound to be some very ruffled feathers in the splendid plumage of the Air Ministry, Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Ministry of Supply.

With that done the Meeting dispersed and Joseph Smith and Jeffry Quill proceeded to take Sir Hugh through the drawings and specifications of the new Mark III LR. After a quick Lunch Sir Hugh was taken down to Eastleigh where Quill showed him around the prototype of the MKIII LR Spitfire explaining the salient points of the modifications before finally demonstrating a take off with a full fuel load.

Sir Max Aitkin was to describe years later that Sir Hugh was walking around the aircraft with a grin worthy of the proverbial Cheshire Cat and had turned to his young aid and enquired if he would like to fly the aircraft and give Sir Hugh his honest opinion of the aircraft. Jeffery Quill had suggested that Max Aitkin first fly the test aircraft with the rear fuel tank empty, then Supermarine would half fill the aft tank and then finally Max would take off and fly with a full rear tank. After a quick run through of the ‘bells and whistle’ in the cockpit and wearing borrowed flying kit Max was off. For the full hour these test flights took Sir Hugh was keenly observing all that was happening and asking questions of the assorted workers busy in the flight test hanger. Sir Hugh’s genuine interest in what these people had to say and his deep technical knowledge of aircraft design and the fact that his questions were informed and required thoughtful answers left a marked impression on many who spoke with him at the time.

One other very important point to come out of this meeting was that as this version was going to be first sent to the middle east it needed to be further modified to take the necessary special filters and other tropicalised equipment from the start. With that in mind Supermarine were going to start modifying the remain Mk III test aircraft to that standard as if a further test aircraft was required for the MK V program taking an already completed Mk III LR would be easier. Subsequently the Tropical version of the MkIII LR was given a separate mark number as the Mk VIII as the Mark numbers VI and VII had already been allocated to the high altitude Mk II and III already ordered and in produced or being completed at Eastleigh

Once he had completed his familiarisation flights in the special Mark III long range development fighter Max Aitkin walked over to Sir Hugh and when asked what he thought his response was marked by all who heard it as Max Aitkin simply requested to be given Command of the first squadron to be equipped with the new aircraft. His official write up on the aircraft concluded that the aft shift of the CoG when the sixty six gallon aft tank was full rendered the aircraft unsuited for combat but within acceptable limits under war time conditions for non combat flight. With the tank empty and filled with inert gas then the aircraft handing was virtually indistinguishable from a standard Mark III. Max Aitkin’s report also stated that loss of power on take off would almost invariably result in the loss of aircraft and pilot when using the aft tank whether or not addition external fuel was carried. Again this was an acceptable risk in time of war that would not necessarily be countenanced under peacetime constraints.

As Sir Hugh headed back to London and a meeting with Sir Peter, Sir Hugh was aware that the fight to get this new variant of the Mark III into service was only just begging. As long as they could get Churchill to back it then Sir Hugh was confidant that by the end of the summer Spitfires would be flying all the way to the Middle East via Gibraltar and possibly even further than that.

 

[PMN1]

For info, the RAF museum will be doing a crowdcast presentation on the 25th June at 12.30 titled 'The controversy and cost of Rhubarb sorties'

The controversy and cost of Rhubarb sorties - Crowdcast

RAF Museum Archivist Gary Haines explores the controversy and the cost of the RAF’s ‘Rhubarb’ sorties

www.crowdcast.io

RAF Museum Archivist Gary Haines explores the controversy and the cost of the RAF’s ‘Rhubarb’ sorties
Circumstances permitting, this lecture will be live-streamed from the RAF Museum, London.
This free lecture is part of the RAF Museum's Research Lecture Programme. If you'd like to support the RAF Museum, you can make a donation at: https://support.rafmuseum.org/Donate-Now

TALK OUTLINE
On 12 January 1941 Willie McKnight a 21 year old Canadian Ace with 17 confirmed victories was shot down while strafing troops on the ground in trenches near the beaches of Gravelines in Northern France. This followed a successful attack on an E boat as part of a Rhubarb operation.

Unlike the defensive fighter operations of the Battle of Britain, ‘Rhubarbs’ were offensive operations, designed to harass the enemy, target key areas and disrupt Germany’s infrastructure in occupied territories. The plan to fly in bad weather with poor visibility was conceived with the thought that it would reduce the chance of enemy fighter interception. However, there was the ever-present danger of anti-aircraft fire and the cost paid in terms of aircraft and experienced pilots was high.

The first Rhubarb patrol took place on the 20 December 1940 and between this date and 13 June 1941, MRAF Sir Sholoto Douglas recalled that 149 Rhubarb patrols were launched. This involved some 336 sorties and argues that these patrols gave ‘valuable experience alike for pilots, operational commanders, and the staffs of the formations-concerned’. It is then admitted that in these sorties seven enemy aircraft were destroyed for the loss of eight RAF pilots.

This paper will look at the organisation and planning of this controversial strategy and the personal cost via an examination of the RAF Museum’s archives and memoirs of those who took part.

In theory, this will also be available to watch again later.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12.23 Good luck or bad luck.



The young pilot was sitting up in bed, his eyes bandaged and the bruising around his temple, nose and face still a lurid multicoloured display. He had been back in the base hospital at Benghazi for two weeks now and he had only regained consciousness for half that time. The trouble was his eyes, he was still blind, to say he was scared that the doctors were not telling him the truth when they claimed that as the swelling of his brain and the tissue around his eyes diminished his eyesight would return was an understatement. As it was he had now been deemed fit enough to be moved back to the better recuperation facilities available in the Nile delta and he was to be flown out the following day.

This morning the Group intelligence officer was coming in to see him. Apparently the higher ups wanted his version of the events that day even though they had had the after action reports from all three of the other pilots.

Having introduced himself the intelligence officer who was actually a Squadron leader and a former barrister asked the young pilot to just talk him through the events of that day as he took notes. When the pilot had finished, a few questions were asked and then the officer stated that usually he would ask him to read the statement and then sign it, so due to the circumstance he would simply read the statement back.

‘Flying as wingman to the flight leader he was flying as Red two in a four aircraft flight from Eighty Squadron on the eleventh of February and they were forward based just east of Sirte. The flight leader had taken the four hurricanes in the usual finger four formation at ten thousand feet for a patrol to the west to attack targets of opportunity and continue the domination of the airspace currently enjoyed by the RAF.

Having been airborne for nearly an hour the flight leader had decided to have a look for enemy activity around the village of Buerat some fifty six mile miles west of Sirte and very much in the disputed front line area patrolled by the armoured cars of both sides. Approaching the village from the west at ten thousand feet with the late afternoon sun behind then the flight leader had spotted three enemy aircraft to the east at about three thousand feet below and ahead of them.

Identifying the aircraft as two Me 110’s apparently escorting a lone He 111 bomber the flight leader had radioed his intention of attacking as the situation was advantageous, the flight were to bounce the two Me 110’s and then stay low and head for home avoiding unnecessary trouble as they were quite short on fuel. The flight leader and his number two would take the right hand Me 110 and the other pair consisting of Red Three and Four would take on the left hand Me 110. Having giving his very brief instructions the flight leader had called ‘Tally Ho’ and commenced his diving attack. As Red two, the injured pilot had dropped back slightly to cover his bosses tail. Red three and Four mirroring this manoeuvre to their left.

Coming out of the sun in a classic swooping bounce the young pilot confirmed that his flight leader had opened fire on the right Me110 from above and behind at very short range. Red two had observed cannon shell striking the cockpit and right wing root of the Me110, the end of the burst had missed ahead of the Me 110 and the tracer shells passed close to and just astern on the port side of the He 111. This aircraft had taken violent evasive action rolling and climb to the right strait into Red two’s flight path. Red Two had got of a short burst at the bomber but had to take action to avoid a collision, in doing so he had exposed his fighter to defensive fire from the Me 111 bombers dorsal machine gun. Machine gun bullets had struck the starboard side of the engine cowling and the bullet proof wind screen and at least one had entered the cockpit hitting the instrument panel. The pilot had been showered in shattered glass from the panel and had continued to take evasive action.

On realising that he was no longer being fired at, he had assessed his own condition and then that of his aircraft throttling back and regaining level flight as he did so. Red two was certain that his cannon shells, even in that fleeting burst, had hit the cockpit and fuselage of the He 111. A quick check showed that he had superficial cuts about his face from the shattering of his instruments and that his goggle had protected his eyes from the shards of glass and the shattered Perspex from the starboard side of the cockpit hood. A gentle waggle of the control stick demonstrated that he still had control but the response was a little sluggish. Both his compass and artificial horizon were shattered and useless but most of the other instruments were working and so far both the temperature and pressure seemed to be steady. However there was a real stench of hydraulic oil in the cockpit.’ These events were over in a moment rather than the minutes it took the intelligence officer to read back.

‘Red two had then heard his flight leader calling him on the radio asking him if he was okay and where the hell he thought he was going. Responding that he had taken hits and had lost both compass and AH. Flight had replied by telling him to make a gentle turn to port as he was currently heading south into the unknown depths of the desert. As he turned towards the east in Red two his flight leader had flown an orbit around his Hurricane to assess the damage. Coming back on the radio Flight had confirmed that there was damage on the starboard side of the engine and that there was a thin stream of oil or glycol visible from below the aircraft. Taking station on Red two’s starboard wing his flight leader gave him instruction to guide him back to base and confirmed that Red three and Four were flying top cover above and behind to make sure that they were not attacked.

After what seemed like hours to the young pilot but was in fact just a few minutes the airfield came in sight ahead just inland from the coast road east of Sirte. Even in the short time available the flight leader had told him that they had got both 110’s and the he had definitely damaged the He 111 that had last been seen descending rapidly leaving a trail of smoke as it headed west.

As he approached the airfield the young pilot set the undercarriage lever for down, there was a brief sound but no reassuring pair of green lights to confirm that the wheels where down. In moments the flight leader had confirmed that the starboard undercarriage leg did not look like it was fully down and locked.

Trying to raise it had no effect so Red two had no option but to land and hope it held. Attempting to land the aircraft with as little stress on the starboard undercarriage as possible the young pilot almost made it, but two factors combine to turn his landing into an ugly crash. First, a late afternoon thermal caught the Hurricane with lift as he flared for the landing causing the aircraft to balloon upwards and then, as he tried to correct this, the sink as he came out of the thermal caused him to side slip to starboard collapsing the damage undercarriage as it struck the ground, resulting in the aircraft cart wheeling into a mess of wreckage.

The rescue crew had pulled him unconscious from the remains of the cockpit with severe facial injuries where he had appeared to strike the gun sight with his head.

After initial treatment at the airfield he had been flown back to Benghazi where he had remained unconscious for days.

Having got the pilot to confirm that the details were correct the Squadron Leader finished by reading the last paragraph that stated.

'This report was dictated by Flying Officer Roald Dahl on the fifth of March Nineteen Forty One.'

As the intelligence officer rose to leave, the injured pilot asked the if he was in trouble for pranging his Hurricane, The squadron leader turned and said “No you are not in trouble, far from it. I am not meant to tell you this but not only did that He111 crash land after you hit it but apparently there was some German General called Rommel on board who was seriously injured. You might well get a gong for this.”

 

[sonofpegasus]

12.24 Tornado and the wings of change

With the Monarch engine Tornado now entering service Sydney Camm and the Hawker design team could devote more time to other projects. Two were currently in progress and would benefit from more resources.

First there was the radial engines version of the Tornado, a prototype of this was already flying with an eighteen cylinder, fifty four and a quarter litre Alvis Alcides engine current capable of delivering just over two thousand horse power. Alvis were predicting a power output of around two thousand two hundred and fifty horse power by the end of nineteen forty one and even more horse power with better high altitude performance when the two speed two stage supercharger version was ready for production.

Comparative handling trials between the standard Tornado aircraft with counter rotating propellers and the single propeller on the Alvis engine version were ongoing at the A&A.E.E.

As there was some consideration that the current Tornado was potentially over powered by the two thousand four hundred horse power that the H twenty four Monarch engine could produce and that this engine was heavier than needed for the aircraft there was a case to be made for a lighter radial engine that was achieving sufficient power that there would be little performance lost in terms of climb and speed and possibly more agility in combat manoeuvres.

The rational in the Ministry of Aircraft Production was that with production capacity for the Fairy engine already close to the theoretical maximum, then having an alternative engine was a prudent development. Initial trials with the Alcides were showing that the combination would work very well once the marriage of the airframe and engine had matured.

Currently the exhaust system, oil cooler and the cowling of the engine was causing problems but already the aircraft was almost matching the performance of the Tornado. The decision had been made that this aircraft was sufficiently different from the Tornado to deserve its own name and was now being called the Typhoon I, the Typhoon II would be the Bristol Centaurus engine version which at the moment was delayed by the inability of Bristol Aircraft to deliver a reliable production standard Centaurus engine. Moves to shut down the Centaurus engine project completely so that Bristol could concentrate on both increasing the reliability and production volume of the Hercules had resulted in loud howls of indignation from the Bristol Board and more political pressure, the result of this was that the Bristol company had been given time and resources to work on perfecting the Centaurus engine but with a real time scale and targets to meet.

However a production standard Centaurus was not now due at Hawkers till at least late nineteen forty one.

With the Typhoon one flying with the Alcides engine, development work was in hand to refine the aircraft to the point where it could enter series production as a viable alternative to the Tornado.

The problem for Hawkers and the Ministry of Aircraft Production was find production capacity for another aircraft.

The other project currently Occupying Sydney Camm was what was known as the thin wing fighter project.

Having accepted that the inherent high drag of the ‘thick’ wing as used on the Hurricane, Tornado and Typhoon severely limited both their speed and range this project was looking at designing a new aircraft that basically used as much of the existing production design as possible but married it to a new thinner wing of higher performance potential. The effort here was being concentrated on the Radial engine aircraft as these were considered to require less modification than the Tornado would require to achieve the desired for improvements. Wind tunnel testing had shown that without major redesign of the cooling system on the Tornado the thin wing would not have as much effect on performance as required. To move the chin radiator down to an aft ventral position would require an almost new fuselage design so Sydney Camm and his team were looking for an alternative location for the radiators that did not add crippling levels of drag to the aircraft. At the current time Hawkers’ were working towards having the first thin wing Tempest flying by late summer of Nineteen forty one.

Another reason for the emphasis on getting the radial engine aircraft design completed first was that in the opinion of the AM the planned Monarch engine thin wing Tornado did not offer any advantage over the Martin Baker MB 4 aircraft that was already being test flown and being prepared for production.

Reducing the drag and increasing the general efficiency had become an important part of all the future fighter project after the Tornado/Typhoon for all manufactures, one reason for this was not just the search for higher speeds but also the new requirement for longer range and endurance. The first new fighter to really exemplify these traits would be the Martin Baker MB 3, 4, and 5 which all used the same low drag wing profile and a very low drag cooling system. When the Monarch powered MB 4 entered service as planned at the end of nineteen forty one it would have a range even greater than that of the Spitfire Mark V that was planned to enter service at around the same time. Two prototypes of the MB4 had been built and the visual difference between them was stark. The first was some two feet shorter than the second, also the second prototype had the cockpit moved some three and a half feet further forward. The other striking change was the removal of the dorsal spine and the fitting of a bubble style canopy reminiscent of the canopy fitted to the MB2 aircraft. This increase in overall length encompassed not just the additional fuselage section but a larger fin and rudder these modifications were made to resolve lateral and longitudinal stability problems experience with the original short fuselage prototype. Valentine Baker as the head test pilot had been very pleased with the results of these changes and the efforts to harmonise the controls and give the big fighter as much agility as possible. Keeping control loads within those that an average pilot could cope with under combat conditions required not only a lot of test flying but an increased theoretical knowledge of how those forces were generated. All this was of course time consuming and Martin Baker had a reputation as a ‘perfectionist’ so both the AM and the MAP were keeping a tight rein on him to ensure that the start of production of the aircraft did not get delayed excessively.

What was truly remarkable about the second MB4 prototype was that it was fundamentally structurally virtually un altered from the first aircraft. That was due to the modular construction form adopted by John Martin in that adding an extra half bay into the tail appendage and moving the cockpit forward was as simple as swapping two fuselage bay assemblies around and adding an extra half bay. As for the removal of the dorsal spine that was achieved by simply applying different semi monoque panels to the base structure. In stark contrast to achieve the same for the Mark V Spitfire was necessitating a totally revised design for the rear fuselage and a complete set of new jigs for its production.

With all the modifications the third prototype MB Type Four was now flying in a full RAF operational configuration. The second prototype MB Type Four was also being brought up to this standard whilst the first prototype aircraft was being kept with its original shorter fuselage and dorsal spine to provide comparative data.

At the current time the Aircraft Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down where flying trials with , Spitfire Mark III’S, Spitfire MarkIII/ER, Spitfire PR Mark IV’s and Tornado production aircraft with additionally the Martin Baker Type Four. Comparative testing of these four aircraft against the latest mark of ME 109 captured and a Follond Falcon mark two from the FAA were ongoing. Tests to accurately record the average miles per gallon flown for each aircraft flown under varying load conditions were consuming a lot of flight hours. With the new aircraft, their behaviour under various fuel loading and the consequent shift in the CoG and its effect on the aircraft handling was providing base line parameters that could be used in setting the operational criteria for the aircraft. One result that had become very obvious early in the trials was that both the Tornado and the MB Type Four gained an advantage as their fuel was consumed as for long range economical cruising they had the ability to completely shut down half of the engine and have the remaining engine running at optimum boost and fuel mixture for the altitude. What was also immediately apparent was the increase in cruising speed for any throttle setting of the MB Type Four over the other aircraft. This was reflected in the data that showed that the MB Type Four was not only cruising some thirty miles an hour faster than the Spitfire Mark III but was also doing so whilst achieving comparable miles per gallon flown with an engine of almost double the cubic capacity of the Merlin used in the Spitfire, albeit this was achieved with half the Monarch shut down, so using a comparable engine displacement.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Aircraft of the PAM. Hawker Tornado I

Using the 2400HP Version of the H24 Fairy Monarch engine the early production Tornado had a wingspan of Forty two feet, with the larger tail, the length had grown from the original thirty two feet and ten inches to thirty three feet and four inches height to the tip of the counter rotating propeller was fourteen feet.

Performance, top speed at twenty three thousand feet was four hundred and four mile an hour.

With the flaps down stalling speed was sixty one miles an hour and clean the aircraft stalling speed rose to eighty two miles an hour.

Empty weight stood at eight thousand five hundred pounds whilst fully loaded this figure rose to just under eleven thousand pounds though this figure would increase as the A& AEE, carried out more weapons trials on the aircraft and new equipment was fitted.

The operational ceiling was thirty five thousand feet though at this height the controls were sloppy and handling sluggish. Depending on fuel state and load the aircraft could gain around three and a half thousand feet a minute.

Hawker Typhoon Prototypes.



Early version with Bristol Centaurus engine with collector ring exhaust and solid spine behind cockpit.

No armament fitted at this time.

Alvis engine Tornado which was now renamed Typhoon, with ejector exhaust system and cockpit hood arrangement. New cowling with oil cooler at bottom.

This picture below clearly shows the mounting of six heavy Mg’s in each wing. This was trialled as an alternative to the four 20mm cannon arrangement but never saw service.

The location of the oil cooler radiator in a modified chin fitting is visible here. As is the slight crank in the wing.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12 25 Mad March, begins



As March started the situation in East Africa was improving the southern thrust by the East Africa, Southern force starting from Kenya, consisting of the First South African division, with Brigade units from Rhodesia, East Africa and the Gold Coast attached had. Captured the Port of Kismayu and it was receiving supply convoys by twenty first of February. Mogadishu captured on February twenty fifth with its port easing the supply position even more. With the capture of Mogadishu the Southern force were now to head north on the long road to Addis Abada. To shorten the supply line that this advance would entail the British prepared a sea landing at Berbera in British Somaliland, This would be staged from Aden from where the landing would receive constant air support.

In the Sudan the Northern force consisting of the Fourth and Fifth Indian divisions were also making good progress as they advanced. General Wavell was pushing hard to get this campaign concluded as rapidly as possible to free up troops for operations in other theatres. Two lines of advance were approaching the all important port of Massawa on the Red sea. The Indian divisions from the west and a further force staging out of port Sudan coming down the coast. Frequent bombing of the Italian navy in Massawa had reduced the force there to virtual stagnation. Once again this campaign was dominated by logistics and airfields as much as the set piece battles. Persuading the French in Djibouti to declare for the Allies in mid March was a political triumph for the British much aided by the constant domination of the airspace by both British bombers and fighters. The establishment of advanced air fields near the city did much to hasten the defeat of the Italian forces in both British Somaliland and Eitrea.

The domination of the air space in East Africa by the RAF and the SAAF was much facilitated by the severing of the route by which Italian aircraft were getting from Tripoli to Italian East Africa. This was done by the capture and occupation of the airfield at Oweinat also known as Ain Doua situated some two hundred miles south east of Kufra oasis in the corner where the borders of Egypt, Sudan and Libya met at Mount Uwaynat or Gabal El Uweinat massive depending on who was asked. This had been the last refuelling stop on the Italian Trans Saharan flight route to the Sudan and Italian East Africa. Visited by Ralph Alger Bagnold in the interwar period it was considered important enough for the LRDG and to the Italians that it was taken over and occupied by the Allies in late 1940. It possessed a rocky firm landing ground comprising a square a thousand yards on each side and had the benefit of water from an oasis in the wadis of the mountain massive. Being three hundred and fifty miles due west of the British bases at Wadi Halfa made it a strategically import base for controlling the southern Sahara desert.



With the collapse of the Italian defence of Amba Alagi and its surrender by the Duke of Acosta in late march, once the mountain stronghold had been surrounded by allied troops and subjected to a continued bombardment by the RAF and SAAF the major campaign in east Africa drew to a conclusion. Though some Italian units would continue a guerrilla campaign until nineteen forty three.

With the final clearance of Italian naval forces from the Red Sea President Roosevelt of America was able to remove the restriction on American ships from entering what had been previously declared a war zone.

By mid April all the ports were functioning and the railway line from Masawa to Addia Aada was once again hauling supplies up to the city from the coast.

The conclusion of this campaign enable the Indian and south African division to be reassigned to other areas. Also the SAAF and RAF squadrons could be relieved, refitted and sent elsewhere. With the events unfolding in the North these forces were sorely needed.

Just as Italian East Africa had been subdued two more areas of conflict erupted, in the north, Vichy controlled Syria was now being used as a staging post for Luftwaffe air attacks and this breach of the somewhat one sided neutrality of the Vichy regime was all the reason the allies required to justify invading Syria and liberating it from Vichy control. These aircraft were over flying Iraq in order to attack allied shipping and over targets. As a response to this a SAAF OTU was transferred from Nairobi to the large British airbase at Habbaniya just a few miles from Bagdad. Habbaniya was a flight some five hundred miles from the air bases in Palestine and three hundred from those in the Persian Gulf. Here again the sheer distance from the nearest other major air bases show some of the problems with supporting such an outpost, even one as large and well equipped as Habbaniya entailed. Support for the SAAF OTU was initially flown in, The Iraqi authorities were showing a belligerence stance and obstructing overland resupply in defiance of the terms of the treaty with Britain. One purpose of sending modern fighters was as a gentle reminder of the possible consequences if such actions escalated. In accordance with the treaty Terms the British Government had informed the Government in Bagdad that in accordance with the treaty a contingent of British and Commonwealth troops would be landed at Basra and passed up the agreed line of communication to the base at Habbaniya in early April.

By these measures in march Wavell and the British diplomats hoped to nip in the bud any plot against the pro-British Regent Abdulla Illah. The troops to be sent to Iraq were some of those released from East Africa that had been slated to return to India in order to provide a core of battle hardened veterans for new formations being raised there.



With the capture of Cyrenaica the Sarah desert to the south had become both a liability and an opportunity. Since the early days after the declaration of war by Italy in the summer of nineteen forty a specialised allied unit known as the Long Range Desert Patrol had been exploring and policing this vast empty area. In January a major expedition had left the Nile with the intention of establishing not only a permanent bases deep in the southern desert but to link up with French forces from Chad who wished to join the allies.
The air support and resupply systems developed for and During Operation Compass were to be fully exploited in this foray. The target of this operation was the Oasis at Murzuk, it’s air landing fields and the nearby garrison fort at Traghen, nearby being relative where distances are measured in hundreds of miles. The operation was a complete success with the occupation of the Oasis at Murzak and the capture of the airfield which was immediately used to fly in supplies and to fly out the captured Italian garrison.
Once the capture was confirmed a major supply convoy of trucks and equipment set out from Cairo on the four week trek across the dessert to deliver heavy supplies and the lorries themselves that could not be flown in. Meanwhile the LRDG had been joined at Murzuk by a free French contingent from Chad under the command of Colonel Jacques Lelerc . Their knowledge of the terrain to the south of the Sarah was of great importance to the RAF who were, amongst other possibilities looking at the viability of sending aircraft north from the Takoradi ferry route directly to Cyrenaica. Departure from the established ferry route would be from Maiduguri in northern Nigeria via Tummo thence to Murzuk. To further explore the route to the south elements of the LRDG drove south to Tummo from Murzuk and then with the aid of French guides south east around the Tibesti Mountains before reconnoitring and traversing a vast area of southern Libya , northern Sudan and southern Egypt looking for suitable landing grounds before ending their epic journey by following the Nile to Cairo. The viability of the short cut north for the air ferry and air transport route was limited as yet by the lack of a viable landing and refuelling stop on the six hundred mile trans Saharan section north of Murzuk. To the south east it was a flight of over six hundred miles over the Rabiana sand sea to reach the captured airfield at a Oweinat .

The reason that this effort was expended was twofold. One was to explore and ultimately protect the southern flank of the British and Commonwealth forces in Cyrenaica and the second was to encourage the French colonial powers in Chad and other territories of the southern Sarah to formal join the Free French Government in exile.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12. 26 logistics and command again

Getting more aircraft and getting them quicker was in Longmore’s view a crucial factor in maintaining any advantage the RAF had gained in the air war. To this end since the appointment of Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS, important strides had been made making Middle East command a more effective fighting force, more and better aircraft were now arriving. The appointment of Air Marshall Tedder as deputy to Longmore had been followed by the important addition of two other senior staff officers to the Middle East Command. The first of these was Air Commodore C.B. Cooke who arrived before Christmas to take up the post of RAF Middle East Chief Maintenance Officer. Cooke found a completely dysfunctional system principally due to there being no separate ‘Maintenance Command’ as there was in Britain. The Repair and Maintenance across the vast Middle East command was just one part of the huge task heaped on Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Maud as the Air Officer Administration based in Cairo.
Air Commodore Cooke had reported back to London that the whole organisation for maintenance in the Middle East needed to be torn apart, separated from the established command hierarchy and rebuilt as an independent command. This in itself was a huge undertaking requiring an officer of unusual talents and powerful presence to achieve. The Officer selected by Dowding with Advice from Tedder was Air Vice Marshal G.G. Dawson who was currently working in the MAP and was well known to both Tedder and Sir Hugh. Arriving in the Middle East at the turn of the new year with carte blanche from the AM and Sir Hugh to do ‘The Necessary’ Air Vice Marshal Dawson had set to his task with vim and vigour.

By the time of Sir Hugh Dowding’s visit in February Dawson’s efforts were already bearing fruit and in the face of established AM policy had appointed himself as Chief Maintenance and Supply Officer independently of the Administration Command. This self appointment had been confirmed by Dowding as CAS ensuring that Dawson had direct access to the AOC-in-C. Air Commodore C.B. Cooke was promoted and given command of a new Group that took control of all the RAF Maintenance Units in the Middle East

By the end of March the fruits of these endeavours were clearly being seen. Some two hundred combat ready Curtis Tomahawk fighters had been passed down the Takardi ferry route by the end of month. This increased supply of aircraft was fundamental in aiding the rapid conclusion of the East African Campaign where the bulk of these fighters went used by the SAAF squadrons at this time.

Elsewhere the build up was slowed by a combination of weather, distance and lack of airfield facilities.

Principal of these was Greece where despite priority de Albiac was unable to deploy more than eleven squadrons due to lack of all weather landing fields and more than half the squadrons were concentrated on airfields in the Athens area. Only with the onset of spring and dryer weather would more airfields closer to the front become available to enable Air Marshal de Albiac to disperse his squadrons.


In a daring attack on shipping in Suda bay Crete on the night of the twenty sixth of March the Regina Marina had a striking success when the RN heavy Cruiser York and the Norwegian tanker Pericles were both badly damaged and were both beached to prevent their total loss. This extremely well executed raid was undertaken by six explosive motor boats that had been launched some ten nautical miles from the harbour by their two parent destroyers. Having crossed the defensive nets the Italians had selected their targets and made their high speed attack. So unexpected was this assault that as both ships were struck and the boats exploded the AA defences commenced a barrage against a supposed air attack. All six of the Italian naval attack party were captured.

This was a very severe blow to the RN, York was a very valuable asset and had been due to sail on the twenty eighth to join the escort of as convoy taking munitions and other supplies to Greece.

The lapse in security and vigilance that enable two Italian Destroyers to approach within ten miles of a major British naval and supply base and then escaped unscathed would be the subject of a court of enquiry as would be the attack it’s self. Having two crippled and vulnerable ships aground in the harbour was certainly going to provide the Axis air forces with a target that they could not ignore. Immediate action was taken to reinforce the fighter protection for the bay by transferring one of the Polish Hurricane squadron to the FAA airfield at Chania. Salvage experts were flown in from Alexandria by Sunderland on the Afternoon of the twenty sixth of March to assess the damage to the two ships and the possibility of salvaging them.

The Sunderland carrying the salvage experts sent from Alexandria landing in Suda bay with the two damaged and grounded ships visible in the background.

The convoy leaving for Athens was due to sail on the evening of the twenty sixth and pass to the East of Crete on the night of the twenty eighth of March. In concert with this ships were scheduled to leave this convoy and run supplies to Heraklion and Suda bay. Other coastal convoys were to take supplies west to Torbruk and Bengahzi. These ships were carrying cargo to heavy or large to be handled by the smaller coastal shipping that was running a continuous shuttle up and down the coast. All these shipping movements required airborne assets to provide protective cover.

All the airfields on Crete were brought to a high state of readiness in anticipation that the damaged ships in Suda bay would be a target the Axis could not ignore and also the sailing of the convoy to Piraeus would be well known to the Axis via their intelligence assets in Alexandria and Port Said. The biggest advantage the RAF had on Crete was the now complete RDF/GCI network, whilst all the island now had radar coverage and aircraft could be detected at ranges of a hundred miles plus from the northern coast, on the island itself there were still gaps in the observation service caused by both the terrain and the lack of communications infrastructure then existing on Crete.

 

[sonofpegasus]

12 27. The battle of Cape Matapan



On the twenty seventh of march a powerful Italian fleet of one Battleship, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and ten destroyers consisting of most of the operational major units of the Regina Marina remaining after the attack on Taranto had sailed and were making a sortie South of Crete to attempt to intercept a British convoy on March twenty eighth and bring to battle what was thought to be by the Italians the only RN battleship available in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not only was the Italian intelligence faulty, the RN had three battle ships and a fleet carrier available but unknown to the Italians their mission was compromised even before they set sail.

The RN had been warned by an Ultra intelligence coup (the breaking of Italian naval Codes by Bletchley Park) of exactly what the Regina marina was planning and had made their own plans to bring the Italians to battle. Elaborate subterfuge by the RN took place in Alexandria to gull the local enemy espionage network into being confident that Admiral Cunningham had no intention of taking his fleet to sea at that time. To help protect the secret of Ultra a Sunderland was dispatched from Crete at first light on March twenty seventh to search west of Crete. At noon the Sunderland’s crew spotted the Italian fleet and duly reported the Italians fleets position course and speed , this radio traffic and the presence of the flying boat was of course duly noted by the Italians.

Also on the morning of the twenty seventh the RN cruisers Gloucester, Orion and Ajax with HMAS Perth and attached destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell had sailed south from Greece to pass to the west of Crete before heading for a rendezvous with Admiral Cunningham with the battle ships Warspite, Valiant and Barham, accompanied by the fleet carrier Formidable and two flotillas of destroyers.

At six thirty on the twenty eighth of March an Italian float plane launched from the battle ship Vittorio Venito spotted the RN cruisers to the south of Crete and four of the Italian heavy cruisers set off in pursuit. Carrying out his task to lure the Italians into range of Cunningham’s Force Vice-Admiral Prideham –Whippel led the Italians cruisers in a high speed stern chase for over an hour south of the Island of Gavados. The Italian Cruisers expend several hundred rounds of ammunition in a fruitless attempt to hit and slow the RN Cruisers . After an hour of consuming vast amounts of fuel the Italians conclude that the stern chase was futile and reversed their course in an attempt to lead the RN cruisers into range of their own battle ship and accompanying heavy cruisers.

The Italians achieved this and at eleven o’clock the battleship Vittorio Venito opened fire at long range on the onrushing British ships. Engaging at ranges from twelve and a half to eleven nautical miles the battleships fire was ineffectual mainly due to excessive dispersion and a misfire rate of around ten percent. As this phase of the engagement took place a flight of FAA Falcons dispatched from Chania arrived over the Italian fleet and promptly shot down the battle ships IMAM Ro 3 float plane and one of two Ju 88’s that were flying as escort, the second Ju 88 departed hurriedly with one engine on fire and little chance of making a safe landfall.

With their air escort dispatched the Italian fleet was now to be on the receiving end of a carefully coordinated series of air attacks from both the fleet carrier Formidable and the FAA and RAF aircraft based on Crete. The mode of this attack had been pre-planned between the FAA and the RAF, all of the pilots had had a chance to rehearse and understand their roles in it.

The first attack was by six albacore monoplane torpedo bombers from HMS Formidable’s 826 squadron, this was an opportunistic attack taken as the Italian battle ship and cruisers were engaging Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell’s force. Though none of the six torpedoes struck the battle ship the necessity to manoeuvre to avoid the attack was a factor in persuading the Italian admiral to disengage and turn for Taranto and the safety of air cover. One of the escorting heavy Cruisers was hit by a single torpedo but the Bolzano was able to proceed at a reduced speed.

Around three o’clock the major co-ordinate air attack was made when a full squadron of Polish Wellingtons carried out a high level bombing attack on the Italian fleet. Well aware that the chance of obtaining a crippling hit were slight, that was not the primary objective of the bombers, which was to mask an attack by a further eight Albacores by 828 Squadron from Formidable. The ruse was highly successful, aided by the strafing of the Italian cruisers and destroyers by two flights of FAA Falcons from Chania to further distract the AA gunners on the Italian ships. For the loss of one Albacore and a Falcon that had to make a crash landing in southern Crete plus flak damage to a couple of the Polish Wellingtons, three torpedo hits were achieved. One completely demolished the bow and bridge of an Italian destroyer, Emanuela Pasagro. No one will ever know if she just got in the way or her captain deliberately took the hit, as she was steaming at high speed the destroyer simply drove herself under sinking almost instantly leaving few survivors.

The other two hits were both on the Vittorio Venito as intended. The most damaging hit struck the Vittorio Veneto on the port outer propeller, the ship immediately slowed and was struck by another torpedo forward this caused more flooding forward of A turret. The Battleship slowed to a stop whilst the damage was assessed and emergency repairs undertaken. Finally at four O’clock Vittorio Veneto was able to get under way again however with some four thousand tons of flooding aft and a further five hundred tons forward the ship could only work slowly up to about fifteen knots. The Italians were not going to be given much rest. With news that the Italian battle ship was stationary Cunningham was closing the distance with his fleet as fast as possible with the hope of fighting a decisive action.

Before dark a third air attack was made this time it consisted of a dozen Albacores from the FAA squadron 815 base at Chanai escorted by two squadrons of Polish Hurricanes and two flights of FAA Falcons. The attack commenced at six Pm with the Italian heavy and light cruisers surrounding the damaged battleship and making smoke. This exercise was some what counter productive as the smoke made it difficult for the light AA to identify and engage the low flying torpedo aircraft. Just as the Albacores turned in for a classic hammer and anvil style attack centred on the damaged battleship events took an unexpected turn for the Italians as suddenly all sixteen hurricanes nosed over into a forty five degree dive with each flight concentring on a different heavy cruiser or light cruiser. Flattening their dives slightly as they entered cannon range the Polish fighters started strafing the cruisers and to the total shock of the Italian naval crews each fighter unleashed a salvo of eight sixty pound rockets. Each aircraft was delivering a weight of fire equal to a broadside from a RN light cruiser. With sixty four rockets fired at four different ships the effect was devastating, not so much in the damage caused, though crew casualties were significant but in the total shock and confusion caused by the sudden onslaught.

The heavy Cruisers Fiume and Pola almost collided causing Pola to lose way, almost stationary she was left crippled by a single torpedo that wrecked her boiler rooms leaving her without power and dead in the water. Fiume was hit by several rockets with damage to her bridge and the destruction of several AA guns. The light cruiser Guiseppe Garabaldi took at hit from a torpedo right aft that wrecked her screws and steering gear rendering her unmanageable. The other light cruiser Ducca degli Abruzzi suffered only slight damage to her topside from a couple of rockets though again these did cause considerable casualties on deck. Triest had taken a single torpedo forward and could steam at twenty knots only. For the loss of another Albacore and its crew plus a Polish Hurricane and its pilot the Italian fleet had been left in complete disarray, the aircraft also reported that the Battleship had received no further damage and was still making fifteen knots to the north west.

By seven thirty Pm some sort of order had been restored. Fume and Zara were standing by Pola as frantic efforts were made to get her underway. The Light cruiser Guiseppe Garabaldi was in a similar situation and was assessed as requiring a tow if she was to be saved. The Heavy cruiser Trento was standing by with instructions to take the crew off the light cruisers and scuttle her if a tow proved impractical. All of this took time for Admiral Iachino to sort out as he continued to steam towards Taranto. Issuing instruction to leave the five heavy cruisers behind with a half dozen destroyers, Admiral Iachino ordered the rest of the fleet to withdraw guarding his battered flag ship now barely capable of exceeding fifteen knots for fear of collapsing further bulkheads.

With the skies darkening around them the glow of the still burning fires on some of the Italian warships helping to denote their position, HMS Orion had a radar lock on the stationary Pola by eight Pm. Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell knowing that the Italian warships lacked radar and keeping beyond visual range he continued in pursuit of the Italian Battleship. The captain of Orion continued to plot and report on the Italian heavy cruisers. Working on the times and reports from the air attacks and the position now signalled by Orion Admiral Cunningham had to make decisions his three Battleships were steaming at their maximum speed of twenty three knots. From the plot it was calculated that it would take at least hour before they could engage the Italian Cruisers if they did not get under way and continued to mill around the two stationary casualties. The question was where was the Italian Battleship and how fast was it steaming.

With Orion keeping tabs on the Italian Cruisers by radar Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell had taken his three remaining light cruisers and half his destroyers in pursuit of the Italian battle ship. Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell ships were making thirty knots relying on their superior radar to give them the advantage by locating the Italians before they were spotted themselves. By eight thirty Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell was signalling Cunningham that the Italian Battle ship was still only twenty nautical miles north west of Orion’s position and the Italian battleship was now making only seventeen knots.

Cunningham’s navigator had quickly worked out the figures in his head and informed Cunningham that at their current speed they would not be in gun range of the Italian Battleship in less than four hour to five hours if the Italians did not speed up. That meant an engagement commencing well after midnight by which time the fleet would be far enough west of Crete to be at risk of air attack after dawn. Cunningham had to weigh the advantage of sinking an already crippled Italian Battleship or to destroy as many of the Italian heavy cruisers as possible, to pursue the battleship increased the risk of damage or loss to his force if caught in daylight by the Luftwaffe. With the combined air cover provided by Formidable and the airfields on Crete could Cunningham take the risk. Controversially Cunningham opted for the second option ordering Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell to break off pursuit and turn back towards the Italian Cruisers to form a blocking force.

At nine thirty Pm the three British battle ships were steaming a parallel course to the virtually stationary Italian cruisers. It would later become apparent that the Cruiser Zara was attempting to pass a tow to Pola whilst the Damaged Fiume and Trento were still collecting the last surviving crew from the light cruiser Guiseppe Garabaldi .

Suddenly the night was split by the stab of a search light from the destroyer HMS Geyhound which revealed the Zara. Searchlights snapped on from all three RN battleships from less than four thousand yards exposing all the Italian ships to the combined fire of twenty four fifteen inch guns at what was point blank range. Aft aboard Valiant the young Midshipman Prince Phillip of Greece directed the searchlights under his control to illuminate the damaged Balzano, The ten starboard side four point five inch secondary guns on Valiant them smothered the heavy cruiser in a hail of shot and shell. As they steamed passed, the three battle ships, sunk Fume which blew up spectacularly, wrecked Zara leaving her a blazing hulk, The Balzano had taken two torpedoes from HMS Greyhound even as her upper works had been demolished by the concentrated fire of Valiant’s secondary armament. Two destroyers were also sunk and a further one was engaged and eventually sunk by the British destroyers. The huge advantage in night fighting that radar gave the RN was tonight starkly illustrated. Both the stationary Pola and Giuseppe Garibaldi were struck by torpedoes launch from the destroyers both sinking rapidly.

The Italian heavy cruiser Trento had managed to avoid critical damage in the first few minutes and turned north west in an attempt to make good her escape as the throttles were opened fully and she accelerated towards thirty knots pursued by radar directed shell fire. Across her path laid Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippell’s three light cruisers and three destroyers. With their attention fixed of the calamitous one sided destruction of their fellow ships behind them the first indication of the ambush they had sailed into was the simultaneous illumination of the ship be search lights and the impact of multiple six inch shells closely followed by several salvos of torpedoes. Trento’s fate was sealed and spectacular as her after magazines exploded hastening her sinking.

In moments it seemed the gunfire subsided and the task of rescuing those who could be saved began. In an act of gallantry the captain of the destroyer HMS Greyhound laid the forecastle of his ship against the after quarter of the now burning Balzano rescuing most of her surviving crew.

Ever mindful of the time and the proximity of enemy airfields, Cunningham ordered his capital ships to reverse their course at cruising speed to get south of Crete and into the air cover provide by the islands airfields. Radio messages were sent in the clear on international maritime emergency frequencies informing the Italian authorities of where there might be survivors and giving guarantees that a properly marked hospital ship would not be attacked.

By dawn the Fleet was again approaching the island of Gavdos on route for Alexandria. Effectively the nights action had finished the task started at Taranto and the Italian navy was now a spent force.

Though the Battle of Cape Matapan would feted as a great RN victory all those in high places new that there was a great dept owed to the code breakers who had made it possible and the pilots who pressed their attacks home to slow the enemy and ensure a decisive engagement. Seldom in history had a naval battle been fought where the results were so one sided and the casualties so unevenly distributed. For the loss of half a dozen aircrew and a few minor wounds on a couple of the Destroyers the Italians had lost over two thousand men and a further five hundred plus captured, five heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and four destroyers sunk with much damage to those ships that made it safely back to port. Such is the fortune of war that despite the overwhelming victory Admiral Cunningham was still criticised in some circles for failing to catch and sink the Italian battleship

 

[sonofpegasus]

Chapter 12.28 We need Bombs, Bombs, Bigger Bombs and More Bigger Bombs



Even as they were discussing the supply of bombs for the RAF the meeting was interrupted by the wail of the sirens as yet another Luftwaffe raid disturbed the London night sky.

To Sir Peter this seemed somewhat apt as each raid on Britain gave more data for the scientists to study. The diversity of the people and the disciplines they represented that had been mobilised on behalf of the AM was remarkable. Every aspect of the enemies bombing campaign was being studied and analysed along with the RAF’s own efforts and perceived results. Comparison studies were then taking place and conclusions drawn. All this data and the deductions made from it were then given to the various committees that advised the AM. This particular meeting was of a sub-committee of the Survey of Air Offence and dealt solely with the design and supply of bombs for the RAF.

One thing that had become very evident even in the earliest days of the war was that the bombs specified in peace time actual proved rather ineffective in actual combat conditions. There were two aspects to this that the committee were currently discussing. Firstly on the agenda was the type and size of bombs required by the RAF. The second item was the fusing requirements for the ordinance selected.

Since the outbreak of war a general consensus had been achieved that for the purpose of what could be termed strategic bombing the bombs available to the RAF when the war commenced were too small and ineffectual to achieve the required damage to strategically important targets. Studys of the damage resulting from the Luftwaffe bombing campaign on the United Kingdom since the fall of France served to reinforce this conclusion. Bombs of less than five hundred pounds in weight whilst doing damage were on the whole not causing sufficient destruction to effectively destroy the targets. Small bombs when dropped on airfields and similar targets suffered from a duel inadequacy. If they landed on grass or earth the smaller bombs penetrated to a depth where the relatively small explosive charge carried for the size and weight of bomb resulted in the explosion being so deep that the explosion was to a point smothered resulting in a smaller crater and less surface damage. If a small bomb struck a concrete runway, road or structure then it would frequently fail to penetrate to a depth where its explosive content would cause significant damage or crater.

The research reports ascribed this diminished effectiveness to any bomb under two hundred and fifty pounds in weight and in fact considered that the effectiveness of even the five hundred pound bomb then in use by the RAF was marginal. Whilst a five hundred pound bomb would do considerable damage to urban housing, as shown by the ongoing Blitz attacks by the Luftwaffe, they often failed to do critical damage to major structures such as bridges, viaducts and major industrial plant. The reports had highlighted the significant damage done by the one thousand kilogram ‘Herman’ bombs and the blast damage caused by the thin cased Luftmines that weight either five hundred or one thousand kilograms depending on type.

Another conclusion of note from these reports was the seemingly high proportion of German bombs that failed to detonate. Investigation of recovered fuses had shown that on inspection their quality of design and construction were at least equal if not better than the design and quality of the fuses currently in use by the RAF. Therefore the assumption had to be made that an equal percentage of British fuses were liable to be defective and fail to detonate. As a result of this another committee had been convened to investigate the entire question of how and what was done to produce effective fuses that worked. Both the Army and Navy had representatives on this committee as the correct function of fuses was a problem that afflicted all three services. If the effectiveness and reliability of the fuses used could be raised by as much as a single percent point then for the RAF the effectiveness of missions flown would be increased significantly.

The recommendations being made to the committee were that bombs of less than five hundred pounds should be allocated for tactical bombing and production levels maintained sufficient for that use. Ordinance of five hundred pounds and more would be primarily reserved for strategic targets and bombs in the following categories produce.

1, General purpose bombs, designated as Medium Capacity, where about fifty percent of the weight was the case and fifty percent the explosive content. This case weigt ratio was dictated by the minum mass to ensure that the casing held togetht long enought for a delayed action fuse to activate and denonate the bombs explosive content.

2. Thin cased blast bombs, Designated as High Capacity, where around twenty five percent of the weight was the casing and seventy five percent the explosive filling. Due to the elative fragility of the casing these bombs required instant fuses to be reliable.

3. heavy cased bombs, Designated as Armoured piercing, Where the case comprised around seventy to seventy five percent of the total weight with a commensurately small bursting charge. Her the mass of the case was dictated by the strength abd shape required to penertrate armour of concrete prior to detotanion.

4, Special purpose bombs and ordinance, As yet no bombs in this category have been specified.

5. Incendiaries. These tended to be much lighter individually than purely explosive ordinance and were frequently dropped in clusters. Larger sizes are being investigated

6, Area denial sub-munitions dropped either from the extant ‘small bomb’ carrier or in streamlined free fall casings that could be dropped with greater accuracy from higher altitudes.



As to weight and sizes of bombs, currently these were limited to an extent by the aircraft in service with Bomber Command. Both the Wellington and the Whitley had a maximum bomb load of four thousand pounds which severely limited the size of bombs that they could carry, currently these two aircraft generally carried eight five hundred pound bombs at max load.

The report was suggesting that medium capacity bombs of one thousand, two thousand and four thousand pounds should be developed.

In the high capacity bombs a four thousand pound bomb was entering service, the proposal was for a modular high capacity bomb of four thousand pound weight that could be coupled together to form eight and twelve thousand pound bombs to be dropped by the bigger aircraft now entering service. This modular system could be extended to provide bombs of an even greater gross weight.

Armoured piercing bombs of up to two thousand pound weight were currently in production and after extensive discussions with the Admiralty, who already had a sixteen hundred pound armoured piercing bomb in production for use by their torpedo reconnaissance aircraft, it had been agreed that an experimental design for a four thousand pound armoured piercing bomb should be commenced. The Admiralty were of the opinion that even a single hit from such a bombs would be capable of defeating any known ships deck armour would if not sinking it at least cause crippling damage.

Also being considered by the committee was a proposal from Barnes Wallace, a well known and highly respected aeronautical engineer at Vickers and well known to Sir Hugh Dowding from the R 101 and his bomber designs, for a very heavy medium capacity bomb designed to destroy large targets that would be difficult to destroy with smaller conventional bombs. Suitable targets for this weapon were listed by Barnes Wallace as, bridges, viaducts, canals, dams, dry docks and mines or any other large industrial facility. The bomb was designed to destroy its target not by blowing it up as was the perception of how a bomb normally worked but by utilising two mechanisms that resulted from the bombs large size and deep penetration into the ground. Firstly a bomb blast of that size would cause ground vibrations of an earthquake scale that would literally shake a structure to pieces. The second was by creating what is known as a camouflet, which was an explosively formed underground cavity that then collapses thereby undermining the structure and causing it to collapse. With the simple fact that his proposed bomb had an all up weight of ten tons or twenty two thousand pounds it was easy to understand why the average RAF officer thought the whole idea ‘crackpot’ as there was not a single RAF aircraft yet flying or planned that could carry a bomb of that size and weight, let alone that could attain the altitude of forty five thousand feet which Barnes Wallace calculated was required for the bombs optimum performance.

To achieve this Barnes Wallace had also proposed a six engine ‘Victory’ bomber designed specifically for the dropping of this huge bomb. Due to his work on the R 101 airship and various aircraft including the Wellington Sir Hugh had taken his proposal seriously and had requested a series of design studies for the largest bomb that current aircraft could carry and the smallest bomb that could actually exploit the mechanisms of destruction proposed by Barnes Wallace.

Barnes Wallace had replied via Tizard that the smallest size of bomb practicable for taking advantage of this methodology was around eight thousand pounds and would have an explosive charge of around fifty percent of the total weight and this would have to be the most powerful explosive practical for this application. The largest bomb sizes capable of being carried and dropped at a practical target radius by existing operational aircraft was twelve thousand pounds which could be carried by a modified Stirling. It was also possible that the new big wing Manchester or even the proposed four engine Lancaster could be adapted to carry a bomb of this size.

The AM had therefore formally requested the Ministry of Supply to undertake to find the production resources to construct these new weapons whilst Barnes Wallace developed his designs with the aid of the A & AEE and the Royal Aeronautical Society Engineering Sciences Data Unit. This was in addition to the require expansion in bomb production to keep pace with the increasing usage by an expanding Bomber Command and the other RAF commands as well.

 

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12.29 making Order out of Chaos

As March turned to April O’Conner and Wavell were review the distribution of the forces and their command and the moves needed to renew the advance into Tripolitania. Wilson and the XIII corps staff remain in Cyrenaica. O’Conner had taking some leave with his wife in Palestine before returning to Cairo for discussions with Wavell before recommencing operations against the Italians



The current situation was that, the Seventh armoured division in the Cairo region and had almost completed refitting. Currently this unit would be held in reserve to be brought forward when required or when the refit and training period had been completed.

XIII corps HQ was currently based at Benghazi planning the invasion of Tripolitania. The Military Administrative Headquarters for Cyrenaica was also based in Benghazi.



The sixth Australian division were at Tobruk in early march and were to move up towards Sirte by the month end as they were replaced at Torbruk by the sixth British division. This was a new Division formed from Sixteenth Brigade and garrison troops from Mersa Matruh and Palestine, This division would be used to Garrison Torbruck as its constituent units trained to work as a coherent Divisional unit.

The Ninth Australian division were currently holding the line a Sirte where they would be joined by the Sixth Australian Division as they were relieved at Torbruk.

The Seventh Australian division like the British Sixth Division was completely green and was working up to fighting efficiency. Currently they were located west of Benghazi to provide support and reserves for the other two Australian divisions.

Second Armoured division were also up on the Sirte line. Whist all the three forward Divisions had taken up a defensive stance they were at the same time preparing for a further push towards Tripoli and the Tunisian border.



The New Zealand division of three brigades was being held in reserve in the area of Msus to protect the route across the bottom of the Cyrenaica bulge.

The talks back in Cairo had covered not only the planned advance to capture Tripoli but the action XIII Corps under O’Conner could take if Axis troops retreated into Vichy controlled Tunisia.

With reports of German Panzers moving east from Tripoli and reconnaissance units clashing between Buerat and the allies at Sirte both Wavell and O’Conner considered it imperative that in order to maintain the initiative that operation to advance beyond Sirte should commence in the first week of April.



For the RAF the rapid advance to Benghazi had seemed to create as many problems as it solve. Major Italian air bases were capture at Bardia, Torbruk, Derna, Barce and Benghazi, plus dozens of other airfields, landing grounds and sundry emergency strips. All of the major bases had to secured, cleared of Italian detritus and made operational for allied use. This in itself was a major task especially when doing so in the midst of a rapid advance. March was very much a month of consolidation and re supply. With the RAF now stretched so thinly between Sirte and Egypt two objectives were paramount. Firstly ensure that staging airfields from the new supply base at Buq Buq in Egypt through Cyrenaica to Benghazi and Sirte were established and supplied so that aircraft could be rapidly transferred from Egypt to the West. Secondly to build up the RAF presence and operational bases in the region between Sirte and Benghazi to support the Army and defend the area from Axis attack. The rapid establishment of mobile RAF tracking stations including GCI was fundamental to defending the now critical port of Benghazi from Axis air attack, as was establishing fighter squadrons on the large airfields at Benina north and South. Passive defence measures were as important as the fighter squadrons, the Q service set about making as many of the unoccupied airfields look as if they were active and had been busy with the addition of completely false ones as well. Those airfields that were active were disguised or protected as well as practically possible

Throughout March the air fighting over the port of Benghazi was critical to the success of the build up of supplies and reinforcement on the border with Tripolitania. Here the constant watch and warning provided by the mobile RDF/GCI system was fundamental in the thwarting of the Axis air attacks and acted as a force multiplier for the hard pressed RAF Hurricanes charged with the defence of the port, city and the allied bases in the area. The crucial importance of the RAF’s ability to maintain local air superiority over these vital areas has been emphasised by historians ever since, many describing it along with the defence of Crete as being the two hinges on which the door of Axis aspiration in North Africa was slammed shut, with some adding that Malta was the lock that secured the door!

Inland airfields were not neglected either one of the principle and most strategically important developments being of the two air fields known as Msus one and Msus two. These airfields were on the direct inland route from Torbruk to Beda Fomm being some sixty five miles south East of Benghazi. Msus one was about a mile and a half to the east of Msus Fort with Msus two being a further mile and a half to the south east. By late march both airfields were capable of supporting multiple fighter or bomber squadrons. Administration and store were concentrated at Msus one whilst Msus Two with its two dirt landing strips was principally built to provide surge capacity and redundancy in case Msus one was damaged by enemy action.

This theme of building many duplicate facilities was helped by the fact that in many locations the ground conditions were conducive to the quick provision of simple landing strips by merely clearing off the larger stones. Elsewhere ground condition and topography required major construction effort to provide viable runways and these were only undertaken if essential with no viable alternative. Longmore and his staff were fully aware of how stretched the Middle East Command was and would remain for the foreseeable future and that the maximised effect for the minimum or expended resource was a necessary. This situation would only get worse if and when the Germans invaded Greece.

O’Connor had informed Wavell that by the end of March his divisions would be in a position to take the offensive abut unless supplies, especially of replacement tanks were forthcoming very soon that offensive would stall probably in the foothills of the plateau on the deserts western edge short of Tripoli.